Ülo Ennuste Economics

papers and articles in wordpress

Draft (20.VII 17 – do not quote)

Ennuste, Ülo (2017) Small Nation-State Catastrophic Risks and  Macro Shocks Bayesian Modelling Bibliography from Angle of Academic Macro-Economics and Social-Cybernetics in Post-GDP and Social-Cybernetics Informal Concepts and with Operational Research Kit – for the Retrospective Modelling  of Estonian National inter Generational Evolution in the 1939-1991 Occupations and in  Hybrid War 2007-2017 and for Prospective Long Rrange Optimal Adaptiv Strategy Projection as Member-State of the EU and NATO

This short Bibliography contains … entries, including book reviews (e.g. monographies by Prof R.A. Posner) and publications in the popular literature of Big Authors (e.g. John le Carre and J. M. Coetzee).  Where possible, I have included links to open-access (subscription-free) web versions of the entries and occasionally abstracts (not open-access). I presume that I have overlooked some literature. Please send me any and all suggestions for further entries to existing ones via email: ylo.ennuste@mail.ee (Futher preliminary Intoductory Remarks:  https://uloennuste.wordpress.com/2016/11/18/do-not-quote-18-xi-16/ )

Acemoglu, D.; S. Johnson, J.A. Robinson (2005) „Institutions as the fundamental cause of long-run growth“ In: Aghion, P., Durlauf, S. (Eds.), Handbook of Economic Growth. North-Holland, pp. 385–472.

Ahlerup, Pelle; Gustav Hansson (2011) „Nationalism and government effectiveness“ – Journal of Comparative Economics Volume 39, Issue 3: 431–451.

Akerlof, Georg, Robert Shiller (2015) Phishing for Phools: The Economics of Manipulation and Deception, ISBN: 9781400873265 Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ and Kindle Edition.

Applebaum, A. (2014), ‘War in Europe is not a hysterical idea” The Washington

Post, 29 August 2014. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.

com/opinions/anne-applebaum-war-in-europe-is-not-a-hystericalidea/

2014/08/29/815f29d4-2f93-11e4-bb9b-997ae96fad33_story.html

Alston, L. J. (1996) „Empirical work in institutional economics: an overview“ In: Alston, L.J., Eggertsson, T., North, D.C. (Eds.), Empirical Studies in Institutional Change. Cambridge University Press, pp. 25–30.

Aoki, M. (1996) „Towards a comparative institutional analysis: motivations and some tentative theorizing“  Jpn. Econ. Rev. 47 (1), 1–19.

Aoki, M. (2001) Towards a Comparative Institutional Analysis. MIT Press.

Azrieli, Yaron; Ehud Lehrer (2008) “The value of a stochastic information structure” – Games and Economic Behavior 63 (2008) 679–693.

Barelli, Paulo; John Duggan (2015) „Purification of Bayes Nash equilibrium with correlated types and interdependent payoffs“ –  Games and Economic Behavior 94 (2015) 1–14.

Baum, Seth D. (2009) “Global Catastrophic Risks” (book review). Risk Analysis, vol. 29, no. 1: 155-156:

http://sethbaum.com/ac/2009_Rev-GCR.pdf

Blattman, Christopher; Julian Jamison, Tricia Koroknay-Palicz, Katherine Rodrigues, Margaret Sheridan (2016) „Measuring the measurement error: A method to qualitatively validate survey data“ – Journal of Development Economics 120 (2016) 99–112.

Brada, Josef C., Ali M. Kutan and Goran Vukšić (2009) The Costs of Moving Money across Borders and the Volume of Capital Flight: The Case of Russia and Other CIS Countries.  EMG Working Paper Series, WP-EMG-28-2009.

Bretschneider et al. (1989) “Political and organizational influences on accuracy of forecasting state government revenues” – International Journal of Forecasting 5 307-319.

Brutus, L.; Ü. Ennuste  (1965) Un domaine d´experimentation economique“ – Democratie Nouvelle, Mars, 89 – 94.

BUCHANAN, JOHN; DOMINIC HEESANG CHAI and SIMON DEAKIN (2014) „Empirical analysis of legal institutions and institutional change: multiple-methods approaches and their application to corporate governance research“ – Journal of Institutional Economics / Volume 10 / Issue 01 / March 2014, pp 1-20.

Buchholz, Wolfgang; Michael Sch,⁎ymura (2012) „Expected utility theory and the tyranny of catastrophic risks“ – Ecological Economics 77: 234–239.

Abstract

Expected Utility theory is not only applied to individual choices but also to social decisions, e.g. in cost–benefit

analysis of climate change policymeasures that affect future generations and hence incorporate an ethical dimension.

In this context the crucial question arises whether EU theory is able to deal with “catastrophic risks”, i.e. risks

of high, but very unlikely losses, in an ethically appealing way. In this paper we show that this is not the case.

Rather, if in the framework of EU theory a plausible level of risk aversion is assumed, a “tyranny of catastrophic

risk” (TCR) emerges, i.e. project evaluation is dominated by the catastrophic event. Or, contrary to that, with

low degrees of risk aversion, the catastrophic risk eventually has no impact at all (“negligence of catastrophic

risk” (NCR)) which is ethically not acceptable as well.

© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Grechuk, Bogdan; Michael Zabarankin (2014) „Risk averse decision making under catastrophic risk“ – European Journal of Operational Research 239: 166–176.

A b s t r a c t

A nonstandard probabilistic setting for modeling of the risk of catastrophic events is presented. It allows random variables to take on infinitely large negative values with non-zero probability, which correspond to catastrophic consequences unmeasurable in monetary terms, e.g. loss of human lives. Thanks to this extension, the safety-first principle is proved to be consistent with traditional axioms on a preference relation, such as monotonicity, continuity, and risk aversion. Also, a robust preference relation is

introduced, and an example of a monotone robust preference relation, sensitive to catastrophic events in the sense of Chichilnisky (2002), is provided. The suggested setting is demonstrated in evaluating nuclear power plant projects when the probability of a catastrophe is itself a random variable. _ 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Chang, H.-J. (2011) „Institutions and economic development: theory, policy and history“  J. Inst. Econ. 7 (4), 473–498.

Chichilnisky, Graciela (2010) “The foundations of statistics with black swans” – Mathematical Social Sciences Volume 59 Issue 2: 184-192:

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.09.007Get rights and content

Abstract

We extend the foundation of statistics to integrate rare events that are potentially catastrophic, called black swans.These include natural hazards, regime change in complex systems, market crashes, catastrophic climate change and major episodes of species extinction. Classic statistics and physics treat such events as ‘outliers’ and often disregard them. We propose a new axiomatization of subjective probability requiring equal treatment for rare and frequent events, and characterize the likelihoods or subjective probabilities that the axioms imply. These coincide with countably additive measures and yield normal distributions when the sample has no black swans. When the sample includes black swans, the new likelihoods are represented by a combination of countable and finitely additive measures with both parts present. The axioms were introduced in Chichilnisky (2000, 2002); they extend the axiomatic foundations of Savage (1954)Villegas (1964) and Arrow (1971) and they are valid for bounded and unbounded samples (Chichilnisky, 1996b). The finitely additive measures assign more weight to rare events than do standard distributions and in that sense explain the persistent observation of power laws and ‘heavy tails’ that eludes classic theory.

Coetzee, J. M. and Arabella Kurtz (2015) The Good Story: Exchanges on Truth, Fiction and Psychotherapy. Harvill Sacker, London: 198.

Coetzee, J. M. (2014) The childhood of Jesus. London, Vintage Books: 329. 

Communist Crimes (Polish legal concepts): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communistcrimes_(Polish_legal_concept)

 CommunistCrimes.org: http://www.communistcrimes.org/en/Database/Estonia/Estonia-Communist-Era

Conti, Maurizio; Giovanni Sulis (2016?) „Human capital, employment protection and growth in Europe“ – Journal of Comparative Economics (in Press).

Grechuk, Bogdan; Michael Zabarankin (2014) „Risk averse decision making under catastrophic risk“ – European Journal of Operational Research 239: 166–176.

A b s t r a c t

A nonstandard probabilistic setting for modeling of the risk of catastrophic events is presented. It allows

random variables to take on infinitely large negative values with non-zero probability, which correspond

to catastrophic consequences unmeasurable in monetary terms, e.g. loss of human lives. Thanks to this

extension, the safety-first principle is proved to be consistent with traditional axioms on a preference

relation, such as monotonicity, continuity, and risk aversion. Also, a robust preference relation is

introduced, and an example of a monotone robust preference relation, sensitive to catastrophic events

in the sense of Chichilnisky (2002), is provided. The suggested setting is demonstrated in evaluating

nuclear power plant projects when the probability of a catastrophe is itself a random variable.

_ 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

 

Diamond, Peter; Emmanuel Saez (AUGUST 2011) The Case for a Progressive Tax: From Basic Research to Policy Recommendations. CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 3548 CATEGORY 1: PUBLIC FINANCE: http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/diamond-saezJEP11opttax.pdf

Djankov, Simeon; Elena Nikolova , Jan Zilinsky (2016) „The happiness gap in Eastern Europe“  – Journal of Comparative Economics,

 DOSI, GIOVANNI and LUIGI MARENGO (2015) „The dynamics of organizational structures and performances under diverging distributions of knowledge and different power structures“ – Journal of Institutional Economics, 11, pp 535-559: http://journals.cambridge.org/JOI, IP address: 90.190.39.14 on 10 Jun 2016

EESTI  STATISTIKA  AASTARAAMAT  2016/STATISTICAL YEARBOOK of ESTONIA 2016 (2016) http://www.stat.ee/277639

 The Economist (2014)”The war in Ukraine: reversal of fortune” The Economist

Briefing, 6–12 September 2014, vol. 412, no. 8903, pp 21–24.

The Economist (2016) ”How to measure prosperity”: April 30:

http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21697834-gdp-bad-gauge-material-well-being-time-fresh-approach-how-measure-prosperity

Ennuste, Ülo (1969) “Uncertainty, Information and Decomposition in the Planning of a Production System” – Economics of Planning, 9(3): 258 – 266:

https://springerlink3.metapress.com/content/apt25151401mm553/resource-secured/?target=fulltext.pdf&sid=fvfx4a45bfltmq55fcc0xk55&sh=www.springerlink.com

– – (1989) “Some Models of Stochastic Planning Mechanisms”- Finnish Economic Papers, 2:116-124: http://econpapers.repec.

org/article/fepjournl/v_3a2_3ay_3a 1989_3ai_3a2_3ap_3a116-124.htm

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124.htm

– – (1993) ” An outline for estimating long-term economic damage by means of analogy” –  Eesti TA Toimetised. Humanitaar- ja Sotsiaalteadused, 42, 1, 1-4.

– and Rajasalu, T. (2002) “Critical Probability of the EU Eastern Enlargement Project’s Institutional Failure: Aspects of Calibrated Economic Impacts of the Failure” In: Aksel Kirch and Juhan Sillaste (eds.) Monitoring Preparations of Transition Countries for EU-Accession. 4th International Conference 4-6 October, 2002 Pärnu, Estonia, The Institute for European Studies, Tallinn, 212-227: http://www.ies.ee/iesp/ennuste.pdf

– – (2003) “A Linear Planning Analysis of Institutional Structure in the

Economy”:  Policy Documentation Centre –

http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00001564/01/linear.PDF

– – (2007) “Dual Market-Transition in Estonia 1987-2006: Institutional Mechanism Analysis Approach” In: “EUROPE AFTER HISTORICAL ENLARGEMENT. The Proceedings of 5th Audentes Spring Conference, Apr. 28 2007, Tallinn, 60-126: http://www.ies.ee/iesp/No3/

— (2008a) „Speech“ :

https://uloennuste.wordpress.com/2008/11/09/ulo-ennustes-speech-at-the-inauguration-of-honorary-doctors-of-international-university-audentes-september-26-2007/

– – (2008b) “Synthetic conceptions of implementing mechanisms design for public socio-economic information structure: illustrative Estonian examples”- Socio-Economic and Institutional Environment: Harmonisation in the EU 9–39:

http://www.ies.ee/iesp/No4/Ennuste.pdf

–  – (2014) “ Towards Special Methodological Problems of Macro-Optimal Sociocybernetic International Economic Sanctioning Coordination Modelling: Introductory Remarks oPreliminary Postulates and Conjectures” – Baltic Journal of European Studies Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2228-0588), Vol. 4, No. 2 (17), 150-158:  http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bjes.2014.4.issue-2/bjes-2014-0021/bjes-2014-0021.xml?format=INT

EC (2014), ‘Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 961/2014 of 8

September 2014 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning

restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the

territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine,’ L271,

Official Journal of the EU, 12 September 2014.

The Economist (16.VII 2016) “Econometrics: It is not easy to compare the size of economies – even across the Channel”.

http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21702184-it-not-easy-compare-size-economieseven-across-channel-econometrics

Estonia 1940-1945 (2006) – Estonian International Commission for the Investigation of Crimes Against Humanity, Tallinn: 1337pp.

ETLA (1993) ESTONIA AND FINLAND – A RETROSPECTIVE SOCIOECONOMIC COMPARISON (Edited by Olev Lugus and Pentti Vardia)The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy, Helsinki: 404.

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Eurostat (2014) ‘EU Sanctions against Russia over Ukraine crisis,’ European

Union Newsroom Highlights. Retrieved from http://europa.eu/newsroom/

highlights/special-coverage/eu_sanctions/index_en.htm

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Eurostat (2015) “Quality of Life”: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Quality_of_life_indicators

Eurostat (110/2016 – 6 June 2016) Migrant integration in the EU labour market in 2015:

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/news/news-releases?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_jtJORfNw4amk&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=column-2&p_p_col_count=1&_101_INSTANCE_jtJORfNw4amk_delta=20&_101_INSTANCE_jtJORfNw4amk_keywords=&_101_INSTANCE_jtJORfNw4amk_advancedSearch=false&_101_INSTANCE_jtJORfNw4amk_andOperator=true&p_r_p_564233524_resetCur=false&_101_INSTANCE_jtJORfNw4amk_cur=2

Eurostat (2017) Final report of the expert group on quality of life indicators 2017 edition: 119 (Raportis kahjuks puudub rahvusvaheliste ja rahvustevaheliste konfliktide riskide mõju hindamine elukvaliteedile – seda eriti hübriidsõja tingimustes ning kus intensiivselt kasutatakse riikidevahelisi küberrünnakuid juba aastast 2007 ja isegi võimalikud tuumarünnakud pole täielikult välistatud):

 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-statistical-reports/-/KS-FT-17-004?inheritRedirect=true&redirect=%2Feurostat%2Fpublications%2Fstatistical-reports

Forrester, Jay W. (1998) Designing the FutureUniversidad de Sevilla Sevilla, Spain, December 15, 1998, Copyright © 1998 by Jay W. Forrester, Permission granted for copying and electronic distribution for non-commercial educational purposes.

Fukuyama, Francis (2014) Political order and political decay. FARRAR, STRAUS AND GIROUX,  NY: 658.

 Gagliardi, Francesca (2016) „Institutions and economic change“ – Journal of Comparative Economics 0 0 0 (2016) 1–3  (in Press).

Giegerenzer, Gerd (2014) Risk Savvy. ALLEN LANE: 322.

Gregory, Paul R., Philipp J.H. Schröder, Konstantin Sonin (2011) „Rational dictators and the killing of innocents: Data from Stalin’s archives“ – Journal of Comparative Economics 39 (2011) 34–42.

 HANSEN, BRADLEY A. and MARY ESCHELBACH HANSEN (2016) „The historian’s craft and economics“ – Journal of Institutional Economics / Volume 12 / Issue 02 / June 2016, pp 349-370.

Hansson, Ardo (2016): http://www.eestipank.ee/en/press/symbiosis-economic-policy-and-statistics-important-identifying-crises-says-ardo-hansson-25042016

Hodgson, G. (2007) “Evolutionary and Institutional Economics as the New Mainstream?” – Evolutionary Institutional Economics Review, 4(1): 7-25.

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INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (2006) ESTONIA 1940-1945TALLINN 2006: http://www.historycommission.ee (NB: p1126 ).

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (2009) Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual

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Kahan, Dan M., Asheley Landrum, Katie Carpenter, Laura Helft, Kathleen Hall Jamieson (2017) „Science Curiosity and Political Information Processing“ – Political Psychology“ –  38: 179–199, doi:10.1111/pops.12396, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.12396/epdf

Kasparov, G. (2014) „It’s a War, Stupid!” Times, 30 August 2014: http://time.com/3227869/garry-kasparov-its-a-war-stupid/

Kirch, Aksel; Marika Kirch, Tarmo Tuisk, Hanna-Hulda Reinkort and Aimar Altosaar (2008)Etics, Emics, Estonians and Russians in Contemporary Estonia: Is the Past still Dominating the Present?”

Presentation at IACCP Congress 27-31 July, 2008 Bremen, Germany: Working Papers of the Institute for European Studies International University Audentes No 1:

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Kirch, A., Tuisk, T.; Reinkort, H.- H. (2011). Estonians and Russians in Contemporary Estonia: Is the Past still Dominating the Present? In J. Deutsch, M. Boehnke, U. Kühnen, & K. Boehnke (Eds.), Rendering borders obsolete: Cross-cultural and cultural psychology as an interdisciplinary, multi-method endeavor. Bremen : Jacobs University Bremen : International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology. pp. 106-120.

Kissinger, Henry (2014)  World Order. Allen Lane: 420  (Index  on p 408:  Estonia, Russian cyberattac on  p 345).

Kukk, Kalev (2005) ”Economic DamagesIn: The White Book: Losses Inflicted on the Estonian Nation by Occupation Regimes 1940–1991, State Committee on the Investigation into Repression Policy of Occupation, Tallinn, Estonian Encyclopaedia Publishers:141-171:    http://www.digar.ee/arhiiv/nlib-digar:8192

KUNČIČ, ALJAŽ (2014) „Institutional quality dataset“ –  Journal of Institutional Economics / Volume 10 / Issue 01 / March 2014, pp 135-161:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1744137413000192 (About DOI

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Experimentations Implementing Monotone Systems Theory in Bargaining Games, Data

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Parr, Nick and Ross Guest (2014) „A Method for Socially Evaluating the Effects of Long-Run Demographic Paths on Living Standards“ – Demographic Research, Volume 31 275-318.

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Posner, Richard A. (2006) “Efficient responses to catastrophic risk” –  Chicago Journal of International Law, vol. 6, no. 2, pages 511-526.

Rahi-Tamm, Aigi (2005) “Human LossesIn:  The White Book: Losses Inflicted on the Estonian Nation by Occupation Regimes 1940–1991”, State Committee on the Investigation into Repression Policy of Occupation, Tallinn 2005: Estonian Encyclopaedia Publishers:25-48:

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Rajasalu, Teet (2003) “Indicators of economic freedom and economic structure as determinants of growth and convergence in enlarging EU and priorities for Estonia”:  In: Essays in Estonian transformation economics, 2003, Tallinn: 9-32.

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Resiliency Authors (2016)“Making the Eurozone more resilient: What is needed now and what can wait?“:

http://voxeu.org/article/making-eurozone-more-resilient-what-needed-now-and-what-can-wait#

Russ, Meir (2016) „The probable foundations of sustainabilism: Information, energy and entropy based definition of capital, Homo Sustainabiliticus and the need for a “new gold” – Ecological Economics 130: 328–338.

A b s t r a c t

this conceptual, interdisciplinary paper will start with an introduction to the new-networked knowledge-based global economy and the importance of intellectual and, specifically, human, capital. Next, an advanced definition of human and other forms of capital using information, energy and entropy will be introduced. This will be followed by a discussion of the premises framing the study of economics and will focus on the role of law in the economy. Afterwards, the paper will suggest the addition of a new model of humans that should serve as the base for the concept of law, the homo sustainabiliticus. Ensuing this discussion and consistent with the newly proposed definition of capital, a proposal for a new currency (“new gold”) will be offered. This proposal suggests viewing usable, renewable energy, knowledge and data as the most important assets for the 21st century

and is seen as the building block for the new sustainabilistic economy.

© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Ecological Economics: This paper builds on and significantly enhances a chapter by Russ, M. (2014b).

E-mail address: russm@uwgb.edu.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.07.013

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https://www.google.ee/search?q=martensctre%20eu%20publications%20bear%20sheeps%20clothing%20russias%20government%20funded%20organisations 

Shao, Jia; Apostolos D. Papaioannou, Athanasios A. Pantelous (2017) „Pricing and simulating catastrophe risk bonds in a Markov-dependent environment“:

A b s t r a c t

At present, insurance companies are seeking more adequate liquidity funds to cover the insured property losses related to natural and manmade disasters. Past experience shows that the losses caused by catastrophic events, such as earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, or hurricanes, are extremely high. An alternative method for covering these extreme losses is to transfer part of the risk to the financial markets by issuing catastrophe-linked bonds. In this paper, we propose a contingent claim model for pricing catastrophe risk bonds (CAT bonds). First, using a two-dimensional semi-Markov process, we derive analytical bond pricing formulae in a stochastic interest rate environment with aggregate claims that follow compound forms, where the claim inter-arrival times are dependent on the claim sizes. Furthermore, we obtain explicit CAT bond prices formulae in terms of four different payofffunctions. Next, we estimate and calibrate the parameters of the pricing models us- ing catastrophe loss data provided by Property Claim Services from 1985 to 2013. Finally, we use Monte Carlo simulations to analyse the numerical results obtained with the CAT bond pricing formulae. ©2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

STIGLITZ, Joseph E., Amartya SEN, Jean-Paul FITOUSSI (2010) Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress:

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/gdp-and-beyond/publications

StratCom COE (15.III 2017) StratCom laughs. In search of an analytical framework – ISBN: 978-9934-564-12-3: http://www.stratcomcoe.org/publications

SUNSTEIN, CASS R. and REID HASTIE (2015) „Garbage in, garbage out? Some micro sources of macro errors“ – Journal of Institutional Economics / Volume 11 / Issue 03 / September 2015, pp 561-583

Wikipedia (n.d.) ‘Economic Sanctions.’ Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

Thorsten Janus, Daniel Riera-Crichton (2015) Economic shocks, civil war and ethnicity. – Journal of Development Economics 115 32–44.

Tirole, Jean (1992) The Theory of Industrial Organizations. The MIT Press: 479.

Tongeren,  Jan W. van and Ruud Picavet (2016) „Bayesian estimation approach in frameworks; integration of compilation and analysis“ In  EURONA — Eurostat Review on National Accounts and Macroeconomic Indicators: 7-49.

Valge, Jaak (2006) Breaking away from Russia : economic stabilization in Estonia 1918-1924. Stockholm, Stockholm University 232 pp: http://www.ester.ee/record=b2169982*est

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Valge, Jaak (XII 2017?) Punased II. Tallinna Ülikooli Eesti Demograafia Instituut: Rahvusarhiiv, Tallinna Raamatutrükikoda: 376. 

Valge raamat: Eesti rahva kaotustest okupatsioonide läbi 1940-1991. Okupatsioonide Repressiivpoliitika Uurimise Riiklik Komisjon, Eesti Entsüklopeediakirjastus, 2005 Tallinn:
http://www.digar.ee/arhiiv/nlib-digar:8196
ja
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The White Book. Losses Inflicted on the Estonian Nation by Occupation Regimes 1940-1991. State Committee on the Investigation into Repression Policy of Occupation, Estonian Encyclopaedia Publishers, 2005 Tallinn:
http://www.digar.ee/arhiiv/nlib-digar:8192
ja
http://www.riigikogu.ee/public/Riigikogu/TheWhiteBook.pdf

Белая книга: о потерях, причиненных народу Эстонии оккупациями 1940-1991 / Государственная комиссия по расследованию репрессивной политики оккупационных сил; [перевод с эстонского: Андрей Бабаджан, Татьяна Верхоустинская, Эйнар Вяря; ORURK-24. Kirjastus Ilo. Tallinn, 2005: http://digar.nlib.ee/digar/show/?id=1604

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A bstract

This study examines income convergence in regional GDP per capita for a sample of 269 regions within the European Union (EU) between 2003 and 2010. We use an endogenous broad capital model based on foreign direct investment (FDI) induced agglomeration economies and human capital. By applying a Markov chain approach to a new dataset that exploits micro-aggregated sub-national FDI statistics, the analysis provides insights into regional income growth dynamics within the EU. Our results indicate a weak process of overall income convergence across EU regions. This does not apply to the dynamics within Central and East European countries (CEECs), where we find indications of a poverty trap. In contrast to FDI, regional human capital seems to be associated with higher income levels. However, we identify a positive interaction of FDI and human capital in their relation with income growth dynamics. Introduction Regional disparities in per capita output and income have been a concern of the European Community since its inception. The objective of reducing income inequalities has been challenged by trade liberalization following the single market program and more enhanced by the continuous integration process of new member states. While economic growth and cohesion within the European Union (EU) tend to decrease income disparities at a national level, regional inequalities have rather deepened (Kramar, 2006). In this context, the convergence/divergence issue of per capita incomes across any set of regions in the EU has attracted considerable research interest in the last decade, but the results have been mixed. Some studies suggest the existence of convergence across all European regions (Fingleton, 1997, 1999; López-Bazo et al., 1999; Votteler, 2004), while others show evidence of convergence clubs or multiple equilibriums within the income distribution (López-Bazo et al., 1999; Ertur and Le Gallo, 2003; Canova, 2004). Within an endogenous growth framework (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988), the accumulation of foreign direct investment (FDI) can be regarded as an important growth driver that triggers technological progress, resulting in productivity spillovers. FDI has been perceived as a key ingredient for growth and catching-up strategies by Central and East European Countries.

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Sketch 24. IV 17 (automatic translation of the previous Estonian paper for idependent international references)

Ülo Ennuste (24. IV  17) Socio-cybernetic small Note national  of the approximate financial resources assessment methods in hybrid-warfare  conditions, from the prospect of the probability  of the of the national sustainability stabilty criteria: case study of the experimental calculations illustrating Estonian present conditions with the previous century of occupation fallouts, as well as the negative effects of long-term damage to the accounting of the ruins of the occupation

Abstact

The 21st century academic socio-Cybernetics primary power shall evaluate the hybrid war solidaarsestesse kooperatiivsesse/suurliitudesse of the UNHCR on the national economic, social-and in particular the success of the cybernetic-Meta-Post based GDP: in particular, the sustainability of the sustainability of the national proxy-convergence of the sustainability of the conditional probability, Bayes ‘ on the basis of national macro increments –-in models of national institutions (Hodgson (2007; 1998) and the resources and risks in the form of a quantification financially developed so positively than negatively – and particularly in the human capital and social capital measurement of the financial volumes also both direct and indirect – and financially by measuring the long-term occupation of the most recent, also caused by the terrorist national casualties in particular, the human-, social-and cultural-property, etc-because in the current hübriidsõjas is the aim of the agressori once again, the likelihood of sustainability sustainability loits erodeerimine trying to rely on the previous occupation by the komplikatsioonidele – for optimal deterrence strategies and policies of the respective national resources planning requires a quantitative assessment of the comparable volumes, and to cooperate with the scientific cooperation of the allies of the independent oivakskustega.

  • Stiglitz et al. (2010) put the strictly teadusloogiliselt firmly into place so that the standard/formal GDP indicators are mainly based on the flows highlighted in market economy and thus to strictly invalid both the sustainability of the national evaluation of welfare as well – particularly in the conditions of uncertainty and risks of high hübriidsõja – and also in the teaduslagedate of national revenue redistribution of disfunktsionaalsete under the conditions of the institutions (e.g. 0-profit tax which is detrimental to the partner and hübriidsõjas sub-aggressor subsideerib, etc.); next to remain largely out of both national socio- , the human-, culture-, etc, the creation of reserves assets/current volumes of the estimates, and the stock of resources if the faktotite calculations: what’s more important that the standard GDP accounting check will go to the currently positive, such as several of the hübriidsõja caused by crimes – for example, as a result of the 2007 pronksmäsu rebuilding, etc (the credibility of the report confirms the scientific composition of the authors tippkompetentsus-added – for this is missing both the politikaanid and the bankers, and the plutokraadid and other magnaadid like we practice, etc.)

NB: the real (G) the validation of non-formal/research-based GGDP some of the volumes are abbreviated preliminary quantitative operational and their preliminary results given the informal, so-called sateliitkontosid is described summarily in the following studies

  http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/gdp-and-beyond/publications

http://ec.europa.eu/environment/beyond_gdp/index_en.html

refer to the academic/informal, the volumes of the GGDP duaalhindades (or varihindades), which is possible in the absence of market prices, the optimiseerimisteooriate võimekustega are submitted by financially rough-in excess of the standard in terms of human resources (in a wide sense of regulations, together with the reproduction of the capital), the financial value exceeds substantially the size of the physical capital in this context (see, for example, the OECD (2011) which, unfortunately, on the basis of statistics and economy narrowly where the calculations of the Estonian are missing – and the OECD (2016), where there are also some indirect social capital of the Estonian kvantifikatsioone).

  • Stiglitz et al . according to the national population should be taken into account adequately the activities of both revenue-market sourcing and acquisition of national investment and the creation of national resources – in particular, both the national human-and social-and physical-and institutsionaal-the acquisition of the capital by the non-market institutions and households – and their assessment of the financial resources of the volumes – and a largely informal basis duaalhindade. On OECD (2011) for the evaluation of a complex formula of the volume of the human capital is a complex approach to the market economy, even in the case of narrow, where indigenous communities such as the reproduktiivsusega related to the human resources of households – the same as allude to the Diamond & Saez , etc., as well as the sotsiaalkapitaliga stories in particular, given the conditions of the hübriidsõja risks, related national änge (see, for example, Ott & Ennuste (1996) ethnic groups, such as that in paragraph unless asymmetric side structures: in English and Russian). And see also the Chou (2006) abstract which added; not to mention the national küberneetiliste institutsionaalkapitalide financial hinnanguest – KUNČIČ (in 2014).
  • It is unfortunate that a large part of our national economic and Monetary Affairs-politicians is politically motivated, narrowly remained the nationalist ebaadekvaatsete deterministlike kummardajateks GDP indicators so far (see annex) – which distort their perceptions of the actual situation and the size of the risks, and to lead them to a nationalist ränkadele väärotsustustele, such as putinoid the troll tekitatavatele by the national social capital in the EU and NATO, in particular in the kiilulõõmisega strain on the system. Especially in the hübriidsõja under the conditions of risk (see Kissinger (2014), Lucas (2014), Toomse (2015), Kaljulaid (2017), etc.), and even more are the mechanisms of majandusküberneetiliste- Diamond & Saez (2011) and Best et al. (2017), such as the current of our 0-profit tax is a teaduslage mechanism and, at the same time, the negative of the institution – particularly when taking into account the risks and the respective claims.
  • Examples of problems in hübriidsõja: strategic communications war 1) see, for example, war, sanctions, Ennuste (2014) given in the literature references that need a hierarchical coordination service kooperatiivses in the Union 2) strategic communications about the war, see the references to the Ennuste (2008) that it is necessary to “freedom of expression” kremlimeelsete restrictions in respect of the trolls, etc. 3) is worth tähelpanu also called ifolõhe between the camps of academic and poliitkorporatiivse (Januskaite, & Uziene (2015), and Kahan et al. (2017) recognize that this gap may be somewhat relieved by the curiosity of some võimurite) the worsening strategic kommunikatsioonisõjas between the academic and political institutions (see also StratCom COE (2015)) – particularly in the understanding of the risks to the sustainability of the sustainability väikerahvuslike tõenäosuslikkuse part 4), especially in the deep gap is, on the one hand, a probabilistic approach to the treatment of teadusloogilises (truth is the probability and false, and faktoidid may come from not only the pudrupäisusest but probably also the sulilikust salakavalsusest (Wiener (1948)) – in particular in the strategic communication) – and, on the other hand, subjective support political-between the determinismi (where the hägusloogika in use).

Example: The long-term occupation by the NLi and the waste from the financial losses suffered by the national täilike the real assessment which takes into account in particular the inimvaradega, such as

 https://uloennuste.wordpress.com/2016/11/18/do-not-quote-18-xi-16/

NB: the long-term occupation of Estonia by the NLi, such as the damage caused by a completely formal (on the basis of the national statistics of the national resources in standardese, thus excluding entities) to the correct rating (the cock (2005) it’s probably within the limits (0, 1, 0, 2) tn (tn is a 10 step 12) – that’s right, 2004. (a) the data and macro-economic theories into the mainstream … and on the basis of methodologies), and within the framework of the National Commission on Outokumpu in that – as diplomatically ethically correct manner (e.g., Kirch et al. (2009)), it was possible (including is Cock responsibly stated that the NLi occupation was the essence of colonization which Fukuyama (2014 lk391) sets a primary põlisrahvuse the destruction of the light) – for example, that in our war of independence II (Lindmäe (1999-2015) Volume IX, lk542)) in losses came from completely off to remain silent – turns out to be the now currently hübriidsõja under conditions of risk and the informaalsetes teaduspõhistes costumes, the completely null and void – especially our national inimvarade the massive amounts of losses due to the barbaarses okupatsioonis, and pikaajaluste terms of the lesions that are continuing so far (Raukas (2005), such as radioactive waste-see also ANNEX ).

P.S.: It is clear that the informal financial described above, the kompleksete national academic tõenäosuslike (largely on the basis of subjective assessments like the Bayes ‘: Tongeren et al. (2016), and indirect macroeconomic results of the measurements, such as, for example, Rajasalu (2003) the reliability of the estimates) and the strategic consideration of hübriidsõja antagonistliku in the conditions of communication can be secure – the only and only – a broad well coordinated within the framework of international cooperation — the synergies of national teadmusstruktuuride metasünteesis. The remains of perhaps but still add these to the national structures of the energy contained in huge scholarly assets – in particular, the relevant tippteaduslike of the hundreds of magazines, and studies of hundreds of thousands of tippteoreetiliste inside the hiding-although many of these studies can be found in/buy a few clicks below, such as osunduste, also kirjandusviidetest – but none of the top scientists have not let this pink long enough so that the whole of this large multi-dimensionaalsuses, and määramatuses, and the dynamics of, and complementary methods to operate alone in the field and try to poliitpõhiseid the numerous corporate sustainability sustainability of national õõnestavaid the likelihood of populist väärotsuseid don’t hcertainly hold – although at times, it would be possible to quickly and easily make, such as: (a) is also scientifically, such as strategic communications in war, a certain degree of limitation of the “freedom of expression” absolutely oblikatoorne (see, for example, Ennuste (2008). Such as even the President Kaljulaid’s WaPo article – https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/russia-is-a-threat-estonia-frets-about-its-neighbor/2017/03/24/011ad320-0f2b-11e7-9b0d-d27c98455440_story.html?utm_term=.ab0febde5386 – is probably the dozens in the Kremlin, the trolls have added comments to diversioonilisi (and it funnier is that the same article is probably to support political-accuracy credible probably kremlimeelse Y faktoidi ‘ Toom. as to the Russian spoke in Narva is currently not any putinoidi the way kiskjaliku was changed to Narva – the NLi venekeelseks by the sõjakuritegelikult ethnic in the course of the cleansing, and thus a potential dangerous situation especially in the currently sütikuna during the civil war with Russia – see, for example, Thorsten & Riera-Crichton (2015)) ((b)) very, very easy to be approaching the Estonian Presidency during the EU/27-s to enforce the tax laws take into account the whole science-based risks and that the Member States, the institutions of multinational or deceptive tax havens takes (see EU Commission, preparatory Reports corresponding to the recent years) – and – with the EU as a whole, the 27/both social capital and defence capabilities would increase (while we teadustühiselt asendusteemasid kilplaslikult seltskonnameedias up in the heat, and the rahvuslikku teadmusruumi hägustatakse dispuutidega sotsiaalmaksustamise, such as robots, etc: = =) (c), which is particularly important for us in this hübriidsõjas that kiskjalik inimsusevastaselt okupatsioonis prior to the aggressor, significantly undermined our both ethnic and national structure of the spiritual (see, e.g., Hill et al. (2016) and Young (2005)), and the Russian-speaking population here now trying to falsely on behalf of human rights once again into the rescue of the occupation to restore social capital as the national nationalist loits and ideologically lõhestades: in doing so as one of the main weapon of the wrong the wrong end – as if the occupation existed and that the deportations were to rescue the people of Estonian and Russian language should be restored as a national language, etc. Absolutely definitely were the okupatsioonis of our põhirahvuse of the national teadmusruumi and the quality of the human asset losses will be enormous and long-term meaning of the 21st century – in the larger senihinnatutest and so far significantly reduce the likelihood of sustainability sustainability loits – up to the historic truth truly is also scientifically in the face/view: for example, that in all probability already tunamullu in Tallinn, Estonia v (k) was dominated by (the study of Mägi et al. (2016)).

P.S.P.S.: (a) the text is designed for the professional, to facilitate international cooperation, and in this sense, in particular in terms of “a machine translation for the appropriate decimal point instead of using dashes and such as GDP (production of homegrown and not GDP/GDP, etc.), (b) UR30.III, Eurostat published a fresh overview of the 2017 in EU GDP in the region 28/276 p. (c) imbalances on: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/news/news-releases. Although this review is of the 21st century in terms of macroeconomics vaegteaduslik (see, e.g., Atkinson (2017) – for example, reflects only a narrowly turumajanduslikke indices) — this overview may, however, also, such as the OECD, with reports that concluded on the basis of the EU as a whole, the level of social capital is probably lousy because the variance of economic levels in these regions are very large (free, however, to the Baltic States is the regionalization of non-differentiated. (c) at least at the Estonian Presidency should be EL/27-s this problem also scientifically Agendasse to push it, especially considering that such as Econ.com 1. (IV) on the basis of the forecast of GDP by 2017 2018 on the fresh, it seems likely that the Member States are able to argue that the sigma divergence seems to continue deepening and, thus, mitmegi perifeeriariigi (especially in the adjacent kiskjaliku (Tirole (1992) the term oligopolide in theory) for the Empire) the likelihood of the sustainability of the national sustainability seems to eksistentsiaalselt decreasing – if still in võimurid especially in the Member States (in particular the high levels of concentration, where Russian-speaking) of the true socio-küberneetilistest (Inc. EL/27 the promotion of social capital as a whole) to the problems of the bankers/kröösuste management populistlikult/teaduslagedalt along to look at (by the way, the newspaper The Economist has the skilled workforce, teadusosakonda).

Understandably, it must also include the Agendasse issue:

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2016-0440&language=ET&ring=A8-2016-0317

Acknowledgements: Thank YOU for the financial contribution to the WHITE PAPER on the Board which allowed me to get close to half the paid fresh scientific publications, including the latest Amazon Kindle very quickly the monographs suhtkalleid; deep, thanks to the Tallinn University Academic Library in order to allow me to free access to thousands of articles and advice on proper sciensdirect.com; for the hundreds of comments, thanks to his long-time academic colleagues in this area: Geoffrey Hodgson, Attiat f. Ott, Ilari Tyrni, Teet Rajasalu, Peep the Shade , Jaak Uibu, Aigi Rahi-Oak, Alari Drunk, Aksel Kirch, Anton Laur, …

In particular it would be grateful to the expected charitable kaasautoritele – I’m totally aware of that, so far, for the pursuit of the complicated area of prognostilisel alone, in principle, does not create sufficient to virtually tõeväärtusega the results.

 

ADD (the retsenseerimata and the unedited draft 23. (IV) 17 – not to refer to the)

“The better the approximately right than exactly wrong”

J.M. Keynes

The visible and invisible of national macro-evaluation of the approximate financial resources, examples and the corresponding financial assessment of the effects of long-term okupatsioonikahjude – Estonian national sustainability the sustainability aspect, the likelihood of both international alliances if hübriidsõja conditions

  1. Standard/formal market economy of human capital (SMHC) per capita (p. c) on average in the OECD (2011) on the basis of the results of the generalized transfer (see the Abstract claim that the whole of the SMHC is 8 to 10 times higher than the volume of the GDP (SGDP) – with the likelihood of the accuracy of the results of such studies are assessed at least 0.9 the level. This OECD study is done in a dozen relatively rich and ethnically homogeneous major national and the transfer of the results of the Bayes ‘ by being ethnically rich and majandusliidus perifeersele of the results of the confidence of the corresponding threats requires the reduction of the likelihood of also-if the extension of the usalduspiiride (see, for example, the Tongeren & Picavet(2016)), and the official statistics (GDP and population, etc.) for the data, we can get a big ligikaudsusega and, at the same time, probably a sufficient likelihood of subjective/Bayesliku (0.8) were initially assessed at current market prices in 2016 to the Estonian market and expected by the method of income-the average SMHC p. subparagraph (c) is placed in the : € (0, 1, 0, 2) 0.1 and 0.2 M – which is the paragraph in the lower and the upper confidence limit and M stands for million.

NB to: (a) the average of the whole population, it is the usalduslõik with the OECD (2011), such as some of the elite-cohort score may be close to twice that of the average overcome perhaps be, for example, € (0, 1, 0, 2) M, and contrary to what-is probably the hübriidsõja conditions appropriate to define it as a negative average kohorte (b) in determining the entity of the national whole SMHC 2016. (a) the number of the population to be used as a net at this point must be taken into account only domestic residents, such as the occupation of the population due to irreversible losses in economic terms also include the occupation of the Polish emigrants during the occupation, the politically discriminated against persons, the occupation of the educational opportunities lost due to injuries, and (c) and which are also important: the entire population of a distortion in the structure (in particular venestamisega) caused the damage (as Eurostat (2016) by those born in third countries (in particular, therefore, the Russian-speaking) positive economic activity is lower than our põhirahvuse – however, these statistical data is currently in need of refinement (because of the conditions of the hübriidsõja in recent years, the ethnic polarity probably growing).

  1. the Informal/non-market kodumajanduslik (sic! puhtmajanduslik but the rated current in the standard market prices) of the IMHC p. (c) perhaps also the so-called satellite GDP (a housewife raising children, a home for elderly care, home chores, etc.) to volumes of statisticians will be assessed (e.g., on the basis of the official statistics of active tegevustundide) by an average of 2 to 3 times larger than the IMHC p. c – thus € (0, 2, 0, 6), M.
  2. the National informal social capital (an amorphous = visible/invisible, and formal statistics largely incomplete – the acronym NISC): Estonian, as of 2013, for there is some quantitative measurements made on the level of social capital index to the OECD (in 2016), the study-which is, unfortunately, been limited only to the extent of the national evaluation of the General level of 10 points in the system and the structure of the film, in the form of the indicator is presented – which seems to be more or less at the level of the average of the EU-28-5.8 points. In doing so, such factors as the undifferentiated/separeerimata: reproduktiivsus of the population and the related family biological reserves, social/social capital of communities, economic inequality, ethnic heterogeneity, the aggressor Empire, strategic communications diversioonoperatsioonide hübriidsõja ängide, the negative impact of destructive ethnic asümmeetrilisus (e.g., Ott & Ennuste (1996)), etc. The national informal (formal/official statistics greatly lacking in particular as regards prices), social capital (NISC) to assess the financial volume of p c (including, for example, especially in the assessment of the volume of the capital-reproduktiivsus) there are no market prices, and the standard must be high in reliability, the trials, the first to migrate to the informal use of duaalhindade (varihindade). It ideally for large dynamic stohhastiliste optimeerimismudelite dekomponeeritud duaalhinnad endogeenselt lead into the settlement where the (unfortunately, the Estonian on such numerical models are currently missing), then the remains over to the larger ligikaudsusega and the lower level of confidence to fall back on international panels to the use of faktoranalüüside, such as econometric Rajasalu (2003) and, in particular, the so-called “black box method: where God directly (that one time, Rajasalu) applied in the calculation of factor of amorphous social capital are not implemented – but indirectly we can find by Rajasalu (2003), sotsiaalkapitalile lähendeid, and, through them, the evaluation of the volumes of the NISC p. (c) the use of relevant international research-based estimates of the raw, subjective ( in this case, sadly, only the data of the temporal transformeerimist with the expected future amounts to diskonteerimisega (see OECD (2016)) the amounts, timing and past Estonian 2016 value-terms and conditions (see, e.g., Ennuste (1996)): NISC p. c-€ (0, 3; 1) M.
  3. the National traditional physical capital (OECD term – here the acronym NTFC). On OECD (2016), a study has claimed that TFC (natural resources, national infrastructure assets with, such as and, together with the full and includes light and gold) size is generally smaller than the SMHC – thus, roughly correspond to the conditions of the war initially, appreciate the hybrid not taller than 6 to 12 times the SGDP p. (c) perhaps in 2016. (a) the NTFC. p. (c) is in the range of € (0, 1, 0, 2) M.
  4. the Ethnic-National institutsioonkapitali (NINC) include, in particular, the assets of the national administrative institutions such as in particular, Fukuyama (2014): the national-and support political organisations, national conservation organizations, national monetary and fiscal system, together with the tax arrangements, international alliances, blokkidesse, membership, etc. Their financial olevikuväärtus, in particular, their investments to create a measurable and amortiseerumisega (Hodgson (1998)). The author’s opinion, their aggregated financial details as a reliable measurement of the makrovarade for the free mesoökonoomiliste in the bin of the plant) is probably still need a large detailed statistical field work to do micro: very, very tentatively, and subjectively/intuitively could NINC p. (c) rating range from € (0, 1, 0, 2) M – see, for example, Ennuste (by 2016).
  5. the National informal intellektuaalvara (NIIC) as the national: research and uskumusvara and cultural treasures are also measurable in these systems to advance the ages during the panustuste and hävitustega of the corresponding assets and the abductions (such as the destruction of the values of historical architecture by warfare, the libraries of the devastation, the works of art of stealing, etc.) in the opinion of the author, again, their aggregated financial details, free of makrovarade as a reliable measurement is probably still need a large detailed statistical field work to do: the very tentatively, and subjectively/intuitively could NIIC p. (c) rating range from € (0, 1; 0 , 2) M – see, for example, Ennuste (by 2016).

P.S.: Obviously it would be a different tõeväärtusega of the above, the provisional to peruse the large amounts macro ligikaudsusega totals (weighted the various rough tõeväärtustega) widely to publish is not worthwhile-before the study is not relevant to the international independent (sic!), the adjusted by oivakeskuste. But, however, these amounts can be quite likely to assume, such as that in Estonia until the studies of long-term occupation of the national majanduskahjude of the NLi’s-the modern macroeconomics and sotsiaalküberneetika rakursist-in the half-price: and it is hübriidsõja in the conditions of national strategies/policies need to optimize a numerically even large ligikaudsusega to know – because, unfortunately, the hübriidsõda is largely directed at reokupeerimisele and is based substantially on long-term occupation and prior to this waste of our national resources by the extent of damage (Schmid-Schmidsfelden & Potapova (2016) , RAND (2017).

 

P.S.P.S.: The accuracy of the probability of exceeding 0.7:

SMHC p. c-€ (0, 1, 0, 2) M-E (0, 2)-P (0, 9)

IMHC p. c-€ (0, 2, 0, 6), M-E (0, 4)-P (0, 8)

NISC p. c-€ (0, 3; 1) to M-E (0, 7)-P (0, 7)

NTFC p. c-€ (0, 1, 0, 2) M-E (0, 2) – (…)

NINC p. c-€ (0, 1, 0, 2) M-E (0, 2) – (…)

NIIC p. c-€ (0, 2, 0, 4), M-E (0, 3) – (…)

__________________________

Total p (c), (E), (2, 2) M and P (0, 7), where E is the code for the rounded average of the upward-and-P (…) of the conditional probability of the lower limit of the range, accuracy, and can adhere, such as P (0, 9), we assume an average of 95% of the usaldustõenäosust in the ring (usalduspiirides +/-15%), and P = (0, 7) in the case of usalduspiirides +/-50% and-(…) indicates that an adequate clarification of the data in the usaldusväärsuseni will continue. Technically, Bayes conditional probability is defieeritud ‘ lik if P (A/B), where B stands for usaldustõenäosust is currently used in the database here.

Thus, currently the entire nationalist would be the major financial resources of the rating in euro on average: (1, 3 x 10 * 6) (2×10, 2 * 6) = > 2, 5 x 10 * 12, or more than € 2, 5tn – where tn is the code of a trillion (trillion = 10 * 12 – where the * is the exponent symbol)-perhaps 2016 would be the major financial resources of the Estonian national estimate of the volume of 2.5 trillion euro in a circle: (2; 3) tn – P (0, 7).

While an average of one per Finnish financial resources could be the size of the currently important to evaluate an average of at least two times taller, perhaps at least five million euro in the ring – it plenty of higher inflation due to the lack of a long-term occupation of the NLi’s direct (see, for example, the cock (2005) and in the Ennuste (1996)). Thus, based on the resources we could assess the financial damage our long-term occupation in p. (c) now is to assess the two million euro in the ring: (1, 5; 2, 5), M perhaps nationalist (2; 3) within the limits of the euro likely tn P (0.7) in the ring. Add to that the remains of the cock (2005) by the corresponding assessment, published in particular, which was based on the kaotustele, at least, was the formal SGDP flows less than a dozen times as a member of the National Commission on – because the do not have the freedom to not take into account the moral informaalselt of national human or socio-cultural-and also in the physical-asset losses.

What’s more important to Rahi-Oak (2005), published by P (0, 9) the occupation of the fatal casualties include (in the context of the treatment of that era) is not included in the emigration of many of the repressed people not resident nor the relatives to a significant loss of operational resources of the reproduction of the population – yet the domestic aspect of the national makroökonoomilisest and sustainability is an important consideration of such factors – and – the data necessary for adequate adjustments in the coming years continues to be undertaken in the Baltic countries (StratCom COM? )-thus, the long-term national assessments of casualties of the financial volumes of the okupatsioonilised (the missing item 7.) for future studies will remain in parishes.

 

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The accuracy of the probability of exceeding 0.9

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Abstract

The main purpose of the paper is to identify challenges that occur “developing strategies based on the national intellectual capital (NIC) in the measurements. As it can be observed from the IC to the literature, even though there are different methods to measure the NIC, they are not commonly used among policy makers as a tool for strategic management decisions to raise the competiveness of the nation. This paper compares different approaches to measure the NIC, reveals related problems and provides possible explanations accordingly. The findings of the paper show that there is a big gap between academic research and policy makers. The four major directions of explanations to bridge this gap are highlighted in the paper: (1) the poor awareness of IC concept among policy makers, (2) the methodology related issues, (3) changing the leadership profile and (4) collaboration related issues. The insights to the possible solutions are also presented. They reveal the need to research different countries regarding their NIC policy.

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ABSTRACT

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https://www.google.ee/search?q=martensctre%20eu%20publications%20bear%20sheeps%20clothing%20russias%20government%20funded%20organisations

Thorsten Janus, Daniel Riera-Crichton (by 2015), “Economic shocks, the civil war and ethnicity” – the Journal of Development Economics 115:32-44:

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleListURL&_method=list&_ArticleListID=-1175221378&_sort=r&_st=13&view=c&md5=d185b1e7697a1a536327b241f9e4dd3b&searchtype=a

Tirole, Jean (1992) The Theory of Industrial Organizations. The MIT Press: 479.

Toomse, Rene (2015) Defending Estonia in peace and war. Retaining a small state near the aggressive neighbor by utilizing unconventional strategies; (supervisor: Jyrki Käkönen); School of Governance, Law and Society, Tallinn University, Tallinn, Estonia: 245lk:

http://www.etera.ee/zoom/8725/view?page=1&p=separate&view=0,0,2067,2834

 Tõesusega more than 0.7

Ülo Ennuste, (2016): https://uloennuste.wordpress.com/2016/11/18/do-not-quote-18-xi-16/

Ennuste, Ü. (2008) “Synthetic Conceptions of Design for the Public instead of Mechanisms Implementing Socio-Economic Information Structure: Illustrative Examples of Estonian.” In: Kirch, Aksel et al. (Eds.) the Socio-economic and institutional environment: harmonisation in the EU countries of the Baltic Sea Rim: Tallinn University of Technology, 9-39: http://www.ies.ee/iesp/No4/Ennuste.pdf

Ennuste, Ü. (1993) “An outline for a quote on the long-term economic damage by means of analogy”- proceedings of the Estonian IT. The humanities and social sciences, 42, 1, 1-4 .

The Cock, The Kalev (2005) “Economic Damages In: The White Book: Losses Inflicted on the Estonian Nation by Occupation Regimes from 1940 to 1991, State Committee on the Investigation into the Repression Policy of Occupation, Tallinn, Estonian Encyclopaedia Publishers: 141-171: http://www.digar.ee/arhiiv/nlib-digar:8192

(there is no assessment of the loss of national resources)

The Ministry of finance (12. (IV) 2017), 2017. the spring economic forecast. RM võrguteavik: 76lk means the compiler of the Madis Aben .

NB: the sustainability of the national (RJ) is the aspect of this is the line that will reduce the disadvantages of the credibility of the (a), such as Estonian RJ lähendi-convergence EU/28 for the average (mm) in the “forecast” is here until 2015! – with 2016 on the formal statistics is available – Furthermore, it is the “prognosis” teadustühiselt currency PPS garbled (b) projections is the big gap in this regard that there is no macro-resources for the prognosis, such as part of the balance of payments – therefore remains unknown to what extent will continue in the coming years through the national financial accounts financial assets slikerdamine under the petunimede of investments abroad by residents as well as e-by the residents of the (c) the reliability of the forecasts published by the severe lack of usalduspiiride and the regressandide of several of the decreases, thus probably the hübriidsõja risks (in particular, the sanctions of the war) in nationalist irresponsible ignoring.

 

 

Visand 24.IV 17 (automaattõlkimiseks)

Ülo Ennuste (24.IV 17) Sotsiaal-küberneetiline lühiuurimus väikese rahvusriigi eksistentsiaalsete ressursside ligikaudse rahalise hindamise meetoditest, hübriid-jätkusõja tingimustes rahvusliku jätkusuutlikkuse kestlikkuse tõenäosuse kriteeriumi alusel: illustreerivaid eksperimentaal-arvutusi Eesti näitel koos eelmise poolesajandilise okupatsiooni kui ka selle pikaajaliste jäänuste kahjustuste negatiivsete mõjude ilmutatud arvestamisega

Eelmärkusi  

XXI sajandi akadeemiline sotsiaal-küberneetika peavool hindab hübriid sõja tingimustes solidaarsestesse kooperatiivsesse/koordineeritavasse suurliitudesse kuuluva rahvusliku väikeriigi majanduslikku-, sotsiaalset- ja küberneetilist-edukust eeskätt Meta-GDP põhiselt: eeskätt rahvusliku jätkusuutlikkuse kestlikkuse lähendi – konvergentsi kestlikkuse tingliku Bayes’liku tõenäosuse muutude alusel – ning makro-mudelites rahvuslikke institutsioone (Hodgson (2007;1998) ja ressursse ning riske ilmutatud kujul rahaliselt kvantifitseerides nii positiivselt kui negatiivselt –  ja seda eriti inimkapitali ning ka sotsiaalkapitali mahtude rahalise mõõtmisega nii otseselt kui kaudselt – ning rahaliselt mõõtes ka viimatise pikaajalise terroristliku okupatsiooni poolt tekitatud rahvuslikke kaotusi eeskätt inim-, sotsiaal- ning kultuuri-vara jne osas – sest praeguses hübriidsõjas on agressori eesmärgiks järjekordselt eestluse jätkusuutlikkuse kestlikkuse tõenäosuse erodeerimine püüdes selleks ka tugineda eelnenud okupatsiooni poolt tekitatud komplikatsioonidele – optimaalsete heidutus-strateegiate ja –poliitikate kavandamine nõuab vastavate rahvuslike ressursside mahtude võrreldavat kvantitatiivset hindamist ning selleks koostööd teaduslikku koostööd liitlaste sõltumatute oivakskustega.

  • Stiglitz et al. (2010) panevad rangelt teadusloogiliselt kindlalt paika et standardsed/formaalsed GDP indikaatorid on valdavas osas kitsalt turumajanduslikel voogudel põhinevad ja seega sobimatud nii rahvusliku jätkusuutlikkuse kui ka heaolu hindamiseks – seda eriti hübriidsõja suure määramatuse ning riskide tingimustes – ning ka rahvuslike tulude teaduslagedate ümberjagamise disfunktsionaalsete institutsioonide tingimustes (nt 0-kasumimaks mis partnerriike kahjustab ja hübriidsõjas agressorit subsideerib jne); edasi jäävad turumajanduslikust arvestusest välja nii rahvusliku sotsiaal-, inim-, kultuur- jne kapitalide/varade loomise jooksvate mahtude arvestused ning ressursside varude kui faktotite arvestused: mis veelgi olulisem et standardse GDP arvestuse sisse lähevad parajasti positiivselt nt mitmed hübriidsõja poolt põhjustatud kuriteod – nt 2007 pronksmäsu purustuste taastamistööd jne (Raporti usaldusväärsust kinnitab autorite teaduslik tippkompetentsus – koosseis lisatud – selles puuduvad nii politikaanid kui ka pankurid ning plutokraadid ja muud magnaadid nagu meil tavaks jne)

NB: Tõelise (G) mitteformaalse/teaduspõhise GGDP mahtude mõningad esialgsed rakenduslikud kvantitatiivsed hinnangumeetodid ja nende esialgsed tulemused arvestades mitteformaalseid nn sateliitkontosid on kirjeldatud ülevaatlikult järgnevates uurimustes

  http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/gdp-and-beyond/publications

http://ec.europa.eu/environment/beyond_gdp/index_en.html

 osundavad et akadeemilised/informaalsed GGDP mahud duaalhindades (ehk varihindades) milliseid on võimalik turuhindade puudumisel optimiseerimisteooriate võimekustega ligikaudselt rahaliselt hinnata – ületavad standardseid magnituudides ning inimressursside (laias mõistes koos põhielanikkonna reprodutseerimise kapitaliga) rahaline väärtus ületab selles kontekstis oluliselt füüsilise kapitali mahtu (vt nt OECD (2011) mis kahjuks kitsalt turumajandusliku statistika alusel ja kus Eesti kohta arvutused puuduvad – ja OECD (2016) kus leidub mõnigaid kaudseid kvantifikatsioone ka Eesti sotsiaalkapitali kohta).

  • Stiglitz et al. järgi arvestada tuleb adekvaatselt elanikkonna rahvuslikku turuvälist tegevust nii tulude hankimisel kui ka rahvuslike investeeringute soetamisel ja rahvuslike ressursside loomisel – seda eriti nii rahvusliku inim- kui ka sotsiaal- ning füüsilise- ja institutsionaal- kapitali soetamisel kodumajapidamiste ja turuväliste institutsioonide poolt – ning nende ressursside rahaliste mahtude hindamisel – ja seda suuresti informaalsete duaalhindade alusel. OECD (2011) keeruka valemi järgi inimkapitali mahu hindamine on keerukas isegi kitsalt turumajandusliku käsitluse puhul kus nt ei arvestata ka põlisrahva reproduktiivsusega seotud kodumajapidamiste inimressurssi – sama vihjavad Diamond&Saez jne; samuti ka sotsiaalkapitaliga lood eriti hübriidsõja riskide tingimustes arvestades sellega kaasnevaid rahvuslikke änge (vt nt Ott&Ennuste (1996) mis asümmeetrilised etniliste rühmade lõikes nt: eestikeelsed ja venekeelsed). Ja vt ka Chou (2006) abstrakti mis lisatud; rääkimata rahvuslikest küberneetiliste institutsionaalkapitalide rahalistest hinnanguest – KUNČIČ (2014).
  • Siinjuures on kahetsusväärne et suures osas meie rahvuslikud majandus- ning rahandus-poliitikud on poliitiliselt kitsalt motiveerituna jäänud rahvuslikult ebaadekvaatsete deterministlike GDP indikaatorite kummardajateks siiani (vt LISA) – mis moonutavad nende arusaamu tegelikust olukorrast ja riskide suurusest ning viivad neid rahvuslikult ränkadele väärotsustustele nt putinoid trollide poolt tekitatavatele rahvusliku sotsiaalkapitali kahjustustele eeskätt kiilulõõmisega ELis ning NATOs. Seda eriti hübriidsõja riskide tingimustes (vt Kissinger (2014), Lucas (2014), Toomse (2015), Kaljulaid (2017) jne) ning veelgi rohkem majandusküberneetiliste mehhanismide disainimisel – Diamond&Saez (2011) järgi nt praegune meie 0-kasumimaks on teaduslage mehhanism ning samas negatiivne institutsioon – eriti kui arvestada riskidega ning määramatustega.
  • Näiteid hübriidsõja probleemidest: strateegilise kommunikatsiooni sõjast 1) vt nt sanktsioonide sõjast Ennuste (2014) toodud kirjanduse viidetest et on vaja hierarhilist koordineerimissüsteemi kooperatiivses liidus 2) strateegilise kommunikatsiooni sõjast vt viiteid Ennuste (2008) et on vaja „sõnavabaduse“ piiranguid kremlimeelsete trollide suhtes jne 3) tähelpanu väärib ka nn ifolõhe akadeemilise ning poliitkorporatiivse leeri vahel (Januskaite&Uziene (2015) ja Kahan et al. (2017) tõdevad et seda lõhet mõnevõrra võib leevenda mõningate võimurite uudishimu) süvenemine strateegilises kommunikatsioonisõjas akadeemiliste ja poliitiliste institutsioonide vahel (vt ka StratCom COE (2015)) – seda eriti väikerahvuslike jätkusuutlikkuse kestlikkuse riskide tõenäosuslikkuse mõistmise osas 4) eriti sügav lõhe on on ühelt poolt tõenäosusliku käsitluse (teadusloogilises käsitluses tõde on tõenäosuslik ja vale ning faktoidid võivad pärineda mitte ainult pudrupäisusest vaid tõenäoselt ka sulilikust salakavalsusest (Wiener (1948)) – eriti strateegilises kommunikatsioonis) – ning teiselt poolt subjektiivse poliit-determinismi vahel (kus kasutusel hägusloogika).

Näide: NLi poolt pikaajalise okupatsiooni ja selle jäätmetega tekitatud rahvuslike täilike tõeliste kahjude rahalisest hindamisest kus arvestatakse eeskätt inimvaradega nt

 https://uloennuste.wordpress.com/2016/11/18/do-not-quote-18-xi-16/

NB: nt NLi pikaajalise okupatsiooni poolt Eestile tekitatud kahjude täiesti formaalne (riikliku standardese statistika alusel seega rahvuslike ressursside olemeid arvestamata) korrektne hinnang (Kukk (2005) tõenäoselt piirides (0,1;0,2)tn eurot (tn on 10 astmel 12) – seda küll 2004. a. andmete ja makroökonoomiliste peavoolu teooriate ning metodoloogiate alusel) ning – nagu tookordse Riikliku Komisjoni raames diplomaatiliselt eetiliselt korrektselt (nt Kirch et al. (2009)) oli võimalik (sh on Kukk vastutustundlikult tõdenud et NLi okupatsioon oli sisuliselt kolonisatsioon mis Fukuyama (2014 lk391) järgi seab esmaseks põlisrahvuse hävitamise) – arvestades nt et meie II Vabadussõja (Lindmäe (1999-2015) Köide IX lk542)) kaotused tulid täiesti maha vaikida – osutub nüüd parajasti hübriidsõja riskide tingimustes ning informaalsetes teaduspõhistes käsitlustes täiesti tühiseks – seda eriti meie rahvuslike inimvarade tohutute kaotuste tõttu barbaarses okupatsioonis ning pikaajaluste kahjustuste arvestuses mis jätkuvad siiani (Raukas (2005) nt radioaktiivsed jäätmed – vt ka LISA).

P.S.: On selge et ülalkirjeldatud kompleksete rahvuslike rahaliste informaalsete akadeemiliste tõenäosuslike (suuresti Bayes’like subjektiivsete hinnangute alusel: Tongeren et al. (2016) ning kaudsete makroökonoomiliste mõõtmiste tulemustel nagu nt Rajasalu (2003)) hinnangute usaldusväärsust hübriidsõja määramatuste ning strateegilise antagonistliku kommunikatsiooni tingimustes saab kindlustada – ainult ja ainult – laialdase hästi koordineeritud rahvusvahelise koostöö raames – rahvuslike teadmusstruktuuride sünergia metasünteesis. Jääb ehk vaid veel lisada et nendes rahvuslikes teadmus-struktuurides sisaldub tohutu akadeemiline vara – eeskätt sadade asjakohaste tippteaduslike ajakirjade ning sadade tuhandete tippteoreetiliste uurimuste sees peidus – kuigi mitmedki nendest uurimustest võib leida/osta mõne klikiga nt ka allolevate osunduste kirjandusviidetest – kuid ühelgi väikeriigil ei ole tippteadlaste pink küllalt pikk et kogu selles suures multi-dimensionaalsuses ning dünaamikas ja määramatuses ning komplementaarsete meetodite vallas üksi opereerida ning püüda arvukaid poliitpõhiseid korporatiivseid rahvuslikku jätkusuutlikkuse kestlikkuse tõenäosust õõnestavaid populistlikke väärotsuseid ära hoida – kuigi kohati oleks seda võimalik kiiresti ja kergesti teha nt: (a) nt teaduspõhiselt on  strateegilise kommunikatsiooni sõjas teatav “sõnavabaduse” piiramine absoluutselt oblikatoorne (vt nt Ennuste (2008). Nt isegi President Kaljulaid’i WaPo artiklile – https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/russia-is-a-threat-estonia-frets-about-its-neighbor/2017/03/24/011ad320-0f2b-11e7-9b0d-d27c98455440_story.html?utm_term=.ab0febde5386 – on ilmselt tosinad Kremli trollid diversioonilisi kommentaare lisanud (ja seda naljakam on et samas artiklis tunnistatakse ilmselt poliit-korrektsusest tõsiseltvõetavaks ilmselt kremlimeelse Y. Toom’i faktoidi nagu et venekeelses Narvas polevat parajasti mitte ühtegi putinoidi – muide Narva muudeti kiskjaliku NLi poolt venekeelseks sõjakuritegelikult etnilise puhastuse käigus ning seega parajasti eriti ohtlikus olukorras võimaliku kodusõja sütikuna Venemaa kaasabil – vt nt Thorsten&Riera-Crichton (2015)) (b) väga lihtne oleks läheneva Eesti eesistumise ajal EL/27-s jõustada teaduspõhised riske ning sulisid arvestavad maksuseadused mis liikmesriikides kõlvatute hargmaiste maksuparadiiside institutsioonid likvideeriks (vt EL Komisjoni vastavaid ettevalmistavaid Raporteid viimatistel aastatel) – ja – sellega EL/27 kui terviku nii sotsiaalkapitali kui ka kaitsevõimet suurendaks (samas kui meil teadustühiselt asendusteemasid kilplaslikult seltskonnameedias üles soojendatakse ning rahvuslikku teadmusruumi hägustatakse nt robotite sotsiaalmaksustamise dispuutidega jne :==) (c) mis selles hübriidsõjas meie jaoks eriti oluline et kiskjalik agressor eelnenud okupatsioonis kahjustas inimsusevastaselt oluliselt meie nii etnilist kui ka vaimset rahvuslikku struktuuri (vt nt Mägi et al. (2016) ja Noor (2005)) ning nüüd püüab valelikult siinse venekeelse elanikkonna inimõiguste päästmise nimel järjekordselt okupatsiooni taastada seejuures eestluse rahvuslikku sotsiaalkapitali nii rahvuslikult kui ka ideoloogiliselt lõhestades: seejuures üheks peamiseks relvaks valed valede otsa – nagu poleks okupatsiooni olnudki ja et küüditamise olid eesti rahva päästmiseks ning vene keel tuleb taastada riigikeelena jne. Täiesti kindlasti olid okupatsioonis meie põhirahvuse inimvara ja rahvusliku teadmusruumi kvaliteedi kaotused tohutud ning pikaajalised – XXI sajandi mõistes magnituudides suuremad senihinnatutest ja siiani oluliselt vähendavad eestluse jätkusuutlikkuse kestlikkuse tõenäosust – kuni ajaloolisele tõele tõeliselt/teaduspõhiselt näkku ei vaadata: nt et suure tõenäosusega juba tunamullu Tallinnas v.k domineeris (uurimuse Mägi et al. (2016) järgi).

P.S.P.S.: (a) tekst on mõeldud erialase rahvusvahelise koostöö hõlbustamiseks ning selles mõttes eeskätt ingl masintõlke jaoks sobivaid termineid ning koma asemel mõttekriipse kasutades ja nt GDP (kodumaine kogutoodang ja mitte SKT/SKP jne) (b) 30.III 2017 Eurostat avaldas värske ülevaate EL/28 276 piirkonna GDP p.c ebavõrdsuste kohta: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/news/news-releases. Kuigi see ülevaade on XXI sajandi makroökonoomika seisukohalt vaegteaduslik (vt nt Atkinson (2017) – nt kajastab ainult kitsalt turumajanduslikke indekseid) – siiski võib sellest ülevaatest nt ka OECD teadusosakondade raportite põhjal järeldada et ELi kui terviku sotsiaalkapitali tase on tõenäoselt vilets sest nende piirkondade majanduslike tasemete dispersioon on väga suur (seejures Balti-Riigid on piirkondadeks liigendamata jäänud. (c) vähemalt Eesti eesistumise ajal tuleks EL/27-s see probleem teaduspõhiselt Agendasse suruda  seda eriti arvestades et nt Econ.com 1.IV 2017 värske GDP prognoosi alusel 2018 kohta näib suure tõenäosusega et liikmesriikide lõikes on võimalik väita et sigma divergents näib jätkuvalt süvenevat ning seega mitmegi perifeeriariigi (eriti mis külgnevad kiskjaliku (Tirole (1992) termin oligopolide teoorias) impeeriumiga) rahvusliku jätkusuutlikkuse kestlikkuse tõenäosus näib eksistentsiaalselt kahanevat – kui endiselt võimurid eriti liikmesriikides (eriti kus venekeelsete kontsentreeritus kõrge) tõelistest sotsiaal-küberneetilistest (inc EL/27 kui terviku sotsiaalkapitali edendamisest) probleemidest pankurite/kröösuste juhtimisel populistlikult/teaduslagedalt mööda vaatavad (muide ajaleht The Economist omab kompetentset teadusosakonda).

Arusaadavalt peab Agendasse kuuluma ka see probleemistik:

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2016-0440&language=ET&ring=A8-2016-0317

Tänuavaldused: tänan SA VALGE RAAMAT juhatust rahalise toetuse eest mis võimaldas mul hankida ligemale poolsada tasulist värsket teaduspublikatsiooni sh väga kiiresti Amazon Kindle viimatisi suhtkalleid monograafiaid; sügav tänu Tallinna Ülikooli Akadeemilisele Raamatukogule võimaldamaks minul tasuta juurdepääsu tuhandetele sciensdirect.com artiklitele; asjalike nõuannete ning märkuste eest avaldan tänu oma pika-ajalistele akadeemilistele kolleegidele sellel alal: Geoffrey Hodgson, Attiat F. Ott, Ilari Tyrni, Teet Rajasalu, Peep Varju, Jaak Uibu, Aigi Rahi-Tamm, Alari Purju, Aksel Kirch, Anton Laur, …

Eriti tänulik oleks oodatavatele heategevuslikele kaasautoritele –  olen täiesti teadlik et niivõrd komplitseeritud prognostilisel alal üksi tegutsemine põhimõtteliselt ei loo praktiliselt piisava tõeväärtusega tulemusi.

 

LISA (retsenseerimata ja toimetamata visand 23.IV 17 – mitte viidata)

                                            „Parem  ligikaudu õige kui täpselt vale“

                                                                                              J.M. Keynes

Rahvuslike nähtavate ja nähtamatute makro-ressursside ligikaudse rahalise hindamise näiteid ning vastavate pikaajaliste okupatsioonikahjude mõjude rahalisest hindamisest – Eesti rahvusliku jätkusuutlikkuse kestlikkuse tõenäosuse aspektist nii rahvusvaheliste liitude kui hübriidsõja tingimustes

  1. Standardne/formaalne turumajanduslik inimkapital (SMHC) elaniku kohta (p.c) keskmiselt on OECD (2011) üldistatud tulemuste ülekandmise alusel (vt Abstract väidet et kogu SMHC on 8 kuni üle 10 korra suurem standardsest GDP mahust (SGDP) – kusjuures taoliste uuringute tulemuste tõesuse tõenäosust hinnatakse vähemalt 0,9 tasemele. See OECD uuring on tehtud tosina suhteliselt rikka ning etniliselt homogeense rahvusliku suurriigi kohta ja selle tulemuste Bayes’likul ülekandmisel etniliselt polaarsele ning rikkas majandusliidus perifeersele väikeriigile nõuab nii tulemuste vastavat usaldus-tõenäosuse vähendamist kui ka usalduspiiride laiendamist (vt ntTongeren&Picavet(2016)) ja ametliku statistika (GDP ja elanike arvu jne) andmetel saame suure ligikaudsusega ning samas ilmselt piisava subjektiivse/Bayesliku tõenäosusega (0,8) esialgselt hinnata et Eesti 2016 jooksvates turuhindades ja oodatavate turumajanduslike sissetulekute meetodil – keskmine SMHC p.c asetseb lõigus: €(0,1;0,2)M – kus 0,1 ja 0,2 on lõigu alumine ja ülemine usalduspiir ning M tähistab miljonit.

NB: (a) see on kogu elanikkonna keskmise usalduslõik kusjuures OECD (2011) järgi nt mõne eliit-kohordi keskmine võib ligemale kaks korda seda keskmist ületada ehk olla nt €(0,1;0,2)M ning vastupidiselt – on ilmselt hübriidsõja tingimustes otstarbekas defineerida negatiivse keskmisega kohorte (b) kogu rahvusliku SMHC olemi määramisel 2016. a. seisuga  kasutatava elanike neto arvu juures tuleb siinkohal arvestada ainult kodumaiste residentidega ning nt okupatsioonist tingitud elanikkonna pöördumatute kaotuste hulka kuuluvad majanduslikus mõttes ka okupatsiooni aegsed emigrandid, okupatsiooni ajal poliitiliselt diskrimineeritud isikud, okupatsiooni tõttu kaotatud haridusvõimalused ning tervisekahjustused (c) ning mis samuti oluline: kogu elanikkonna struktuuri moonutamisega (eeskätt venestamisega) tekitatud kahjustused (kuna Eurostati (2016) järgi kolmandates riikides sündinute (seega eeskätt venekeelsete) positiivne majandusaktiivsus on madalam meie põhirahvuse omast – kuid need statistilised andmed vajavad parajasti täpsustamist (sest hübriidsõja tingimustes viimastel aastatel on etniline polaarsus ilmselt süvenemas).

  1. Informaalne/turuväline kodumajanduslik (sic! puhtmajanduslik kuid hinnatud standardsetes jooksvates turuhindades) IMHC p.c ehk ka nn satelliit GDP (kodune laste kasvatamine, kodune eakate hooldamine, kodused majapidamistööd jne) mahud hinnatakse statistikute (nt aktiivsete tegevustundide ametlike statistikate alusel) poolt keskmiselt 2 kuni 3 korda suuremateks kui IMHC p.c – seega €(0,2;0,6)M.
  2. Rahvuslik informaalne sotsiaalkapital (amorfne=nähtav/mittenähtav ning formaalne statistika suuresti puudulik – akronüüm NISC):Eesti kohta 2013 seisuga on mõningaid kvantitatiivseid mõõtmisi tehtud sotsiaalkapitali indeksi taseme kohta OECD (2016) uurimuses – kus on küll kahjuks piirdutud ainult rahvusliku üldise koostöövalmiduse taseme hindamisega 10 punkti süsteemis ja näitaja struktuuri ilmutatud kujul ei esitata – mis olevat enam vähem EL/28 keskmisel tasemel 5,8 punkti. Seejuures eristamata/separeerimata selliseid faktoreid nagu: elanikkonna reproduktiivsus ning sellega seotud perekondlikud bioloogilised kapitalid, sotsiaalsete/seltskondlike ühenduste kapital, majanduslik ebavõrdsus, etniline heterogeensus, agressor impeeriumi strateegilise kommunikatsiooni diversioonoperatsioonide destruktiivne negatiivne mõju, hübriidsõja ängide etniline asümmeetrilisus (nt Ott&Ennuste (1996)) jne. Rahvusliku informaalse (formaalne/riiklik statistika oluliselt puudub eriti hindade osas) sotsiaalkapitali (NISC) rahalise mahu p.c hindamiseks (sh nt eriti reproduktiivsus-kapitali mahu hindamiseks) standardsed turuhinnad puuduvad ning tuleb kõrge usaldusväärsusega uuringutes esmalt siirduda informaalsete duaalhindade (varihindade) kasutamisele. Seda ideaalis suurte dünaamiliste stohhastiliste optimeerimismudelite dekomponeeritud lahendamisel kus duaalhinnad kujunevad endogeenselt (kahjuks Eesti kohta taolised kvantifitseeritud mudelid parajasti puuduvad) Siis jääb üle suurema ligikaudsusega ning väiksema usaldusväärsusega taanduda rahvusvaheliste paneelide ökonomeetriliste faktoranalüüside kasutamisele nt Rajasalu (2003) ja eeskätt nn musta kasti meetodil: kus küll otseselt (tollele Rajasalu ajale omaselt) amorfse sotsiaalkapitali faktorit rakenduslikes arvutustes ei rakendatud – kuid kaudselt saame Rajasalu (2003)järgi leida sotsiaalkapitalile lähendeid ning nende kaudu NISC p.c mahtude hindamisel toorelt kasutama vastavate rahvusvaheliste teaduspõhiste hinnangute subjektiivset (antud juhul kahetsusväärselt ainult andmete ajalise transformeerimist koos tuleviku oodatavate summade diskonteerimisega (vt OECD (2016)) ja mineviku summade ajastamisega Eesti 2016 hinna-tingimustesse (vt nt Ennuste (1996)): NISC p.c – €(0,3;1)M.
  3. Rahvuslik traditsiooniline füüsiline kapital (OECD termin – siin akronüüm NTFC).  OECD (2016) uurimuse väitel TFC (loodusvarad, rahvuslikud infrastruktuuri varad koos nt raskerelvastusega ning koos kulla ja finantsvaradega) maht on üldiselt väiksem kui SMHC – seega ligikaudselt hindame esialgselt hübriid sõja tingimustes mitte kõrgemaks kui 6 kuni 12 kordne SGDP p.c ehk 2016. a. NTFC p.c on vahemikus €(0,1;0,2)M.
  4. Rahvus-riikliku institutsioonkapitali (NINC) hulka kuuluvad eeskätt rahvuslike administratiivsete institutsioonide varad nagu eeskättFukuyama(2014) järgi: riiklikud- ja poliit-organisatsioonid, rahvusliku kaitse organisatsioonid, rahvuslik monetaar-ja fiskaal-süsteem koos maksusüsteemiga, rahvusvahelistesse liitudesse, blokkidesse, kuulumine jne. Nende rahaline olevikuväärtus on eeskätt mõõdetav nende loomiseks tehtud investeeringutega ning amortiseerumisega (Hodgson (1998)). Autori arvates nende agregeeritud makrovarade usaldusväärseks detailide vabaks rahaliseks mõõtmiseks mesoökonoomiliste agregaatide aluse) on ilmselt vaja veel mahukaid detailseid statistilisi välitöid teha mikrotasandil: väga esialgselt ning subjektiivselt/intuitiivselt võiks NINC p.c hinnang olla vahemikus €(0,1;0,2)M – vt nt Ennuste (2016).
  5. Rahvuslik informaalne intellektuaalvara (NIIC) nagu rahvuslik: teadus- ja uskumusvara ning kultuurivara on samuti mõõdetavad nendesse süsteemidesse eelnevalt aegade jooksul tehtud panustuste ning vastavate varade hävitustega ning röövimistega (nt okupantide poolt ajalooliste arhitektuuri väärtuste hävitamise, raamatukogude laastamise, kunstiteoste varastamisega jne) Jällegi autori arvates nende agregeeritud makrovarade usaldusväärseks detailide vabaks rahaliseks mõõtmiseks on ilmselt vaja veel mahukaid detailseid statistilisi välitöid teha: väga esialgselt ning subjektiivselt/intuitiivselt võiks NIIC p.c hinnang olla vahemikus €(0,1;0,2)M – vt nt Ennuste (2016).

P.S.: Arusaadavalt oleks ülaltoodud subjektiivseid erineva tõeväärtusega esialgseid suure ligikaudsusega makro summade kokkuvõtteid (kaalutud erinevate ligikaudsete tõeväärtustega) laialt avaldama pole mõttekas – enne kui  uuringut ei ole vastavate rahvusvaheliste sõltumatute (sic!) oivakeskuste poolt korrigeeritud. Kuid siiski nende summade saab juba üsna suure tõenäosusega oletada nt – et Eestis seni tehtud uuringud NLi pikaajalise okupatsiooni rahvuslike majanduskahjude kohta on – tänapäeva makroökonoomika ja sotsiaalküberneetika rakursist – magnituudides allahinnatud: ja seda on hübriidsõja tingimustes rahvuslike strateegiate/poliitikate optimeerimiseks vaja numbriliselt kasvõi suure ligikaudsusega teada – sest paraku hübriidsõda on suuresti reokupeerimisele suunatud ning tugineb oluliselt eelnenud pikaajalise okupatsiooni ja selle jäätmete poolt meie rahvuslike ressursside kahjustuste ärakasutamisele (Schmid-Schmidsfelden&Potapova (2016), RAND (2017).

 

P.S.P.S.: Tõesuse tõenäosusega üle 0,7:

SMHC p.c – €(0,1;0,2)M –  E(0,2) – P(0,9)

IMHC p.c – €(0,2;0,6)M –   E(0,4) – P(0,8)

NISC p.c –   €(0,3;1)M   –    E(0,7) – P(0,7)

NTFC p.c –  €(0,1;0,2)M   – E(0,2) – (…)

NINC p.c –  €(0,1;0,2)M –   E(0,2) – (…)

NIIC p.c –    €(0,2;0,4)M –  E(0,3) – (…)

__________________________

Kokku p.c E(2,2)M ja P(0,7) – kus E on ülespoole ümardatud keskmise tähis  – ja P(…) tingliku tõesuse tõenäosuse vahemiku võimalk alampiir ning nt P(0,9) puhul eeldame keskmiselt usaldustõenäosust 95% ringis (usalduspiirides +/-15%) ning P=(0,7) puhul usalduspiirides +/-50% ja – (…) tähistab et andmete täpsustamine piisava usaldusväärsuseni jätkub. Tehniliselt Bayes’lik tinglik tõenäosus on defieeritud kui P(A/B) kus B tähistab siin parajasti kasutatava andmebaasi usaldustõenäosust.

Seega parajasti kogu rahvuslikult oleks eurodes olulisemate ressursside rahaline hinnang keskmiselt: (1,3×10*6)(2,2×10*6)=>2,5×10*12 ehk rohkem kui €2,5tn  – kus tn on triljoni tähis (triljon =10*12 – kus * on astendaja tähis) – ehk 2016 oleks eesti olulisemate rahvuslike ressursside rahalise mahu hinnang 2,5 triljoni euro ringis: (2;3)tn – P(0,7).

Samas keskmiselt ühe soomlase kohta võiks parajasti oluliste ressursside rahalist mahtu hinnata keskmiselt vähemalt kaks korda kõrgemaks ehk vähemalt viie miljoni euro ringis – seda palju kõrgemana pikaajalise otsese NLi okupatsiooni puudumise tõttu (vt nt Kukk (2005) ja Ennuste (1996)). Seega võiksime ressursside põhiselt hinnata meie pikaajalise okupatsiooni rahalist kahju p.c praegu hinnata kahe miljoni euro ringis: (1,5;2,5)M ehk rahvuslikult (2;3)tn euro piiridesse tõenäosusega P(0.7) ringis. Jääb lisada et Kukk (2005) poolt aastal avaldatud vastav hinnang mis põhines eeskätt SGDP formaalsete voogude kaotustele oli vähemasti tosin korda väiksem – sest riikliku komisjoni liikmena ei omanud moraalset vabadust informaalselt arvestada ei rahvuslike inim- ega sotsiaal-kultuuriliste- ning ka füüsiliste-varade kaotustega.

Mis veelgi olulisem et Rahi-Tamm (2005) poolt korrektselt avaldatud P(0,9) okupatsiooni pöördumatud inimkaotuste hulka (tolle ajastu käsitluse kontekstis) ei ole arvestatud ei emigratsiooni ega ka represseeritute paljude residentidest sugulaste olulist väljalangemist töövõimeliste ning elanike reproduktsiooni ressurssidest  – ometi kodumaisest makroökonoomilisest ning rahvusliku jätkusuutlikkuse aspektist on taoliste faktorite arvestamine oluline – ning – nende andmete osas vajalikud piisavad täpsustused lähematel aastatel jätkuvalt näivat Balti-Riikides toimuvat (StratCom COM ?) – seega pikaajalised rahvuslikud okupatsioonilised inimkaotuste mahtude rahalised hindamised (puuduv punkt 7.) jäävad edaspidiste uurimuste valda.

 

        OSUNDUSI (rühmitatud nende tõesuste tõenäosuste järgi kolmeks)

Tõesuse tõenäosusega üle 0,9

Diamond, Peter; Emmanuel Saez (AUGUST 2011) The Case for a Progressive Tax: From Basic Research to Policy Recommendations. CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 3548 CATEGORY 1: PUBLIC FINANCE: http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/diamond-saezJEP11opttax.pdf

European Commission (February 2015) “What is the “Beyond GDP”:http://ec.europa.eu/environment/beyond_gdp/index_en.html

Fukuyama, Francis (2014) Political Order and Political Decay. FARRAR, STRAUS and GIROUX, New York: 658.

Januskaite, Virginija; Lina Uziene (2015) „Intellectual Capital Measurements and National Strategy Development: Explaining the Gap“ – Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences 213 ( 2015 ) 161 – 166: Available online at http://www.sciencedirect.com

Abstract

The main purpose of the paper is to identify challenges that occur developing strategies based on national intellectual kapital (NIC) measurements. As it can be observed from IC literature, even though there are different methods to measure NIC, they are not commonly used among policy makers as a tool for strategic management decisions to raise competiveness of nation. This paper compares different approaches to measure NIC, reveals related problems and provides possible explanations accordingly. The findings of the paper show that there is a big gap between academic research and policy makers. Four major directions of explanations to bridge this gap are highlighted in the paper: (1) poor awareness of IC concept among policy makers, (2) methodology related issues, (3) changing leadership profile and (4) collaboration related issues. The insights to possible solutions are also presented. They reveal the need to research different countries regarding their NIC policy.

© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Kissinger, Henry (2014 –  e.k 2017)  World Order. Allen Lane: 420  (Index  on p408:  Estonia, Russian cyberattac on  p 345).

Lindmäe, Herbert (2015-1999) SUVESÕDA  … 1941, Tartu, OÜ Greif: 4825lk (sic! IX Köidet – üe).

OECD STATISTICS DIRECTORATE (10-Oct-2011) MEASURING THE STOCK OF HUMAN CAPITAL FOR COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: AN APPLICATION OF THE LIFETIME INCOME APPROACH TO SELECTED COUNTRIES – WORKING PAPER NO. 41 (This paper has been prepared by Gang LiuE-mail: gang.liu@oecd.org): http://www.oecd.org/std/research

 

ABSTRACT

This paper summarizes the outcomes of the first phase of the OECD human capital project. In so doing, it shows the feasibility of applying the lifetime income approach to measuring human capital for comparative analysis, both across countries and over time. It also highlights the feasibility of applying the methodology to the categorical data (i.e. by 5-year or 10-year age group) that are typically available within the OECD statistics system, rather than to data by single year of age required by the original Jorgenson-Fraumeni methodology. The results in this paper indicate that the estimated value of human capital is substantially larger than that of traditional physical capital. Ratios of human capital to GDP are in a range from around eight to over ten across countries, broadly in line with those reported in a number of national studies. The distributions of human capital by age, gender, and education show that men dominate women in terms of their human capital holdings. In addition, people with higher education are better off than those with lower education, and the same is true for younger people compared to their older counterparts, although the detailed patterns vary across countries. Decomposition analysis of changes in the volume of human capital demonstrates that changes in population structure between men and women had little effect on the change of human capital per capita. While in all countries higher educational attainment contributed positively to the change of human capital per capita, this is not always sufficient to offset the negative effect of population ageing;

as a result, the volume of human capital per capita appeared to have declined in some countries over the observed period. Finally, sensitivity analysis confirms that estimates of the value of human capital depend on the choice of the two key parameters, i.e. annual real income growth rate and discount rate, while within-country distribution of human capital and trends of the volume of human capital are less sensitive to these assumptions.

OECD (2016) How’s Life in Estonia? :

https://www.google.ee/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=OECD+(May+2016)+How%E2%80%99s+Life+in+Estonia%3F+Additional+information%2C+including+the+data+used+in+this+country+note%2C+can+be+found+at%3A+www.oecd.org%2Fstatistics%2FBetter-Life-Initiative-2016-country-notes-data.xlsx

Eurostat (110/2016 – 6 June 2016) Migrant integration in the EU labour market in 2015:

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/news/news-releases?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_jtJORfNw4amk&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=column-2&p_p_col_count=1&_101_INSTANCE_jtJORfNw4amk_delta=20&_101_INSTANCE_jtJORfNw4amk_keywords=&_101_INSTANCE_jtJORfNw4amk_advancedSearch=false&_101_INSTANCE_jtJORfNw4amk_andOperator=true&p_r_p_564233524_resetCur=false&_101_INSTANCE_jtJORfNw4amk_cur=2

Ott, A.F., U. Ennuste (1996) “Anxiety as a Consequence of Liberalization: an Analysis of Opinion Surveys in Estonia” – Social Science Journal, 33, 2, 149-164:

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0362

Rahi-Tamm, Aigi (2005) “Human Losses” In:  The White Book: Losses Inflicted on the Estonian Nation by Occupation Regimes 1940–1991”State Committee on the Investigation into Repression Policy of Occupation, Tallinn 2005: Estonian Encyclopaedia Publishers:25-48:

http://www.digar.ee/arhiiv/nlib-digar:8192

Rajasalu, Teet (2003) “Indicators of economic freedom and economic structure as determinants of growth and convergence in enlarging EU and priorities for Estonia”:  In: Essays in Estonian transformation economics, 2003, Tallinn: 9-32.

Raukas, Anto (2005) “Enormous Envirolmental Damage Caused by Occupation Army” In:  The White Book: Losses Inflicted on the Estonian Nation by Occupation Regimes 1940–1991”State Committee on the Investigation into Repression Policy of Occupation, Tallinn 2005: Estonian Encyclopaedia Publishers:133- 140:

http://www.digar.ee/arhiiv/nlib-digar:8192

STIGLITZ, Joseph E., Amartya SEN, Jean-Paul FITOUSSI et al. (2010) Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress:

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/gdp-and-beyond/publications

Raporti kaalukust näitab Eurostati autorite koosseis:

Juhtivad

Professor Joseph E. STIGLITZ, Chair, Columbia University

Professor Amartya SEN, Chair Adviser, Harvard University

Professor Jean-Paul FITOUSSI, Coordinator of the Commission, IEP

http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr

 StratCom COE (15.III 2017) StratCom laughs. In search of an analytical framework – ISBN: 978-9934-564-12-3: http://www.stratcomcoe.org/publications

Thorsten Janus, Daniel Riera-Crichton (2015) “Economic shocks, civil war and ethnicity” – Journal of Development Economics 115: 32–44:

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleListURL&_method=list&_ArticleListID=-1175221378&_sort=r&_st=13&view=c&md5=d185b1e7697a1a536327b241f9e4dd3b&searchtype=a

Tirole, Jean (1992) The Theory of Industrial Organizations. The MIT Press: 479.

Toomse, Rene (2015) Defending Estonia in peace and war. Retaining a small state near the aggressive neighbor by utilizing unconventional strategies; (supervisor: Jyrki Käkönen)  School of Governance, Law and Society, Tallinn University, Tallinn, Estonia: 245:

http://www.etera.ee/zoom/8725/view?page=1&p=separate&view=0,0,2067,2834

Schmid-Schmidsfelden, Hubertus; Kristina Potapova (2016) The Bear in Sheep’s Clothing: Russia’s Government-Funded Organisations in the EU. Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies:

https://www.google.ee/search?q=martensctre%20eu%20publications%20bear%20sheeps%20clothing%20russias%20government%20funded%20organisations

 StratCom COE (15.III 2017) StratCom laughs. In search of an analytical framework – ISBN: 978-9934-564-12-3: http://www.stratcomcoe.org/publications

Thorsten Janus, Daniel Riera-Crichton (2015) “Economic shocks, civil war and ethnicity” – Journal of Development Economics 115: 32–44:

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleListURL&_method=list&_ArticleListID=-1175221378&_sort=r&_st=13&view=c&md5=d185b1e7697a1a536327b241f9e4dd3b&searchtype=a

Tirole, Jean (1992) The Theory of Industrial Organizations. The MIT Press: 479.

Tongeren,  Jan W., van Ruud Picavet (2016) „Bayesian estimation approach in frameworks; integration of compilation and analysis“ In  EURONA — Eurostat Review on National Accounts and Macroeconomic Indicators: 7-49.

Toomse, Rene (2015) Defending Estonia in peace and war. Retaining a small state near the aggressive neighbor by utilizing unconventional strategies; (supervisor: Jyrki Käkönen)  School of Governance, Law and Society, Tallinn University, Tallinn, Estonia: 245:

http://www.etera.ee/zoom/8725/view?page=1&p=separate&view=0,0,2067,2834

Tõenäosusega üle 0,8

Best, Micael, Jonas Hjort, David Szakonyi (April 2017) Individuals and Organizations as Sources of State Effectivness and Consequences for Policy Design. CEPR Discussion Papers:

DP11968 Individuals and Organizations as Sources of State Effectiveness, and Consequences for Policy Design

CCDCOE (2016): https://ccdcoe.org/publications/books/legalconsiderations.pdf

 ………                

Abstract: How much of the variation in state effectiveness is due to the individuals and organizations responsible for implementing policy? We investigate this question and its implications for policy design in the context of public procurement, using a text-based product classification method to measure bureaucratic output. We show that effective procurers lower bid preparation/submission costs, and that 60% of within-product purchase-price variation across 16 million purchases in Russia in 2011-2015 is due to the bureaucrats and organizations administering procurement processes. This has dramatic policy consequences. To illustrate these, we study a ubiquitous procurement policy: bid preferences for favored firms (here domestic manufacturers). The policy decreases overall entry and increases prices when procurers are effective, but has the opposite impact with ineffective procurers, as predicted by a simple endogenous-entry model of procurement. Our results imply that the state’s often overlooked bureaucratic tier is critical for effectiveness and the make-up of optimal policies.

 

Chou, Yuan (2006) “Three simple models of social capital and

economic growth “– The Journal of Socio-Economics 35  889-912:

DOI: 10.1016/j. socec. 2005.11.053

Abstract

This paper proposes three models of social capital and growth that incorporate different perspectives on the concept of social capital and the empirical evidence gathered to date. In these models, the social capital impacts growth by assisting in the accumulation of human capital, by affecting financial development through its effects is the collective trust and social norms, and by facilitating networking between firms that result in the creation and diffusion of business and technological innovations. We solve for the optimal allocation of resources channelled into the building of so::cial capital, to examine the models ‘ comparative statics and dynamics, and demonstrate how a tax and subsidy scheme may correct the resource under-allocation that results from the public good aspect of social capital creation. Observed, in the social capital across countries are explained by, in government policies and the possibility of multiple equilibria and social capital, the poverty of noughts and crosses.

© 2006 Published by Elsevier Inc.

Ennuste, Ülo  (2014) „Towards Special Methodological Problems of Macro-Optimal Sociocybernetic International Economic Sanctioning Coordination Modelling: Introductory Remarks oPreliminary Postulates and Conjectures“ – Baltic Journal of European Studies Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2228-0588), Vol. 4, No. 2 (17), 150-158:

http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bjes.2014.4.issue-2/bjes-2014-0021/bjes-2014-0021.xml?format=INT

Hodgson, G. (2007) “Evolutionary and Institutional Economics as the New Mainstream?” – Evolutionary Institutional Economics Review, 4(1): 7-25.

Hodgson, G. (1998) Institution Building as an Industrial Strategy. PHARE-ACE Research Project P95-2234-R. (co-author Ülo Ennuste) University of Cambridge Working Papers: 527.

Hurwitcz, Leonid et al. (2007): http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2007/advanced.html

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Januskaite, Virginija; Lina Uziene (2015) „Intellectual Capital Measurements and National Strategy Development: Explaining the Gap“ – Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences 213 ( 2015 ) 161 – 166: Available online at http://www.sciencedirect.com

Abstract

The main purpose of the paper is to identify challenges that occur developing strategies based on national intellectual kapital (NIC) measurements. As it can be observed from IC literature, even though there are different methods to measure NIC, they are not commonly used among policy makers as a tool for strategic management decisions to raise competiveness of nation. This paper compares different approaches to measure NIC, reveals related problems and provides possible explanations accordingly. The findings of the paper show that there is a big gap between academic research and policy makers. Four major directions of explanations to bridge this gap are highlighted in the paper: (1) poor awareness of IC concept among policy makers, (2) methodology related issues, (3) changing leadership profile and (4) collaboration related issues. The insights to possible solutions are also presented. They reveal the need to research different countries regarding their NIC policy.

© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.

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Presentation at IACCP Congress 27-31 July, 2008 Bremen, Germany: Working Papers of the Institute for European Studies International University Audentes No 1:

http://www.ies.ee/iaccp2008/Kirch_et_al_paper.pdf

http://www.digar.ee/arhiiv/nlib-digar:30058

Kirch, A., Tuisk, T.; Reinkort, H.- H. (2011). Estonians and Russians in Contemporary Estonia: Is the Past still Dominating the Present? In J. Deutsch, M. Boehnke, U. Kühnen, & K. Boehnke (Eds.), Rendering borders obsolete: Cross-cultural and cultural psychology as an interdisciplinary, multi-method endeavor. Bremen : Jacobs University Bremen : International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology. pp. 106-120.

Kissinger, Henry (2014)  World Order. Allen Lane: 420  (Index  on p 408:  Estonia, Russian cyberattac on  p 345).

KUNČIČ, ALJAŽ (2014) „Institutional quality dataset“ –  Journal of Institutional Economics / Volume 10 / Issue 01 / March 2014, pp 135-161:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1744137413000192 (About DOI

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Kubiszewski, Ida; Robert Costanza, Carol Franco, Philip Lawn, John Talberth, Tim Jackson, Camille Aylmer (2013) “Beyond GDP: Measuring and achieving global genuine progress” – Ecological Economics 93 (2013) 57–68.

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Lucas, Edward (2014) The New Cold War: Putin’s Russia and the Threat to the West (Amazon.com Kindle).

Matsushima, Hitoshi (2008) „Role of honesty in full implementation“ – Journal of Economic Theory 139 2008  353 – 359: www.elsevier.com/locate/jet

 Kahan, Dan M., Asheley Landrum, Katie Carpenter, Laura Helft, Kathleen Hall Jamieson (2017) „Science Curiosity and Political Information Processing“ – Political Psychology“ –  38: 179–199, doi:10.1111/pops.12396, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.12396/epdf

Kaljulaid, Kersti (2017): https://www.president.ee/et/meediakajastus/intervjuud/13147-qrussia-is-a-threat-estonia-frets-about-its-neighborq-the-washington-post/index.html

http://www.digar.ee/arhiiv/nlib-digar:8192

KUNČIČ, ALJAŽ (2014) „Institutional quality dataset“ –  Journal of Institutional Economics Volume 10 Issue 01 March 2014, pp 135-161:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1744137413000192 (About D

Mägi, Kadi; Kadri Leetmaa, Tiit Tammaru, Maarten van Ham (2016) „Types of spatial mobility and change in people’s ethnic residential contexts“ – DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH VOLUME 34, ARTICLE 41, PAGES 1161−1192 PUBLISHED 28 JUNE 2016 http://www.demographic-research.org/Volumes/Vol34/41/ DOI: 10.4054/DemRes.2016.34.41:

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Schmid-Schmidsfelden, Hubertus: Kristina Potapova (2016) The Bear in Sheep’s Clothing: Russia’s Government-Funded Organisations in the EU. Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies:

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Thorsten Janus, Daniel Riera-Crichton (2015) “Economic shocks, civil war and ethnicity” – Journal of Development Economics 115: 32–44:

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleListURL&_method=list&_ArticleListID=-1175221378&_sort=r&_st=13&view=c&md5=d185b1e7697a1a536327b241f9e4dd3b&searchtype=a

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Toomse, Rene (2015) Defending Estonia in peace and war. Retaining a small state near the aggressive neighbor by utilizing unconventional strategies; (supervisor: Jyrki Käkönen); School of Governance, Law and Society, Tallinn University, Tallinn, Estonia: 245lk:

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 Tõesusega üle 0,7

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Ennuste, Ü. (2008) “Synthetic Conceptions of Implementing Mechanisms Design for Public Socio-Economic Information Structure: Illustrative Estonian Examples.” In: Kirch, Aksel et al. (Eds.) Socio-economic and institutional environment: harmonisation in the EU countries of Baltic Sea Rim: Tallinn University of Technology, 9 – 39: http://www.ies.ee/iesp/No4/Ennuste.pdf

Ennuste, Ü. (1993) „An outline for estimating long-term economic damage by means of analogy“ – Eesti TA Toimetised. Humanitaar- ja Sotsiaalteadused, 42, 1, 1-4.

Kukk, Kalev (2005) ”Economic Damages In: The White Book: Losses Inflicted on the Estonian Nation by Occupation Regimes 1940–1991State Committee on the Investigation into Repression Policy of Occupation, Tallinn, Estonian Encyclopaedia Publishers:141-171:    http://www.digar.ee/arhiiv/nlib-digar:8192

(puudub rahvuslike ressursside kaotuste hindamine)

Rahandusministeerium (12.IV 2017) 2017. aasta kevadine majandusprognoos. RM võrguteavik: 76lk – koostaja Madis Aben.

NB: Rahvusliku jätkusuutlikkuse (RJ) aspektist on sellel prognoosil rida puuduseid mis usaldusväärsust vähendavad (a) nt Eesti RJ lähendi – konvergentsi EL/28 keskmisele (KK) „prognoos“ on siin aastani 2015! – kusjuures 2016 kohta on formaalne statistika olemas – liiati on see „prognoos“ teadustühiselt moonutatult PPS vääringus (b) prognoosil on suur lünk selles osas et puudub makro-ressursside prognoos nt maksebilansi finantskonto osa – seega jääb teadmata millises mahus jätkub finantskonto kaudu lähematel aastatel rahvuslike finantsvarade slikerdamine investeeringute petunimede all välismaale nii residentide kui ka e-residentide poolt (c) avaldatud prognooside usaldusväärsust rängalt vähendab mitmete regressandide usalduspiiride puudumine ja seega ilmselt hübriidsõja riskide (eriti sanktsioonide sõja) rahvuslikult vastutustundetu ignoreerimine.

 

April 24, 2017 Posted by | Uncategorized | Leave a comment

Visand 24.IV (automaattõlkeks ingl)

Visand 23.IV 17 (eelretsenseerimiseks)

Ülo Ennuste (22.IV 17) Sotsiaal-küberneetiline lühiuurimus väikese rahvusriigi eksistentsiaalsete ressursside ligikaudse rahalise hindamise meetoditest, hübriid-jätkusõja tingimustes rahvusliku jätkusuutlikkuse kestlikkuse tõenäosuse kriteeriumi alusel: illustreerivaid eksperimentaal-arvutusi Eesti näitel koos eelmise poolesajandilise okupatsiooni kui ka selle pikaajaliste jäänuste kahjustuste negatiivsete mõjude ilmutatud arvestamisega

Eelmärkusi  

XXI sajandi akadeemiline sotsiaal-küberneetika peavool hindab hübriid sõja tingimustes solidaarsestesse kooperatiivsesse/koordineeritavasse suurliitudesse kuuluva rahvusliku väikeriigi majanduslikku-, sotsiaalset- ja küberneetilist-edukust eeskätt Meta-GDP põhiselt: eeskätt rahvusliku jätkusuutlikkuse kestlikkuse lähendi – konvergentsi kestlikkuse tingliku Bayes’liku tõenäosuse muutude alusel – ning makro-mudelites rahvuslikke institutsioone (Hodgson (2007;1998) ja ressursse ning riske ilmutatud kujul rahaliselt kvantifitseerides nii positiivselt kui negatiivselt –  ja seda eriti inimkapitali ning ka sotsiaalkapitali mahtude rahalise mõõtmisega nii otseselt kui kaudselt – ning rahaliselt mõõtes ka viimatise pikaajalise terroristliku okupatsiooni poolt tekitatud rahvuslikke kaotusi eeskätt inim-, sotsiaal- ning kultuuri-vara jne osas – sest praeguses hübriidsõjas on agressori eesmärgiks järjekordselt eestluse jätkusuutlikkuse kestlikkuse tõenäosuse erodeerimine püüdes selleks ka tugineda eelnenud okupatsiooni poolt tekitatud komplikatsioonidele – optimaalsete heidutus-strateegiate ja –poliitikate kavandamine nõuab vastavate rahvuslike ressursside mahtude võrreldavat kvantitatiivset hindamist ning selleks koostööd teaduslikku koostööd liitlaste sõltumatute oivakskustega.

  • Stiglitz et al. (2010) panevad rangelt teadusloogiliselt kindlalt paika et standardsed/formaalsed GDP indikaatorid on valdavas osas kitsalt turumajanduslikel voogudel põhinevad ja seega sobimatud nii rahvusliku jätkusuutlikkuse kui ka heaolu hindamiseks – seda eriti hübriidsõja suure määramatuse ning riskide tingimustes – ning ka rahvuslike tulude teaduslagedate ümberjagamise disfunktsionaalsete institutsioonide tingimustes (nt 0-kasumimaks mis partnerriike kahjustab ja hübriidsõjas agressorit subsideerib jne); edasi jäävad turumajanduslikust arvestusest välja nii rahvusliku sotsiaal-, inim-, kultuur- jne kapitalide/varade loomise jooksvate mahtude arvestused ning ressursside varude kui faktotite arvestused: mis veelgi olulisem et standardse GDP arvestuse sisse lähevad parajasti positiivselt nt mitmed hübriidsõja poolt põhjustatud kuriteod – nt 2007 pronksmäsu purustuste taastamistööd jne (Raporti usaldusväärsust kinnitab autorite teaduslik tippkompetentsus – koosseis lisatud – selles puuduvad nii politikaanid kui ka pankurid ning plutokraadid ja muud magnaadid nagu meil tavaks jne)

NB: Tõelise (G) mitteformaalse/teaduspõhise GGDP mahtude mõningad esialgsed rakenduslikud kvantitatiivsed hinnangumeetodid ja nende esialgsed tulemused arvestades mitteformaalseid nn sateliitkontosid on kirjeldatud ülevaatlikult järgnevates uurimustes

  http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/gdp-and-beyond/publications

http://ec.europa.eu/environment/beyond_gdp/index_en.html

 osundavad et akadeemilised/informaalsed GGDP mahud duaalhindades (ehk varihindades) milliseid on võimalik turuhindade puudumisel optimiseerimisteooriate võimekustega ligikaudselt rahaliselt hinnata – ületavad standardseid magnituudides ning inimressursside (laias mõistes koos põhielanikkonna reprodutseerimise kapitaliga) rahaline väärtus ületab selles kontekstis oluliselt füüsilise kapitali mahtu (vt nt OECD (2011) mis kahjuks kitsalt turumajandusliku statistika alusel ja kus Eesti kohta arvutused puuduvad – ja OECD (2016) kus leidub mõnigaid kaudseid kvantifikatsioone ka Eesti sotsiaalkapitali kohta).

  • Stiglitz et al. järgi arvestada tuleb adekvaatselt elanikkonna rahvuslikku turuvälist tegevust nii tulude hankimisel kui ka rahvuslike investeeringute soetamisel ja rahvuslike ressursside loomisel – seda eriti nii rahvusliku inim- kui ka sotsiaal- ning füüsilise- ja institutsionaal- kapitali soetamisel kodumajapidamiste ja turuväliste institutsioonide poolt – ning nende ressursside rahaliste mahtude hindamisel – ja seda suuresti informaalsete duaalhindade alusel. OECD (2011) keeruka valemi järgi inimkapitali mahu hindamine on keerukas isegi kitsalt turumajandusliku käsitluse puhul kus nt ei arvestata ka põlisrahva reproduktiivsusega seotud kodumajapidamiste inimressurssi – sama vihjavad Diamond&Saez jne; samuti ka sotsiaalkapitaliga lood eriti hübriidsõja riskide tingimustes arvestades sellega kaasnevaid rahvuslikke änge (vt nt Ott&Ennuste (1996) mis asümmeetrilised etniliste rühmade lõikes nt: eestikeelsed ja venekeelsed). Ja vt ka Chou (2006) abstrakti mis lisatud; rääkimata rahvuslikest küberneetiliste institutsionaalkapitalide rahalistest hinnanguest – KUNČIČ (2014).
  • Siinjuures on kahetsusväärne et suures osas meie rahvuslikud majandus- ning rahandus-poliitikud on poliitiliselt kitsalt motiveerituna jäänud rahvuslikult ebaadekvaatsete deterministlike GDP indikaatorite kummardajateks siiani (vt LISA) – mis moonutavad nende arusaamu tegelikust olukorrast ja riskide suurusest ning viivad neid rahvuslikult ränkadele väärotsustustele nt putinoid trollide poolt tekitatavatele rahvusliku sotsiaalkapitali kahjustustele eeskätt kiilulõõmisega ELis ning NATOs. Seda eriti hübriidsõja riskide tingimustes (vt Kissinger (2014), Lucas (2014), Toomse (2015), Kaljulaid (2017) jne) ning veelgi rohkem majandusküberneetiliste mehhanismide disainimisel – Diamond&Saez (2011) järgi nt praegune meie 0-kasumimaks on teaduslage mehhanism ning samas negatiivne institutsioon – eriti kui arvestada riskidega ning määramatustega.
  • Näiteid hübriidsõja probleemidest: strateegilise kommunikatsiooni sõjast 1) vt nt sanktsioonide sõjast Ennuste (2014) toodud kirjanduse viidetest et on vaja hierarhilist koordineerimissüsteemi kooperatiivses liidus 2) strateegilise kommunikatsiooni sõjast vt viiteid Ennuste (2008) et on vaja „sõnavabaduse“ piiranguid kremlimeelsete trollide suhtes jne 3) tähelpanu väärib ka nn ifolõhe akadeemilise ning poliitkorporatiivse leeri vahel (Januskaite&Uziene (2015) ja Kahan et al. (2017) tõdevad et seda lõhet mõnevõrra võib leevenda mõningate võimurite uudishimu) süvenemine strateegilises kommunikatsioonisõjas akadeemiliste ja poliitiliste institutsioonide vahel (vt ka StratCom COE (2015)) – seda eriti väikerahvuslike jätkusuutlikkuse kestlikkuse riskide tõenäosuslikkuse mõistmise osas 4) eriti sügav lõhe on on ühelt poolt tõenäosusliku käsitluse (teadusloogilises käsitluses tõde on tõenäosuslik ja vale ning faktoidid võivad pärineda mitte ainult pudrupäisusest vaid tõenäoselt ka sulilikust salakavalsusest (Wiener (1948)) – eriti strateegilises kommunikatsioonis) – ning teiselt poolt subjektiivse poliit-determinismi vahel (kus kasutusel hägusloogika).

Näide: NLi poolt pikaajalise okupatsiooni ja selle jäätmetega tekitatud rahvuslike täilike tõeliste kahjude rahalisest hindamisest kus arvestatakse eeskätt inimvaradega nt

 https://uloennuste.wordpress.com/2016/11/18/do-not-quote-18-xi-16/

NB: nt NLi pikaajalise okupatsiooni poolt Eestile tekitatud kahjude täiesti formaalne (riikliku standardese statistika alusel seega rahvuslike ressursside olemeid arvestamata) korrektne hinnang (Kukk (2005) tõenäoselt piirides (0,1;0,2)tn eurot (tn on 10 astmel 12) – seda küll 2004. a. andmete ja makroökonoomiliste peavoolu teooriate ning metodoloogiate alusel) ning – nagu tookordse Riikliku Komisjoni raames diplomaatiliselt eetiliselt korrektselt (nt Kirch et al. (2009)) oli võimalik (sh on Kukk vastutustundlikult tõdenud et NLi okupatsioon oli sisuliselt kolonisatsioon mis Fukuyama (2014 lk391) järgi seab esmaseks põlisrahvuse hävitamise) – arvestades nt et meie II Vabadussõja (Lindmäe (1999-2015) Köide IX lk542)) kaotused tulid täiesti maha vaikida – osutub nüüd parajasti hübriidsõja riskide tingimustes ning informaalsetes teaduspõhistes käsitlustes täiesti tühiseks – seda eriti meie rahvuslike inimvarade tohutute kaotuste tõttu barbaarses okupatsioonis ning pikaajaluste kahjustuste arvestuses mis jätkuvad siiani (Raukas (2005) nt radioaktiivsed jäätmed – vt ka LISA).

P.S.: On selge et ülalkirjeldatud kompleksete rahvuslike rahaliste informaalsete akadeemiliste tõenäosuslike (suuresti Bayes’like subjektiivsete hinnangute alusel: Tongeren et al. (2016) ning kaudsete makroökonoomiliste mõõtmiste tulemustel nagu nt Rajasalu (2003)) hinnangute usaldusväärsust hübriidsõja määramatuste ning strateegilise antagonistliku kommunikatsiooni tingimustes saab kindlustada – ainult ja ainult – laialdase hästi koordineeritud rahvusvahelise koostöö raames – rahvuslike teadmusstruktuuride sünergia metasünteesis. Jääb ehk vaid veel lisada et nendes rahvuslikes teadmus-struktuurides sisaldub tohutu akadeemiline vara – eeskätt sadade asjakohaste tippteaduslike ajakirjade ning sadade tuhandete tippteoreetiliste uurimuste sees peidus – kuigi mitmedki nendest uurimustest võib leida/osta mõne klikiga nt ka allolevate osunduste kirjandusviidetest – kuid ühelgi väikeriigil ei ole tippteadlaste pink küllalt pikk et kogu selles suures multi-dimensionaalsuses ning dünaamikas ja määramatuses ning komplementaarsete meetodite vallas üksi opereerida ning püüda arvukaid poliitpõhiseid korporatiivseid rahvuslikku jätkusuutlikkuse kestlikkuse tõenäosust õõnestavaid populistlikke väärotsuseid ära hoida – kuigi kohati oleks seda võimalik kiiresti ja kergesti teha nt: (a) nt teaduspõhiselt on  strateegilise kommunikatsiooni sõjas teatav “sõnavabaduse” piiramine absoluutselt oblikatoorne (vt nt Ennuste (2008). Nt isegi President Kaljulaid’i WaPo artiklile – https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/russia-is-a-threat-estonia-frets-about-its-neighbor/2017/03/24/011ad320-0f2b-11e7-9b0d-d27c98455440_story.html?utm_term=.ab0febde5386 – on ilmselt tosinad Kremli trollid diversioonilisi kommentaare lisanud (ja seda naljakam on et samas artiklis tunnistatakse ilmselt poliit-korrektsusest tõsiseltvõetavaks ilmselt kremlimeelse Y. Toom’i faktoidi nagu et venekeelses Narvas polevat parajasti mitte ühtegi putinoidi – muide Narva muudeti kiskjaliku NLi poolt venekeelseks sõjakuritegelikult etnilise puhastuse käigus ning seega parajasti eriti ohtlikus olukorras võimaliku kodusõja sütikuna Venemaa kaasabil – vt nt Thorsten&Riera-Crichton (2015)) (b) väga lihtne oleks läheneva Eesti eesistumise ajal EL/27-s jõustada teaduspõhised riske ning sulisid arvestavad maksuseadused mis liikmesriikides kõlvatute hargmaiste maksuparadiiside institutsioonid likvideeriks (vt EL Komisjoni vastavaid ettevalmistavaid Raporteid viimatistel aastatel) – ja – sellega EL/27 kui terviku nii sotsiaalkapitali kui ka kaitsevõimet suurendaks (samas kui meil teadustühiselt asendusteemasid kilplaslikult seltskonnameedias üles soojendatakse ning rahvuslikku teadmusruumi hägustatakse nt robotite sotsiaalmaksustamise dispuutidega jne :==) (c) mis selles hübriidsõjas meie jaoks eriti oluline et kiskjalik agressor eelnenud okupatsioonis kahjustas inimsusevastaselt oluliselt meie nii etnilist kui ka vaimset rahvuslikku struktuuri (vt nt Mägi et al. (2016) ja Noor (2005)) ning nüüd püüab valelikult siinse venekeelse elanikkonna inimõiguste päästmise nimel järjekordselt okupatsiooni taastada seejuures eestluse rahvuslikku sotsiaalkapitali nii rahvuslikult kui ka ideoloogiliselt lõhestades: seejuures üheks peamiseks relvaks valed valede otsa – nagu poleks okupatsiooni olnudki ja et küüditamise olid eesti rahva päästmiseks ning vene keel tuleb taastada riigikeelena jne. Täiesti kindlasti olid okupatsioonis meie põhirahvuse inimvara ja rahvusliku teadmusruumi kvaliteedi kaotused tohutud ning pikaajalised – XXI sajandi mõistes magnituudides suuremad senihinnatutest ja siiani oluliselt vähendavad eestluse jätkusuutlikkuse kestlikkuse tõenäosust – kuni ajaloolisele tõele tõeliselt/teaduspõhiselt näkku ei vaadata: nt et suure tõenäosusega juba tunamullu Tallinnas v.k domineeris (uurimuse Mägi et al. (2016) järgi).

P.S.P.S.: (a) tekst on mõeldud erialase rahvusvahelise koostöö hõlbustamiseks ning selles mõttes eeskätt ingl masintõlke jaoks sobivaid termineid ning koma asemel mõttekriipse kasutades ja nt GDP (kodumaine kogutoodang ja mitte SKT/SKP jne) (b) 30.III 2017 Eurostat avaldas värske ülevaate EL/28 276 piirkonna GDP p.c ebavõrdsuste kohta: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/news/news-releases. Kuigi see ülevaade on XXI sajandi makroökonoomika seisukohalt vaegteaduslik (vt nt Atkinson (2017) – nt kajastab ainult kitsalt turumajanduslikke indekseid) – siiski võib sellest ülevaatest nt ka OECD teadusosakondade raportite põhjal järeldada et ELi kui terviku sotsiaalkapitali tase on tõenäoselt vilets sest nende piirkondade majanduslike tasemete dispersioon on väga suur (seejures Balti-Riigid on piirkondadeks liigendamata jäänud. (c) vähemalt Eesti eesistumise ajal tuleks EL/27-s see probleem teaduspõhiselt Agendasse suruda  seda eriti arvestades et nt Econ.com 1.IV 2017 värske GDP prognoosi alusel 2018 kohta näib suure tõenäosusega et liikmesriikide lõikes on võimalik väita et sigma divergents näib jätkuvalt süvenevat ning seega mitmegi perifeeriariigi (eriti mis külgnevad kiskjaliku (Tirole (1992) termin oligopolide teoorias) impeeriumiga) rahvusliku jätkusuutlikkuse kestlikkuse tõenäosus näib eksistentsiaalselt kahanevat – kui endiselt võimurid eriti liikmesriikides (eriti kus venekeelsete kontsentreeritus kõrge) tõelistest sotsiaal-küberneetilistest (inc EL/27 kui terviku sotsiaalkapitali edendamisest) probleemidest pankurite/kröösuste juhtimisel populistlikult/teaduslagedalt mööda vaatavad (muide ajaleht The Economist omab kompetentset teadusosakonda).

Arusaadavalt peab Agendasse kuuluma ka see probleemistik:

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2016-0440&language=ET&ring=A8-2016-0317

Tänuavaldused: tänan SA VALGE RAAMAT juhatust rahalise toetuse eest mis võimaldas mul hankida ligemale poolsada tasulist värsket teaduspublikatsiooni sh väga kiiresti Amazon Kindle viimatisi suhtkalleid monograafiaid; sügav tänu Tallinna Ülikooli Akadeemilisele Raamatukogule võimaldamaks minul tasuta juurdepääsu tuhandetele sciensdirect.com artiklitele; asjalike nõuannete ning märkuste eest avaldan tänu oma pika-ajalistele akadeemilistele kolleegidele sellel alal: Geoffrey Hodgson, Attiat F. Ott, Ilari Tyrni, Teet Rajasalu, Peep Varju, Jaak Uibu, Aigi Rahi-Tamm, Alari Purju, Aksel Kirch, Anton Laur, …

Eriti tänulik oleks oodatavatele heategevuslikele kaasautoritele –  olen täiesti teadlik et niivõrd komplitseeritud prognostilisel alal üksi tegutsemine põhimõtteliselt ei loo praktiliselt piisava tõeväärtusega tulemusi.

 

LISA (retsenseerimata ja toimetamata visand 23.IV 17 – mitte viidata)

                                            „Parem  ligikaudu õige kui täpselt vale“

                                                                                              J.M. Keynes

Rahvuslike nähtavate ja nähtamatute makro-ressursside ligikaudse rahalise hindamise näiteid ning vastavate pikaajaliste okupatsioonikahjude mõjude rahalisest hindamisest – Eesti rahvusliku jätkusuutlikkuse kestlikkuse tõenäosuse aspektist nii rahvusvaheliste liitude kui hübriidsõja tingimustes

  1. Standardne/formaalne turumajanduslik inimkapital (SMHC) elaniku kohta (p.c) keskmiselt on OECD (2011) üldistatud tulemuste ülekandmise alusel (vt Abstract väidet et kogu SMHC on 8 kuni üle 10 korra suurem standardsest GDP mahust (SGDP) – kusjuures taoliste uuringute tulemuste tõesuse tõenäosust hinnatakse vähemalt 0,9 tasemele. See OECD uuring on tehtud tosina suhteliselt rikka ning etniliselt homogeense rahvusliku suurriigi kohta ja selle tulemuste Bayes’likul ülekandmisel etniliselt polaarsele ning rikkas majandusliidus perifeersele väikeriigile nõuab nii tulemuste vastavat usaldus-tõenäosuse vähendamist kui ka usalduspiiride laiendamist (vt nt Tongeren&Picavet(2016)) ja ametliku statistika (GDP ja elanike arvu jne) andmetel saame suure ligikaudsusega ning samas ilmselt piisava subjektiivse/Bayesliku tõenäosusega (0,8) esialgselt hinnata et Eesti 2016 jooksvates turuhindades ja oodatavate turumajanduslike sissetulekute meetodil – keskmine SMHC p.c asetseb lõigus: €(0,1;0,2)M – kus 0,1 ja 0,2 on lõigu alumine ja ülemine usalduspiir ning M tähistab miljonit.

NB: (a) see on kogu elanikkonna keskmise usalduslõik kusjuures OECD (2011) järgi nt mõne eliit-kohordi keskmine võib ligemale kaks korda seda keskmist ületada ehk olla nt €(0,1;0,2)M ning vastupidiselt – on ilmselt hübriidsõja tingimustes otstarbekas defineerida negatiivse keskmisega kohorte (b) kogu rahvusliku SMHC olemi määramisel 2016. a. seisuga  kasutatava elanike neto arvu juures tuleb siinkohal arvestada ainult kodumaiste residentidega ning nt okupatsioonist tingitud elanikkonna pöördumatute kaotuste hulka kuuluvad majanduslikus mõttes ka okupatsiooni aegsed emigrandid, okupatsiooni ajal poliitiliselt diskrimineeritud isikud, okupatsiooni tõttu kaotatud haridusvõimalused ning tervisekahjustused (c) ning mis samuti oluline: kogu elanikkonna struktuuri moonutamisega (eeskätt venestamisega) tekitatud kahjustused (kuna Eurostati (2016) järgi kolmandates riikides sündinute (seega eeskätt venekeelsete) positiivne majandusaktiivsus on madalam meie põhirahvuse omast – kuid need statistilised andmed vajavad parajasti täpsustamist (sest hübriidsõja tingimustes viimastel aastatel on etniline polaarsus ilmselt süvenemas).

2. Informaalne/turuväline kodumajanduslik (sic! puhtmajanduslik kuid hinnatud standardsetes jooksvates turuhindades) IMHC p.c ehk ka nn satelliit GDP (kodune laste kasvatamine, kodune eakate hooldamine, kodused majapidamistööd jne) mahud hinnatakse statistikute (nt aktiivsete tegevustundide ametlike statistikate alusel) poolt keskmiselt 2 kuni 3 korda suuremateks kui IMHC p.c – seega €(0,2;0,6)M.

3. Rahvuslik informaalne sotsiaalkapital (amorfne=nähtav/mittenähtav ning formaalne statistika suuresti puudulik – akronüüm NISC):Eesti kohta 2013 seisuga on mõningaid kvantitatiivseid mõõtmisi tehtud sotsiaalkapitali indeksi taseme kohta OECD (2016) uurimuses – kus on küll kahjuks piirdutud ainult rahvusliku üldise koostöövalmiduse taseme hindamisega 10 punkti süsteemis ja näitaja struktuuri ilmutatud kujul ei esitata – mis olevat enam vähem EL/28 keskmisel tasemel 5,8 punkti. Seejuures eristamata/separeerimata selliseid faktoreid nagu: elanikkonna reproduktiivsus ning sellega seotud perekondlikud bioloogilised kapitalid, sotsiaalsete/seltskondlike ühenduste kapital, majanduslik ebavõrdsus, etniline heterogeensus, agressor impeeriumi strateegilise kommunikatsiooni diversioonoperatsioonide destruktiivne negatiivne mõju, hübriidsõja ängide etniline asümmeetrilisus (nt Ott&Ennuste (1996)) jne. Rahvusliku informaalse (formaalne/riiklik statistika oluliselt puudub eriti hindade osas) sotsiaalkapitali (NISC) rahalise mahu p.c hindamiseks (sh nt eriti reproduktiivsus-kapitali mahu hindamiseks) standardsed turuhinnad puuduvad ning tuleb kõrge usaldusväärsusega uuringutes esmalt siirduda informaalsete duaalhindade (varihindade) kasutamisele. Seda ideaalis suurte dünaamiliste stohhastiliste optimeerimismudelite dekomponeeritud lahendamisel kus duaalhinnad kujunevad endogeenselt (kahjuks Eesti kohta taolised kvantifitseeritud mudelid parajasti puuduvad) Siis jääb üle suurema ligikaudsusega ning väiksema usaldusväärsusega taanduda rahvusvaheliste paneelide ökonomeetriliste faktoranalüüside kasutamisele nt Rajasalu (2003) ja eeskätt nn musta kasti meetodil: kus küll otseselt (tollele Rajasalu ajale omaselt) amorfse sotsiaalkapitali faktorit rakenduslikes arvutustes ei rakendatud – kuid kaudselt saame Rajasalu (2003)järgi leida sotsiaalkapitalile lähendeid ning nende kaudu NISC p.c mahtude hindamisel toorelt kasutama vastavate rahvusvaheliste teaduspõhiste hinnangute subjektiivset (antud juhul kahetsusväärselt ainult andmete ajalise transformeerimist koos tuleviku oodatavate summade diskonteerimisega (vt OECD (2016)) ja mineviku summade ajastamisega Eesti 2016 hinna-tingimustesse (vt nt Ennuste (1996)): NISC p.c – €(0,3;1)M.

4. Rahvuslik traditsiooniline füüsiline kapital (OECD termin – siin akronüüm NTFC).  OECD (2016) uurimuse väitel TFC (loodusvarad, rahvuslikud infrastruktuuri varad koos nt raskerelvastusega ning koos kulla ja finantsvaradega) maht on üldiselt väiksem kui SMHC – seega ligikaudselt hindame esialgselt hübriid sõja tingimustes mitte kõrgemaks kui 6 kuni 12 kordne SGDP p.c ehk 2016. a. NTFC p.c on vahemikus €(0,1;0,2)M.

5. Rahvus-riikliku institutsioonkapitali (NINC) hulka kuuluvad eeskätt rahvuslike administratiivsete institutsioonide varad nagu eeskätt Fukuyama (2014) järgi: riiklikud- ja poliit-organisatsioonid, rahvusliku kaitse organisatsioonid, rahvuslik monetaar-ja fiskaal-süsteem koos maksusüsteemiga, rahvusvahelistesse liitudesse, blokkidesse, kuulumine jne. Nende rahaline olevikuväärtus on eeskätt mõõdetav nende loomiseks tehtud investeeringutega ning amortiseerumisega (Hodgson (1998)). Autori arvates nende agregeeritud makrovarade usaldusväärseks detailide vabaks rahaliseks mõõtmiseks mesoökonoomiliste agregaatide aluse) on ilmselt vaja veel mahukaid detailseid statistilisi välitöid teha mikrotasandil: väga esialgselt ning subjektiivselt/intuitiivselt võiks NINC p.c hinnang olla vahemikus €(0,1;0,2)M – vt nt Ennuste (2016).

6. Rahvuslik informaalne intellektuaalvara (NIIC) nagu rahvuslik: teadus- ja uskumusvara ning kultuurivara on samuti mõõdetavad nendesse süsteemidesse eelnevalt aegade jooksul tehtud panustuste ning vastavate varade hävitustega ning röövimistega (nt okupantide poolt ajalooliste arhitektuuri väärtuste hävitamise, raamatukogude laastamise, kunstiteoste varastamisega jne) Jällegi autori arvates nende agregeeritud makrovarade usaldusväärseks detailide vabaks rahaliseks mõõtmiseks on ilmselt vaja veel mahukaid detailseid statistilisi välitöid teha: väga esialgselt ning subjektiivselt/intuitiivselt võiks NIIC p.c hinnang olla vahemikus €(0,1;0,2)M – vt nt Ennuste (2016).

P.S.: Arusaadavalt oleks ülaltoodud subjektiivseid erineva tõeväärtusega esialgseid suure ligikaudsusega makro summade kokkuvõtteid (kaalutud erinevate ligikaudsete tõeväärtustega) laialt avaldama pole mõttekas – enne kui  uuringut ei ole vastavate rahvusvaheliste sõltumatute (sic!) oivakeskuste poolt korrigeeritud. Kuid siiski nende summade saab juba üsna suure tõenäosusega oletada nt – et Eestis seni tehtud uuringud NLi pikaajalise okupatsiooni rahvuslike majanduskahjude kohta on – tänapäeva makroökonoomika ja sotsiaalküberneetika rakursist – magnituudides allahinnatud: ja seda on hübriidsõja tingimustes rahvuslike strateegiate/poliitikate optimeerimiseks vaja numbriliselt kasvõi suure ligikaudsusega teada – sest paraku hübriidsõda on suuresti reokupeerimisele suunatud ning tugineb oluliselt eelnenud pikaajalise okupatsiooni ja selle jäätmete poolt meie rahvuslike ressursside kahjustuste ärakasutamisele (Schmid-Schmidsfelden&Potapova (2016), RAND (2017).

P.S.P.S.: Tõesuse tõenäosusega üle 0,7:

SMHC p.c – €(0,1;0,2)M –  E(0,2) – P(0,9)

IMHC p.c – €(0,2;0,6)M –   E(0,4) – P(0,8)

NISC p.c –   €(0,3;1)M   –    E(0,7) – P(0,7)

NTFC p.c –  €(0,1;0,2)M   – E(0,2) – (…)

NINC p.c –  €(0,1;0,2)M –   E(0,2) – (…)

NIIC p.c –    €(0,2;0,4)M –  E(0,3) – (…)

__________________________

Kokku p.c E(2,2)M ja P(0,7) – kus E on ülespoole ümardatud keskmise tähis  – ja P(…) tingliku tõesuse tõenäosuse vahemiku võimalk alampiir ning nt P(0,9) puhul eeldame keskmiselt usaldustõenäosust 95% ringis (usalduspiirides +/-15%) ning P=(0,7) puhul usalduspiirides +/-50% ja – (…) tähistab et andmete täpsustamine piisava usaldusväärsuseni jätkub. Tehniliselt Bayes’lik tinglik tõenäosus on defieeritud kui P(A/B) kus B tähistab siin parajasti kasutatava andmebaasi usaldustõenäosust.

Seega parajasti kogu rahvuslikult oleks eurodes olulisemate ressursside rahaline hinnang keskmiselt: (1,3×10*6)(2,2×10*6)=>2,5×10*12 ehk rohkem kui €2,5tn  – kus tn on triljoni tähis (triljon =10*12 – kus * on astendaja tähis) – ehk 2016 oleks eesti olulisemate rahvuslike ressursside rahalise mahu hinnang 2,5 triljoni euro ringis: (2;3)tn – P(0,7).

Samas keskmiselt ühe soomlase kohta võiks parajasti oluliste ressursside rahalist mahtu hinnata keskmiselt vähemalt kaks korda kõrgemaks ehk vähemalt viie miljoni euro ringis – seda palju kõrgemana pikaajalise otsese NLi okupatsiooni puudumise tõttu (vt nt Kukk (2005) ja Ennuste (1996)). Seega võiksime ressursside põhiselt hinnata meie pikaajalise okupatsiooni rahalist kahju p.c praegu hinnata kahe miljoni euro ringis: (1,5;2,5)M ehk rahvuslikult (2;3)tn euro piiridesse tõenäosusega P(0.7) ringis. Jääb lisada et Kukk (2005) poolt aastal avaldatud vastav hinnang mis põhines eeskätt SGDP formaalsete voogude kaotustele oli vähemasti tosin korda väiksem – sest riikliku komisjoni liikmena ei omanud moraalset vabadust informaalselt arvestada ei rahvuslike inim- ega sotsiaal-kultuuriliste- ning ka füüsiliste-varade kaotustega.

Mis veelgi olulisem et Rahi-Tamm (2005) poolt korrektselt avaldatud P(0,9) okupatsiooni pöördumatud inimkaotuste hulka (tolle ajastu käsitluse kontekstis) ei ole arvestatud ei emigratsiooni ega ka represseeritute paljude residentidest sugulaste olulist väljalangemist töövõimeliste ning elanike reproduktsiooni ressurssidest  – ometi kodumaisest makroökonoomilisest ning rahvusliku jätkusuutlikkuse aspektist on taoliste faktorite arvestamine oluline – ning – nende andmete osas vajalikud piisavad täpsustused lähematel aastatel jätkuvalt näivat Balti-Riikides toimuvat (StratCom COM ?) – seega pikaajalised rahvuslikud okupatsioonilised inimkaotuste mahtude rahalised hindamised (puuduv punkt 7.) jäävad edaspidiste uurimuste valda.

        OSUNDUSI (rühmitatud nende tõesuste tõenäosuste järgi kolmeks)

Tõesuse tõenäosusega üle 0,9

Diamond, Peter; Emmanuel Saez (AUGUST 2011) The Case for a Progressive Tax: From Basic Research to Policy Recommendations. CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 3548 CATEGORY 1: PUBLIC FINANCE: http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/diamond-saezJEP11opttax.pdf
European Commission (February 2015) “What is the “Beyond GDP”:http://ec.europa.eu/environment/beyond_gdp/index_en.html
Fukuyama, Francis (2014) Political Order and Political Decay. FARRAR, STRAUS and GIROUX, New York: 658.

Januskaite, Virginija; Lina Uziene (2015) „Intellectual Capital Measurements and National Strategy Development: Explaining the Gap“ – Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences 213 ( 2015 ) 161 – 166: Available online at http://www.sciencedirect.com

Abstract

The main purpose of the paper is to identify challenges that occur developing strategies based on national intellectual kapital (NIC) measurements. As it can be observed from IC literature, even though there are different methods to measure NIC, they are not commonly used among policy makers as a tool for strategic management decisions to raise competiveness of nation. This paper compares different approaches to measure NIC, reveals related problems and provides possible explanations accordingly. The findings of the paper show that there is a big gap between academic research and policy makers. Four major directions of explanations to bridge this gap are highlighted in the paper: (1) poor awareness of IC concept among policy makers, (2) methodology related issues, (3) changing leadership profile and (4) collaboration related issues. The insights to possible solutions are also presented. They reveal the need to research different countries regarding their NIC policy.

© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Kissinger, Henry (2014 –  e.k 2017)  World Order. Allen Lane: 420  (Index  on p408:  Estonia, Russian cyberattac on  p 345).

Lindmäe, Herbert (2015-1999) SUVESÕDA  … 1941, Tartu, OÜ Greif: 4825lk (sic! IX Köidet – üe).

OECD STATISTICS DIRECTORATE (10-Oct-2011) MEASURING THE STOCK OF HUMAN CAPITAL FOR COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: AN APPLICATION OF THE LIFETIME INCOME APPROACH TO SELECTED COUNTRIES – WORKING PAPER NO. 41 (This paper has been prepared by Gang Liu, E-mail: gang.liu@oecd.org): http://www.oecd.org/std/research

 

ABSTRACT

This paper summarizes the outcomes of the first phase of the OECD human capital project. In so doing, it shows the feasibility of applying the lifetime income approach to measuring human capital for comparative analysis, both across countries and over time. It also highlights the feasibility of applying the methodology to the categorical data (i.e. by 5-year or 10-year age group) that are typically available within the OECD statistics system, rather than to data by single year of age required by the original Jorgenson-Fraumeni methodology. The results in this paper indicate that the estimated value of human capital is substantially larger than that of traditional physical capital. Ratios of human capital to GDP are in a range from around eight to over ten across countries, broadly in line with those reported in a number of national studies. The distributions of human capital by age, gender, and education show that men dominate women in terms of their human capital holdings. In addition, people with higher education are better off than those with lower education, and the same is true for younger people compared to their older counterparts, although the detailed patterns vary across countries. Decomposition analysis of changes in the volume of human capital demonstrates that changes in population structure between men and women had little effect on the change of human capital per capita. While in all countries higher educational attainment contributed positively to the change of human capital per capita, this is not always sufficient to offset the negative effect of population ageing;

as a result, the volume of human capital per capita appeared to have declined in some countries over the observed period. Finally, sensitivity analysis confirms that estimates of the value of human capital depend on the choice of the two key parameters, i.e. annual real income growth rate and discount rate, while within-country distribution of human capital and trends of the volume of human capital are less sensitive to these assumptions.

OECD (2016) How’s Life in Estonia? :

https://www.google.ee/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=OECD+(May+2016)+How%E2%80%99s+Life+in+Estonia%3F+Additional+information%2C+including+the+data+used+in+this+country+note%2C+can+be+found+at%3A+www.oecd.org%2Fstatistics%2FBetter-Life-Initiative-2016-country-notes-data.xlsx

Eurostat (110/2016 – 6 June 2016) Migrant integration in the EU labour market in 2015:

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/news/news-releases?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_jtJORfNw4amk&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=column-2&p_p_col_count=1&_101_INSTANCE_jtJORfNw4amk_delta=20&_101_INSTANCE_jtJORfNw4amk_keywords=&_101_INSTANCE_jtJORfNw4amk_advancedSearch=false&_101_INSTANCE_jtJORfNw4amk_andOperator=true&p_r_p_564233524_resetCur=false&_101_INSTANCE_jtJORfNw4amk_cur=2

Ott, A.F., U. Ennuste (1996) “Anxiety as a Consequence of Liberalization: an Analysis of Opinion Surveys in Estonia” – Social Science Journal, 33, 2, 149-164:

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0362

Rahi-Tamm, Aigi (2005) “Human Losses In:  The White Book: Losses Inflicted on the Estonian Nation by Occupation Regimes 1940–1991”State Committee on the Investigation into Repression Policy of Occupation, Tallinn 2005: Estonian Encyclopaedia Publishers:25-48:

http://www.digar.ee/arhiiv/nlib-digar:8192

Rajasalu, Teet (2003) “Indicators of economic freedom and economic structure as determinants of growth and convergence in enlarging EU and priorities for Estonia”:  In: Essays in Estonian transformation economics, 2003, Tallinn: 9-32.

Raukas, Anto (2005) “Enormous Envirolmental Damage Caused by Occupation Army In:  The White Book: Losses Inflicted on the Estonian Nation by Occupation Regimes 1940–1991”State Committee on the Investigation into Repression Policy of Occupation, Tallinn 2005: Estonian Encyclopaedia Publishers:133- 140:

http://www.digar.ee/arhiiv/nlib-digar:8192

STIGLITZ, Joseph E., Amartya SEN, Jean-Paul FITOUSSI et al. (2010) Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress:

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/gdp-and-beyond/publications

Raporti kaalukust näitab Eurostati autorite koosseis:

Juhtivad

Professor Joseph E. STIGLITZ, Chair, Columbia University

Professor Amartya SEN, Chair Adviser, Harvard University

Professor Jean-Paul FITOUSSI, Coordinator of the Commission, IEP

http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr

 StratCom COE (15.III 2017) StratCom laughs. In search of an analytical framework – ISBN: 978-9934-564-12-3: http://www.stratcomcoe.org/publications

Thorsten Janus, Daniel Riera-Crichton (2015) “Economic shocks, civil war and ethnicity” – Journal of Development Economics 115: 32–44:

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleListURL&_method=list&_ArticleListID=-1175221378&_sort=r&_st=13&view=c&md5=d185b1e7697a1a536327b241f9e4dd3b&searchtype=a

Tirole, Jean (1992) The Theory of Industrial Organizations. The MIT Press: 479.

Toomse, Rene (2015) Defending Estonia in peace and war. Retaining a small state near the aggressive neighbor by utilizing unconventional strategies; (supervisor: Jyrki Käkönen)  School of Governance, Law and Society, Tallinn University, Tallinn, Estonia: 245:

http://www.etera.ee/zoom/8725/view?page=1&p=separate&view=0,0,2067,2834

Schmid-Schmidsfelden, Hubertus; Kristina Potapova (2016) The Bear in Sheep’s Clothing: Russia’s Government-Funded Organisations in the EU. Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies:

https://www.google.ee/search?q=martensctre%20eu%20publications%20bear%20sheeps%20clothing%20russias%20government%20funded%20organisations

 StratCom COE (15.III 2017) StratCom laughs. In search of an analytical framework – ISBN: 978-9934-564-12-3: http://www.stratcomcoe.org/publications

Thorsten Janus, Daniel Riera-Crichton (2015) “Economic shocks, civil war and ethnicity” – Journal of Development Economics 115: 32–44:

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleListURL&_method=list&_ArticleListID=-1175221378&_sort=r&_st=13&view=c&md5=d185b1e7697a1a536327b241f9e4dd3b&searchtype=a

Tirole, Jean (1992) The Theory of Industrial Organizations. The MIT Press: 479.

Tongeren,  Jan W., van Ruud Picavet (2016) „Bayesian estimation approach in frameworks; integration of compilation and analysis“ In  EURONA — Eurostat Review on National Accounts and Macroeconomic Indicators: 7-49.

Toomse, Rene (2015) Defending Estonia in peace and war. Retaining a small state near the aggressive neighbor by utilizing unconventional strategies; (supervisor: Jyrki Käkönen)  School of Governance, Law and Society, Tallinn University, Tallinn, Estonia: 245:

http://www.etera.ee/zoom/8725/view?page=1&p=separate&view=0,0,2067,2834

Tõenäosusega üle 0,8

Chou, Yuan (2006) “Three simple models of social capital and

economic growth “– The Journal of Socio-Economics 35  889-912:

DOI: 10.1016/j. socec. 2005.11.053

Abstract

This paper proposes three models of social capital and growth that incorporate different perspectives on the concept of social capital and the empirical evidence gathered to date. In these models, the social capital impacts growth by assisting in the accumulation of human capital, by affecting financial development through its effects is the collective trust and social norms, and by facilitating networking between firms that result in the creation and diffusion of business and technological innovations. We solve for the optimal allocation of resources channelled into the building of so::cial capital, to examine the models ‘ comparative statics and dynamics, and demonstrate how a tax and subsidy scheme may correct the resource under-allocation that results from the public good aspect of social capital creation. Observed, in the social capital across countries are explained by, in government policies and the possibility of multiple equilibria and social capital, the poverty of noughts and crosses.

© 2006 Published by Elsevier Inc.

Ennuste, Ülo  (2014) „Towards Special Methodological Problems of Macro-Optimal Sociocybernetic International Economic Sanctioning Coordination Modelling: Introductory Remarks oPreliminary Postulates and Conjectures“ – Baltic Journal of European Studies Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2228-0588), Vol. 4, No. 2 (17), 150-158:

http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bjes.2014.4.issue-2/bjes-2014-0021/bjes-2014-0021.xml?format=INT

Hodgson, G. (2007) “Evolutionary and Institutional Economics as the New Mainstream?” – Evolutionary Institutional Economics Review, 4(1): 7-25.

Hodgson, G. (1998) Institution Building as an Industrial Strategy. PHARE-ACE Research Project P95-2234-R. (co-author Ülo Ennuste) University of Cambridge Working Papers: 527.

Hurwitcz, Leonid et al. (2007): http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2007/advanced.html

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (2006) ESTONIA 1940-1945TALLINN 2006: http://www.historycommission.ee (NB: p1126 ).

Januskaite, Virginija; Lina Uziene (2015) „Intellectual Capital Measurements and National Strategy Development: Explaining the Gap“ – Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences 213 ( 2015 ) 161 – 166: Available online at http://www.sciencedirect.com

Abstract

The main purpose of the paper is to identify challenges that occur developing strategies based on national intellectual kapital (NIC) measurements. As it can be observed from IC literature, even though there are different methods to measure NIC, they are not commonly used among policy makers as a tool for strategic management decisions to raise competiveness of nation. This paper compares different approaches to measure NIC, reveals related problems and provides possible explanations accordingly. The findings of the paper show that there is a big gap between academic research and policy makers. Four major directions of explanations to bridge this gap are highlighted in the paper: (1) poor awareness of IC concept among policy makers, (2) methodology related issues, (3) changing leadership profile and (4) collaboration related issues. The insights to possible solutions are also presented. They reveal the need to research different countries regarding their NIC policy.

© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Kahan, Dan M., Asheley Landrum, Katie Carpenter, Laura Helft, Kathleen Hall Jamieson (2017) „Science Curiosity and Political Information Processing“ – Political Psychology“ –  38: 179–199, doi:10.1111/pops.12396, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.12396/epdf

Kirch, Aksel; Marika Kirch, Tarmo Tuisk, Hanna-Hulda Reinkort and Aimar Altosaar (2008) Etics, Emics, Estonians and Russians in Contemporary Estonia: Is the Past still Dominating the Present?”

Presentation at IACCP Congress 27-31 July, 2008 Bremen, Germany: Working Papers of the Institute for European Studies International University Audentes No 1:

http://www.ies.ee/iaccp2008/Kirch_et_al_paper.pdf

http://www.digar.ee/arhiiv/nlib-digar:30058

Kirch, A., Tuisk, T.; Reinkort, H.- H. (2011). Estonians and Russians in Contemporary Estonia: Is the Past still Dominating the Present? In J. Deutsch, M. Boehnke, U. Kühnen, & K. Boehnke (Eds.), Rendering borders obsolete: Cross-cultural and cultural psychology as an interdisciplinary, multi-method endeavor. Bremen : Jacobs University Bremen : International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology. pp. 106-120.

Kissinger, Henry (2014)  World Order. Allen Lane: 420  (Index  on p 408:  Estonia, Russian cyberattac on  p 345).

KUNČIČ, ALJAŽ (2014) „Institutional quality dataset“ –  Journal of Institutional Economics / Volume 10 / Issue 01 / March 2014, pp 135-161:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1744137413000192 (About DOI

 Krugman, Paul (1990) Rethinking International Trade. The MIT Press: 282.

Kubiszewski, Ida; Robert Costanza, Carol Franco, Philip Lawn, John Talberth, Tim Jackson, Camille Aylmer (2013) “Beyond GDP: Measuring and achieving global genuine progress” – Ecological Economics 93 (2013) 57–68.

 Laitin, David (1998) Identity in Formation: the Russian-speaking Populations in the Near Abroad. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Lindmäe, Herbert (2015-1999) SUVESÕDA  … 1941, Tartu, OÜ Greif: 4825lk (sic! IX Köidet – üe).

Lucas, Edward (2014) The New Cold War: Putin’s Russia and the Threat to the West (Amazon.com Kindle).

Matsushima, Hitoshi (2008) „Role of honesty in full implementation“ – Journal of Economic Theory 139 2008  353 – 359: www.elsevier.com/locate/jet

 Kahan, Dan M., Asheley Landrum, Katie Carpenter, Laura Helft, Kathleen Hall Jamieson (2017) „Science Curiosity and Political Information Processing“ – Political Psychology“ –  38: 179–199, doi:10.1111/pops.12396, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.12396/epdf

Kaljulaid, Kersti (2017): https://www.president.ee/et/meediakajastus/intervjuud/13147-qrussia-is-a-threat-estonia-frets-about-its-neighborq-the-washington-post/index.html

http://www.digar.ee/arhiiv/nlib-digar:8192

KUNČIČ, ALJAŽ (2014) „Institutional quality dataset“ –  Journal of Institutional Economics Volume 10 Issue 01 March 2014, pp 135-161:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1744137413000192 (About D

Mägi, Kadi; Kadri Leetmaa, Tiit Tammaru, Maarten van Ham (2016) „Types of spatial mobility and change in people’s ethnic residential contexts“ – DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH VOLUME 34, ARTICLE 41, PAGES 1161−1192 PUBLISHED 28 JUNE 2016 http://www.demographic-research.org/Volumes/Vol34/41/ DOI: 10.4054/DemRes.2016.34.41:

http://www.demographic-research.org/volumes/vol34/41/default.htm

Noor, Heino (2005) “Permanent Health Damages” In: The White Book: Losses Inflicted on the Estonian Nation by Occupation Regimes 1940–1991State Committee on the Investigation into Repression Policy of Occupation, Tallinn, Estonian Encyclopaedia Publishers: 58-73: http://www.digar.ee/arhiiv/nlib-digar:8192

OECD (2011) MEASURING THE STOCK OF HUMAN CAPITAL FOR COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: AN APPLICATION OF THE LIFETIME INCOME APPROACH TO SELECTED COUNTRIES – STATISTICS DIRECTORATE- WORKING PAPER NO. 41 (This paper has been prepared by Gang Liu, OECD Statistics Directorate): http://www.oecd.org/std/research

OECD (2016) How’s Life in Estonia? :

https://www.google.ee/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=OECD+(May+2016)+How%E2%80%99s+Life+in+Estonia%3F+Additional+information%2C+including+the+data+used+in+this+country+note%2C+can+be+found+at%3A+www.oecd.org%2Fstatistics%2FBetter-Life-Initiative-2016-country-notes-data.xlsx

Ott, A.F., U. Ennuste (1996) “Anxiety as a Consequence of Liberalization: an Analysis of Opinion Surveys in Estonia” – Social Science Journal, 33, 2, 149-164:

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0362

Rajasalu, Teet (2003) “Indicators of economic freedom and economic structure as determinants of growth and convergence in enlarging EU and priorities for Estonia”:  In: Essays in Estonian transformation economics, 2003, Tallinn: 9-32.

RAND (2017) https://www.google.ee/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=hybrid+warfare+in+the+baltics.+threats+and+potential+responses

Schmid-Schmidsfelden, Hubertus: Kristina Potapova (2016) The Bear in Sheep’s Clothing: Russia’s Government-Funded Organisations in the EU. Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies:

https://www.google.ee/search?q=martensctre%20eu%20publications%20bear%20sheeps%20clothing%20russias%20government%20funded%20organisations

Thorsten Janus, Daniel Riera-Crichton (2015) “Economic shocks, civil war and ethnicity” – Journal of Development Economics 115: 32–44:

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleListURL&_method=list&_ArticleListID=-1175221378&_sort=r&_st=13&view=c&md5=d185b1e7697a1a536327b241f9e4dd3b&searchtype=a

Tirole, Jean (1992) The Theory of Industrial Organizations. The MIT Press: 479.

Toomse, Rene (2015) Defending Estonia in peace and war. Retaining a small state near the aggressive neighbor by utilizing unconventional strategies; (supervisor: Jyrki Käkönen); School of Governance, Law and Society, Tallinn University, Tallinn, Estonia: 245lk:

http://www.etera.ee/zoom/8725/view?page=1&p=separate&view=0,0,2067,2834

 Tõesusega üle 0,7

 Ennuste, Ülo (2016): https://uloennuste.wordpress.com/2016/11/18/do-not-quote-18-xi-16/

Ennuste, Ü. (2008) “Synthetic Conceptions of Implementing Mechanisms Design for Public Socio-Economic Information Structure: Illustrative Estonian Examples.” In: Kirch, Aksel et al. (Eds.) Socio-economic and institutional environment: harmonisation in the EU countries of Baltic Sea Rim: Tallinn University of Technology, 9 – 39: http://www.ies.ee/iesp/No4/Ennuste.pdf

Ennuste, Ü. (1993) „An outline for estimating long-term economic damage by means of analogy“  Eesti TA Toimetised. Humanitaar- ja Sotsiaalteadused, 42, 1, 1-4.

Kukk, Kalev (2005) ”Economic Damages In: The White Book: Losses Inflicted on the Estonian Nation by Occupation Regimes 1940–1991State Committee on the Investigation into Repression Policy of Occupation, Tallinn, Estonian Encyclopaedia Publishers:141-171:    http://www.digar.ee/arhiiv/nlib-digar:8192

(puudub rahvuslike ressursside kaotuste hindamine)

Rahandusministeerium (12.IV 2017) 2017. aasta kevadine majandusprognoos. RM võrguteavik: 76lk – koostaja Madis Aben.

NB: Rahvusliku jätkusuutlikkuse (RJ) aspektist on sellel prognoosil rida puuduseid mis usaldusväärsust vähendavad (a) nt Eesti RJ lähendi – konvergentsi EL/28 keskmisele (KK) „prognoos“ on siin aastani 2015! – kusjuures 2016 kohta on formaalne statistika olemas – liiati on see „prognoos“ teadustühiselt moonutatult PPS vääringus (b) prognoosil on suur lünk selles osas et puudub makro-ressursside prognoos nt maksebilansi finantskonto osa – seega jääb teadmata millises mahus jätkub finantskonto kaudu lähematel aastatel rahvuslike finantsvarade slikerdamine investeeringute petunimede all välismaale nii residentide kui ka e-residentide poolt (c) avaldatud prognooside usaldusväärsust rängalt vähendab mitmete regressandide usalduspiiride puudumine ja seega ilmselt hübriidsõja riskide (eriti sanktsioonide sõja) rahvuslikult vastutustundetu ignoreerimine.

April 24, 2017 Posted by | Uncategorized | Leave a comment

Õiendusi

Õiendusi http://pluss.postimees.ee/4073203/teadustoo-voi-soov-panna-okupandile-vastu-lougu?utm_source asjus

Eesti rahvuslikud pikaajalised kaotused NLi okupatsioonist pärinevad eeskätt okupantide  genotsiidilistest, sõjakuritegudest ja muudest inimsusvastastest (nt vägivaldsest venestamisest nii eestlaste küüditamise, vangistamise, hukkamise kui ka okupatsiooni ajal eriti väikelaste suhtkõrgest suremusest ja üldisest põliselanikkonna lühikesest elueast (tsiviliseeritud riikidega võrreldes – seda eriti nt Soomega võrreldes – rääkimata kommunistlikust venekeelsete anomaalsest immigratsioonipoliitikast ning sellega etnilise struktuuri polariseerumisest jne).

Seega eeskätt põliseesti inim-kapitali ja inim-varde ning rahvusliku sotsiaalkapitali ning ka rahvuslike  teadmus- ning kultuurivarade pöördumatutest kaotustest.

Nende kaotuste kohta on möödunud aastakümnetel arvukalt tõenduspõhiseid uurimusi tehtud – nt sellel sajandi mõningaid viimatisi publikatsioone:

 

http://www.communistcrimes.org/en/Database/Estonia/Estonia-Communist-Era

Herbert Lindmäe (2015) Suvesõda Harjumaal 1941. Köide IX (sic! kokku üheksa köidet 4852lk meie     II Vabadussõja ühe kangemasiku perioodi kohta – üe) GREIP, Tartu.

Peep Varju. Eesti laste küüditamine Venemaale 14. juunil 1941 kui genotsiidi- ja sõjakuritegu. Sihtasutus Valge Raamat, Tallinna Raamatutrükikoda, 116 lk, Tallinn 2013: http://digar.nlib.ee/digar/show/?id=134869

Estonia 1940-1945 (2006) – Estonian International Commission for the Investigation of Crimes Against Humanity, Tallinn: 1337pp.

Valge raamat: Eesti rahva kaotustest okupatsioonide läbi 1940-1991 (peatoim Vello Salo). Okupatsioonide Repressiivpoliitika Uurimise Riiklik Komisjon, Eesti Entsüklopeediakirjastus, 2005 Tallinn. http://digar.nlib.ee/digar/show/?id=8196  ehk

http://www.riigikogu.ee/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Valge-Raamat.pdf

Vello Salo (2005) The White Book. Losses Inflicted on the Estonian Nation by Occupation Regimes 1940-1991. State Committee on the Investigation into Repression Policy of Occupation, Estonian Encyclopaedia Publishers, Tallinn: http://digar.nlib.ee/digar/show/?id=8192  ehk   http://www.riigikogu.ee/public/Riigikogu/TheWhiteBook.pdf

Белая книга: о потерях, причиненных народу Эстонии оккупациями 1940-1991 / Государственная комиссия по расследованию репрессивной политики оккупационных сил; [перевод с эстонского: Андрей Бабаджан, Татьяна Верхоустинская, Эйнар Вяря ; редакторы Юло Эннусте … и др.; предисловие: Велло Сало] ORURK-24. Kirjastus Ilo. Tallinn, 2006: http://digar.nlib.ee/digar/show/?id=1604

Kuid okupatsiooni pikaajaliste kaotuste teaduspõhine hindamine peab jätkuma pidevalt sest (a) okupatsiooni jätted (nt Eesti etnilise struktuuri venestatus, siia jäänud radioaktiivne saast, siinsete okupantidest järeltulejate mõningate putinoid trollidele võimaldatud vaba vaenulik tegevus rahvusliku teadmusvara mürgitamisel jne) kahjustavad eestluse rahvuslikke jätkusuutlikkuseid siiani ja seda eriti hübriidsõja tingimustes kus kiskjalik agressorimpeerium üritab rekoloniseerimist

(b) sotsiaal-küberneetika ning makro-ökonoomika arenevad pidevalt nt XXI sajandil ELis kui OECDs on teaduspõhiselt kitsalt turumajanduslikelt GDP indikaatoritelt üle mindud Post-GDP indikaatorite hindamisele kus arvestatakse ka inimkapitali-, sotsiaalkapitali-, kultuurikapitali-, institutsionaalkapitali-loomist jne – ning GDP indikaatorite asemel eksistentsiaalsete kriteeriumitena rahvusliku jätkusuutlikkuse kestlikkuse ning sigma konvergentsi tõenäosuse maksimeerimist jne – vt nt:

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/gdp-and-beyond/publications

https://uloennuste.wordpress.com/2016/11/18/do-not-quote-18-xi-16/

  • jääb lisada NLi okupatsiooni ajal käsumajanduslikus süsteemis planeerimine toimus sisuliselt eeskätt naturaalnäitajate alusel ning hinnad ning rahalised näitajad olid eeskätt puhtformaalsed ning poliitilised defitsiidimajanduslikud – näitamaks et liitriigid on kõik Moskvale võlgu ja iseseisvalt hakkama ei saaks – selle saavutamiseks olid liitriikide rahvuslikud sotsiaal-majanduslikud sfäärid dekomponeeritud nn üleliidulisteks sektoriteks ja kohalikeks. Seejuures üleliidulistes sektorites toimusid tehingud suuresti nt barteri printsiibil (nt ENSV energeetikasektori ametlikus statistikas oli kirje et oluline osa siin toodetud elektrist „anti vabariigist mujale“ nagu oli ka märkus et põllumajanduse toodangu hindades ei ole kogu väärtust ja see realiseerub tööstuste kaudu – sama toimus välisekspordis jne – seega liitriikide keskpankade rahavood olid ainult osalised ja hindades mis ei omanud mitte mingit sisulist tähendust)
  • Artikli kohta niipalju et ajakirjanikud ei küsinud arvamust ajaloolase Gatis Krumins’i küsitava tõenduspõhisusega ning puuduliku asjatundlikkusega narratiivi kohta mitte ühegi meie monetaar- ega fiskaal- teadlase rääkimata meie okupatsioonikahjude uurijate käest – rääkimata nt majandusteadlase dr K. Kukk’e käest (kes on nii rahandus- kui ka okupatsioonikahjude rahvusvaheliselt tunnustet autor – vt „Valgest raamatust“ dr Kukk’e pt mis olla tõlgitud ka läti keelde) – PMi ajakirjanikud eelistasid eeskätt meie väheusaldusväärseid rusikavehkijaid eks-kommuniste küsitleda kes igal alal ja ajal ning iga kell mihklid – ning Krumins’i meeskonna teksti AVASTUSEKS tituleerida).

April 10, 2017 Posted by | Uncategorized | Leave a comment

Visand 20.II 2017

Konspektiivselt: natsionaalse positiivse inimkapitali sotsiaalküberneetilisest hindamisest jätkusuutlikkuse aspektist – hübriidsõja kommunikatsiooniriskide tingimustes (visand 20.II 2017 – mitte osundada)

Selles puhtskolaarses pealiskaudses üheautori kiirlühiülevaates viimatistest tähelpanu äratanud uurimustest – on püütud eeskätt Norbert Wiener’i (1948 ja 1954 – e.k 1961 ja 1969) monograafiate jälgedes (kus sotsiaal-küberneetilises tasakaalus/jätkusuutlikkuses kommunikatsioonimürade ning sulide poolt lollide hulgas tekitatud rahvuslike riskide ja määramatuste osakaal eriti suur) edasi vaadata kõige viimati ilmunud vastavatelt publikatsioonidelt – ning seda eriti hübriidsõja küberneetilistest strateegilise kommunikatsiooniriskidest hägustatud ning lõhestatud sootsiumite jätkusuutlikkuse kestlikkuse tõenäosuse probleemidele kontsentreerudes  – eeskätt intellektuaal-/teadmus-kapitali faktorite aspektist* ning kommunikatiivse agressiivsuse ohjeldamise potentsiaalidest**2008 – seda komplekse positiivse tsensuuri jõustamisega tõeääkimise stimuleerimiseks – positiivse selles Wiener’likus mõttes et põhirahvuse enda vaimsus- ja teadmus-ruumi kvaliteet ei kannataks.

*) Muntean, Laura; Oprean, Constantin; Titu, Mihail Aurel (2016) „CONTRIBUTION OF HUMAN RESOURCES TO THE SUSTAINABILITY OF THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATIONS“The 2nd International Scientific Conference SAMRO  Romania, October, 2016: 260-293.

ABSTRACT

Sustainability is a new concept, developed during the second half of the 20th century, which

started out from scientists’ and politicians’ awareness regarding the vulnerability of the resources necessary in order to survive as well as the need to ensure the resources for the survival of the present and future generations. The development of this concept became particularly widespread, being tackled, studied and developed by all scientific fields; thereby no scientific process can be conceived today without taking into account the characteristics of sustainable development. Identifying the paths to ensure sustainability for all types of capital is no longer a challenge, but a necessity. Human capital represents the most important form of capital of the modern organizations. Identifying this form of capital at the level of the organization and harnessing it are the preliminary stages in the process of identifying how this type of capital can be preserved, regenerated, or totally

or partially replaced.

ja

Zambon, Stefano  (2016) “Ten years after: the past, the present and the future of scholarly investigation on intangibles and intellectual capital (IC)”, Journal of Intellectual Capital, Vol. 17 Iss: 1: http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/JIC-11-2015-0093  http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/full/10.1108/JIC-11-2015-0093

ja

Januskaite, Virginija; Lina Uziene (2015) „Intellectual Capital Measurements and National Strategy Development: Explaining the Gap“ – Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences 213 ( 2015 ) 161 – 166: Available online at http://www.sciencedirect.com

Abstract

The main purpose of the paper is to identify challenges that occur developing strategies based on national intellectual capital (NIC) measurements. As it can be observed from IC literature, even though there are different methods to measure NIC, they are not commonly used among policy makers as a tool for strategic management decisions to raise competiveness of nation. This paper compares different approaches to measure NIC, reveals related problems and provides possible explanations accordingly. The findings of the paper show that there is a big gap between academic research and policy makers. Four major directions of explanations to bridge this gap are highlighted in the paper: (1) poor awareness of IC concept among policy makers, (2) methodology related issues, (3) changing leadership profile and (4) collaboration related issues. The insights to possible solutions are also presented. They reveal the need to research different countries regarding their NIC policy.

© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Navarro, José Luis Alfaro et al. (2011) “Estimation of intellectual capital in the European Union using a knowledge model“ – Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij.  vol. 29  sv. 1: 109-132:

UDC 005.336.4: 001.101: 061.1

 Abstract

This paper presents a model aimed at measuring intellectual capital as the

potential knowledge of a country and apply it to the European Union. The method

consists of activating accountable expenses, assumed to generate knowledge. In

order to do so, efficiency indicators are used, derived from a summary of variables

of structural, human and technological capitals by means of factor analysis. The

results of this study for the EU25 in 2006 explain why Northern Europe has greater

intellectual capital potential. They are more productive, as they manage and apply

new technologies better. In human capital, Eastern countries have strong potential.

The paper concludes that, at the conceptual level, this information should be used

to design convergence policies and balanced development strategies to ensure

economic growth.

**)  Ennuste, Ü. 2008. Synthetic Conceptions of Implementing Mechanisms Design for Public Socio-Economic Information Structure: Illustrative Estonian Examples. Kirch, Aksel et al. (Eds.) Socio-economic and institutional environment: harmonisation in the EU countries of Baltic Sea Rim: a collection of research articles dedicated to the 10th Anniversary of the Institute for European Studies, Tallinn: Tallinn University of Technology, 9 – 39: http://www.ies.ee/iesp/No4/Ennuste.pdf

ja

https://uloennuste.wordpress.com/2016/11/18/do-not-quote-18-xi-16/

 

P.S.:

Kehtiva formaalse ametlikult üldtunnustatud standardse GDP (kasutan rahvusvahelises teaduskirjanduses põlistunud akronüüme) statistika vaegusteks rahvusliku jätkusuutlikkuse kestlikkuse riskide mõttes on eeskätt see et (a)*2016 I –  arvestatakse ainult kitsalt turumajanduslikke tehinguid/vooge ja mitte rahvusliku jätkusuutlikkuse eksistentsiaalseid indikaatoreid – ning  seega tõelise teaduspõhise informaalse käsitluse seisukohalt standardse GDP maht moodustab ainult murdosakese tegelikust rahvuslikust aktiivsusest – ning seejuures pigistatakse silmad täiesti kinni GDP mahu kasutamise efektiivsusest rahvusliku jätkusuutlikkuse huvides jne (b)** ei arvestata peaaegu üldse isegi ainelisi rahvuslikke ressursse – välja arvatud vihjamisi GDP lõhe arvutustes – ning sageli (nagu meil) ei arvestata täielikult kodumajapidamiste ainelisi investeeringuid – seda eriti põhielannikkonna reproduktiivsuse ning selles intellekutaalkapitali ressursside eskaleerimises (c) üldsegi ei arvestata natsionaalseid ainetuid ressursse nagu nt natsionaalset positiivset intellektuaalset inimkapitali (NIC – rahvusvaheliselt teaduskirjanduses tunnustet akronüüm) ega rahvuslikku sotsiaalkapitali, institutsionaalvarasid ega rahvusliku teadmus- ning kultuuri-struktuuri varasid jne, jne.

Kõik see kokku päädib sellega et hübriidsõja tingimustes pahatahtlike ning sulitsevate trollide negatiivsete strateegiliste kommunikatsioonide efektid jäävad põhiliselt suurele osale rahvuslikule sootsiumile mõistmatuks ja seega rahvusliku jätkusuutlikkuse kestlikkuse tõenäosuse erosioon ning divergents ning seega rahvuslikud rahalised kaotused tõelistes optimumhindades (varihindades**2016) märkamatuteks ja seega ka rahvusliku katastroofi lähenemise tõenäosuse suurenemine laiale publikule ning valijaskonnale jääb hoomamatuks – mille suhtes Wiener meid on juba eelmise sajandi keskel juba hoiatanud.

NB: strateegilises kommunikatsioonis on kremlimeelsete trollide üheks peamiseks võtteks parajasti**2008 faktoidide kaskaadides levitamise teel kiilu lõõmine ja lõhede ning vastakuste tekitamine nii EL/28 liikmesriikide vahel kui ka nende sees olevate etniliste/lingvistiliste/usundiliste  ning erineva varakusega ning piirkondlike jne rühmade vahele – eeskätt rahvusliku sotsiaalkapital ning teadmusstruktuuri õõnestamiseks ning seega ka efektiivse põhirahvusliku jätkusuutlikkuse kõigutamiseks – kõige sellega seotult tõelised rahvuslike kaotuste mahud rahaliselt on tohutult suuremad kui seda võimaldavad otseselt kvantitatiivselt/rahaliselt mõõta standardsed ametlikud statistikad ning ning kvantifitseeritult käsitleda populistlikud „poliitkorrektsed“ ignorantsed heietused massimeedias eeskätt eesmärgiga poliitkonkurentide laimamiseks elektoraadi ees.

NBNB: Osundatud värskemates uurimustes strateegilise kommunikatsiooni vallas on domineerivaks kujunenud eeskätt nii rahvusliku intellektuaal- kui ka sotsiaal- ning ka institutsionaa-kapitali mahtude ja efektide mõõtmine ja seda eeskätt rahvusliku jätkusuutlikkuse kestlikkuse tõenäosuse hindamise seisukohalt: nt ScDirectist vastavaid päringuid tehes nt Intellektuaalkapiali kohta tuleb silmapilkselt vastuseks osundused kümnete tuhandetele teadusuuringutele. Tõsi küll et sellel alal vastavad terminid ei ole veel rangelt välja kujunenud nagu ka vastavad mõõtmismetoodikad – seda eriti turbulentsetes keskkonna- ning puuduliku statistika-tingimustes.

Kuid esialgselt võib suure tõenäosusega väita et domineerivateks esitentsiaalseteks faktoriteks/regressoriteks näivat kujunevad eeskätt nii positiivsed inimkapitali/intelligentsi kui ka sotsiaalkapitalis inimreproduktsiooni/fertiilsuse rahvuslikud ressursid/varad – seda nii prospektiivsetes konvergentsi prognoosides kui ka retrospektiivsetes analüüsides: nt kui NLi poolse barbaarse poolesajandilise okupatsiooni hinnaguks formaalselt ametliku statistika alusel Eesti rahvuslike turumajanduslike standardsete kaotuste mahuks on 2004 jooksvates hindades ligikaudu triljon krooni (vt „Valge raamat … 2005“ – võrgus priilt saadaval kolmes keeles) siis 2010 püsihindades 2015 seisuga ning informaalselt ning mittestandardselt ehk teaduspõhiset ning ülalosundatud uurimustele toetudes arvestades ka rahvuslike inimkaotustega seotud tõeliste majandusvoogude kui ka ressursside koatuste mahtu – ilmselt võiksime saada esialgselt tulemuseks kaotuse kogumahuks ligikaude triljoni euro ringis**2016.

 

February 20, 2017 Posted by | Uncategorized | Leave a comment

Memo 3.I 17

Memo 3.I 17 – Microsoft Translator of Origional* (Do not quote!)

President of Estonia Kersti Kaljulaid in the interview for newspaper POSTIMEES (PM) on 22.XII 16 said:

“it must be able to see these trends, how the problem of some kind, seeks to tilt public opinion to someone else. It is emerging as a separate branch of social science disciplines, strategic communications, their understanding of the techniques and their going to be dealing with. In Latvia, by the way, is Excellence Center (sic! – üe) created for analyses.”

To clear (a) that such centers must be coordinated to create in all of the Baltic countries (Poland, Inc.), and (b) the occupation of the Baltic States by the terrorist-caused by the NLi’s long-term socio-economic damages based on Science/informal** clarification of the coordinated field must fall within the competence of those centres (see also PM 30.XII p. 3 “Reinsalu wants to submit the Bill to Russia”.  While it has been argued that the assessment of the losses of Latvia as of 2016. the year was EUR 0.19 trillion in volume – which shows that the investment in human capital (especially the elite), and the social capital of the cultural endowment, and the casualties of national institutional have not been competently assess – perhaps these losses have not rated the level of nationalist) – (c) with the view of strategic communications is the scientific meaning of the thing “invoice submission” of strategic populist point far away – it is in particular in the Kremlin’s side in a new occupation/colonization of the event at the research-based strategy to be applied internationally, communication deterrent in the Baltic Countries, in order of sustainability-– this not the humiliation of compromise-factoid idée right on the way – but the Kremlin’s magnum national and the long-term consequences of the crimes against humanity of the approximate financial evaluation on the way: this particular ethnicities of the sustainability of sustainability erosion.

P.S.: (a) the informal/non-standard  evaluation also includes the assessment of damages in an undocumented what modern socio-cybernetics in macro-and micro/detail-free methods (Bayesian change such as Tongeren, Jan w. van and Ruud Picavet (2016) “Bayesian estimation approach in the will; integration of the compilation and analysis “In the EURO, Eurostat — the Review is a National Accounts and are accompanied by Indicators: a 7-49) allow (see** and Harrison, Glenn W., Mart´ınez-Correa, Jimmy, Swarthout, J.Todd, Ulm, Eric R., Scoring Rules for Subjective Probability Distributions. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.12.001) – including (b) estimates of the loss of human capital, human resources, national and official institutions, the destruction of the damages (including the destruction of families, such as fertile), a distortion in the national related losses, such as in connection with the real (informal/non-standard) distortions of genuin GDP volumes to market based positive activities, etc.), the distortion of the national demographic structures, Russification etc. etc. (for example, ** according to the assumptions of science-based methods to the show dozens of times in the larger national of the traditional and formal (based on official statistics) ratings: thus, not 100-200 billion euros in the Baltic-about the country – but – most likely 1-2 trillion euros – with the most so far higher than the estimate of damages Estonian PhD Kalev Kukk’s by is 0.15 trillion (the WHITE PAPER 2005) – which is so low in the sense that our national human assets and the destruction of social capital and other national institutions, the size of the losses was the long-term were not taken into account, formally financially – such as at the time was still internationally colonial-policies by analyzing the micro-economically the practice – or rather, into the mainstream of the macro-audiovisual sector, but was the great reluctance of the informal “amorphos” stochastic (one example of a stochastic approach in mechanism design – Ennuste, Ü., 1989. Some Models of Stochastic Planning Mechanisms. – The Finnish Economic Papers, 2, 2, 116-124. http://econpapers.repec.org/article/fepjournl/v_3a2_3ay_3a1989_3ai_3a2_3ap_3a116-124.htm , and http://www.taloustieteellinenyhdist – and –  another example in optimizing agents activite structure: Ennuste, Ü. 1969. Uncertainty, Information and Decomposition in the Planning of a Production System. – Economics of Planning, 9, 3, 258 – 266:

https://springerlink3.metapress.com/content/apt25151401mm553/resource-secured/?target=fulltext.pdf&sid=fvfx4a45bfltmq55fcc0xk55&sh=www.springerlink.com (NB maksab ca 40 eurot).

But tehse complicationsthat are now almost fully been exceeded also practically so according to Eurostat (see the “GDP and Beyond”) as well as by the OECD (see OECD (1998) Human Capital Investment: An International Comparison (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Centre for Educational Research and Innovation) – more in theory, see, e.g., here in 2006, Chou cited; Kissinger 2014, Fukuyama in 2014 and 2014 Piketty, etc – these monographs are a few seconds attainable with the help of Amazon.com downloaded – though often more expensive price than the paper) (c) of the national long-term economic losses evaluation should be borne in mind that, in the present case, is also largely irreversible loss of the population exodus because immigrants are significantly less positive activity (Eurostat data) – (d) but a number of international agencies and the financial estimates made by both human and sotsiaal capital are not used here, because, based on the standard-economy-GDP, narrowly to gain access to the base.

Annex:

To be published in topical Article also in the area: the strategic communications which claims that should not be forgotten that the hostile camp is trying to in every way, and in many ways our national sustainability stability likelihood to undermine it and in particular in the social capital of the national poisoning  so also the institution of the Holy family of Russification than demolition and the heads of the Kremlin, and the distortion of the national knowledge structure with the appropriate faktoids, etc. – and – as the motto of the article says:

 

“War gives a sense that we can rise above our smallness and

divisiveness, “by Chris Hedges (2002):

also, it must not be forgotten!

Article

Jennings, Colin; Santiago Sanchez-Pages (2016-17), “Social capital, the conflict and welfare” – the Journal of Development Economics 124 (2017) 157-167:0304-3878

(A) (B) S T R A C T (to disseminate information on the value of the institution of the national sotiaalkapitali assessment)

This paper analyzes the role of external conflict as a force that can create social capital. Host inter-group interactions can help to resolve intra-group social dilemmas but these potential gains must be weighed against the insecurity of the host relations with an out-of the group. Our central result is that the presence of an outside threat can induce higher levels of social capital, either because (a) the protective aspect of social capital comes into play and/or as a reallocation of investments from the private to the social capital. Given that social capital is potentially subject to free-riding, the threat, by promoting a greater level of social capital, can be welfare improving. When the threat is severe, the social capital and welfare are more likely to fall. This effect of an external threat is social capital is stronger in poor economies. These results can shed light on the sometimes contradicting empirical evidence on the relationship between conflict and social capital.

© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Available online on 01 October 2016.

……………………….

Some of the references to this article

Chou, Y.K., 2006. Three simple models of social capital and economic growth. J. Socio-Econ. 35, 889-905.

Coleman, j., 1988. Social capital in the creation of human capital. Am. J. Sociol. 94,

S95-S120.

Collier, P, 1999. On the economic consequences of the civil war. Oxford Econ. A Pap smear. 51 (1), 168-183.

De Luca, g., Verpoorten, M., by 2015. Civil war, social capital, and resilience in Uganda. Oxford Econ. A Pap smear. 67 (3), 661-686.

Deng, maybe lb, 2010. Social capital and civil war: the dinka communities in Sudan’s civil war. Afr. Affairs 109 (435), 231-250.

DiPasquale, d., Glaesar, e., 1999. Incentives and social capital: are homeowners better citizens? (J). Urban-Econ. 45 (2), 353-384.

Durlauf, s., Fafchamps, m., 2006. Social capital. In: Aghion, P., Durlauf, S. (Eds.),

Handbook of Economic Growth. North-Netherlands, Amsterdam.

Estrella-Lopez, o., 2003. Social Capital and Government in the Production of Public Goods. Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Department of Economics, Mimeo.

One of the earliest important to the article (see the introduction)

Chou, Yuan (K). (2006) “Three simple models of social capital and

economic growth “– The Journal of Socio-Economics 35 (2006) 889-912: DOI: 10.1016/j. socec. 2005.11.053

Abstract

This paper proposes three models of social capital and growth that incorporate different perspectives on the concept of social capital and the empirical evidence gathered to date. In these models, the social capital impacts growth by assisting in the accumulation of human capital, by affecting financial development through its effects is the collective trust and social norms, and by facilitating networking between firms that result in the creation and diffusion of business and technological innovations. We solve for the optimal allocation of resources channelled into the building of social capital, to examine the models ‘ comparative statics and dynamics, and demonstrate how a tax and subsidy scheme may correct the resource under-allocation that results from the public good aspect of social capital creation. Observed, in the social capital across countries are explained by, in government policies and the possibility of multiple equilibria and social capital, the poverty of noughts and crosses.

© 2006 Published by Elsevier Inc.

JEL classification: The G20; I20; O31; O33; O41

Keywords: Economic growth; Social capital; Human capital; Financial development; Technological change

  1. Introduction

The concept of social capital, which refers to features of social organizations, such as networks, norms and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit, has found rising albeit grudging set within the economics profession in recent years. Like other sociological concepts, its amorphous nature initially elicited deep skepticism from mainstream economists, who questioned the validity of classifying social interactions as a form of capital. …

Formalization example:

Y.K. Chou / The Journal of Socio-Economics 35 (2006) 889–912 895
… Mathematically, the model may be summarized as follows:
˙K= Y − C − δKK, (1)
˙H= E(uHH)1−ψSψ − δHH, (2)
˙S= P(uSH)1−σSσ − δSS, (3)
Y = AKα(uYH)1−α, (4)
where K is the aggregate physical capital stock, Y the aggregate output, the aggregate consumption, H the stock of human capital, S the stock of social capital, δK the physical capital depreciation rate, δH the human capital depreciation rate, and δS is the social capital depreciation rate. uH, uS and uY denote the share of the human capital stock that is allocated to accumulating new human
capital, building social capital, and producing goods, respectively. A, E and P are productivity parameters, while α, σ and ψ are elasticity parameters constrained to lie on the (0,1) interval.
While ψ measures the extent of social capital spillovers on human capital formation, σ measures the externalities in social capital building, that is the extent to which community-wide stocks of
social capital influences an individual’s social capital formation. The above equations describe in turn the evolution of the physical, human, and social capital stocks. For example, Eq. (1) states
that the change in the physical capital stock per unit time, ˙K , is equal to new investment (which is equal to savings, Y − C) minus depreciated old capital. Eq. (4) is the production function for the
consumption good. The model collapses to the Lucas (1988) model of human capital and growth if ψ = 0 since S and the ˙S equation then become irrelevant. …

Naevdal, Eric (2016) „Catastrophes and ex post shadow prices — How the value of the last fish in a lake is infinity and why we should not care (much)“ – Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Volume 132, Part B, December 2016, Pages 153–160: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.04.021

Abstract

Catastrophic risk is currently a hotly debated topic. This paper contributes to this debate by showing two results. First, it is shown that for a certain class of optimal control problems, the derivative of the value function with respect to the initial state may approach infinity as the state variable goes to zero, even when the first-order partial derivatives of the integrand and transition functions are finite. In the process, it is shown that standard phase diagrams used in optimal control theory contain more information than generally recognized and that the value function itself may be easily illustrated in these diagrams. Second, we show that even if the value function has an infinite derivative at some point, it is not correct to avoid this point in finite time at almost any cost. The results are illustrated in a simple linear-quadratic fisheries model and proven for a more general class of growth functions.

Axtle-Ortiz, Miguel Angel  (2013) „Perceiving the value of intangible assets in context“ – Journal of Business Research 66 (2013) 417–424: doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2012.04.008

 

Keywords:

Intangible assets valuation

Intellectual capital

Context

Culture

 

Perceptions of the intangible assets of worldwide organizations vary according to context. The sample

population in the study discussed in this paper includes eight geographical regions, 16 types of industries,

two types of operations, and three organization sizes. The study demonstrates that geographical region,

industry sector and organization size are statistically significant factors that influence the weighting of

intangible assets. This paper identifies the principal components that shape intellectual capital and the way

it is characterized.

© 2012 Published by Elsevier Inc.

Some Refrerences

Axtle Ortiz, M. A. (2009). Analysis and valuation of intellectual capital according to its context. Journal of Intellectual Capital, Volume 10, No. 4, . : Emerald Publishing.

Brooking, A. (1996). Intellectual capital: Core asset for the third millennium enterprise. Thomson International Business Press, New York, NY.

Chaminade, C., & Johanson, U. (2003). 2003. Can guidelines for intellectual capital management and reporting be considered without addressing cultural differences?. Journal of Intellectual Capital, Vol. 4, Iss. 4. (pp. 528) : Bradford.

Flamholtz, E. (1971). A model for human resource valuation: a stochastic process with service rewards. The Accounting Review, 46, 253–267 [Apr.].

Flamholtz, E. (1972). Toward a theory of human resource value in formal organizations. The Accounting Review, 47, 666–678 [Oct.].

Flamholtz, E. (1973). Human Resource Accounting: Measuring Positional Replacement Cost. Human Resource Measurement. 1st. 8-16. In Edvinsson, L.and Malone, M., (1997). Intellectual capital, realizing your company’s true value by finding its hidden brainpower. NY, EUA: Harper Collins.

Lev, B. (1999). Seeing is believing. A better approach to estimating knowledge capital. Boston,MA: CFO Magazine, CFO Publishing Corporation February.

Lev, B., & Schwartz, A. (1971). On the use of the economic concept of human capital in financial statements. The Accounting Review(52), 3–5 [March].

Rodov, I., & Leliaert, P. (2002). FiMIAM: Financial method of intangible assets measurement. Journal of Intellectual Capital, 3(3), 323–336.

Stewart, T. (1998). Intellectual capital: The new wealth of organizations. Currency/Doubleday, NY, USA.

 

 

NB: Terroristic occupation/colonization may be adequately  mathematically modelled as national catastrophe (üe).

 

*) https://yloennuste.wordpress.com/2016/12/30/memo-30-xii-16/

**) https://uloennuste.wordpress.com/2016/11/18/do-not-quote-18-xi-16/

 

Additional Quotations

Memo to 27.16 XI: XI, of the European Parliament of 23 October 16 Report A8-2016-0317

This paragraph 6 requires the EU/28-s here, particularly from third countries targeted for terrorist propaganda and the improvement of preventive action against it, especially on the Web:

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2016-0440&language=ET&ring=A8-2016-0317

The White Book (2005): Losses Inflicted on the Estonian Nation by Occupation Regimes in 1940-1991 “(2005), the State Committee on the Investigation into the Repression Policy of Occupation, Tallinn, Estonia: the Estonian Encyclopaedia Publishers: 171:

http://www.digar.ee/arhiiv/nlib-digar:8192

and/or

http://www.riigikogu.ee/public/Riigikogu/TheWhiteBook

Toomse, Rene (2015) in Defending Estonia in peace and war. Retaining a small state near the aggressive neighbor by utilizing unconventional strategies; (supervisor: Jyrki Käkönen); School of Governance, Law and Society, Tallinn University, Tallinn, Estonia: 245lk:

http://www.etera.ee/zoom/8725/view?page=1&p=separate&view=0,0,2067,2834

 

http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21710862-militia-moms-are-practicing-their-marksmanship-just-case-estonia-counts-nato-worries

Schmid-Schmidsfelden, Hubertus: Kristina Potapova (2016) The Bear in Sheep’s Clothing: Russia’s Government-Funded Organisations. In the EU. Wilfried Martens, Centre for European Studies:

https://www.google.ee/search?q=martensctre%20eu%20publications%20bear%20sheeps%20clothing%20russias%20government%20funded%20organisations

NB! Popular overview of the concept of social capital in the relatively popular fresh:    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_capital:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_capital

January 4, 2017 Posted by | Uncategorized | Leave a comment

Visand 11.XII 16 (ära viita)

Muide Teise Maailmasõja eest põgeneti kolmel korral ja NLi poolt korraldati “migratsiooni” poole sajandi jooksul nii genotsiidide, sõjakuritegude, inimsusvastaste kuritegude – kui ka põliselanike russifitseerimise kui ka nende varade konfiskeerimise jne viisil (PMi tekstile seoses Inimõiguste Kongressiga)

PS: Impeeriumite Laagrite Hübriidsõja kontekstis väikeriigi polaar/diametraalsete (mitte paralleelsete) etniliste sektorite segregatsiooni* mitmedimensioonilise muutude (mis võõrkeelsete sektorite osas suuresti reguleeritavad ka vastavate impeeriumide poolt – nt venekeelsed Kremli poolt jne) mõju hindamisest nt võimaliku kodusõja tõenäosuse tõenäosele muudule – on multi-metoodilise käsitluse puhul mõttekas mudelleerida ka tõenäosuslike kompleksarvudega** – kus nt reaalteljel võiks olla etniliste sektorite osakaalud polaarsel „ida-lääs“ teljel vasakult-paremale poole – ning imaginaarteljel „agressiivsus-heidutus“ võimete osakaalud alt-üles poole: vastavaid tõenäosus-muute sõltuvalt osakaalude muutudest võimaldavad tõenäosuslikult arvutada vastavate kompleksarvude jagatised (NB: tavaliste vektorite jagatised ei ole defineeritud)
*) Journal of Institutional Economics
„ Ethnic diversity and conflict“
MICHAEL BLEANEY and ARCANGELO DIMICO -) DOI:https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137416000369 Published online: 21 November 2016
Abstract
We argue that the reason why it has proved hard to determine whether negative effects on economic performance and conflict are more strongly associated with polarized rather than fractionalized societies is because the distinction between polarization and fractionalization is only relevant for societies with ethnic diversity above a certain threshold. In addition, high levels of ethnic fractionalization at a country level are generally associated with regional concentration of minorities, and as a result, many regions may have a very different ethnic composition from the national average, and in particular, they may have much higher levels of ethnic polarization than the national level. Because of the very different ethnic composition of different regions in this situation, conflict is more likely to be confined to a limited geographical area.
Copyright
COPYRIGHT: © Millennium Economics Ltd 2016
Corresponding author
Email: michael.bleaney@nottingham.ac.uk
Ja russifitseerimise seisukohalt vt:
http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rbal20/47/4?nav=tocList&
**) https://uloennuste.wordpress.com/…/ulo-ennustes-speech…/
Ja multi-kriteriaalsuse ning –metoodilisuse seisukohalt vt:
Ennuste, Ülo (2016) https://uloennuste.wordpress.com/…/do-not-quote-18-xi-16/

December 11, 2016 Posted by | Uncategorized | Leave a comment

Do not Quote 18.XI 16

Draft 18.XI 16 (do not quote – comment and contribute pro bono publico: ylo.ennuste@mail.ee)

   PART I – COMPILATION of EXCERPTS on the theme: Importance in the Hybrid-War and Brexit etc increasing uncertainty and risk context to estimate/categorise informally and approximately  monetary long-term occupational repressions damages for the National Sustainabilty Stability Probability in Eastern-European Countries occupied by former USSR – on the bases of modern macro- socio-cybernetics –  fragmental preliminary Estonian empirical illustrations

 

Abstract

This raw narrative preliminarily in telegram style compiles and preliminary revisits and examines for national macropolicy consultation purposes some publications on Post-Soviet countries occupational macroecnomic damages – from the perspective of the National Sustainabylity Stability indicators – and – contemporary sociocybernetic methodological approaches (Beyond GDP/Institutional/Comparative/Coevolutional/Stochastic/ICT/Bayesian/Meta-mathematical etc) to estimate informally in first large approximation monetarily long-term occupation/colonization (Fucuyama 2014, etc) damages/losses/consequences on Estonia – in 1940-1991 by Stalinist barbaric communist Command Regime (e.g. genocides and deportations mainly of the National Elite members (Rahi-Tamm 2005)  – and later in the developed socialism mainly in the form of Russification and erosion of national sustainability by KGB operations decaying the population physically and mentally (Noor 2005) – and eroding National Economy with dysfunctional colonization institutions (Hodgson (2007), Brutus and Ennuste (1965) ) and some fragmentary Estonian empirical monetary quantified illustrations in the comparative economics approach with civilized liberalized economies (Kukk 2005, etc)).

It is argued that the breakdown of the pre-existing system of production and distribution, changes in political power, and the displacement of property rights (especially confiscation of land from private ownership) – and especially current Hybrid-War on cyberattack front from Kremlin (Kissinger 2014) and in information- and ideological-trolling sectors introduces uncertainty into people’s lives – and anxieties asymmetrically in different ethnic groups (Kirch et al. 2008 and 2011).

The narrative preliminarily explores two GDP satellite account questions in the contemporary context the long-term occupational USSR damages and in what proportions: a) in the Hybrid-War context accompanied by increasing uncertainty affect people’s beliefs about their own well-being? and b) how does the anxiety created by these processes impact different ethnic and ideological groups? c) how much have been Estonia’s occupational damages monetarily underestimated in the conventional XX century macroeconomic studies – compared with estimations of XXI century sociocybernetics results taking into consideration coevolution of socioeconomic activities and institutional developments in the game theoretic context with uncertainties and considering predatory/imperial agents (defined by Wiener, North, Hodgson, Aoki, Krugman, Tirole  etc).

 

Keywords: Human Assets, Human Capital, Human Reproductions Assets, Social Capital, Population Ethnical Structure, Occupation’s Genocides, Ethnic Anxiety, National Knowledge Structure, Cultural Upheavals, Terrorist Occupational Distortions of Populating Ethnical Structure, Transitional Anxieties, Repressive Deportations, Repressive Confiscations, Government’s Socio-Economic-Institutional Policy Failures, Social Trust, Institutional Assets, Economic Capital, Infrastructure Assets, Systems Transitions, Shadow Prices, Implementations Models, Bayesian Estimations, Formal and Informal Assessments, Satellite Accounts, Standard GDP (SGDP), Genuine GDP (GGDP), Social Progress Indicator (SPI), Quality of Life, Economic Inequality, Income Inequality, Assets Inequality, Special Inequality, Human Capital Inequality, Political Environment, Predatory Agents, Trolling Agents, Hybrid-War, Sanctions-War, Subsidies, Taxation Systems, Public Sector Forecasting, Accuracy of Forecasting, Correlated States, Political Environment, Analogues States, Parallel Societies, Transformation of Macrodata, Flows and Stocks, Analogues Data, Information Asymmetry, Moral Hazards, Secret Agents, Actual Individual Consumption, National Satisfaction, Convergence, National Sustainabilty Stability Probability, Macro-Socio-Economic-Institutional Damages, National Existential Damages, National Significant Damages, National Minor Damages, Damages of National Knowledge Structures, Lagrangean Relaxations, Truth-Telling, Negative Activity, Mechanisms Design, Detail Free Coordination, Field Studies, Long- and Short-Term Occupation Damaged, Long-Term Occupational Fallouts on National Capital Stocks  Erosion, European Union, Soviet Union Occupation of Estonia 1940-1991, GULAG.

 

  1. Introduction

1.1.In this paper we start from the assumption that it is now widely accepted in macro economics (North 1989, Hodgson 2001, Rajasalu 2003) and socio cybernetics (Aoki 2001, Hurwicz et al. 2007) that hierarchical macro institutions, broadly defined as systems of established national social rules, hierarchical state mechanisms etc – play a major role in explaining in coevolution of real economy nation’s policy behaviour and national sustainability stability probabilities. Although scholars generally agree that institutions coordinate nations/states behaviour and to a certain extent mould it into recognizable patterns, there is much less consensus regarding the precise mechanisms involved. We also have yet to fully understand the ways in which alternative international rule systems and behavioural patterns emerge, persist and evolve to create our complex social systems – mainly inviseble.

In our context Soviets occupation of Estonia 1939-1941 (“Estonia 1940-1945”Cp: “SOVIET MILITARY BASES IN ESTONIAN TERRITORY IN 1939-1940” pp7-42 and “White Book” 2005 pp9-24 (according  Fukuyama 2014 and Kukk 2005 also: “colonization”) all Estonian National Institutional System has been totally destroid. The national macroeconomic damage of this barbaric action according XXI century socio-cybernetics may be in contemporary understandin most rationally approximately evaluated (American Evaluation Journal) by  nowdays imaginagy resoutation value in current euros (in spe this analysis should be done by sufficintly large international consilium in proper complexity next year: by now absolutely superficially we evaluate this volume in the interval €(50;100)bn – much on the bases with AppendixConcise Chronologies in the Period 1987-2006: The Transformation of the Estonian Economic Institutions and Domestic and Foreign Environment – Ennuste (2007) pp110-126.

 

1.2.It is now widely accepted that macro indicators based on Standard GDP (SGDP) and its index-derivatives are not sufficient and adequate aggregated proxies for rigorous analyses of national sustainabilty stability probability estimates in the increasing uncertainty environments – and should be substituted first of all by the “Beyond GDP” indicators. Broadly defined as systems of Genuine GDP (GGDP) and Genuine NNI (GNNI)  indicators including additionally informal income flows from the households in the form of investments to national human capital stocks and social capital stocks etc. Importantly: from the sustainability angle the most important economic indicators are Domestically Useable GNNI pc indicators – meaning that from the GNNI are subtracted Estonian fraudulent investments to the foreign countries (national economic institutional system and governmental policy failures).

1.3.By now it is now widely accepted that macro indicators based on SGDP Macrodata is almost adequate formally (officially) statistically measured – but Beyond GDP etc Macrodata are not – so much of this kind of statically dada has to be by scholars created informally and in great approximates – to be in this context credible only in cooperating of scholars of several correlative and analogues countries. In Estonian empirical case needs cooperative study of correlated analogues countries: the European border countries of Russia – especially Baltic-States + Poland and Finland (as analogous countries but correlated as without Russian occupation) + in spe International Research Centres (e.g. as in form of parallel paper by Schmid-Schmidsfelden, Hubertus and Kristina Potapova (2016) The Bear in Sheep’s Clothing: Russia’s Government-Funded Organisations in the EU. Wilfried  Martens Centre for European Studies. – etc).

 

Theoretical and empirical research into these important topics needs to draw on insights from multiple independent academic disciplines, including macroeconomics (especially Eurostat’s Bayesian approaches e.g.: Tongeren,  Jan W. van and Ruud Picavet (2016) „Bayesian estimation approach in frameworks; integration of compilation and analysis“ In  EURONA — Eurostat Review on National Accounts and Macroeconomic Indicators: 7-49), institutional economics, politology, demography,  ethnology, history, human geography, law, linguistics, risk management, philosophy, psychology and sociology and involvement of correlated countries scholar centres.

 

The study is organized as follows: This Section PART I “COMPILATION” (to be composed superficiaaly by Ü. Ennuste alone in  2016 for international publication) gives a brief methodological review of the study conceptions and contains several preliminary raw technical Excerpts and Notes with possible references. There are subsections: 1. Introduction, 2. Beyond GDP (GGDP Genuin GDP, National Sustainability Stability Probability etc), 3. National Resources (Human Capital, Social Capital, Natural Assets, National Institutional Assets, National Knowledge Assets 4. Methods and Models, 5. Historical Remarks, 6. Examples of Estonian Empirical Studies, Preliminary Conclusions and Notes (Collections of raw excerpts on satellite themes.In PART II “COMPENDIUM“ in spe composed in  2017 by several pro bono scholar from correlated EU28 Member-Countries co-authors teams in hierarchical coordination and extending selected Notes of this text into research chapters – to prove the main hypotheses based on empirical findings in accordance with Estonia’s current idiosyncrasies as the member of  EU and NATO in the situation of actual Hybrid-War on the frontline and borderline with Russia – from the point of view of 21 century standard mainstream sociocybernetics and coevolutionary macroeconomic disciplines  – giving special importance to uncertainties and risks in the case of national sustainability studies). Importantly these chapters should be composed first of all in unison with Latvian-Lithuanian-Polish-Finnish scholars and first of all to study long term damages made in the sense of national sustainability by the terroristic Russification of the local national ethnicity structures – and …

 

  1. Beyond GDP

 

  1. A) HANSEN, BRADLEY A.and MARY ESCHELBACH HANSEN (2016) „The historian’s craft and economics“ –

Abstract

History refers both to the past and to the systematic study of the past. Attempts to make a case for history in economics generally emphasize the first definition. There are benefits from increased attention to the past. This paper argues that significant benefits can be gained from increased attention to the systematic study of the past, the historian’s craft. The essence of the historian’s craft is the critical evaluation of sources. Failure to critically evaluate sources has the potential to lead to erroneous conclusions, whether one is using historical documents or more recently created data.

 

 

NB! Respectability and benefits of the economic historical studies can be gained by objective systematic studies – i.e. by critical independent teams – indeed: economic patriotism may easily lead to erroneous interpretations of approximate historical economic data (Ennuste 2008a: e.g. monetary losses are much more negentrophic than human losses in numbers of persons etc – and in standard approaches are taking account as complex numbers).

 

 

BOX 1.

The Economist 14.V 2016 

“… Since 2011 The Office for National Statistics has been developing wider measures of economic well-being. These include household “satellite accounts” that estimate the value of unpaid labour, such as volunteering and informal child care, that fall outside the scope of GDP as informal social activities. In 2014 the value of this activity amounted to £1 trillion … compared with a British GDP of £1.8 trillion. We have also been publishing quarterly information on economic well-being since December 2014 that brings together a number of indicators to give a more rounded and comprehensive picture. These include net domestic product and net national disposable income per person that adjust GDP for the depreciation of assets, the net flows of profits into and out of the country and population.

JONATHAN ATHOW
Deputy national statistician for economic statistics

London“

 

NB: a) the monetary estimates household „satellite accounts“ (for formal definition in the field of national accounts see: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (2009) Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual Sixth Edition (BPM6)) that fall outside the scope of GDP as informal (not in official statistics) social activities  – are in this example seemingly more approximate than conventional GDP components statistical indicators: Here the British GDP value amounted to £1,8 tn => 1,8(+/-0,05) or with relative error almost +/-3%  – compared to 1(+/-0,5) or with relative error 50% – that brings together (1,75÷1,85)+(0,5÷1,5)=2,25÷3,35 => the average 2,80 with relative error ca 20% b) informal visible child care is only one of satellite accounts that should be additionally connected to conventional GDP to amount to the Genuine Socioeconomic Gross Domestic Product (GSGDP) in the logic of „Beyond GDP“: but so should several visible and invisible other activities. E.g. additional satellite accounts may be added like invisible “human capital” and “social capital” informal creation in the form of learning children and grandchildren or to taking care of the feeble ones in the families plus visible activities like cooking, heating and gardening etc.

 

B)Theoretically excellent (fragmentary) introduction by Kubiszewski et al. (2013) for the Beyond GDP:

 

“Nations need indicators that measure progress towards achieving

their goalseconomic, social, and environmental. Standard economic

indicators like gross domestic product (GDP) are useful for measuring

just one limited aspect of the economymarketed economic activity

but GDP has been mistakenly used as a broader measure of welfare

(Costanza et al., 2009; Stiglitz et al., 2010). GDP was never designed to

measure social or economic welfare, and yet, today, it is the most commonly

used indicator of a country’s overall performance (Kuznets,

1934; Marcuss and Kane, 2007; McCulla and Smith, 2007).

GDP’s current role poses a number of problems. A major issue is that it

interprets every expense as positive and does not distinguish welfare enhancing

activity from welfare-reducing activity (Cobb et al., 1995;

Talberth et al., 2007). … GDP also does not account for the distribution of

income among individuals, which has a considerable effect on individual

and social well-being (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009).

A more comprehensive indicator would consolidate economic, environmental,

and social elements into a common framework to show net

progress (Costanza et al., 2004). A number of researchers have proposed

alternatives to GDP that make one or more of these adjustments

with varying components and metrics (Smith et al., 2013). Some have

also noted the dangers of relying on a single indicator and have proposed

a dashboardapproach with multiple indicators.

One such alternative indicator that has been commonly used is the

Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI). While GDP is a measure of current

production, the GPI is designed to measure the economic welfare generated

by economic activity, essentially counting the depreciation of community

capital as an economic cost. The GPI is a version of the Index of

Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) first proposed in 1989 (Daly and

Cobb, 1989). … “

 

NB!:  from the point of occupation damages is most important the following remarks: 1)

GDP’s current role poses a number of problems. A major issue is that it

interprets every expense as positive and does not distinguish welfare enhancing

activity from welfare-reducing activity … “ – very good  2) the other problem is that GDP formal statistic is not taking into account the GDP and financial leakages from the domestic country 3) by definition is GPI indicator still fragmentary for our tasks because it is not taking into account e.g. households wealth (social, intellectual, material etc) and not wakening into account its distribution.

 

 C)EU Commission in the unison with Eurostat has started the applied Beyond GDP Project officially 2008 –  Eurostat (2015):

 

Abstract (extracts)

 

Quality of life in Europe — facts and views presents different aspects of people’s well-being combining for the first time objective indicators with subjective evaluation of individuals’ situations and covering various aspects of quality of life. The indicators are analysed together with different elements affecting quality of life such as educational level, activity, health status or family and financial situation. The emphasis in this publication has been placed on the data collected through the 2013 ad-hoc module on subjective well-being, which was added to the statistics on income and living conditions (EU-SILC). Data

are presented for the European Union and its Member States as well as for the EFTA countries. Quality of life in Europe — facts and views provides an overview of the wealth of information that is available on Eurostatis website and within its online databases.”

 

NB!: However, for our purposes –  1) monetary estimation of long-term occupational damages in XXI century sociocybernetics study – in this paper we should use more wide approach including Institutional/Cybernetic activities and officially human assets in formal monetary form – the “Beyond Beyond GDP” approach –  to take adequately into account all USSR’s last century filthy year occupation damages to Estonia’s national sustainability and that may be adequately formally modelled like colonization process (Kukk 2005) 2) according to ETLA (1993) and Kukk (2005 p188): “As there are no suitable statistical data about Estonia, we necessarily have to resort to some simplification to make such calculations possible.” In other words without large scale statistical ad-hoc fieldworks about the occupation period statistics – there is no hope to make credible monetary micro-calculations about damages done that belong to Beyond GDP repertoires – and we have here to resign informal approximate Bayesian shadow price estimations (Piketty 2014) .

 

 

D)A resent excellent theoretical introduction for institutional economics has been presented by   Gagliardi (2016) – extract:

 

„There is now widespread consensus among scholars and policy makers that institutions are a crucial determinant of economic performance, and that the mechanisms involved in the processes of institutional emergence and change can generate solutions to socio-economics problems that enhance economic growth ( Acemoglu et al., 2005; North, 2005 ). Both the conceptual frameworks focusing on the study of institutions and the large body of existing empirical literature on the topic show that a country’s long-term economic performance critically depends not just on its institutional environment but also on complementarities between different kinds of institutions ( Gagliardi, 2015 ). Historical evidence also suggests that the causality from economic development to institutions may be even stronger than the one running from institutions to economic development. Economic development changes institutions through a number of channels. While increased wealth due to growth may create greater demands for higher-quality institutions, and may make better institutions more affordable, economic development creates also new agents of change, demanding new institutions ( Chang, 2011 ). From a theoretical point of view, two broad approaches have been proposed in economics to study institutional issues. The first, pioneered by North (1990) and other new institutional economists, and referred to here as the “historical approach”, conceptualizes institutions as the rules of the game, and integrates economic theory and economic history. The emphasis placed on the historical context comes from the observation that much of the developmental trajectory of societies is conditioned by their past in a path dependent way, with the implication that institutions are historically specific. It follows that historical contexts must always be taken into account, especially when dealing with the issue of institutional change ( Alston, 1996 ). The historical approach furthermore combines a theory of human behaviour with a theory of transaction costs. Its central result is that institutions determine the structure for exchange that influences the level of transaction costs, thereby affecting the feasibility and profitability of engaging in economic activity. It is through this mechanism that institutions are the underlying determinant of long-run economic performance. In other words, by defining and constraining the opportunity sets available to economic agents, institutions structure incentives in human exchange, provide a stable structure to human interaction, and reduce uncertainty by fostering convergent expectations ( Gagliardi, 2008 ). The second analytical framework is the “comparative institutional analysis approach” associated with Aoki (1996) that also draws on historical information while at the same time making extensive use of game theory. Institutions are here conceptualized as the endogenously emerging equilibrium outcome of a game and the focus is on the interdependencies existing across economic, political, social and organizational domains. In addition attention is given to interdependencies arising across institutions linking different domains. The core issue is how the rules of the game are generated and become self-enforcing through the strategic interaction of the agents, whose behaviour is influenced by the self-enforcing constraints determined within the existing set of rules …“

 

 

NB!: and here also we have to apply some kind of „Beyond Institutions“ approach: taking into consideration of risks connecting with institutions and anxieties for different groups of agents coursed with the changes of institutions/regimes (Ott and Ennuste 1996 and N4).

Now the mainstream theoretical frameworks focusing on the study of national socio-economic sustainabilty stability problems and the large body of existing empirical literature on the topic show that a country’s long-term economic performance analyses adequately shoud be tackled with the large scale stochastic dynamic computational models – containing interdependencies not just between socio economic activities – but also its institutional and demographic/ethnic environment and complementarities between different kinds of institutions (repressive occupation) and ethnic groups, differentiating e.g. between human capital and social capital, between ethnicity groups (occupationally forced Russification  immigration) etc (Aoki 1996, Hodgson 20…, Gagliardi 2015, Kirch et al 2008, White Book 2005, Ott-Ennuste 1996 etc). By the way – the occupation regimes may be adequately modelled and analysed in formalised contexts as destructive institutions (…): ….

The crucial methodological issue in the “Beyond GDP” approach is that the GDP indicator is based mainly on formal marketed activities and formal market prices transactions and not considering informal social activities without monetary transactions Meta-GDP: so absolutely not adequate to be a proxy for national quality of life or sustainability analyses in the risky situations.

The trouble is that in the traditional macroeconomics many social activities and services have no formal National price tags and this makes in official statistical practice impossible to estimate the monetary volumes of most produced social or institutional values in combative ways with real market activities and transactions – in contradiction to social-market fundamental humanity principles. This problem is easily solved with “shadow prises” in the modern sociocybernetic with the Lagrangean relaxation and Lagrangean multipliers – and importantly makes possible in our context e.g. to approximate social/human values/losses monetarily (see for details Note N3) etc.

Standard applied twenty-first century sociocybernetic methodological problems of macroeconomic and sociocybernetic imputed/notional/factoid monetary Bayesian estimation of long-term National Sustainability Damages of occupations: introductory remarks on preliminary postulates and conjectures and Estonian hypothetical empirical rudimentary case-study Examples for the period 1939-2015.

Mainly based on White Book (2005) up-dating and extensions and ScienceDirect.Com Journals and current Estonian occasional papers etc.

 

This narrative is partly purely objective Bayesian statistical and partly imaginary (administrative statistics is of fully sparse not only demographically (Rahi-Tamm 2005) and also economically (Hansson 2016) applied research and no political economics or social-cybernetic theoretical or ideological/philosophical original frameworks are tackled within it. We explore only extinct applied methodological and statistical possibilities to test on the Estonian data the main hypotheses such as 1) once occurred occupational national damages and losses may have long-term after effects additional to instantaneous aggression effects – especially in the conditions if part of the occupying repressive aggressor nation is planning with significant probability to restore the previous one – and part of the occupying main ethnic group members and their offspring’s are in significant quantities previously  here active in anti-western mentality 2) with previously  increasing uncertainty – especially connected with Putin-Kremlin Hybrid-War against West – and so giving considerable rise inter-ethnic tensions in the previously occupied countries (Kirch et al. 2008) – especially if the ethnicity structure is in the occupation period was repressively distorted with ethnic cleansing and genocides and inserting occupants as residents etc 3) all these by direct occupations and their fallouts caused national damages and losses may be only extremely approximately estimated and imputed noticionally also in the money terms in contemporary currencies – and among these volumes the human fortune/capital losses are obviously super dominating the genuine economic losses and damages like real and natural capital, environmental damages caused by occupation army etc – especially accordingly from the contemporary long-term consequences 3) Anyway Piketty (2014) has managed to restore informally economic data for centuries ago in reasonably correct way for contemporary mainstream macroeconomic public.

 

  1. Methodology: models and methods

 

In the 21. century the GDP volume in market prices indicator is generally not viewed by policy makers any more as sufficiently adequate criteria proxy for national socio-economic well-being and development – and the prevailing sentiment or the mainstream standard theoretical understanding is supporting the so called “Beyond the GDP” approach (see for latest results, authors and some application details in the first note: N1).

 

Accordingly in the case of adequate genuine total occupational national economic losses (GTL) estimations we have to distinguish between 1) direct market domestic income losses e.g. proxies by the lost GDP volumes in the official statistics market prices terms and … 2) and total losses and damages of all national development resources – ingredients generally without actual market prices statistics: inc e.g. human losses in imputed monetary value volumes (in natural numerals preliminarily: national fixed-capital assets ; national social capital losses, national institutional capital losses (e.g. in banking assets, taxing system values), national knowledge structure quality losses in money terms – etc.

 

The main methodological problems in these economic assessment cases is the absence of the actual market prices statistics for the non-tradable ingridiente – but the main methodology to overcome this difficulty is in the technical mathematical-cybernetics to apply “optimal shadow prices” (also called Lagrange multipliers, dual prices, notional prices – and cyber prices in the case socio-institutional mechanisms types are among optimized variables  etc (see excellent Wikipedia introduction in  N3:

 

 “…In mathematical optimization, the method of Lagrange multipliers (named after Joseph Louis Lagrange[1]) is a strategy for finding the local maxima and minima of a function subject to equality constraints.

For instance (see Figure 1), consider the optimization problem

maximize f(xy)

subject to g(xy) = 0.

We need both f and g to have continuous first partial derivatives. We introduce a new variable (λ) called a Lagrange multiplier and study the Lagrange function (or Lagrangean) defined by

where the λ term may be either added or subtracted. If f(x0y0) is a maximum of f(xy) for the original constrained problem, then there exists λ0 such that (x0y0λ0) is stationary for the Lagrange function (stationary points are those points where the partial derivatives of   are zero). However, not all stationary points yield a solution of the original problem. Thus, the method of Lagrange multipliers yields necessary for optimality in constrained problems.[2][3][4][5][6] Sufficient conditions for a minimum or maximum also exist. ,,,  “).  … “

 

According to decomposed complex (tangible and intangible resources)planning theories (see some of most rudimentary and simplified approaches in the conditions of risks and uncertainties in Ennuste (1969) (1989) and Ennuste-Matin (1998)) in the case of decomposed (according agents activities x(j) j=1…n) and solution processed via Lagrangean relaxation and gradient vise movement – the lambda (λ vector) terms i=1…m  (shadow prices) may also be also calibrated/estimated separately by agents (experts) separately in the centrally coordinated gradient wise movement (see for example N3 for estimation calibrated  human values volumes in shadow prises terms): this will be here the main method for estimation lambda prices and monetary volumes of by agents on the basis of e.g. Bayesian statistical prognostics (inc outside information – method probably widely used in Piketty (2014) and presently theoretically developed by …. ): in sum – in our case the modelling should start from the disdaining of general coevolutionary (inc institutions) model for East-European countries by the Centre and decomposed/separated firstly according countries – and secondly according activities and institutions etc – and iteratively coordinated by the Centre.

 

 

Importantly is to tell that Eurostat is suggesting and estimating more than 130 Hierarchy National Sustainability Indicators  with  couple of dozen headline indicators (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/sdi/indicators) and so in the same mode the EU Commission (… )

 

But 1) these indicators are still e.g. missing monetary sectors 2) not considering e.g. HW situations and 3) not considering longevity occupational repressions damages e.g. Russification damages etc. In the Table 1 we preliminarily suggest some rudimentary approximate indicators to be more adequate in the Estonian Sustainability Stability Policy optimization contexts.

 

Table 1. Complex Indicators and Ingredients

 

Market/Real/Tangibles/etc                        Social/Imaginary/Intangibles/etc

Flows:

 

GDP pc (per capita)

NNI pc

Investments pc

Balance of Payments pc

Investments Outflow from Estonia pc

(inc 0-profit tax arrangements)

Working Population Outflow %

Employment decline %

Foreign Investments into Estonia pc

Estonia’s International Net Lending pc

Estonia’s International Investment- Position pc

National Financial Account

Financial Fragility of National- Economy

Transactions

Trade-War grade

Sanction-War grade

Business Corruption grade

 

Flows:

 

Investments by Public Education pc

Investments by Public Medicine pc

R&D investments pc

Defence expenditures

Households Investments into informal Child Care, Human Capital, Social Capital, etc pc

Public Communication %

Social Communication %

Destructive Informational Activities

Actual Individual Consumption %

Quality of Life

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Stocks:

 

National Workforce Assets

Employment %

Human Professional Capital

Land and Natural Resources pc

Technological Institutions capital

Technology Adaption Quality

Technological Institutions Quality

Defence and Police Institutions

Households’ Wealth

Institutional Wealth

Production’s Fixed-Capital

Universities, Churches etc Fixed-  Assets, Uncertainties and Risks

Infrastructure Assets

Computers

Stingers

Tanks

Prisons

International Investment Position %

 

 

Stocks:

 

National Social Assets

National Social Capital

Households Social Capital

Institutional Social Capital

Infant Mortality Rate

Social Reproduction Assets

Life Expectancy

Migration indexes

Households Financial Account pc

National Knowledge Structure Quality

National Ethical Structure Quality

Country’s Ethnicity Structure-Social Synergies

Income inequality

Wealth inequality of Households

Regional inequality

Financial Fragility of Households

Political Corruption

Criminality and Actions of Fifth- Columns grade

Convergence/Divergence grade

Current National General Subjective Bayesian Probability of Imminent Conventional Military Attack (inc N-Attack) in the HW

Ethnic Heterogeneity

Russification of Population

National Museums, Statues, Parks

National Libraries, Theatres, etc

Anxieties

Churches

Graveyards

 

 

 

International Environment:

 

Membership in International Economic and Defence Org.

Trade Wars

Sanctions Wars

Technology Cyberattack

Military Conflicts

 

 

International Environment:

 

Membership in Cultural Intern. Org.

Ideological Wars

Socially Barbaric Imperial Neighbour

Military Conflicts

 

 

 

 

… : … :

 

Standard method for Baltic Countries + Poland case for central coordination in the applied decomposed optimal planning theories (Ennuste 1978) suggest probably that: the best solution in our approach  would be to organize internationally funded Coordination Centre in Poland (for justification of this suggestion see Internet Publication:

http://www.communistcrimes.org/en/Database/Poland/Historical-Introduction ) – and – in this Centre to applied for complex-compound losses assessments first comparable analogy models (Ennuste 1993 and Kukk 2005): Occupied Poland compared e.g. with Sweden and Baltic Countries with Finland etc.

 

 

  1. Historical and demographic/ethnicity prerequisites in the Macro-Institutional context

 

Estonia’s recent history, not unlike that of its Baltic neighbours (White Book 2005, Zubkova 2009 etc) and also Poland – is marred by occupations of two ethnic groups – Russian and German – and even under the intersections or double occupations in 1941-44. The secret protocols of the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact put Estonia first of all for the period 1940-1991 ipso facto under Kremlin brutal terrorist repressions with huge irreversible human losses (Rahi-Tamm 205) and under dysfunctional command economic colonization institution (Brutus & Ennuste (1965) and Mau (1996)) with confiscations of all private land properties (with accommodating inefficiencies: as analogues see YOO, DONGWOO and RICHARD H. STECKEL (2016) „Property rights and economic development: the legacy of Japanese colonial institutions“ –  Journal of Institutional Economics) and of private production assets and destruction of domestic market institutions and banking/currency systems and international trade institutions. And 1941-1944 additionally was ipso facto overlapped by the Nazi German Genocide occupation: Both terrorist occupations inflicted instantiations and longevity tremendous losses and damages to the Estonia’s National sustainability duration probability – especially to the National Ethnic and demographical structures in the long-term context (Rahi-Tamm 2005). In Post-Stalinist or in the Developed Socialist period the Leninist (Krugman 1990 pp101-2) industrialization strategy begin for importing forcefully Russian speaking labour into Estonia for the full Russification and eroding Estonia’s National Sustainabilty in the long-term perspective – and with many permanent repression health damages (Noor 2005).

 

From the macroeconomics point of view in the USSR occupation period in Estonia we have to distinguish at least to sub-periods: 1) Terrorist-Stalinist were macroeconomic official statistics in credible form is absolutely missing (Estonia and Finland 1993) and hypothetically we may claim that monetarily human losses absolutely dominate the other losses here in the form of Stalinist genocides and war crimes: in this period two Estonian partisan wars against Soviet Armed Forces have taken place – Summer wars 1941 and 1944 with great population losses (Estonia 1940-1945 (2006) and H. Lindmäe (2007; 2015) 2) the After-Stalinist period in which KGB was distorting/manipulating official regional macro-statistics according to ideological/political purposes (e.g.: occasional economic inequality statistics was top secret, so was mainly with heavy industry, transport, interregional trade, movement of finances/capital etc). So here we have also resort to informal approximate data production etc e.g. to estimate long-term damages done to Estonia’s population ethnical structure, environmental quality, population repressions in many forms, cultural inheritance wealth, industry structure, fisheries etc by colonization and Russification: in the attempt to destroy Estonian National Sustainabilty.

In this second period many short-term damages from the first have been “compensated”: e.g. to build apartments for the Russian speaking immigrants – and in this context we may these consider to be not significant any more.

The Estonian post-communist double transitional period 1987-2006 institutional coevolutionary developments/reforms may be chronologically followed e.g. form Ennuste (2007)“Dual Market-Transition in Estonia 1987-2006: Institutional Mechanism Analysis Approach” In: EUROPE AFTER HISTORICAL ENLARGEMENT. The Proceedings of 5th Audentes Spring Conference, Apr. 28 2007, Tallinn, 60-126: : http://www.ies.ee/iesp/No3/

 The main crucial economical policy failure in this period seems to be implementation of 0-profit tax: http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/diamond-saezJEP11opttax.pdf

In the current Hybrid-War period (for Estonia started in 2005 with President Putin statement: “The collapse of  the Soviet Union was the biggest geopolitical catastrophe … “ and  with aggressive Russia first cyber attack on  Estonian Government already in 2007 (Kissinger 2014 – Estonia NATO member from 2004) great uncertainty situation in Estonia – were neighbour country – predatory (Tirole 1992: 372-3) Imperial Russia is seemingly trying restore the USSR in the Stalinist borders – and again to make attempts to destroy Estonia’s national sustainability – first of all by ideological war (claiming: there has been no occupation and any national damages have not been done on Estonian soil) and by threats of conventional military interventions with tactical nuclear weapons and trade-wars etc fuzzy our national knowledge structure and produce anxieties etc: it is extremely important to understand objectively/ sociocybernetically how the last century long-term USSR occupation by criminal Russification of Estonian population and destruction of the National infrastructure (inc National knowledge structure etc) as the destruction of households wealth (including informal social wealth) and so on in the public infrastructure sphere – have been connected with the long-term effects of the occupation – and how much so with current sociocybernetic governmental incompetent policy errors (including incompetent cybernetic mechanism (e.g. unbalanced tax system, facilitating e.g. indirectly substitution of sanctionised corporations under the Russian controls, Estonian official statistics) implementations – that should be in war situation instantly liquidated.

 

The occupations had most profound negative effects on the ethnic composition of the Estonian population – e.g. via brutal Russification – nowadays by far the largest non-ethnic Estonian group is Russian nationals or Russian Speakers – and presently among them probably a significant group of diversion putinoids-trolls to  distort information and create informational asymmetry – in the putinoids columns have been active supporters of the Kremlin Cyber attack against Estonia e.g. in 2007 March (Kissinger 2014, alas the economic damage of this attack was never discussed) and in the same style distorting Estonian National Knowledge Structure (see e.g.: Schmid-Schmidsfelden, Hubertus and Kristina Potapova (2016) The Bear in Sheep’s Clothing:

Russia’s Government-Funded Organisations in the EU. Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies:

https://www.google.ee/search?q=martensctre%20eu%20publications%20bear%20sheeps%20clothing%20russias%20government%20funded%20organisations ).

 

It goes without saying – the Baltic Countries’ and Poland’s adequate occupations crime studies should be conducted in the unison and in coordinated framework: for Estonia the Hybrid-War (HW) started with 2007 Cyber attack and activated after that in the fields of trade and sanctions (Ennuste 2014) – and previously even the probabilities of potential conventional military conflicts (inc tactical nuclear attacks are rising) (Lucas 2014). All these increasing uncertainties have increased local ethnical anxieties and interethnic tensions (see e.g.: Kirch et al. 2008 and 2011).

One of the most damaging long-term occupational fallouts is that presently firms under Russian control as a rule criminally avoid to pay profit taxes in Estonia (Ennuste 2009, 2012).

Most importantly – The Economist 30.VII 16:

 

” … Russia does not want to reconquer the Baltics. But it might want to use the hybrid-warfare tactics it employed in Ukraine (such as disinformation, political subversion, cyber-attacks and the use of special forces without insignia) to demonstrate that the West is reluctant to defend its most vulnerable allies. If, for example, Russia sent forces into a Russian-speaking area of Estonia, NATO would be faced with an existential dilemma: to fight back and risk nuclear war, or to capitulate and destroy its own credibility. … ”

It is really important to know from the Estonian National Sustainabilty aspect: how  match Russia does want to do this or that on the bases of former occupational damages and how much these actions are induced by policy failures of Estonian Governments in the last quarter of century. The trouble here for us is that the negative institutional capital problems have not been formalized sufficiently yet.

 

 

  1. Estonian Fragmental Empirical Illustrations

 

 

5.1)Kukk (2005) has published excellent methodological and statistical formal fragmental paper on the basis of official statistical flows GDP and official currency rates etc. data – especially on assessments of long-term monetary GDP losses in comparison with Finland (also on the base of ETLA (1993) rapport and Eurostat GDP statistics 1964-2003):

 

“…  there are no suitable statistical data about Estonia, we necessarily

have to resort to some simplifications to make such calculations possible.

Thus, the author of this report has, in an earlier treatment56 on the years

of 196987, conditionally considered the development level of Estonia

and Finland in 1968 as equal (there were logical grounds to believe that

the per capita GNP of these two countries was USD 1720 in current prices

that year) and further supposed (again a simplification) that the increase

in this respect  in 196987 in Estonia was linear. The per capita GNP in

1987 was estimated to be 3700 roubles in Estonia and various exchange

rate scenarios were used to if  out this value in US dollars. In the most

plausible version, Estonia’s per capita GNP was taken to be equal to

that of Hungary (USD 2240). In that case, the calculated exchange rate

in 1987 would have been 1 US dollar = 1.65 roubles; the exchange rates

of the years between 1969 and 1987 were interpolated with the use of

the official exchange rate in 1961: 1 US dollar = 0.90 roubles. As the per

capita GNP of Finland in 1987 was already USD 14,370, the calculated

(with the above-described simplifications) loss in the GNP of Estonia

would have been 153 (± ?) billion US dollars in 196987 or 73 % of the

GNP value, which Estonia could have reached „in Finnish conditions”.

The significance of this figure is also illustrated by the fact that only in

1996 did the GNP of Estonia exceed USD 4b. To this damage, we have

to add the damage done to the environment by polluting and wastefully

exploiting natural resources, which has still not been compensated for,

as well as the damage proceeding from the distortion of moral values

of people.

This is but one example about a relatively short period, and a quite

hypothetical one, as such; we can estimate its statistical reliability, but

these values, like the model itself, have only „theoretical” meaning. The

question is in the basic presumptions of our model. The selection of those

presumptions is extremely conditional and subjective. If one considers

that Eurostat estimated the per capita GDP in 2004 to be 50.5 % of the

average value of the European Union (on the basis of the purchasing power

parity; in the current prices which show the international purchasing

power of an economy, the figure is about half of that), the total damage

to Estonia resulting from the income not earned is even greater. The

per capita GDP of Estonia is lower than that of any old Member State of

the EU (the corresponding figures for Portugal and Greece in that year

were 73,4% and 81,2 %). For comparison, Finland exceeded the average

level of the European Union by 15 % respectively.

If the history had taken another turn and Estonia could have developed

in the same political and economic conditions as Finland, and supposing

that the development level of Estonia were equal to that of Finland

(measured as the per capita GDP), then Estonia’s GDP should have been

EUR 37.2b in 2003. The actual GDP of Estonia was only EUR 8.0 bn or one                                                                      fifth of that hypothetical value that year. In 2003 the per capita GDP of

Estonia and Finland were 5941 and 27 496 euro respectively.

Ülo Ennuste (Reference 57) has employed a similar approach to assess the long-term

damage done to Estonia’s economy, that is, he compared Estonia’s development

with the market-based development of neighbouring countries.

The development of Estonian economy after Estonia regained independence

is illustrated in Table 13 with the aid of comparative assessments

of the per capita GDP of the former USSR republics, made by The

Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd in 1998 on the basis of the purchasing power

parity (see also Table 12). Pursuant to these data, Estonia was the

only former Soviet Republic that managed to exceed the level of 1989

after the transformation crisis (the lowest point of the crisis in Estonia

was in 1993). … “

 

NB: 1) only 2016 was in Estonia published first official statistical study to asses households domestic assets on the 2013 statistical data basis by Meriküll-Rõõm (2016) and considering this Report Kukk has missed at least one loss about euro 50-150 milliard – it was before the 2007 as “Beyond GDP” Project by  EU Commission was started and this approach was acknowledged the mainstream mythology – making important monetary assessments imaginary national well-fare and sustainability resources – such as: national social and human capital stability and downward risks probabilities; national knowledge structure quality; outflows from the country labour and finances etc 3) it was before 2006 Russia actually started the imperial cold Hybrid-War to erode Estonia’s national sustainability with ideological attacks declaring that has never been any Russian occupation or Justification 4) it has been long before restart of the Russia’s hot Hybrid-War 2007 with cyber attacks (Kissinger 2014) and criminal huliganity ….mainly by ethnic Russian mobs and before the start of the Trade- and Sanction-War (Ennuste 2014).

 

BOX 2.

 

 

White Book (2005:22): “… Kalev Kukk has made calculations to estimate the long-time economic harm … in the interval from 1969 to 3003 – the unrecieved GDP was approximately 153 billion dollars … “

 

NB: 1) Kukk (2005) has fractionally calculated in 2004 formally absolutely correctly (based on official Eurostat statistics probably in +/-5% credibility interval, and Estonian and Finland official statistics of standard GDP – fractionally in the macroeconomic sense: omitting national assets and other resource stocks (incl. human resources) losses) and has fractionally chousen short period 1969-2003 – prudently in the realm of credible GDP official data and to avoid Estonian Governments economic policy errors to take into account 2) In  informal and contemporary 2016 Beyond GDP and national recourse stocks losses of the occupation approach this 153 bn has to be multiplied in preliminary assessments at  least n …m times. 3) Indeed: (to be continued – in the first approximation hypothetically 4-6 times: so very approximately probably in the interval from 0,6 as high as 0,9 tn eur) ….. 4)  Alas in Estonian official statistics much monetary data on economic/infrastructural and institutional (inc National Knowledge and cultural structure) assets/stokes is missing – and in this study expensive  field work to restore this retrospective data is absolutely impossible. We have at presented only claimed that from the long-term point of view much of these damages have been reversible short-term and presently not significant – but not all of these: to demolish libraries and destroy statues and robbery of national mussels by occupants are  irreversible losses and should be compensated by Russia.

 

 

 

5.2)Merikül and Rõõm (2016) Have given us by micro field work monetary data creation and macro aggregation about household assets (as regular official statistics is missing) the first occasional formal possibility to estimate 95% trustfully (seemingly practically in +/-15% error intervals) the national occupational losses of households net material wealth compared with some data transformations from Finland Statistics:

 

“Non-technical summary

Micro data on households’ assets and liabilities have always been recognised

as a valuable tool for analysing financial stability. The importance of

this type of dataset has increased further in the aftermath of the Great Recession

as the concentration of debt to high-risk borrowers in the US was missed

by policy-makers and became one of the triggers for the crisis. The need to

understand the distribution of the assets and liabilities of euro area households

motivated the European Central Bank to launch the Household Finance

and Consumption Survey (HFCS), which is conducted by all the euro area

national central banks.

The HFCS is a longitudinal survey that is carried out at three-year intervals.

The first wave of the survey took place during the years 2008 – 2010.

Since Estonia only became the member of the euro area in 2011 we started

participating in the survey from the second wave. The fieldwork for the Estonian

survey was carried out in the first half of 2013, while most of the other

euro area countries conducted their fieldwork for the second wave later and

their results are not yet available for comparison. Therefore the results of the

Estonian HFCS are compared with the findings from the first wave for other

euro area countries in the current overview. The data were collected from

2220 Estonian households, covering 4675 individuals.

This paper shows the main descriptive statistics for Estonian households’

real and financial assets, collateralised and non-collateralised debt, financial

fragility, net wealth, income, consumption and credit constraints. The paper

follows closely the structure of the article describing the euro area survey

results from the first wave of the HFCS (Eurosystem Household Finance and

Consumption Network (2013b)); however, topical sections for Estonia such

as high levels of home-ownership, recent rapid debt accumulation, and

wealth inequality receive more discussion in the Estonian report. The paper

provides many descriptive that can be used as a starting point for research

papers or policy analyses. In what follows we summarise only some basic

findings that may have higher policy value or that were not known from earlier

micro studies.

First, real assets from the dominant part of total assets in Estonia and financial

assets play a much smaller role. This finding is affected by the high

home ownership rate of Estonian households, which in turn can be related to

the privatisation of household dwellings in the 1990s or to households’ strong

preference for owning rather than renting their home. In Estonia, 77% of

households own their main residence, while only 60% of euro area households

own their home on average. The household main residence is the most

important component of assets, meaning that the value of the home is the

most influential factor for household wealth. Self-employment business

wealth also plays an important role among real assets in Estonia; 20% of total

real wealth consists of self-employment businesses, while this share is about

two times lower in the euro area. Financial assets are poorly diversified and

mainly consist of deposits. The findings of the relatively high home ownership

rate and poor diversification of financial assets are not unique to Estonia,

as they are also characteristic of other countries with lower than average income

levels in the euro area, namely Slovakia, Slovenia, Portugal, Malta and

Greece.

Second, credit market participation in Estonia is relatively similar to participation

in the euro area, while the debt is more concentrated in young and

high-income households. Participation in debt is somewhat lower in Estonia

than in the euro area, as the participation rate is 37% in Estonia and 44% in

the euro area. The concentration of debt, especially mortgage debt, to young

households is again related to the privatisation process that took place in the

1990s in Estonia and enabled older cohorts to become home owners without

mortgages, and it also arises because the market for housing loans was essentially

absent before the 2000s.

Third, the financial fragility of households is relatively low in Estonia, and

debt to asset and debt to income ratios are below the euro area averages.

Low-income indebted households are vulnerable, but debt participation is

very low among these households. There are also some indicators that show

households’ financial vulnerability to be higher in Estonia than in the euro

area. The median loan to value ratio of the household main residence in Estonia

exceeds the euro area median value, which is probably due to the more

recent mortgage loans and to the majority of loans being issued during the

years of the housing price boom. In addition, the financial buffers of Estonian

households are low; the median household holds liquid assets worth a bit

more than one month’s gross income.

Fourth, the Estonian households’ median net wealth is one of the lowest

among the euro area countries while the inequality of net wealth is above the

euro area average. The median net wealth of Estonian households is 43.6

thousand euro with 95% confidence bounds between 39.3 and 47.9 thousand

euro. The average net wealth is much higher at 97.1 thousand euro with

95% confidence bounds between 83.8 and 110.4 thousand euro. Unlike in

other countries with high home ownership rates, wealth inequality is high in

Estonia, and the Gini coefficient of net wealth is 0.69. There are vast regional

differences in net wealth that are caused mainly by strong disparities in real

estate prices across Estonian regions. Net wealth is much higher in the two

largest towns, Tallinn and Tartu, and in the summer resort islands; the rest of

the regions sometimes have two to three times lower median levels of net

wealth despite.”

 

NB: Fractional 1) families’ human capital, social wealth and human recreation assets are here not accounted 2) households economic/material wealth destroyed and confiscated by the fatty year occupation has not been significantly never compensated.

 

BOX 3.

 

 

“Approximately the median net wealth of Estonian households was in 2013 about … 44 th eur  and in Finland 88 th eur  – the difference 44 th eur – and the Estonian comparable loss with 95% confidence bounds may approximately be (taking account the different inequalities of the net wealth in countries) approximately hypothetically may the Estonia’s estimated occupational loss of households be in the interval: 16÷24 bn eur and p.c 12÷19 th eur (with apparent macroeconomic governmental policy losses in this century – caused mainly by bad quality of the occupation era dwelling buildings). Considering the last loss as the long-term national income factor loss –  we may estimate preliminary the compound income loss at least p.c: €(30;50)bn.

……………….

 

 

 

 

NB!: Approximately the median real net wealth of Estonian households was in 2013 about 44 th eur and in Finland 88 th eur  – the difference 44 th eur – and the Estonian comparable occupational loss with 95% confidence bounds may approximately be (taking account the different inequalities of the net wealth in countries) approximately hypothetically may be estimated Nationally in the interval: 16÷24 bn eur – and pc 10÷20 th eur. NB: human- and social- capital included preliminarily hypothetically in kit Nationally 50÷70 bn eur and pc 30÷60 th eur: in sum Nationally seemingly in the interval €(70;100) bn eur in 2013 current market prices.

 

 

5.3)Estonian illustrations of some long-term environmental damages caused by 1040-91 terrorist occupations may be firstly given by excerpts from Raukas (2005 p139):

 

3 . 6 . THREE IMPORTANT CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of the above, and especially on the example of Sillamäe,

we can draw three important conclusions: 1) the environmental damage

caused by the Soviet Union and Russia is huge; 2) neutralisation of this

damage is a long-term process (sic! in the case of contamination with nuclear waste very long term – üe); 3) the damage can be neutralised only with the assistance of international cooperation. The present review includes only a limited selection of the cases of environmental damage

done by the occupation army. The real situation is even worse. It is

possible that we are unaware of the real situation, because the Russian

Army, which left Estonia in 1994, did not leave any documents about their

pollution; on the contrary, it tried to conceal its deeds. We know virtually

nothing of pollutants dumped into the sea, and the bowels of the earth

may still conceal many unpleasant things in Estonia.“

 

NB:  a) Ten years ago there has been still much uncertainty about long-term environmental damages caused in Estonia by 1940-91 terrorist occupation – especially caused by Soviet troops and with armament production nuclear waste not properly storage in conforming of proper standards etc – consequently this chapter by Raukas needs presently certainly fundamental updating – to be the basis for real contemporary rationale political decisions b) approximate monetary estimates of these long-term socio-economic national damages/risks  may be formally (on the basis of official regular statistical data etc) and standard (mainstream macro-economically) comparably without significant approximations calculated with necessarily accompanying liquidation costs etc – based mainly on direct physical measurements and current market prices – transferring e.g. missing statistics  from analogues cases from the correlative countries.

 

 5.4)Mägi et al. (2016):

Abstract

BACKGROUND

Most studies of the ethnic composition of destination neighbourhoods after residential moves do not take into account the types of moves people have made. However, from an individual perspective, different types of moves may result in neighbourhood environments which differ in terms of their ethnic composition from those in which the individuals previously lived.

OBJECTIVE We investigate how the ethnic residential context changes for individuals as a result of different types of mobility (immobility, intra-urban mobility, suburbanisation, and long-distance migration) for residents of the segregated post-Soviet city of Tallinn. We compare the extent to which Estonian and Russian speakers integrate in residential terms.

METHODS

Using unique longitudinal Census data (2000‒2011) we tracked changes in the individual ethnic residential context of both groups.

RESULTS We found that the moving destinations of Estonian and Russian speakers diverge. When Estonians move, their new neighbourhood generally possesses a lower percentage of Russian speakers compared with when Russian speakers move, as well as compared with their previous neighbourhoods.  Russian speakers in their residential surroundings decreases only for those who move to the rural suburbs or who move over longer distances to rural villages.

CONCLUSIONS & CONTRIBUTION

By applying a novel approach of tracking the changes in the ethnic residential context of individuals for all mobility types, we were able to demonstrate that the two largest ethno linguistic groups in Estonia tend to behave as ‘parallel populations’ and that residential integration remains slow.

  1. Introduction

Today, Russian speakers form almost one third of the 1.3 million people living in Estonia, giving Estonia one of the highest proportions of ethnic minorities in Europe. The Russian speaking minority population in Estonia has its roots in the intensive immigration that took place from other Soviet republics in the period when the country was part of the Soviet Union (1940–1991). Culturally this minority is rather homogeneous, consisting mainly of Russians, but with large groups of Ukrainians and Byelorussians. Even those who have been living in the country for two or three generations generally use Russian in their daily communication. The Estonian case is very interesting for studying the processes of ethnic segregation because of the unique historical backdrop provided by its Soviet past. In essence, the residential patterns of Russian speakers differed from those of the majority population during the Soviet period because central planners (sic! first of all Russian military commands under the  orders of Communist Party Central Comity (White Book 2005) – üe) distributed migrants to major administrative, military, and industrial centres, such as the capital city of Tallinn, where they now form almost half of the city’s population, and to urban industrial areas in the North East of Estonia, where they are now a majority group. In all of these cities, Russian speakers were usually accommodated in large housing estates built during the Soviet era. The societal conditions of the Soviet years thus shaped the current ethnic landscape in Estonia in a unique way, because central planners exogenously created the residential pattern of the minority population.

There are both similarities and fundamental differences between Estonian cities and other ethnically segregated cities in Western Europe and North America. In the latter case, ethnic residential differentiation typically reflects the differences between the consumption capacity and preferences of the different ethnic groups as well as the discrimination practices in these societies (e.g., Massey and Denton 1985; Johnston, Forrest, and Poulsen 2002). Ethnic segregation in Soviet cities was not originally driven by such factors and it was, to a large degree, a function of housing allocation by central planning authorities. Thanks to industrialisation and militarisation, “

 

NB: a) for Estonian-Russian contemporary segregation studies we need mainly informally created data and non-standard original research methods b) putting monetary values on segregation processes in Tallinn – especially in case of e.g. emigration of Estonians into Finland and causing tremendous losses to the national domestic socio-economic potencies (emigration caused partly by fears based on  present Kremlin aggression Hybrid-War  for the restoration of occupation – and considering Nation’s memory on national sustainabilty risks and increasing interethnic tensions) – comparable abatement costs cannot be based on formal prices or standard methods.

 

BTW: paper by Mägi et al. (2016) needs badly independent competent historical terrorist occupational/colonalisation etc  experts in many fields of macroeconomics, ethnicity, psychology etc corrections – first of all e.g. on the basis of collections:

 

White Book (2005) chapters, Portal CommunistCrims.org databases, Estonia 1940-1945 (2006), Lindmäe (2007 and 2015), Kirch et al. (2008 and 2011) etc.

 

The present content is in great amount politically biased and erroneous – take for example excerpt from p 1162:

 

“Today, Russian speakers form almost one third of the 1.3 million people living in Estonia, giving Estonia one of the highest proportions of ethnic minorities in Europe. The Russian speaking minority population in Estonia has its roots in the intensive immigration that took place from other Soviet republics in the period when the country was part of the Soviet Union (1940–1991).“

a)“the country was part of the Soviet Union (1940-1991)“ – was under the predatory communist Russian occupation: WB pp 9-25.

b)“The Russian speaking minority population in Estonia has its roots in the intensive immigration that took place from other Soviet republics … “ – has its roots mainly and first of all in the intensive mass destruction of Estonian population by communist Kremlin genocides, war crimes and crimes against humanity: WB pp 25-47 –  ca 1/3 of initial 1040 population was lost (mainly elites) and these communist crimes are the main roots/factors/regressors of segregation – segregation that involves also anomalous emigration of nationals especially in the conditions of the previous Hybrid-War  with nuclear Russia.

  1. c) “intensive immigration that took place“ – was mainly not free willing but deportation of Russian speakers by Kremlin from GULAG camps etc for the total Russification of Estonian genuine population and destruction of Estonian national sustainabilty: BTW in Estonia immigrants are economically less effective then nationals (Eurostat 6.VI 2016).

And so the „, ethnic residential differentiation typically reflects the differences between the consumption capacity and preferences of the different ethnic groups as well as the discrimination practices in these societies (e.g., Massey and Denton 1985; Johnston, Forrest, and Poulsen 2002) … ethnic residential differentiation typically reflects the differences between the consumption capacity and preferences of the different ethnic groups as well as the discrimination practices in these societies (e.g., Massey and Denton 1985; Johnston, Forrest, and Poulsen 2002).“ – these kind of residential differentiation are in Estonia presently spontaneously widening (Eurostat: economic inequality is presently in Estonia growing) – with accommodating discrimination practices: € (5;10)bn.

 

5.5) Human Losses – Rahi-Tamm (2005) pp37-39:

 

Table 2 PDF

http://www.digar.ee/arhiiv/nlib-digar:8192 )

 

The Department of History of the University of Tartu, the Bureau

of the Register of the Repressed of Estonia, and the Estonian

International Commission for the Investigation of the Crimes

against Humanity continue their work in ascertaining the population

losses of Estonia.

No. Category Total Survived Irreversible

Losses

 

NB: The Table needs urgently a) data updating – first of all on the bases of: Estonia 1040-1945 (2006) and Lindmäe, Herbert  (2015) SUVESÕDA HARJUMAAL 1941. Tartu, 648 p.

a)„Prof. Lindmäe’s ninth (sic! – üe) created the book on this topic, and could be like the summary of the guerrilla war against the Soviet Army in 1941, which grabbed the all counties in Estonia. After 14 in June 1941, the barbaric and massive deportation of the Estonian Population to Siberia, broke out at the nation, the military leader of the opposition to the spontaneous Soviets. The whole of the Nation had been covered by the resistance-is-the best evidence of the fact that the Estonian People had not been in any way free willingly joined in the 1940s in the Soviet Union, a terrorist.

With numerous facts and many of the sources (> 700) this BOOK gives an overview of the true and sound narrative of the Estonian victories to achieve independence. In the Harjumaa County and in Tallinn, where casualties have been especially large – and by Prof. Lindmäe the very precise factually rich information on the fate of the Estonian citizens in this Region in these times is extremely valuable historically as well politically and presently extremely actual  also. …“

By P. Varju (automatic translations from Estonian)

  1. c) In the National long-term human losses shoud be taken into account also the permanent distortions of the population ethnical structure etc.

P.S.: 1) In the Table are estimated losses presented in approximate numbers – as it seems in the +/-10% intervals –  based on the state of mainstream national knowledge by the end of 2004. At the present time (see e.g. “Estonia 1940-45” 2006) we may estimate that at least partly these numbers may be probably trusted only in the limits of +/-20%  2) in this Table completed in the end of 2004 a number of Categories are missing – see e.g.: Estonia 1940-1945 (2006) pp 1122-1123.

 

P.S.P.S.: The value estimates of total human losses in the contemporary Northern European context have to be researched – but also it is my connection that these probably should be with great approximate in the interval imputed of € 0,5-1,5 tn (tn=trillion=one followed by twelve zeros=10¤12;here ¤ meaning on the power of):

 

Illustrative example on the basis of:

 

  • According to ESA Statistics (http://pub.stat.ee/px-web.2001/Dialog/Saveshow.asphttp://pub.stat.ee/px-web.2001/Dialog/Saveshow.asp ) in 2015 the explicit statistical amount of the population working hours in the Estonia’s domestic market sector was about 1,2 milliard hours by 0,62 M employed – and respective Fragmental GDP volume in current market prices has been approximately € 20 milliard
  • Accordingly to the same statistics total respective implicit volume of social working hours (nursing and educating children’s, dealing with self-education and rising human capital, cocking meals, dealing with socialization activities (e.g. national song festivals etc) and so rising national social/trust capital etc – was approximately … – meaning that the total Genuine socio-economic GDP volume may have been hypothetically at least about five-six times more – or per capita (pc) life-time socio-economic implicit GDP production volume in 2015 current prices may be in very thirst approximation at least € 2 M
  • In Finland (Eurostat) the same indicator € 4 M – in lifetime (25 years employment 1(10¤8) and
  • those in the Finnish efficiency and Estonian employment in 2015 current prices the loss of GGDP may be estimated hypothetically about 6(10¤5)x2(10¤6)=1,2(10¤12) eur and in +/-20% approximation interval:

 

€(0,9; 1,4)tn.

 

 

5.6)Remark on relatively macro economically short-term losses and damages in the long-term occupation

 

White Book (2005 p22-23):

 

“Three occupation regimes in more than 50 years brought immense

economic loss to the people of Estonia, it is difficult to give a scientific

estimation about such a long period. Scientists estimate the economic

loss of the last Soviet occupation period to exceed 100 billion US dollars.

According to the information of the Ministry of Defence, the damages

caused to the natural environment of Estonia by the Army of the Soviet

Union and of its legal successor, the Russian Federation, are about

4 billion US dollars.25

In the chapter of the White Book describing economic losses, the

author Kalev Kukk has made calculations to estimate the long-time

economical harm of the occupation periods. The losses reach hundreds

of billions of dollars. For instance in the interval from 1969 to 1987 the

unrecieved GDP was 153 billion dollars in the accounting value. 26

A thorough assessment of the economic damage of the first Soviet

occupation was carried out during the German occupation. Estonia was

greatly damaged by the war in the summer of 1941 as a result of J. Stalin’s

tactics of burnt land, applied by the destroyer battalions, NKVD units

and the Red Army. Heavy damage was caused by evacuation of assets

and treasures to the Soviet Union and taking over Estonian property

in foreign states. Demolition of a developed economic system, in order to

be replaced with the uneconomic soviet system, caused serious economic

damage already during the first year. These losses are recorded in the

collection „Eesti rahva kannatuste aasta” (The Year of Suffering for the

Estonian Nation).

A committee formed by the State Special Committee assessed the

damages caused by the German occupation in 1941—1944. The results

were published in 1947 in a book „Saksa fashistlik okupatsioon Eustis

aastail 1941—1944” (German Fascist Occupation in Estonia in 1941

1944). Study of archive documents has proved that the information of the

Special Committee is to a great extent a falsification and that the Soviet

Government has accused the Nazi regime of many of its own crimes and

destructive acts. Thus the Red Army Air Force bombed Narva, Tallinn

and Tartu, which led to destruction of 3326, 1885 and 2432 houses,

respectively. However, the committee reported these to be crimes of the

German occupants. All the above mentioned destruction was presented

to the International Court of Nuremberg as damage done by Nazi Germany.

Additional research work is necessary to assess the war damage.

On 31 August 1994 the last armed forces of Russia, the legal successor

of the Soviet Union, left the territory of Estonia. For the people of

Estonia, this concluded the gloomy period of three successive occupation

regimes that had lasted for 54 years and 75 days. The World War II has

come to an end.“

 

NB: a) pp17-18:

“In February 1944, when the Soviet troops reached

Narva and a new Soviet occupation became a reality, Jüri Uluots’ radio

interview was the first statement by a national-minded Estonian politician

in support of the mobilisation proclaimed by the Germany-appointed

Estonian Self Government. He called upon the men of Estonia to enlist in

the army and defend their fatherland against the danger coming from the

East. The call was received with enthusiasm and the mobilisation brought

together more men than previously expected. Three Estonian battalions

— the 1st Battalion of the 45th Regiment, the Tallinn Regiment formed of

the mobilised, and the Nord Army Group — were hastily brought to Narva

where they stopped the invaded enemy in the battles held in February.

On 6 March 1944, the last enemy foothold on the front line between

Narva and Narva-Jõesuu was taken. The front remained under Narva for

five months and the plan of the Soviet Army General Staff to conquer the

whole territory of Estonia in February 1944 failed.

This was followed by a revenge action of terror attacks on Estonian

towns. On the same night of 6 March, the Soviet Air Force carried out

such massive bombing attack on the town of Narva, that the town was

razed to the ground. The civilian population had been almost entirely

evacuated from the town by that moment. The artillery of the Estonian

Corps also took part in the destruction. Factory buildings were left

untouched during the bombing. On 8 March, Russian aircraft attacked the

towns of Jõhvi and Tapa. On 9/10 March 1944, Tallinn was bombed in

an attack, which lasted from the evening to the next morning, and in

which more than 750 people were killed, 5073 buildings were destroyed,

1540 of them completely. More than 20,000 people were left without

shelter. The Estonia Theatre, one of the symbols of the Estonian nation,

was destroyed; St. Nicholas Church and the valuable medieval documents

of the Tallinn City Archives were burned.15 This attack was also

clearly aimed against the civilian population because the Port of Tallinn

and industrial buildings were not attacked. On the night of 26 March,

the town of Tartu was bombed with disastrous results and 67 of its

inhabitants were killed. Altogether, at least 130 people are registered in

Tartu Family Archive as victims of bombings who perished in the terrorist

attacks of red pilots during the war.16 According to the Death Register,

2409 people perished in Estonia as a result of bombings during the period

1941—1945.“

 

Indeed: a) tremendous damages to nationally unique civilian buildings and infrastructure assets – but as these attacks started a new long-term period of occupation and annexation – much of this destroyed living shelter and building assets have been in relatively short-term (twenty years or so) somehow substituted by new soviet style blunt large housing estates built during the Soviet era (partly built by Russian speaking soviet prisoners) not as to compensate the destroyed assets but to accommodate partly with force imported hundreds of thousands Russian speakers from other Republics b) p82: “Estonia was

greatly damaged by the war in the summer of 1941 as a result of J. Stalin’s

tactics of burnt land, applied by the destroyer battalions, NKVD units

and the Red Army. Heavy damage was caused by evacuation of assets

and treasures to the Soviet Union and taking over Estonian property

in foreign states. Demolition of a developed economic system, in order to

be replaced with the uneconomic soviet system, caused serious economic

damage already during the first year. These losses are recorded in the

collection „Eesti rahva kannatuste aasta” (The Year of Suffering for the

Estonian Nation).“ – the destroyer battalions caused first of all tremendous human losses (long-term) among civil population and to fight them Estonian patriots started victorious Partisan war in summer 1941 (Lindmäe (2007) „Second Independents War“).

 

In this narrative we have compiled various standard  macroeconomic and sociocybernetic methodological approaches that are making informally possible to test some of the claims made by „Beyond GDP“ and “Beyond Human- and Social-Capital” theories and „Beyond Institutional“ theories concerning the wide indicator clusters approximate comparative informal evaluations of long-term occupational losses and damages quantifiably monetarily.

 

So-called informal „shadow price“ powerful techniques are providing comparative heightening systems on monetary scale facilitating statistical analysis of different satellite indicators like GDP and Human Capital, Social Capital, Economic Inequality, Quality of Life etc. Econometric methods, in particular those using cointegration- and coevolution-based approaches, techniques for studying the quantitative comparisons  e.g. of regime rules with financial variables over extended time periods, and for distinguishing between short-term and long-term effects of legal change – comparisons of anxieties from the institutional changes with fiscal changes etc.

 

These quantitative techniques nevertheless have their limits. As a case studies of  Estonian occupational long-term monetary informal losses and damages demonstrated, field work and face-to-face interviewing are needed to clarify the role of informal institutions, beyond the reach of formal statistics and formal laws

and regulations, in shaping actors’ behaviour. The patterns revealed may exist elsewhere; but a purely quantitative calibration approach might never uncover them. Approaches of the kind should therefore be understood as the methodological state of the art and extremely approximate for institutional research – not fit for comparative ordering of countries but only for grouping. That means the adequate objective outcomes may be achieved only by large international expert groups and rigorous hierarchical coordination of these from one research centre: seemingly preferably from Poland (see e.g.:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_crimes_(Polish_legal_concept) ).

 

A further implication of our analysis is that when empirical methods are

brought to bear on questions of institutional evolution, some of the claims made

in the literature on law and finance do not stand up. In particular, claims that

corporate governance works best when managers act as shareholders’ agents, that

civil law institutions are inherently less adapted to the needs of market economies

than common law ones and that legal systems worldwide are converging on a

supposedly more efficient common law model of legal and economic governance,

are not borne out by recent analyses. As improved empirical methods are brought

to bear on these issues, we may expect to become better informed on the role

institutions play in supporting economic development and growth, and on the

scope for legal reforms to improve economic outcomes (Diamond and Saez 2011)

 

Last but not least: a policy recommendation – in a Hybrid-War situation it should be a mast to implement instantly large scale soft censorship with moral and material incentives to avoid putinoids trolls to fuzzy and decay our National Knowledge Structure (Ennuste 2008).

 

BOX 4.(preliminary)

 

 

 

………………………………….

 

 

 

P.S.: Looking at the Beyond methods and extent Estonian empirical studies a) it seems the previously estimated formal occupational monetary losses may probably be many times or magnitude less of the informal hypothetical  ones b) for the border countries of RF the most important damages in the Hybrid-War conditions are hypothetically in the last century brutally Russificated ethnic structures and national knowledge structures – the comparative economic values of these are as a rule not been estimated until now.

 

  1. Conclusions (preliminary)

 

In this narrative we have compiled various  mainly XXI century macroeconomic and sociocybernetic modern mainstream  methodological approaches that are making informally possible to test some of the claims made by „Beyond GDP“ and “Beyond Human- and Social-Capital” theories and „Beyond Institutional“ theories concerning the wide indicator clusters approximate comparative informal evaluations of XX century long-term  occupational drossals caused losses and damages of Communist occupations of East-European Countries – approximately  quantifiably monetarily – and some preliminary Estonian empirical illustrations.

 

Informally as the formal (official) macroeconomic and sociocybernetic trustworthy measured statistic of this period on these countries is most fragmentary and sparse – to overcome this we have to deduce indirectly necessary conjectures and approximate moneray estimates (e.g.: estimates of assets of national institutional structures, assets of national social capital etc) – with powerful theoretical mathematical methods like Optimal Planninig, Bayesian estimates, Regression Analysis of International Country Panels, Shadow  Prices (analogy of PPS),  etc. Understandably these approaches are credible in the case of multicounty cooperative coordinated teams work.

 

So-called informal „shadow price“ powerful techniques are providing comparative heightening systems on monetary scale facilitating statistical analysis of different satellite indicators like Geniuin GDP Flows and Human Capital, Social Capital, Human Reproductive Capital Stocs; Economic Inequality, Quality of Life etc. Econometric methods, in particular those using cointegration- and coevolution-based approaches, techniques for studying the quantitative comparisons  e.g. of regime rules (occupation/colonization with financial variables over extended time periods, and for distinguishing between short-term and long-term effects of legal change – comparisons of anxieties from the institutional changes with fiscal changes etc. The main obstacle here is that formal official regular statistics is lagging behind the developments of the Beyond GDP and Institutional Economics etc innovations – and forcing macro scholars to use informal more approximate databases.

In the case of long-term occupation/colonalization we have to distingvish between short-term losses and damages as especially in the hybride-war conditions just the last kind of these may be existentcially significant for the national sustainability stability – and also to disdingvish losses in flows and stocs – and amomg the last  ones importantly institutional inmaterial infrastructure decays (e.g.: national knowledge structure quality and assets and national social capital losses etc).

 

These informal quantitative indicators and concectural techniques to estimate these  nevertheless have their limits. As a case studies of Estonian occupational long-term monetary informal losses and damages demonstrated, field work and face-to-face interviewing are needed to clarify the role of informal institutions, beyond the reach of formal statistics and formal laws and regulations, in shaping actors’ behaviour. The patterns revealed may exist elsewhere; but a purely quantitative calibration approach might never uncover them. Approaches of the kind should therefore be understood as the methodological state of the art and extremely approximate for institutional research – not fit for comparative ordering of countries but only for grouping. That means the adequate objective outcomes may be achieved only by large international expert groups and rigorous hierarchical coordination of these from one research centre: seemingly preferably from Poland (see e.g.:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_crimes_(Polish_legal_concept) ).

 

A further implication of our analysis is that when empirical methods are

brought to bear on questions of institutional evolution, some of the claims made

in the literature on law and finance do not stand up. In particular, claims that

corporate governance works best when managers act as shareholders’ agents, that

civil law institutions are inherently less adapted to the needs of market economies

than common law ones and that legal systems worldwide are converging on a

supposedly more efficient common law model of legal and economic governance,

are not borne out by recent analyses. As improved empirical methods are brought

to bear on these issues, we may expect to become better informed on the role

institutions play in supporting economic development and growth, and on the

scope for legal reforms to improve economic outcomes (Diamond and Saez 2011)

 

Preliminarily (by own conjectures): with great probability the present Estonian estimates of last centuries long term occupational economic losses and damages (e.g.: White Book (2005) mainly produced in the boom times and with limited macroeconomic and socio-cybernetic knowledge structures – may be magnitudes less than this centuries – estimated by more advanced institutional economic and social mechanisms theories – and in the Estonian case presently in the Hybrid-War situation and recession environment: there the most important factors for national sustainability satiability probability are national human resources (human capital, social capital, reproductive capital) and national  knowledge structure etc.

 

BOX 5.(preliminary)

 

 

From Macro Socio-Economic angle informally by now seemingly two most significant existencial long-term losses are Compound GGDP Flow Losses* and National Human Wealth Resources Losses**; and two signifant long-term losses are Losseses of Houshold Assets***and National Institutional System Damages**** in current prices:

 

 [(0,6;0,9)*+(0,9;1,4)**+(0,05;0,1)***+(0,05;0,1)**** + …]tn= €(1,6; 2,5)tn > n(0,2;0,3)tn,

                 

where tn is trillion and magnitude n is with great probability conjecturaly in the interval (4;6).

 

In the complex number  format – losses of national income flows and national ressorces damages – z= [(0,6;0,9)+i(1,0;1,5)]tn and i is imaginary number.

 

Own preliminary numerical conjectures.

 

 

Last but not least: a policy recommendation – in a Hybrid-War situation it should be a mast to implement instantly large scale soft censorship with moral and material incentives to avoid putinoids trolls to fuzzy and decay our National Knowledge Structure (Ennuste 2008).

 

Endogenezing institutions we classify occupation models according Fukujama (2014 p30-33) as colonization and have to focus first of all on estimation damages of local national institutional distortions – and distortions of local population structure – in our context colonization of democratic capitalist European small country by non-Western communist emporium – enforcing radically different dysfunctional institutional structures – “killing off ingenious peoples throe war and disease, and setting their lands with foreigners.”

In our context long- term losses of ingenious human resources include also brutal deportations and anomaly emigration due to the brutal occupation – and as the losses macro economically ubiquitous forced immigration of economically low quality foreigners masses (White Book, 2005).  Among the long term institutional capital losses we have to take into consideration losses of National Knowledge Structure (Ennuste, 2008) and in Social Capital Structure (OECD, 2016).

 

 

 

 

Acknowledgement: Compiler (Ülo Ennuste Prof DSc PhD) wishe (in spe) to acknowledge Anne Appelbaum, Andras Inotai (HU), Ardo Hansson, Urmas Heinaste, Geoffry Hodgson (UK), Alar Karis, Kerstin Kari laid, Aksel Kirch, Erik-Niiles Kross, Paul Krugman, Kalev Kukk, David Laitin (mailto.dlaitin@stanford.edu), Edward Lucas (UK), Jaanika Meriküll, Jaanika Merilo, Joseph Mullat, Thomas Piketty,  Aigi Rahi-Tamm, Attiat F. Ott (USA), Kristina Potapova, Ilmar Raag, Anto Raukas, Hannes Rumm, Urmas Reinsalu, Helir-Valdor Seeder, Rein Taagepera, Indrek Tarand, Rene Toomse, Tarmo Tuisk, Jaak Valge, Urmas Varblane, Andres Võrk, Jelena Zubkova, Jouko Ylä-Liedenpohja (FI),  … (PL), … (LT), Ruta Pazdere, Maris Lejnieks, Janis Pocs, Rolandes Bebris and Jlgonis Upmalis (LV), … (DE) etc, and also anonymus referees for pro been  helpful comments and co-authorships, suggestions/corrections etc.

The research for this COMPILATION was supported strongly morally and with modest funding (0,9th eur) by the Publisher VALGE RAAMAT.

 

 

 

NOTES

 

N1. – Beyond the GDP and Resources and Estimation of Errors and Risks

 

A)Eurostat (2015) “Quality of Life”

 

Abstract

Quality of life in Europe — facts and views presents different aspects of people’s well-being combining

for the first time objective indicators with subjective evaluation of individuals’ situations and covering

various aspects of quality of life. The indicators are analysed together with different elements affecting

quality of life such as educational level, activity, health status or family and financial situation. The

emphasis in this publication has been placed on the data collected through the 2013 ad-hoc module on

subjective well-being, which was added to the statistics on income and living conditions (EU-SILC). Data

are presented for the European Union and its Member States as well as for the EFTA countries.

Quality of life in Europe — facts and views provides an overview of the wealth of information that is

available on Eurostat’s website and within its online databases.

Editors

Jean-Louis Mercy, Agnieszka Litwinska, Didier Dupré, Stephen Clarke, Georgiana Aurelia Ivan and

Colin Stewart

Eurostat, Unit F4 — Quality of life

Philippe Bautier, Fabienne Montaigne, Louise Corselli-Nordblad, Catherine Coyette, Isabelle Fiasse,

Annika Johansson, Lucie Peterkova and Helene Strandell

Eurostat, Unit B4 — Dissemination

Contact details

Eurostat

Batiment Joseph Bech

5, rue Alphonse Weicker

L-2721 Luxembourg

LUXEMBOURG

E-mail: estat-user-support@ec.europa.eu

Production

This publication was produced by:

Catherine Kesy, Franz Eiffe, Dovile Minkeviciute, Dimitris Mazonakis, Nikkie Yiokari, Giota Anastasiou,

Asanoula Chatzimakri, Kathrin Gärtner, Ivo Ponocny — ICON-INSTITUT Public Sector Gmbh in

consortium with Statistik Austria and Quantos S.A.

William Helminger, Alain Mahieu, Bruno Scuvée — CRI (Luxembourg) S.A.

For more information please consult

Eurostat website: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat

Statistics Explained: http://ec.eurostat.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained

the members of the steering group for this publication — Mariana Kotzeva, Gallo Gueye, Emanuele

Baldacci, Anne Clemenceau, Timothy Allen, Baiba Grandovska — and to those involved closely in the

editorial work for each chapter — Lucian Agafitei, Marta Beck, Boyan Genev, Marina Grillo, Jakub Hrkal.

 

B)Kubiszewski et al. (2013)  “Measuring and achieving global genuine progress”

 

Abstract

While global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has increased more than three-fold since 1950, economic welfare,

as estimated by the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI), has actually decreased since 1978. We synthesized

estimates of GPI over the 19502003 time period for 17 countries for which GPI has been estimated. These 17

countries contain 53% of the global population and 59% of the global GDP. We compared GPI with Gross

Domestic Product (GDP), Human Development Index (HDI), Ecological Footprint, Biocapacity, Gini coefficient,

and Life Satisfaction scores. Results show a significant variation among these countries, but some major trends.

We also estimated a global GPI/capita over the 19502003 period. Global GPI/capita peaked in 1978, about the

same time that global Ecological Footprint exceeded global Biocapacity. Life Satisfaction in almost all countries

has also not improved significantly since 1975. Globally, GPI/capita does not increase beyond a GDP/capita of

around $7000/capita. If we distributed income more equitably around the planet, the current world GDP

($67 trillion/yr) could support 9.6 billion people at $7000/capita. While GPI is not the perfect economic welfare

indicator, it is a far better approximation than GDP. Development policies need to shift to better account for real

welfare and not merely GDP growth. © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

 

B)OECD May (2016)

How’s Life in Estonia? (Preliminarily PDE format Tables here in Word)

Additional information, including the data used in this country note, can be found at: http://www.oecd.org/statistics/Better-Life-Initiative-2016-country-notes-data.xlsx 2

 

 

The OECD Better Life Initiative, launched in 2011, focuses on the aspects of life that matter to people and that shape the quality of their lives. The Initiative comprises a set of regularly updated well-being indicators and an in-depth analysis of specific topics, published in the How’s Life? report. It also includes an interactive web application, the Better Life Index, and a number of methodological and research projects to improve the information base towards a better understanding of well-being trends and their drivers.

The OECD Better Life Initiative:

 Helps to inform policy making to improve quality of life.

 Connects policies to people’s lives.

 Generates support for needed policy measures.

 Improves civic engagement by encouraging the public to create their own Better Life Index and share their preferences about what matters most for well-being.

 Empowers the public by improving their understanding of policy-making.

 

This brochure presents selected findings for Estonia from the OECD Better Life Index 2016 (page 3), the How’s Life? report (pages 4-5) and shows what Estonian users of the Better Life Index are telling us about their well-being priorities (page 6). A supporting Excel file with the data underlying the graphs shown in this note and further information is available here: http://www.oecd.org/statistics/Better-Life-Initiative-2016-country-notes-data.xlsx.

HOW’S LIFE?

How’s Life?, published every two years, provides a comprehensive picture of well-being in OECD countries and other major economies by bringing together an internationally comparable set of well-being indicators that the OECD considers as essential to a good life. It looks at people’s material conditions and quality of life across the population in eleven dimensions including: income and wealth; jobs and earnings; housing; health status; work-life balance; education and skills; social connections; civic engagement and governance; environmental quality; personal security; and subjective well-being. The How’s Life? 2015 report includes for the first time a set of indicators to measure the stocks of resources that help to support well-being over time. The report also contains three special chapters focusing on child well-being, volunteering and regional well-being.

Estonia

House-hold income

Homicides

Employment

Life satisfaction

Labour market insecurity

Financial wealth

Earnings

Feeling safe at night

Long-term unemployment

Working hours

Time off

Rooms per person

Housing affordability

Basic sanitation

Water quality

Air quality

Social support

Cognitive skills

Years in education

Educational attainment

Voter turnout

Perceived health

Life expectancy

HEALTH STATUS

WORK-LIFE BALANCE

INCOME AND WEALTH

SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING

SOCIAL CONNECTIONS

JOBS AND EARNINGS

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

EDUCATION AND SKILLS

PERSONAL SECURITY

HOUSING

CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE

Stakeholder engagement

HOW’S LIFE IN ESTONIA IN 2016?

 

Estonia has one of the lowest levels of average household net adjusted disposable income per capita in the OECD as well as a low level of household net financial wealth. At 69.6%, the employment rate is however above the OECD average and only 3.3% of Estonian employees work very long hours, compared to 13% in the OECD on average.

In Estonia, 7.2% of people still live in dwellings without basic sanitation (defined as homes without an indoor flushing toilet for the sole use of the household), which is much higher than the OECD average, however, housing affordability is among the highest in the OECD area. Between 2009 and 2013, life expectancy increased by 2.1 years to 77.3 years, which is still lower than the OECD average of 79.9 years. Estonia has one of the highest levels of educational attainment: 91% of the adult working-age population have completed at least an upper secondary education. Estonia’s rate of homicides is the third highest in the OECD area and life satisfaction in Estonia is among the lowest in the OECD.

Current well-being in Estonia

This chart shows areas of well-being strengths and weaknesses in Estonia, based on a ranking of all OECD countries. Longer lines show areas of relative strength, while shorter lines show areas of relative weakness. For more details, see http://www.oecd.org/statistics/Better-Life-Initiative-2016-country-notes-data.xlsx.

Source: OECD calculation based on the OECD Better Life Index 2016 database, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=BLI.

Resources for future well-being in Estonia Beyond measuring well-being today, How’s Life? 2015 looks at some of the resources (or “capital stocks”) that will shape people’s well-being in the future. These include aspects of natural capital, human capital (sic! population(x)value, üe) social capital (sic! cooperation- and national knowledge structure, population reproduction etc üe) and economic capital (sic! real infrastructure assets, institutional and cyber mechanisms assets etc, üe).

For example, trust in other people is an important component of social capital. In Estonia trust in others is the same as in the average European OECD country: on a scale from 0 (“you do not trust any other person’’) to 10 (‘’most people can be trusted’’), the average score given by Estonians is 5.8.

…………………………………………………………………

 

 

HOW’S LIFE FOR CHILDREN IN ESTONIA? Giving children a good start in life is important both for well-being today, and in the future.

Child well-being in Estonia Ranking of Estonia compared to other OECD countries top third middle third bottom third Income and Wealth Disposable income of households with children

Child income poverty

Jobs and Earnings Children in workless households

Children with a long-term unemployed parent

Housing conditions Average rooms per child

Children in homes that lack basic facilities

Environmental quality Children in homes with poor environmental conditions
Health status Infant mortality Low birth weight Self-reported health status Obesity Adolescent suicide rate

Teenage birth rate

Education and Skills Reading skills among 15 year olds (PISA)

Creative problem solving among 15 year olds (PISA)

Youth neither in employment nor education/training

Educational deprivation

Civic engagement Intention to vote

Civic participation

Social and family environment Children who find it easy to talk to their parents Students reporting having kind classmates

Students feeling a lot of pressure from schoolwork Students liking school Sense of belonging in school at 15 years old (PISA)

Time children spend with parents

Personal security Child homicide rate

Bullying

Subjective well-being Life satisfaction

 

 

 

 

 

 

  1. C) Estimation of the estimation errors

 

Blattman, Christopher et al. (2013):

 

“Empirical social science relies heavily on self-reported data, but subjects may misreport behaviours, especially

sensitive ones such as crime or drug abuse. If a treatment influences survey misreporting, it biases causal estimates.

We develop a validation technique that uses intensive qualitative work to assess survey misreporting

and pilot it in a field experiment where subjects were assigned to receive cash, therapy, both, or neither. According

to survey responses, both treatments reduced crime and other sensitive behaviours. Local researchers spent

several days with a random subsample of subjects after surveys, building trust and obtaining verbal confirmation

of four sensitive behaviours and two expenditures. In this instance, validation showed survey underreporting of

most sensitive behaviours was low and uncorrelated with treatment, while expenditures were under reported

in the survey across all arms, but especially in the control group. We use these data to develop measurement

error bounds on treatment effects estimated from surveys.

© 2016 Published by Elsevier B.V.

 

Introduction

 

The trouble with many survey topics, whether it’s abortion, drug

use, crime, domestic violence, or support for terrorism, is that people

may not tell the truth. This makes survey data on any sensitive topic

suspect. Even without incentives to misreport, self-reported data are

often inaccurate. Studies show people even misreport their gender

and education.1Whenmeasuring subjects that can embarrass or endanger

the respondent, we worry that people might misreport their attitudes

or actions.2

When we are interested in the impact of a program or event,

measurement error will also affect our ability to estimate unbiased

causal effects. In dependent variables, random measurement error

reduces precision but won’t bias estimates.3 Systematic reporting errors,

however, generally bias causal estimates, especially when the measurement

error is correlated with the treatment or exogenous event of

interest. For instance, people who receive an anti-crime message or an

addiction treatment might be more likely to respond that they are

non-violent or drug free, both because it’s socially desirable and because

of perceived experimenter demand (where participants conform to the

expectations of the people who ran the program).

Journal of Development Economics 120 (2016) 99–112

 

D)SUNSTEIN, CASS R. and REID HASTIE (2015) „Garbage in, garbage out? Some micro sources of macro errors“ – Journal of Institutional Economics / Volume 11 / Issue 03 / September 2015, pp 561-583

 

 

 

 

E)Estimation of the risks

 

Journal of Development Economics 120 (2016) 182–208

 

Witchcraft beliefs and the erosion of social capital:

Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa and beyond_

Boris Gershman

Department of Economics, American University, 4400 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC, 20016-8029, USA

A R T I C L E I N F O

Article history:

Received 4 April 2015

Received in revised form 26 November 2015

Accepted 28 November 2015

Available online 4 December 2015

Keywords:

Culture

Persistence

Social capital

Superstition

Trust

Witchcraft

A B S T R A C T

This paper examines the relationship between witchcraft beliefs, a deep-rooted cultural phenomenon,

and various elements of social capital. Using novel survey data from nineteen countries in Sub-Saharan

Africa we establish a robust negative association between the prevalence of witchcraft beliefs and multiple

measures of trust which holds after accounting for country fixed effects and potential confounding

factors at the individual, regional, and ethnic-group levels. This finding extends to other metrics

of social capital, namely charitable giving and participation in religious group activities. Such coexistence

of witchcraft beliefs and antisocial attitudes stands in stark contrast to a well-explored alternative

cultural equilibrium characterized by religious prosociality. Evidence from societies beyond Africa

shows that in preindustrial communities where witchcraft is believed to be an important cause of illness,

mistrust and other antisocial traits are inculcated since childhood. Furthermore, second-generation

immigrants in Europe originating from countries with widespread witchcraft beliefs are generally less

trusting.

© 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.”

 

 

F)The Economist (16.VII 2016) “Econometrics: It is not easy to compare the size of economies – even across the Channel”

 

FRANCE is renowned, fairly or not, for its long holidays and short working weeks, subsidised farmers and unionised workers, high culture and higher taxes. Less than two-thirds (64%) of its working-age population was employed last year, according to the OECD, compared with almost three-quarters (73%) in Britain. But is France’s well-lunched workforce of 26.4m now producing more than Britain’s harried 31.1m employees?

Many people seem to think so. France’s GDP in 2015 was about €2.18 trillion. Britain’s was a little over £1.86 trillion. On July 6th the pound fell below €1.17 on the currency markets, rattled by Britain’s vote to leave the European Union (EU). Since 1.86 multiplied by the exchange rate of July 6th is less than 2.18, many commentators jumped to the conclusion that Britain’s economy had slipped overnight from fifth-biggest in the world to sixth. It was one more humiliation among many.

Comparing the size of national economies can be a frustrating exercise. The measuring tape is not always consistent from place to place or period to period. This week Ireland’s statisticians added over 19% to last year’s GDP after folding multinationals’ aircraft and intellectual property into its economy. Both China and India, two of the biggest economies in the world, have recently revised their methods for calculating GDP, bringing them closer to international standards agreed on in 2008. India’s controversial overhaul recalculated everything from manufacturing output (drawing on a new database of corporate e-filings) to the value of dung. (This latter revision added over $180m to India’s GDP, assuming an “evacuation rate” of 0.3kg a day for goats and rather more for sheep.)

China, for its part, last week added R&D spending to its measure of economic size (just as advanced countries already do). It also took the opportunity to revise its figures all the way back to 1952 (see chart). The new numbers suggest that China’s GDP was over 68 trillion yuan last year, compared with only 478 billion yuan in 1952 (at 2015 prices). The difference between those two numbers, however sketchy they may be, represents the greatest economic story of the modern age. But the statisticians keep fiddling with the earlier chapters.

When laypeople reflect on the size of their national economy, they may think of a vast inventory of productive assets: humming factories, gleaming skyscrapers, fertile lands, cosy homes and teeming workers, full of brains and brawn. Similarly, when they look at a chart of GDP, like China’s above, it may remind them of a pile of money accumulating steadily over time, like an unusually successful stock portfolio.

Viewed this way, it may seem natural to recalculate the value of an economy in the light of sudden currency fluctuations, like the yuan’s decline since August or the pound’s since June 23rd. Why not mark these economies to market? It seems unobjectionable to reprice Britain’s GDP at the lower July 6th exchange rate, just as a Frenchman in London might recalculate the diminished euro value of his sterling bank account or his Battersea flat.

But such an exercise betrays a misunderstanding of GDP. This deceptively familiar gauge of economic size does not represent a stock of assets but a flow of goods and services. It is more akin to the wages and interest someone earns during a year than to the money in an account at the end of the year. It cannot therefore be valued at a point in time, like a bank balance, dwelling or stock portfolio. It must instead be evaluated over a span of time.

Most often, this span is a year (which obviates the need for seasonal adjustment) or a quarter. Other periods are possible, both longer and shorter. From 1952 to 2015 China’s GDP amounted to over 809 trillion yuan (at 2015 prices), according to our calculations, based on the government’s revised figures. Incredibly, of all the goods and services ever produced by the People’s Republic of China, over half were produced from 2008 onwards.

Shorter time spans are also possible: Canada publishes a monthly GDP estimate. In theory, one could even calculate the output of Britain and France in the few weeks since the EU referendum. But weekly GDP figures do not exist and would be hideously volatile if they did.

Explore our interactive guide to Europe’s troubled economies

Because GDP represents a flow of goodies over time, it makes sense to value it at the exchange rates that prevailed during that time. It seems odd, in contrast, to reprice what happened last year at an exchange rate that arose only last week. Many of the items that constitute GDP are perishable, disappearing shortly after their creation. Hot meals and long journeys, a stirring night at the theatre, a warm radiator on a winter’s morning—Britain produced many such necessities and conveniences over the course of 2015. But these items left nothing behind that could be marked to market in July 2016.

This is not to deny that the pound was overvalued. Its strength was rooted not in the international appeal of British goods but in the widespread appeal of British assets—including gilded homes and gilt-edged securities. Foreign purchases of these assets added little directly to British output (because GDP includes only newly built homes and factories, not financial securities or pre-existing properties or companies sold to new owners). But these buyers did bid up the currency in which GDP was priced.

Liberty, fraternity, purchasing-power parity

The size of Britain’s GDP, when converted into euro, thus reflected an uneasy amalgam of demand for its goods and services and a somewhat separate demand for the pounds required to buy British assets. The combination made Britain an expensive place to visit: all told, its prices were about 16% higher than France’s last year, according to the World Bank and the IMF. As it happens, if similar items were priced similarly in both countries (bringing their purchasing power into parity with each other), France’s GDP would have been almost the same size as its neighbour’s in 2015, even before Britain’s recent setbacks and indignities.

 

F)Paul Krugman Blog  JUL 12 9:37 AM Jul 12 9:37 am 209

Still Confused About Brexit Macroeconomics

OK, I am still finding it hard to understand the near-consensus among my colleagues about the short- and medium-term effects of Brexit. As I’ve tried to point out, while there are clear reasons to believe that Brexit will make Britain somewhat poorer in the long run, it’s not completely obvious why this should lead to a recession in the short run. I got some thoughtful responses, but they raised more questions in my mind. And I have to say that quite a lot of the reaction I’ve received has involved strange failures of reading comprehension; it’s as if economists simply can’t process the proposition that what’s bad in the long run might not have obviously bad consequences in the short run.

So let me give an example of the kind of analysis that I think should raise eyebrows: Blackrock’s dire warnings about UK slump:

Britain will fall into recession over the coming year and growth in each of the next five years will be at least 0.5 percentage points lower as a result of Britain leaving the European Union, Blackrock said on Tuesday.

“Our base case is we will have a recession,” Richard Turnill, chief investment strategist at the world’s largest asset manager, told reporters at the firm’s investment outlook briefing.

“There’s likely to be a significant reduction of investment in the UK,” he said, adding that Brexit will ensure political and economic uncertainty remains high.

When we say “uncertainty”, what do we mean? The best answer I’ve gotten is that for a while, until things have shaken out, firms won’t be sure where the good investment opportunities in Britain are, so there will be an option value to waiting.

Let’s be slightly spuriously concrete. Suppose you think Brexit might have seriously adverse effects on service exports from the City of London. This would mean that investment in, say, London office buildings would become a bad idea. On the other hand, it would also mean a weaker pound, making investment in industrial properties in the north of England more attractive. But you don’t know how big either effect might be. So both kinds of investment are put on hold, pending clarification.

OK, that’s a coherent story, and it could lead to a recession next year.

At some point, however, this situation clarifies. Either we see financial business exiting London, and it becomes clear that a weak pound is here to stay, or the charms of Paris and Frankfurt turn out to be overstated, and London goes back to what it was. Either way, the pent-up investment spending that was put on hold should come back. This doesn’t just mean that the hit to growth is temporary: there should also be a bounce-back, a period of above-normal growth as the delayed investment kicks in.

And again, since some people seem unable to read what I’m saying, this should happen even if the negative scenario holds; it’s the resolution that should produce the delayed boom, whichever way that resolution goes.

But that’s not what BlackRock, or almost anyone else, seems to be saying; they’re projecting lower growth as far as the eye can see.

They could be right. But I still don’t see the logic. It seems to me that “uncertainty” is being used as a catchall for “bad stuff”.

G)Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan and Goran Vukšić (2009) The Costs of Moving Money across Borders and the Volume of Capital Flight: The Case of Russia and Other CIS Countries.  EMG Working Paper Series, WP-EMG-28-2009.

 

Excerpts:

 

  1. „The residual method estimates capital flight indirectly, using balance of payment and international asset data. It weighs the country’s sources of funds, as given by the net increase in external debt and the net inflow of foreign investment against the uses of these funds as given by the current account deficit and the change in foreign reserves. If the recorded sources are greater than the recorded uses then there is capital flight from the country. Thus

 

Capital Flight = ΔED + NFI – CA – ΔR (Eq. 1)

 

where ΔED is the change in the stock of gross external debt, NFI is the net foreign investment inflow, CA is the current account deficit and ΔR is the change in the stock of official foreign reserves.“

 

 Conclusions

 

In this paper we have provided (sic! indirect, üe) estimates of capital flight for seven CIS (post-communist, üe) countries for the period 1995-2005. In four of these countries, Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Moldova capital flight is, when measured either in absolute amounts or relative to the size of the economy, a significant problem, siphoning off resources equivalent to a non-trivial share of GDP (in the case of Estonia probably subverting the sustainability stability of the national economy – see e.g.:** – üe). Other countries in our sample, despite domestic political instability, or tenuous geopolitical situations, and highly economies that are subject to extensive government regulation have surprisingly low unrecorded outflows of capital, and some are even net recipients of unrecorded capital inflows. Our estimates of capital flight also suggest that it is a growing problem in the countries for which we are able to obtain estimates, and, thus, capital flight will continue to be a policy problem in these countries.

We also find that capital flight from these countries is driven by relatively basic economic forces, the persistence of differences between domestic and foreign returns. Liberalizing the external and financial sectors has a positive effect on capital flight by making it easier to move capital aboard. This facilitating effect appears to outweigh the effects of liberalization on reducing the gap between domestic and foreign returns on capital. Thus, in the CIS countries, in the short run, government repression and regulation rather than liberalization appear to be more effective in combating capital flight, at least in the short run.“

 

 

N2. – Ethnicity does play a significant role, and so does the occupational repression distortion of the national ethnicity and demographic structures

 

A)Thorsten Janus, Daniel Riera-Crichton (2014) “Economic shocks, civil war and ethnicity” – JOCE Elsevier.

 

A b s t r a c t

 

Using a novel cross-country panel dataset, we show that commodity terms of trade declines cause civil war in countries with intermediate (sic! üe) ethnic diversity. The civil war effects for highly diverse or homogenous societies are negative and insignificant. Since the size of the largest ethnic group explains 96% of the variation in the ethnic

diversity measure, we conjecture that a key problem may be ethnic dominance: countries where the ethnic plurality is large, but not so large it cannot be challenged, may be most vulnerable to economic shocks. The findings may help to bridge the partly distinct literatures linking ethnicity and economic factors to conflict.

© 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

 

  1. B) Kirch, Aksel; Marika Kirch, Tarmo Tuisk, Hanna-Hulda Reinkort and Aimar Altosaar (2008) Etics, Emics, Estonians and Russians in Contemporary Estonia: Is the Past still Dominating the Present?

Presentation at IACCP Congress 27-31 July, 2008 Bremen, Germany: Working Papers of the Institute for European Studies International University Audentes No 1:

http://www.ies.ee/iaccp2008/Kirch_et_al_paper.pdf

http://www.digar.ee/arhiiv/nlib-digar:30058

 

 

B)Ott and Ennuste (1996)

Abstract

This article examines some of the consequences of the liberalization of command economies. It is argued that the breakdown of the pre-existing system of production and distribution, changes in political power, and the displacement of property rights introduces uncertainty into people’s lives. The article explores two questions: (1) How does the prospect for political and economic liberalization accompanied by increasing uncertainty affect people’s beliefs about their own well-being? and (2) How does the anxiety created by the process of liberalization impact different ethnic groups? Estonia’s experience during the transitional period is used to explore these questions. On the basis of two surveys, anxiety measures are calculated. To test the theoretical model a probit model is estimated. The study findings suggest that ethnicity does play a significant role in perceptions about “own” well-being and in the development of anxiety.

 

  1. C) Aksel Kirch, Marika Kirch, Tarmo Tuisk, Hanna-Hulda Reinkort and Aimar Altosaar (2008) “Etics, Emics, Estonians and Russians in Contemporary Estonia: Is the Past still Dominating the Present?”

Presentation at IACCP Congress 27-31 July, 2008 Bremen, Germany: Working Papers of the Institute for European Studies International University Audentes No 1.

 

Abstract

 

Given Estonia’s gaining EU membership in 2004 and joining the European single labour

market and being within the Schengen treaty space, the assumption of our research was that

historical context would hold reduced salience for the two main ethnic groups of Estonia,

giving way to perceptions, expressions and nuances of some more modern, common

European identity. Such assumptions are fore grounded by a number of social, economic and

demographic shifts since having joined the EU, not least, the dramatic halving of Estonian

youth unemployment to just 10%.

In researching the inter-relationships between ethics, emics, Estonians and Estonian Russians

in contemporary Estonia – with particular interest in the contemporary orientation towards,

and patterns of identification with, Estonia’s past – domains of interest included ‘Estonians’,

‘Russians in Estonia’, ‘Russians in Russia’ and ‘Estonian Government’; while themes

embraced constructions of the past, including the context of the Soviet Union’s role in WW

  1. Findings suggest that recent events on the streets of Tallinn (April 2007) appear to be

related to the role of the Soviet Union in WW II inter alia, where its construction as ‘occupier

of Eastern Europe (as opposed to ‘liberator’) forms a ‘core evaluative dimension of identity’

for the Estonians, together with the ‘Bronze Soldier’ having no symbolic salience or relation

to the Estonian identity. Findings, such as Estonian Russians expressing much stronger

idealistic identification with ‘Estonians’ than with their own “titular” group, will be used to

further demonstrate ISA ethic concepts that incorporate emic values and beliefs, in

contemporary Estonia.

 

  1. Gregory, Paul R., Philipp J.H. Schröder, Konstantin Sonin (2011) „Rational dictators and the killing of innocents: Data from Stalin’s archives“ – Journal of Comparative Economics 39 (2011) 34–42.

 

‘‘Because it is not easy to recognize the enemy, the goal is achieved even if only five percent of those killed are truly enemies’’

Joseph Stalin

 

 

a b s t r a c t

 

We posit a rational choice model of dictatorship to explain the tendency of dictators to

repress innocent citizens. This model demonstrates that, when the quality of information

about regime enemies is low, a rational dictator will knowingly kill and imprison citizens

who are not real enemies. We use the formerly secret Stalin archives to test this proposition

against the stylized facts of Stalin’s three major repressions. Journal of Comparative

Economics 39 (1) (2011) 34–42.

 

 

  1. Introduction

Dictatorial regimes have engaged in mass killing and imprisonment of citizens. According to one estimate, Marxist–Leninist regimes killed more than 110 million persons in the twentieth century, more than ninety percent were their own citizens, while democratic regimes rarely kill their own citizens (Heinsohn, 1998, p. 53). Stalin’s Russia, Mao’s China, Pol Pot’s Cambodia, and the current dictators of North Korea have subjected their citizens to mass execution and gulags. Contemporary

dictators tend to use exile, a milder form of elimination of perceived enemies. Castro pushed thousands of ‘‘undesirables’’   into emigration as have dictators in former Soviet republics, such as Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus or the late Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan. Cross-sectional empirical analysis also suggests that violence against citizens is linked to dictatorship

(Mulligan et al., 2004). In 2008, Freedom House rated thirty four nations as ‘‘not free’’ (http://freedomhouse.org/). Dictatorships appear to be on the rise (Levitsky and Way, 2010).

 

A particularly striking feature of dictatorial repressions is that they strike persons, who appear to be ‘‘innocent,’’ even by the dictator’s own standards. In Stalin’s repressions, most of his victims had no idea why they were selected. In Pol Pot’s … .

 

  1. F) Pelle Ahlerup and Gustav Hansson. 2011.„Nationalism and government effectiveness“ –Journal of Comparative Economics Volume 39, Issue 3, September 2011, Pages 431–451

 

Abstract

Nation-building is believed to have a positive influence on economic and political outcomes, especially in countries with ethnically fragmented populations. Yet nationalism, an indicator of successful nation-building, has been empirically linked to protectionism and intolerance, which suggests that dismal performance is a more likely outcome. This paper empirically identifies an inverted U-shaped relationship between nationalism and government effectiveness. The results suggest that the level of nationalism in the population is higher than optimal in most countries. It is further shown that nationalism may mitigate the negative effects of ethnic heterogeneity in former colonies. We find no clear linkages between nationalism and trade openness.

Highlights

► We study the relationship between nationalism and government effectiveness. ► We empirically identify a robust inverted U-shaped effect of nationalism. ► One implication is that most countries have too nationalistic populations. ► Nationalism may mitigate negative effects of ethnic heterogeneity in former colonies.

Keywords

  1. Ethnic diversity;
  2. Government effectiveness;
  3. Nation-building;
  4. Nationalism;
  5. Protectionism

 

 

 

::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

 

 

 

 

B)Maurizio Conti, Giovanni Sulis (2016)

 

a b s t r a c t

 

Using data for a large sample of manufacturing and service sectors in 14 EU countries, this

paper shows that the value added and TFP growth rate differential between high and low

human capital intensive industries is greater in countries with low than countries with

high levels of employment protection legislation. We also find that such negative effect

of EPL is slightly stronger for countries near the technology frontier, in the manufacturing

sector and after the 1990s. We interpret these results suggesting that technology adoption

depends on the skill level of the workforce and on the capacity of firms to adjust employment

as technology changes: therefore, firing costs have a stronger impact in sectors where

technical change is more skill-biased and technology adoption more important.

 

 

D)Deformation of the population ethnic structure

 

 

Eurostat (110/2016 – 6 June 2016) Migrant integration in the EU labour market in 2015.

 

Activity rate for non-EU citizens lower than for nationals…

…with a higher unemployment rate and a lower employment rate

In 2015 in the European Union (EU), the proportion of people economically active (employed and unemployed) stood just below 70% for non-EU citizens aged 20 to 64 (69.8%), while the activity rate was above 77% for citizens of the reporting country (77.3%), referred to as “nationals”. A similar pattern is observed in most EU Member States. In detail, non-EU citizens aged 20 to 64 were faced with a notably higher unemployment rate and lower employment rate than nationals. The picture was very different when analysing the labour market situation of nationals compared with that of citizens of another EU Member State.

This information comes from a publication issued by Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union, with data, broken down by citizenship and country of birth, on a wide range of indicators related to the labour market outcomes of the migrant population, of which only a small selection is shown in this News Release. Migrant integration indicators available at Eurostat also include social inclusion, education and active citizenship.

 

E) Parr, Nick; Guest, Ross (2014) „A Method for Socially Evaluating the Effects of Long-Run Demographic Paths on Living Standards“

Abstract The paper is motivated by the need for improved social evaluation of prospective demographic change in order to better inform policies that are designed to reduce the very long-run costs of population ageing and to achieve sustainable economic development.

OBJECTIVE: What is the very long-run social value of a given demographic path? What is the value of hanges in mortality, immigration, fertility, and labour force participation? How important are shorter-term demographic changes relative to very long-term effects in determining the social value ofthe demographic path?

METHODS: A new simulation method is applied for socially evaluating demographic paths, by separating a demographic path into a stable population component and a transition path component. Sensitivity analyses are conducted with respect to demographic assumptions, labour force participation assumptions, and consumption needs by age, returns to scale, andintergenerational value judgements.

RESULTS: The application to Australia shows the considerable social cost, in terms of the loss of discounted consumption per capita, of improvements in mortality and gains from higher immigration and increased participation. The effect of fertility, however, is very sensitive to assumptions about the age-specific consumption needs of the population and social value judgements aboutintergenerational equity.

CONCLUSIONS:

Our method socially evaluates the very long-run implications of specified constant fertility, mortality, and migration, giving consideration to both the transition path and the ultimate stable state. Mortality improvement is costly and higher immigration is beneficial. The impact of higherfertility is sensitive to assumptions about consumption needs and intergenerational equity.

  1. Introduction

This paper proposes a method for socially evaluating the trajectories of long-run populationprojections. Governments in developed countries have, in recent decades, become increasinglyconcerned about the future population ageing that is reflected in their population projections,and which has implications for national prosperity, government budgets3, and sustainableeconomic development. A range of public policies have been introduced to either slow downpopulation ageing or to ameliorate its effects on national prosperity and government budgets.Policies to slow down ageing include pro-fertility policies such as child subsidies of various kinds(McDonald 2006; Gauthier 2007; Guest and Parr 2010; Parr and Guest 2011; Guest and Parr2013) and pro-immigration policies (Malmberg 2006). Policies to boost both supply and demandfor older workers (OECD 2006)4 are designed to reduce the national economic burden of ageing.Population is also seen as a mediating factor in sustainable economic development. TheAustralian Government, for example, produced a Sustainable Population Strategy in 2011(Commonwealth of Australia 2011). Such strategies, however, typically sidestep any socialevaluation of the nation’s prospective demographic path, and rather focus on the implications ofdemographic paths for the ‘needs’ of the population in terms of infrastructure such as water,energy, transport and communication, of government services, education, and training, and ofenvironmental amenity.

It is the public policy attention to the economic effects of demographic change that motivates thesocial evaluation of alternative demographic paths proposed in this paper. The standardapproach taken to such evaluations in the population economics literature is to embeddemographic structure into an intertemporal macroeconomic model of optimal economic growthand then simulate the long-run effects of demographic change. The seminal study is Cutler et al. (1990), which has spawned a large literature. A key feature of these models is optimising behaviour of either individual agents or a social planner. …

  1. F) Mägi, Kadi; Kadri Leetmaa, Tiit Tammaru, Maarten van Ham (2016) „Types of spatial mobility and change in people’s ethnic residential contexts“ – DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH VOLUME 34, ARTICLE 41, PAGES 1161−1192 PUBLISHED 28 JUNE 2016 http://www.demographic-research.org/Volumes/Vol34/41/ DOI: 10.4054/DemRes.2016.34.41.

 

Excerpts:

 

Abstract

BACKGROUND

Most studies of the ethnic composition of destination neighbourhoods after residential moves do not take into account the types of moves people have made. However, from an individual perspective, different types of moves may result in neighbourhood environments which differ in terms of their ethnic composition from those in which the individuals previously lived.

OBJECTIVE We investigate how the ethnic residential context changes for individuals as a result of different types of mobility (immobility, intra-urban mobility, suburbanisation, and long-distance migration) for residents of the segregated post-Soviet city of Tallinn. We compare the extent to which Estonian and Russian speakers integrate in residential terms.

 

METHODS

 

Using unique longitudinal Census data (2000‒2011) we tracked changes in the individual ethnic residential context of both groups.

RESULTS We found that the moving destinations of Estonian and Russian speakers diverge. When Estonians move, their new neighbourhood generally possesses a lower percentage of Russian speakers compared with when Russian speakers move, as well as compared with their previous neighbourhoods. For Russian speakers, the percentage of other Mägi et al.: Types of spatial mobility and change in people’s ethnic residential contexts 1162 http://www.demographic-research.org

Russian speakers in their residential surroundings decreases only for those who move to the rural suburbs or who move over longer distances to rural villages.

 

CONCLUSIONS & CONTRIBUTION

 

By applying a novel approach of tracking the changes in the ethnic residential context of individuals for all mobility types, we were able to demonstrate that the two largest ethnolinguistic groups in Estonia tend to behave as ‘parallel populations’ and that residential integration remains slow.

  1. Introduction

Today, Russian speakers form almost one third of the 1.3 million people living in Estonia, giving Estonia one of the highest proportions of ethnic minorities in Europe. The Russian speaking minority population in Estonia has its roots in the intensive immigration that took place from other Soviet republics in the period when the country was part of the Soviet Union (1940–1991). Culturally this minority is rather homogeneous, consisting mainly of Russians, but with large groups of Ukrainians and Byelorussians. Even those who have been living in the country for two or three generations generally use Russian in their daily communication. The Estonian case is very interesting for studying the processes of ethnic segregation because of the unique historical backdrop provided by its Soviet past. In essence, the residential patterns of Russian speakers differed from those of the majority population during the Soviet period because central planners distributed migrants to major administrative, military, and industrial centres, such as the capital city of Tallinn, where they now form almost half of the city’s population, and to urban industrial areas in the North East of Estonia, where they are now a majority group. In all of these cities, Russian speakers were usually accommodated in large housing estates built during the Soviet era. The societal conditions of the Soviet years thus shaped the current ethnic landscape in Estonia in a unique way, because central planners exogenously created the residential pattern of the minority population.

There are both similarities and fundamental differences between Estonian cities and other ethnically segregated cities in Western Europe and North America. In the latter case, ethnic residential differentiation typically reflects the differences between the consumption capacity and preferences of the different ethnic groups as well as the discrimination practices in these societies (e.g., Massey and Denton 1985; Johnston, Forrest, and Poulsen 2002). Ethnic segregation in Soviet cities was not originally driven by such factors and it was, to a large degree, a function of housing allocation by central planning authorities. Thanks to industrialisation and militarisation, Soviet cities grew …

 

BTW: this DP paper by Mägi et al. (2016) needs independent competent historical terrorist occupational/colonalizational experts corrections – first of all e.g. on the basis of collection:

 

White Book (2005): The White Book: Losses Inflicted on the Estonian Nation by Occupation Regimes 1940–1991”(2005) State Committee on the Investigation into Repression Policy of Occupation, Tallinn: Estonian Encyclopaedia Publishers: 171: http://www.digar.ee/arhiiv/nlib-digar:8192

 

The present content is in great amount politically biased and erroneous – take for example excerpt from p 1162:

 

“Today, Russian speakers form almost one third of the 1.3 million people living in Estonia, giving Estonia one of the highest proportions of ethnic minorities in Europe. The Russian speaking minority population in Estonia has its roots in the intensive immigration that took place from other Soviet republics in the period when the country was part of the Soviet Union (1940–1991).“

a)“the country was part of the Soviet Union (1940-1991)“ – was under the predatory communist Russian occupation: WB pp 9-25.

b)“The Russian speaking minority population in Estonia has its roots in the intensive immigration that took place from other Soviet republics … “ – has its roots mainly and first of all in the intensive mass destruction of Estonian population by communist Kremlin genocides, war crimes and crimes against humanity: WB pp 25-47 –  ca 1/3 of initial 1040 population was lost (mainly elites) and these communist crimes are the main roots/factors/regressors of segregation – segregation that involves also anomalous emigration of nationals especially in the conditions of the previous Hybrid-War  with nuclear Russia.

c)“intensive immigration that took place“ – was mainly not free willing but deportation of Russian speakers by Kremlin from GULAG camps etc for the total Russification of Estonian genuine population and destruction of Estonian national sustainabilty: BTW in Estonia immigrants are economically less effective then nationals:

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/news/news-releases?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_jtJORfNw4amk&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=column-2&p_p_col_count=1&_101_INSTANCE_jtJORfNw4amk_delta=20&_101_INSTANCE_jtJORfNw4amk_keywords=&_101_INSTANCE_jtJORfNw4amk_advancedSearch=false&_101_INSTANCE_jtJORfNw4amk_andOperator=true&p_r_p_564233524_resetCur=false&_101_INSTANCE_jtJORfNw4amk_cur=2

And so the „, ethnic residential differentiation typically reflects the differences between the consumption capacity and preferences of the different ethnic groups as well as the discrimination practices in these societies (e.g., Massey and Denton 1985; Johnston, Forrest, and Poulsen 2002) … ethnic residential differentiation typically reflects the differences between the consumption capacity and preferences of the different ethnic groups as well as the discrimination practices in these societies (e.g., Massey and Denton 1985; Johnston, Forrest, and Poulsen 2002).“ – these kind of residential differentiation are in Estonia presently spontaneously widening (Eurostat: economic inequality is presently in Estonia growing) – with accomodating discrimination practices.

 

 

Rapidly, fuelled by immigration, and new neighbourhoods were purpose-built for the growing urban population. Under market conditions since 1991, this inherited ethnic landscape in Estonia has allowed members of both the majority and minority populations to choose between minority-rich or majority-dominated destinations when they move.

While the inherited ethnic context was created by different means in Soviet Estonia compared with Western Europe and Northern America, the mechanisms of ethnic segregation in place today are quite similar. As elsewhere, for example, prejudice between ethnic groups may be fuelled by their living in separate areas and not having many opportunities to meet members of other ethnic groups (Harrison, Law, and Phillips 2005), which in turn can prevent the creation of cross-cultural contacts between ethnic groups. Consequently, reducing ethnic segregation is often rather difficult, and segregation can persist over generations (Heckmann 2005: 17). Although many authors have challenged the notion of a straightforward link between spatial and social integration (Bolt, Özüekren, and Phillips 2010; Musterd 2003), there is evidence that people with immigrant backgrounds living in minority-rich neighbourhoods are indeed hampered in their attempts at integration and that ethnically diverse neighbourhoods offer better opportunities for contact and social integration between different ethnic groups (Gijsberts and Dagevos 2007; Martinovic, Tubergen, and Maas 2009). Thus, the neighbourhood context and how it changes for those people who move, or also who do not move, is very important for understanding the process of ethnic integration.

Most studies investigating the ethnic composition of destination neighbourhoods after residential moves fail to take into account the types of moves people have made. In the present paper, we address the need to investigate the effects of intra-urban moves, suburbanisation, long-distance migration, and immobility on changes in the ethnic context of where people live. We argue that from the perspective of each individual, different types of moves may lead to different environments (destination neighbourhoods) in terms of the ethnic composition compared to the place the person lived before (origin neighbourhood). We wish to learn which types of moves contribute more to residential integration. We also investigate the ethnic contexts of stayers, which may change as a result of others moving and contributing to residential segregation and integration. Taking these considerations into account, we aim to answer the following research question: How does the individual ethnic residential context change as a result of different types of mobility (immobility, intra-urban mobility, suburbanisation, and long-distance migration) for Estonian and Russian speakers living in the post-Soviet segregated capital city Tallinn; in other words, to what extent does residential integration occur as a result of different types of mobility?

Using a unique database with linked individual-level data from the 2000 and 2011 Estonian censuses, we track the ethnic residential environments of individuals living in Mägi et al.: Types of spatial mobility and change in people’s ethnic residential contexts 1164 http://www.demographic-research.org

the capital city of Tallinn (with 400,000 inhabitants) in 2000, who by 2011 were either still living in their original neighbourhoods, or had moved within the city or within the Tallinn metropolitan area, or had moved from Tallinn to other regions of Estonia. We begin, however, ….

 

 

  1. G) Eurostat (2016): Activity rates differ most between non-EU citizens and nationals in the Netherlands, Finland and Germany

In a majority of Member States, the activity rate of nationals was higher than for non-EU citizens, except in particular in Greece (72.6% for nationals compared with 80.7% for non-EU citizens) and Slovenia (75.7% vs. 83.5%), followed by Slovakia (76.2% vs. 81.3%), Italy (67.9% vs. 72.6%), Spain (78.7% vs. 82.0%), Cyprus (79.3% vs. 81.5%), Portugal (79.0% vs. 80.9%), the Czech Republic (78.7% vs. 79.2%) and Hungary (73.8% vs. 74.1%).

In 2015 across Member States, the most significant differences between the activity rates for non-EU citizens and for nationals were recorded in the Netherlands (59.7% for non-EU citizens compared with 82.2% for nationals, or -22.5 percentage points), Finland (-18.8 pp) and Germany (-18.3 pp), followed by France (-15.7 pp), Denmark (-15.6 pp), Sweden (-15.3 pp) and Belgium (-14.6 pp). On average in the EU, the difference between the activity rate for non-EU citizens (69.8%) and for citizens of the reporting country (77.3%) was -7.5 percentage points in 2015.

 

(Table)

 

Activity rates of population aged 20-64, by citizenship, 2015 Citizens of the reporting country (nationals) Foreign citizens Of which:
Citizens of another EU Member State                                                      Non-EU citizens
EU 77.3 74.8 81.6 69.8
Belgium 74.0 68.7 74.6 59.4
Bulgaria 73.9 (49.0) : :
Czech Republic 78.7 80.6 82.3 79.2
Denmark 82.1 74.6 85.8 66.5
Germany 83.0 72.4 81.9 64.7
Estonia 82.3 77.0 67.7 77.3
Ireland 76.2 73.3 78.8 63.0
Greece 72.6 79.8 75.6 80.7
Spain 78.7 82.2 82.7 82.0
France 78.1 67.1 77.2 62.4
Croatia 71.7 (51.7) : (45.0)
Italy 67.9 74.3 78.0 72.6
Cyprus 79.3 82.2 82.7 81.5
Latvia 81.6 74.1 81.9 73.9
Lithuania 80.8 74.0 : 77.4
Luxembourg 71.9 79.5 80.8 68.6
Hungary 73.8 74.1 74.1 74.1
Malta 71.3 69.8 70.8 69.0
Netherlands 82.2 70.3 81.6 59.7
Austria 79.5 74.2 81.9 65.9
Poland 73.2 71.1 83.0 67.1
Portugal 79.0 81.0 81.7 80.9
Romania 70.8 : : :
Slovenia 75.7 81.7 70.8 83.5
Slovakia 76.2 81.3 81.2 81.3
Finland 80.3 70.3 82.9 61.5
Sweden 87.0 77.2 85.8 71.7
United Kingdom 80.9 78.6 85.9 69.2

 

 

BOX 5 (first draft)

 

###########################################

Official/formal Eurostat differences between activity rates (Table) of Estonian citizens (nationals) and of non-EU nationals aged 20-64, 2015 (in percentage points) are about 5%: approximately 2015 the loss of the volume of GDP from Russification of population is approximately 0,2 bn eur or so: in  20 years 1÷3 bn eur.

 

Informally – considering the higher crime rates of foreign citizens and taking into consideration GGDP (genuine – including production of human and social (human wealth) capital etc) these losses may be preliminarily estimated approximately 3÷9 bn eur.

 

############################################

 

BOX 6 (preliminary draft).

 

 

Siia tuleb kaotatud inimvara rahaline hinnang (esialgselt hüpoteetiliselt – kui pöördumatu kaotuse puhul esimeses lähenduses nt (0,1 mn inimest) loeks rahvuslikuks kaotuseks inimese kohta 5 mn eur – siis see fragmentaarne kaotus oleks kokku ligikaudu 0,5 tr eur – ja tagasipöördujate (0,1 mn inimest) oleks 3 mn eur seega 0,3 tr eur + venekeelsete sundsisserändamise tõttu elanikkonna kvaliteedi langemise tõttu kahju 0,2 tr eur – siis kokku 1 tr eur – see vajab põhjalikku põhjendust … NB!: arvestatud et rahvusliku eliidi liikme keskmise väärtusega rahvuslikult Soome tingimustes kus pikajalist okupatsiooni ei olnud!

 

 

 

N4 – Conceptual and methodological remarks and risks and uncertainties

 

  1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lagrange_multiplier :

 

 

„Lagrange multiplier

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia

In mathematical optimization, the method of Lagrange multipliers (named after Joseph Louis Lagrange[1]) is a strategy for finding the local maxima and minima of a function subject to equality constraints.

For instance (see Figure 1), consider the optimization problem

maximize f(xy)

subject to g(xy) = 0.

We need both f and g to have continuous first partial derivatives. We introduce a new variable (λ) called a Lagrange multiplier and study the Lagrange function (or Lagrangean) defined by

where the λ term may be either added or subtracted. If f(x0y0) is a maximum of f(xy) for the original constrained problem, then there exists λ0 such that (x0y0λ0) is stationary for the Lagrange function (stationary points are those points where the partial derivatives of   are zero). However, not all stationary points yield a solution of the original problem. Thus, the method of Lagrange multipliers yields necessary for optimality in constrained problems.[2][3][4][5][6] Sufficient conditions for a minimum or maximum also exist.

Introduction

One of the most common problems in calculus is that of finding maxima or minima (in general, “extreme”) of a function, but it is often difficult to find a closed form for the function being eternized. Such difficulties often arise when one wishes to maximize or minimize a function subject to fixed outside conditions or constraints. The method of Lagrange multipliers is a powerful tool for solving this class of problems without the need to explicitly solve the conditions and use them to eliminate extra variables.

Consider the two-dimensional problem introduced above:

maximize f(xy)

subject to g(xy) = 0.

The method of Lagrange multipliers relies on the intuition that at a maximum, f(xy) cannot be increasing in the direction of any neighbouring point where g = 0. If it were, we could walk along g = 0 to get higher, meaning that the starting point wasn’t actually the maximum.

We can visualize contours of f given by f(xy) = d for various values of d, and the contour of g given by g(xy) = 0.

Suppose we walk along the contour line with g = 0. We are interested in finding points where f does not change as we walk, since these points might be maxima. There are two ways this could happen: First, we could be following a contour line of f, since by definition f does not change as we walk along its contour lines. This would mean that the contour lines of f and g are parallel here. The second possibility is that we have reached a “level” part of f, meaning that f does not change in any direction.

To check the first possibility, notice that since the gradient of a function is perpendicular to the contour lines, the contour lines of f and gore parallel if and only if the gradients of f and g are parallel. Thus we want points (xy) where g(xy) = 0 and

,

for some λ

where

are the respective gradients. The constant λ is required because although the two gradient vectors are parallel, the magnitudes of the gradient vectors are generally not equal. (The negative is traditional). This constant is called the Lagrange multiplier.

Notice that this method also solves the second possibility: if f is level, then its gradient is zero, and setting λ = 0 is a solution regardless fog.

To incorporate these conditions into one equation, we introduce an auxiliary function

and solve

Note that this amounts to solving three equations in three unknowns. This is the method of Lagrange multipliers. Note that   implies g(xy) = 0. To summarize

The method generalizes readily to functions on   variables

which amounts to solving   equations in   unknowns.

The constrained extreme of f are critical points of the Lagrangean  , but they are not necessarily local extreme of   (see Example 2below).

One may reformulate the Lagrangean as a Hamiltonian, in which case the solutions are local minima for the Hamiltonian. This is done in optimal theory, in the form of Pontryagin’s minimum principle.

The fact that solutions of the Lagrangean are not necessarily extreme also poses difficulties for numerical optimization. This can be addressed by computing the magnitude of the gradient, as the zeros of the magnitude are necessarily local minima, as illustrated

 

Mathematical complication here start with coevolutionary digit variable models (e.g.: Ennuste 2003) with the necessity to resort to informal fuzzy meta-mathematical solutions (e.g.: Ennuste 2008) and decomposed implementation theoretic iterative deductive quantification of Lagrangean multipliers e.g.:

 

Matsushima, Hitoshi (2008) Role of honesty in full implementation – Journal of Economic Theory 139 (2008) 353 – 359: www.elsevier.com/locate/jet

 

Abstract

This paper introduces a new concept of full implementation that takes into account agents’ preferences

for understanding how the process concerning honest reporting works. We assume that the agents have

intrinsic preferences for honesty in the sense that they dislike the idea of lying when it does not influence

their welfare but instead goes against the intention of the central planner. show that the presence of such

preferences functions in eliminating unwanted equilibria from the practical perspective, even if the degree

of the preference for honesty is small. The mechanisms designed are detail free and involve only small fines.

© 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

JEL classification: C72; D71; D78; H41

Keywords: Intrinsic preferences for honesty; Detail-free mechanisms; Full implementation; Small fines; Permissive result.

 

Introduction

 

„ … Matsushima / Journal of Economic Theory 139 (2008) 353 – 359…

these agents by designing a mechanism, according to which each agent makes announcements

about their private signals. Full implementation requires that the values of the social choice

function, i.e., the desired alternatives, are induced by the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium.

The previous works have constructed mechanisms that are not only based on the social choice

functions but also tailored to the finer detail of specifications such as the probability functions

and the utility functions in complicated ways. This complexity makes it difficult to put the implementation

theory into practice. 1 For instance, let us consider the mechanisms provided by Abreu

and Matsushima [5–7], in which the agents are required to make multiple announcements about

their private signals at the same time. The central planner regards their first announcements as

a reference and fines a small monetary amount to any agent who is the first to deviate from this

reference. As long as the agents are honest during their first announcements, this device of small

fines functions to incentivize the agents to keep their all other announcements honest. Incentivizing

the agents to keep their first announcements honest at the outset might be a more problematic

issue. In order to solve this issue, Abreu and Matsushima incorporated an additional incentive

scheme into the device of small fines, which is, however, not detail free, i.e., it depends heavily

on the finer detail of specifications such as the probability function and the utility functions. The

failure to make the mechanisms detail free is the main drawback of the implementation theory

from the practical perspective. 2

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the possibility of implementing social choice

functions without harming the detail free concept of mechanism design. The crucial assumption

is that each of these agents has an intrinsic preference for honesty in the sense that she/he dislikes

the idea of telling white lies that do not influence her welfare but instead go against the intention

of the central planner. With the intrinsic preference for honesty in this sense, we do not need to

incorporate any additional incentive scheme with the device of small fines. All we have to do is just

to keep the agents’ first few announcements irrelevant to the alternative decision. Hence, by using

only detail-free mechanisms, we can fully and exactly implement any incentive compatible social

choice function in iterative dominance. Apart from incentive compatibility, we do not require any

condition on social choice functions. These features are in contrast with the previous works in

the implementation literature, where agents’ intrinsic preferences for honesty were not generally

taken into account. 3

Several experimental economics researches such as Gneezy [10] emphasized that the role

of intrinsic preferences in this manner is non-negligible in economic decisions. Charness and

Dufwenberg [11], on other hand, raised the alarm that agents’ intrinsic preferences to influence

their decisions are heavily dependent on contexts and framings. For instance, agents’ intrinsic

costs of lying may not be significant as long as they expect that the central planner believes that

they lie. Moreover, since each agent makes so many announcements at once, it is inevitable that

her/his intrinsic cost of lying for each single announcement is severely limited. … “

 

And taking account of „correlated types“ of the occupied countries:

 

Barelli, Paulo; John Duggan (2015) „Purification of Bayes Nash equilibrium with correlated types and interdependent payoffs“ –  Games and Economic Behavior 94 (2015) 1–14.

 

We establish purification results for Bayes–Nash equilibrium in a large class of Bayesian games with finite sets of pure actions. We allow for correlated types and interdependent payoffs and for type-dependent feasible action sets. The latter feature allows us to prove existence and purification results for pure Bayes–Nash equilibria in undominated strategies. We give applications to auctions, global games, and voting to illustrate the usefulness of our results.

 

 

„Purification is a potentially powerful tool for obtaining existence of a pure strategy Bayes–Nash equilibrium (BNE) in games of incomplete information. It ensures, under non-atomicity of the underlying distribution of types and some other regularity conditions, that for every BNE in mixed strategies, there exists an equivalent BNE in pure strategies. Thus, insofar as existence of a BNE in mixed strategies has been established in great generality (cf. Balder, 1988, 2002), it suffices that one verifies the conditions needed for purification for a BNE in pure strategies to exist. Unfortunately, the extra regularity conditions for purification provided in the literature are quite restrictive: in particular, types are required to be independent conditional on a finite environmental state variable, and no correlation or interdependence of payoffs in addition to this environmental state variable is allowed. A further limitation of this approach is that known existence results do not adhere to common refinements used in applied modelling, such as the requirement that players use undominated strategies. We address these issues by proving a purification result that allows for general forms of correlation of types and of interdependence of payoffs, and by establishing existence (and purification) in the class of undominated BNE. We illustrate our results with applications to auctions, global games, and voting with incomplete information.

We consider games of incomplete information among n players who choose from finite sets of pure actions, in which the types of each player i can be decomposed into two components, tiand ui. The first is a general component that affects the payoffs of every player; the second is a private-value component that affects only player i’s payoffs and moreover is …. “

 

Reigl, Nicolas (2016) Forecasting the Estonian Rate of Inflation using Factor Models. Eesti Pank. Working Paper Series, ISSN 1406-7161; 8/2016:

http://www.eestipank.ee/publikatsioon/toimetised/2016/82016-nicolas-reigl-eesti-inflatsioonimaara-prognoosimine-faktormudelite-abil

 

Abstract

The paper presents forecasts of the headline and core inflation in Estonia with

factor models in a recursive pseudo out-of-sample framework. The factors are constructed

with a principal component analysis and are then incorporated into vector

autoregressive forecasting models. The analyses show that certain factor-augmented

vector autoregressive models improve upon a simple univariate autoregressive model

but the forecasting gains are small and not systematic. Models with a small number

of factors extracted from a large dataset are best suited for forecasting headline

inflation. In contrast models with a larger number of factors extracted from a small

dataset outperform the benchmark model in the forecast of Estonian headline and,

especially, core inflation.

JEL classification: C32, C38, C53

Keywords: Factor models, factor-augmented vector autoregressive models, factor

analysis, principal components, inflation forecasting, forecast evaluation, Estonia

 

Non-technical summary

 

Inflation dynamics have been an important topic for Estonian central bankers and policy

makers. Forecasting the inflation rate with simple models which rely only on few variables

has proven challenging, given the small and open structure of the Estonian economy. In

recent years, more macroeconomic and financial time series have become available to

researchers. One way to incorporate the increasing amounts of data is by using factor

models. Factors summarise the information of large numbers of variables contained in an

extensive dataset.

First, this paper examines whether and how factor models can be used to forecast the

Estonian headline and core inflation rates. Second, I analyse how the number of factors

in the forecast equation influences the forecast performance. And third, I investigate the

impact of excluding presumably important variables from the large dataset on the factors

and consequently on the forecasting results.

This paper uses a large dataset of 388 macroeconomic, microeconomic and financial

time series spanning 2004 to 2014 to extract factors, which are then incorporated in a

model to forecast the quarterly Estonian inflation rate from 2011 to 2014. To examine the

effects of the size of the dataset on forecasting performance, I exclude domestic and foreign

price indicators in the large dataset, creating a second smaller dataset of 246 variables.

The extracted factors are later incorporated in what is called a factor-augmented vector

autoregressive model, which also contains the inflation rate itself. The forecasts obtained

from this factor model are compared to an autoregressive model, where the inflation rate

is forecast using only its own history. The forecast errors are calculated by comparing

both the factor and autoregressive model forecasts to the actual inflation rate.

The results show that factor model forecasts improve upon the autoregressive forecasts

in many cases but the difference in forecast performance is rather small. In addition, the

results show that including one factor in the model is sufficient for it to outperform the

autoregressive benchmark model when the factor is extracted from the large dataset.

Factor models fail to improve substantially upon the benchmark model when Estonian

core inflation is forecast.

Removing domestic and foreign consumer price indicators from the dataset does not

worsen the forecasting performance of the factor models. However, the results indicate

that the first, second and third factors have to be included in the forecasting equation

to obtain similar forecast results as in the benchmark case. Surprisingly, using the same

three factor model shows forecasting errors that are up to 27 percentage points lower when

the core inflation rate is forecast. However, robustness tests show that the distribution of

the forecasting errors is less stable for models including the first three factors when those

factors are extracted from the small dataset.

In conclusion, factor models can help to forecast the Estonian headline and core inflation

rates. The forecast performance is dependent on the size of the dataset and the

number of factors incorporated in the forecasting equation. For Estonia, the findings

provide evidence in favour of using a fairly large dataset to extract the first factor, which

should then be incorporated, together with the inflation rate, in a factor-augmented vector

autoregressive forecasting equation.

 

 

 

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/gdp-and-beyond/quality-of-life/data

KUNČIČ, ALJAŽ (2014) „Institutional quality dataset“ –  Journal of Institutional Economics / Volume 10 / Issue 01 / March 2014, pp 135-161:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1744137413000192 (About DOI),  Published online: 01 July 2013.

Abstract

In this paper, we emphasize the role of institutions as the underlying basis for economic and social activity. We describe and compare different institutional classification systems, which is rarely done in the literature, and show how to empirically operationalize institutional concepts. More than 30 established institutional indicators can be clustered into three homogeneous groups of formal institutions: legal, political and economic, which capture to a large extent the complete formal institutional environment of a country. We compute the latent quality of legal, political and economic institutions for every country in the world and for every year. On this basis, we propose a legal, political and economic World Institutional Quality Ranking, through which we can follow whether a country is improving or worsening its relative institutional environment. The calculated latent institutional quality measures can be especially useful in further panel data applications and add to the usual practice of using simply one or another index of institutional quality to capture the institutional environment. We make the Institutional Quality Dataset, covering up to 197 countries and territories from 1990 to 2010, freely available online.

Correspondence Email: aljaz.kuncic@fdv.uni-lj.si

 

 

N5 – Institutions, Infrastructures, Sanctions etc

 

 

  1. Gagliardi, Francesca (2016?) Institutions and economic change.-

 

 

„There is now widespread consensus among scholars and policy makers that institutions are a crucial determinant of economic performance, and that the mechanisms involved in the processes of institutional emergence and change can generate solutions to socio-economics problems that enhance economic growth ( Acemoglu et al., 2005; North, 2005 ). Both the conceptual frameworks focusing on the study of institutions and the large body of existing empirical literature on the topic show that a country’s long-term economic performance critically depends not just on its institutional environment but also on complementarities between different kinds of institutions ( Gagliardi, 2015 ). Historical evidence also suggests that the causality from economic development to institutions may be even stronger than the one running from institutions to economic development. Economic development changes institutions through a number of channels. While increased wealth due to growth may create greater demands for higher-quality institutions, and may make better institutions more affordable, economic development creates also new agents of change, demanding new institutions ( Chang, 2011 ). From a theoretical point of view, two broad approaches have been proposed in economics to study institutional issues. The first, pioneered by North (1990) and other new institutional economists, and referred to here as the “historical approach”, conceptualizes institutions as the rules of the game, and integrates economic theory and economic history. The emphasis placed on the historical context comes from the observation that much of the developmental trajectory of societies is conditioned by their past in a path dependent way, with the implication that institutions are historically specific. It follows that historical contexts must always be taken into account, especially when dealing with the issue of institutional change ( Alston, 1996 ). The historical approach furthermore combines a theory of human behaviour with a theory of transaction costs. Its central result is that institutions determine the structure for exchange that influences the level of transaction costs, thereby affecting the feasibility and profitability of engaging in economic activity. It is through this mechanism that institutions are the underlying determinant of long-run economic performance. In other words, by defining and constraining the opportunity sets available to economic agents, institutions structure incentives in human exchange, provide a stable structure to human interaction, and reduce uncertainty by fostering convergent expectations ( Gagliardi, 2008 ). The second analytical framework is the “comparative institutional analysis approach” associated with Aoki (1996) that also draws on historical information while at the same time making extensive use of game theory. Institutions are here conceptualized as the endogenously emerging equilibrium outcome of a game and the focus is on the interdependencies existing across economic, political, social and organizational domains. In addition attention is given to interdependencies arising across institutions linking different domains. The core issue is how the rules of the game are generated and become self-enforcing through the strategic interaction of the agents, whose behaviour is influenced by the self-enforcing constraints determined within the existing set of rules.“

B)      YOO, DONGWOO and RICHARD H. STECKEL (2016)

 

Abstract

 

„Several studies link development to institutions transplanted by European colonizers and here we extend this line of research to Asia. Japan imposed its system of well-defined property rights on some of its Asian colonies. In 1939, Japan began to register private land in its island colonies, an effort that was completed in Palau but interrupted elsewhere by World War II. Within Micronesia, robust economic development followed only in Palau where individual property rights were well defined. We show that well-defined property rights in Korea and Taiwan secured land taxation and enabled farmers to obtain bank loans for irrigation systems. Considering Japanese colonies, we use the presence or absence of a land survey as an instrument to identify the causal impact of new institutions. Our estimates show that property-defining institutions were important for economic development, results that are confirmed when using a similar approach with British Colonies in Asia.“

 

C)Ennuste (2014)

 

„the reason sanctions are popular is not that they are known to be

effective, but “that there is nothing else between words and military

action if you want to bring pressure upon a government”

 

Jeremy Greenstock

 

In economic literature, one of the first examples of economic international

sanctions is provided by the measures taken by the U.K. government in the

Rhodesia independence conflict (Bannock et al., 1978, p. 174).

As we can see also in current publications in recent Wikipedia definitions,

Economic sanctions are domestic penalties applied by one country

(or a group of countries) on another country (or a group of countries).

Economic sanctions may include various forms of trade barriers and

restrictions on financial transactions. Economic sanctions are not

necessarily imposed because of economic circumstances—they

may also be imposed for a variety of political and social issues.

Economic sanctions can be used for achieving domestic political

gain. (Wikipedia, nod.)

 

Actually, the most recent example for the EU-28 is provided by the third round

of measures presently implemented in unison as partners by the EU and the USA

in the camp against the Russian Federation in the case of the Russian aggression

in South-East Ukraine (EU, 2014).

While this sanctioning seems to develop as a many-stage process (the preparation

of the next round was announced by the European Council on 30 August 2014,

and on 12 September all this was published in the Bulletin of European Union

(EC, 2014), there may be still time to analyze the structure of the sanctioning

process mechanism design in an economic union with sovereign national

member states—theoretically in the spectre of modern stochastic coordinated

game theoretical and institutional economic, etc. methods (Appendix A), and

make corrective suggestions….”

 

  1. D) NB!: Sophisticated Probabilistic Information Transfer Toolkit

Dear Colleagues,

Book by Olga Zeydina and Bernard Beauzamy: Probabilistic Information Transfer. ISBN: 978-2-9521458-6-2, ISSN : 1767-1175. Size 15,3 x 24 cm. Hardcover, 208 pages.

In real life situations, one rarely has desirably detailed information.

It is sometimes incomplete and fragmental, sometimes corrupted and distorted, or with missing or erroneous data, sometimes fuzzy  etc.

Conversely, some pieces of information do exist. Therefore, there is a natural wish: to try to use the existing information in order to reconstruct some missing items.

However, this should be done with two constraints:

First, one should not add any artificial information or fuzzy logic, such as model assumptions (for instance, that some growth is linear, or that some law is Gaussian) without rigorous proof  and not calculating connected risks;

Second, the result should be of probabilistic nature: we do not want a precise value for the reconstruction, but a probability law, which allows estimation of the uncertainties and risks explicitly

The book gives one possibly credible way to deal these kind of topics like that.

P.S.: http://www.scmsa.eu/archives/BB_Archimedes_Weighing_2013_07.pdf

 

This is precisely the topic of this book.

We show how to “propagate” the information, from a place where it exists to a place where we want to use it;

this propagation deteriorates with the distance, somewhat as a gravitational field decreases with the distance.

The book is organized in three parts:

the first part presents the basic rules, accessible with no specific expertise in probabilities;

the second presents the applications to real world problems, and the third part gives the theory.

This is a situation not so common these days: a new mathematical theory, developed by us, in order to meet a need initially expressed by the industry (namely Framatome, 2003).

Existing applications are now numerous: classifying industrial objects (Air Liquid), evaluating a pollution (Total), estimating water quality in rivers (European Environment Agency), controlling the safety in a nuclear reactor (Institute de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire), and so on.

The book can be bought on line.

Thank you for your interest

Prof. Bernard Beauzamy

Chairman and CEO,

Societe de Calcul Mathematique SA

111 Faubourg St Honoré

75008 Paris – France

+33 1.42.89.08.91

assistante@scmsa.eu

****

  1. E) Azrieli, Yaron; Ehud Lehrer (2008) “The value of a stochastic information structure” – Games and Economic Behavior 63 (2008) 679–693.

 

Abstract

Upon observing a signal, a Bayesian decision maker updates her probability distribution over the state

space, chooses an action, and receives a payoff that depends on the state and the action taken. An information

structure determines the set of possible signals and the probability of each signal given a state. For a

fixed decision problem, the value of an information structure is the maximal expected utility that the decision

maker can get when the observed signals are governed by this structure. Thus, every decision problem

induces a preference order over information structures according to their value. We characterize preference

orders that can be obtained in this way. We also characterize the functions defined over information

structures that measure their value.

© 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

 

  1. F) PAGANO, UGO and MASSIMILIANO VATIERO (2015) Costly institutions as substitutes: novelty and limits of the Coasian approach“ – Journal of Institutional Economics / Volume 11 / Issue 02 / June 2015, pp 265 – 281

DOI: 10.1017/S1744137414000198, Published online: 27 May 2014:

http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1744137414000198

 

Abstract

One of the main contributions of Ronald H. Coase was to demonstrate

how mainstream economics was based on a contradictory amalgam of costly

physical inputs and free institutional resources, and to give origin to the

economics of institutions: each institution is a mode of allocation and

organization of economic resources that is to be investigated. In particular, none

of the institutions (including the market) is a free lunch. The Coasian approach

regards institutions as costly substitutes and provides a fundamental starting point

for comparative institutional analysis. However, Coase neglected two issues

deriving from the observation that institutions are not cost-free. First, when

institutions are costly, one should not only consider their possible substitutes but

also how complementary institutions affect their costs, as well as the costs of the

possible institutional substitutes. Second, the economic analysis should also take

into account that the transition from one institutional setup to another cannot

occur in costless meta-institutions. The initial conditions may substantially affect

the final institutional arrangements. Both the novelty of Coase’s approach and its

limits were grossly undervalued. In particular, the costly institutions assumption

requires a view of economics as a historical discipline.

“You will not float down, like a sickly fish, with the tide . . . you enjoy

considerable mental vigour and are not a passive instrument in the hands

of others. [ . . . ] you are more inclined to think and work for yourself”

a phrenologist to Coase, when he was 11 years old

(R.H. Coase, 1992)

 

  1. G) DOSI, GIOVANNI and LUIGI MARENGO (2015) „The dynamics of organizational structures and performances under diverging distributions of knowledge and different power structures“ – Journal of Institutional Economics, 11, pp 535-559:

http://journals.cambridge.org/JOI, IP address: 90.190.39.14 on 10 Jun 2016

 

Abstract

 

In this work we analyze the characteristics and dynamics of

organizations wherein members diverge in terms of capabilities and visions they

hold, and interests which they pursue. In particular we examine how different

forms of power can achieve coordination among such diverse capabilities, visions,

and interests while at the same time ensuring control and allowing mutual

learning. By means of a simple simulation model of collective decisions by

heterogeneous agents, we will examine three different forms of power, ranging

from the power to design the organization, to the power to overrule by veto or fiat

the others’ decisions, to the power to shape the very preferences of the members

of the organization. We study the efficiency of different balances between the

three foregoing mechanisms, within a framework in which indeed organizations

‘aggregate’ and make compatible different pieces of distributed knowledge, but

the causation arrow goes also the other way round: organizations shape the

characteristics and distribution of knowledge itself, and of the micro ‘visions’ and

judgements.

 

H)ting Europe’s

omic and

Monetary Union

The Euro Summit of October 2014 underlined the

fact that ‘closer coordination of economic policies

is essential to ensure the smooth functioning of the

Economic and Monetary Union’ (EMU). It called for

work to continue to ‘develop concrete mechanisms for

stronger economic policy coordination, convergence and

solidarity’ and ‘to prepare next steps on better economic

governance in the euro area’.

This report has been prepared by the President of the

European Commission, in close cooperation with the

President of the Euro Summit, the President of the

Eurogroup, the President of the European Central Bank,

and the President of the European Parliament.

It has benefitted from intense discussion with Member

States and civil society. It builds on the report ‘Towards

a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’ (the so called

‘Four Presidents’ Report’), on the Commission’s

‘Blueprint for a Deep and Genuine EMU’ of 2012, which

remain essential references for completing EMU as well

as on the Analytical Note ‘Preparing for Next Steps on

Better Economic Governance in the Euro Area’ of 12

February 2015.

This report reflects the personal deliberations and

discussions of the five Presidents. It focuses on the euro

area, as countries that share a currency face specific

common challenges, interests and responsibilities. The

process towards a deeper EMU is nonetheless open to

all EU Members. It should be transparent and preserve

the integrity of the Single Market in all its aspects. In

fact, completing and fully exploiting the Single Market in

goods and services, digital, energy and capital markets

should be part of a stronger boost towards economic

union, as well as more jobs and higher growth.

A complete EMU is not an end in itself. It is a means to

create a better and fairer life for all citizens, to prepare

the Union for future global challenges and to enable

each of its members to prosper.

Introduction

The euro is a successful and stable currency. It is shared

by 19 EU Member States and more than 330 million

citizens. It has provided its members with price stability

and shielded them against external instability. Despite

the recent crisis, it remains the second most important

currency in the world, with a share of almost a quarter

of global foreign exchange reserves, and with almost

sixty countries and territories around the world either

directly or indirectly pegging their currency to it.

Europe is emerging from the worst financial and

economic crisis in seven decades. The challenges of

recent years forced national governments and EU

institutions to take quick and extraordinary steps. They

needed to stabilise their economies and to protect all

that has been achieved through the gradual and at

times painstaking process of European integration. As

a result, the integrity of the euro area as a whole has

been preserved and the internal market remains strong.

However, as economic growth and confidence return to

much of Europe, it is clear that the quick fixes of recent

years need to be turned into a lasting, fair and

democratically legitimate basis for the future. It is also

clear that, with 18 million unemployed in the euro area, a

lot more needs to be done to improve economic policies.

Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) today

is like a house that was built over decades but only

partially finished. When the storm hit, its walls and

roof had to be stabilised quickly. It is now high time to

reinforce its foundations and turn it into what EMU was

meant to be: a place of prosperity based on balanced

economic growth and price stability, a competitive social

market economy, aiming at full employment and social

progress. To achieve this, we will need to take further

steps to complete EMU.

The euro is more than just a currency. It is a political

and economic project. All members of our Monetary

Union have given up their previous national currencies

once and for all and permanently share monetary

sovereignty with the other euro area countries. In return,

countries gain the benefits of using a credible and

stable currency within a large, competitive and powerful

single market. This common destiny requires solidarity

in times of crisis and respect for commonly agreed rules

from all members.

However, this bargain only works as long as all

members gain from it. For this condition to hold,

countries have to take steps, both individually and

collectively, to compensate for the national adjustment

tools they give up on entry. They must be able, first, to

better prevent crises through high quality governance

at European and national level, sustainable fiscal

and economic policies, and fair and efficient public

administrations. Second, when economic shocks occur,

as they inevitably will, each country has to be able to

respond effectively.

They must be able to absorb shocks internally through

having suitably resilient economies and sufficient

fiscal buffers over the economic cycle. This is because,

with monetary policy set uniformly for the whole euro

area, national fiscal policies are vital to stabilise the

economy whenever a local shock occurs. And with all

countries sharing a single exchange rate, they need

flexible economies that can react quickly to downturns.

Otherwise they risk that recessions leave deep and

permanent scars.

Yet relative price adjustment will never occur as quickly

as exchange rate adjustment. And we have seen

that market pressures can deprive countries of their

fiscal stabilisers in a slump. For all economies to be

permanently better off inside the euro area, they also

need to be able to share the impact of shocks through

risk-sharing within the EMU. In the short term, this risk sharing

can be achieved through integrated financial

and capital markets (private risk-sharing) combined

with the necessary common backstops, i.e. a last resort

financial safety net, to the Banking Union. In the

medium term, as economic structures converge towards

the best standards in Europe, public risk-sharing should

be enhanced through a mechanism of fiscal stabilisation

for the euro area as a whole.

Preventing unsustainable policies and absorbing shocks

individually and collectively did not work well before or

during the crisis. Though several important institutional

improvements have since been made, the legacy of the

initial shortcomings persists. There is now significant

divergence across the euro area. In some countries,

unemployment is at record lows, while in others it is at

record highs; in some, fiscal policy can be used counter cyclically,

in others fiscal space will take years of

consolidation to recover.

Today’s divergence creates fragility for the whole Union.

We must correct this divergence and embark on a new

convergence process. The success of Monetary Union

anywhere depends on its success everywhere. Moreover,

in an increasingly globalised world, Member States have

a responsibility and self-interest to maintain sound

policies and to embark on reforms that make their

economies more flexible and competitive.

Progress must happen on four fronts: first, towards

a genuine Economic Union that ensures each

economy has the structural features to prosper within

the Monetary Union. Second, towards a Financial

Union that guarantees the integrity of our currency

across the Monetary Union and increases risk-sharing

with the private sector. This means completing the

Banking Union and accelerating the Capital Markets

Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union 5

Union. Third, towards a Fiscal Union that delivers

both fiscal sustainability and fiscal stabilisation.

And finally, towards a Political Union that provides

the foundation for all of the above through genuine

democratic accountability, legitimacy and institutional

strengthening.

All four Unions depend on each other. Therefore, they

must develop in parallel and all euro area Member

States must participate in all Unions. In each case,

progress will have to follow a sequence of short- and

longer-term steps, but it is vital to establish and agree

the full sequence today. The measures in the short term

will only increase confidence now if they are the start

of a larger process, a bridge towards a complete and

genuine EMU. After many years of crisis, governments

and institutions must demonstrate to citizens and

markets that the euro area will do more than just

survive. They need to see that it will thrive.

This longer-term vision needs the measures in the

short term to be ambitious. They need to stabilise the

European house now and prepare the ground for a

complete architecture in the medium term. This will

inevitably involve sharing more sovereignty over time.

In spite of the undeniable importance of economic and

fiscal rules and respect for them, the world’s second

largest economy cannot be managed through rule-based

cooperation alone. For the euro area to gradually evolve

towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union, it will

need to shift from a system of rules and guidelines for

national economic policy-making to a system of further

sovereignty sharing within common institutions, most

of which already exist and can progressively fulfil this

task. In practice, this would require Member States to

accept increasingly joint decision-making on elements of

their respective national budgets and economic policies.

Upon completion of a successful process of economic

convergence and financial integration, this would pave

the way for some degree of public risk sharing, which

would at the same time have to be accompanied by

stronger democratic participation and accountability both

at national and European levels. Such a stage-based

approach is necessary as some of the more ambitious

measures require changes to our current EU legal

framework – some more profound than others – as well

as significant progress in terms of economic convergence

and regulatory harmonisation across euro area Member

States.

The aim of this report is two-fold: to lay out the first

steps that will launch this process today, and to provide

a clear orientation for the longer-term measures.

The process would be organised in two consecutive

stages (see Roadmap in Annex 1):

Stage 1 (1 July 2015 – 30 June 2017): In this first

stage (‘deepening by doing’), the EU institutions

and euro area Member States would build on existing

instruments and make the best possible use of the

existing Treaties. In a nutshell, this entails boosting

competitiveness and structural convergence, completing

the Financial Union, achieving and maintaining

responsible fiscal policies at national and euro area

level, and enhancing democratic accountability.

Stage 2: In this second stage (‘completing EMU’),

concrete measures of a more far-reaching nature

would be agreed to complete EMU’s economic and

institutional architecture. Specifically, during this second

stage, the convergence process would be made more

binding through a set of commonly agreed benchmarks

for convergence that could be given a legal nature.

Significant progress towards these standards – and

continued adherence to them once they are reached

– would be among the conditions for each euro area

Member State to participate in a shock absorption

mechanism for the euro area during this second stage.

Final Stage (at the latest by 2025): At the end

of Stage 2, and once all the steps are fully in place,

a deep and genuine EMU would provide a stable and

prosperous place for all citizens of the EU Member

States that share the single currency, attractive for

other EU Member States to join if they are ready to do

so.

The Presidents of the EU institutions will follow up on

the implementation of the recommendations in this

report. To prepare the transition from Stage 1 to Stage

2, the Commission will present a White Paper in spring

2017 assessing progress made in Stage 1 and outlining

the next steps needed, including measures of a legal

nature to complete EMU in Stage 2. The White Paper

will draw on analytical input from an expert consultation

group, which will further explore the legal, economic

and political preconditions of the more long term

proposals contained in this report. It will be prepared

in consultation with the Presidents of the other EU

institutions.

This report puts forward ideas which, following further

discussion, can be translated into laws and institutions.

This requires a broad, transparent and inclusive process

– a process which should begin without delay.

 

I)Jay W. Forrester (1998) Designing the Future. Universidad de Sevilla, Spain, December 15, 1998, Copyright © 1998 by Jay W. Forrester, Permission granted for copying and electronic distribution for non-commercial educational purposes.:

„ …. The Profession of Social System Design

Social-system design will become a recognized profession. It will require the

same kind of intensive education that is necessary in other professions. Only

fragments of a system-designer education now exist. Teaching materials are

available for no more than a two-year sequence in system dynamics. Many

academic levels now teach system dynamics—in precollege schools, in

undergraduate programs, and in graduate schools. However, the different

educational levels all start with students as beginners. The programs are not

cumulative. Education in the behaviour of social systems is now at about the same

point of development as was education in medicine and engineering a hundred years

ago.

Social system design presents a major challenge to the educational

establishment. Precollege schools from kindergarten through age seventeen are

now pioneering the use of system dynamics as a foundation under most subjects.

Teachers and students are building simulation models of environmental, family, city,

and political systems. English teachers are experimenting with simulation of plots in

literature. Students are fascinated with the insights gained by modelling

psychological dynamics as in Shakespeare’s “Hamlet.”

After observing progress in learning about systems in kindergarten through

high school, many of us believe that everything now known in the field of system

dynamics can be learned by age 14. If all that we now know about systems can be learned before high school, we lack material for the four years of high school, and the four years of undergraduate education, and three years of graduate study. We must create at least eleven years more of educational materials before we can claim to have a curriculum for training social-system designers.

During the past century, the frontier of human advancement has been the

exploration of science and technology. Science and technology are no longer

frontiers, they have receded into the fabric of everyday activity. I believe that we

are now embarking on the next great frontier, which will lead to a far better understanding of social and economic systems.“

  1. J) Schmid-Schmidsfelden, Hubertus and Kristina Potapova (2016) The Bear in Sheep’s Clothing:

Russia’s Government-Funded Organisations in the EU.

 

Excecutive Summary

 

This paper sheds light on organisations operating in Europe that are funded by the Russian government,

whether officially or unofficially. These include government-organised non-governmental organisations

(GONGOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and think tanks. Their number and activities

have been growing, but their financing is often complex and hidden from the public eye. Their goal is to shift

European public opinion towards a positive view of Russian politics and policies, and towards respect for

its great power ambitions. In light of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Russian aggression in Eastern Ukraine

and concerns over the militarisation of the country under President Vladimir Putin, the overt or covert support

for GONGOs, NGOs and think tanks in the EU must become a matter of concern to the EU.

Russian and Russia-funded GONGOs, NGOs and think tanks belong within the framework of a particular

vision of ‘soft power’. It is one that relies on coercion more than on attraction, opposes democracy and

human rights, offers ‘traditional values’ and ‘a strong leader’, and promotes the narrative that the US is a

common enemy for Russia and Europe. This paper reveals the broad range of methods and institutions that

the Russian government is using to influence decision-makers and public opinion in the EU. The methods

range from using anti-Americanism in France and focusing on business ties in Italy to emphasising the

common Orthodox faith in the Eastern Balkans.

The different categories of organisation—GONGOs, NGOs and think tanks—serve somewhat different

aims in promoting Russia’s strategy in the EU. These are described in individual sections of the paper. The

GONGOs—for example, the Russkiy Mir Foundation and Rossotrudnichestvo—are based in Russia but

can have numerous branches in the EU. They tend to focus on Russian speakers abroad; some of them

provide grants to promote the spread of Russian culture and political ideas. These GONGOs are overseen

by high-level political figures, such as Konstantin Kosachev, chair of the foreign affairs committee in the

Federation Council; Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov; and Vitaly Ignatenko, deputy chair of the

Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federation Council. This shows how closely these organisations are tied

to Russian foreign policy.

Official Russian think tanks, such as the Valdai Discussion Club, are based in Russia; some have

branches in the EU. They produce analyses for the government and the president, and their analyses often

appear in the Russian media.

 

K)KUNČIČ, ALJAŽ (2014) „Institutional quality dataset“ –  Journal of Institutional Economics / Volume 10 / Issue 01 / March 2014, pp 135-161:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1744137413000192 (About DOI),  Published online: 01 July 2013.

Abstract

In this paper, we emphasize the role of institutions as the underlying basis for economic and social activity. We describe and compare different institutional classification systems, which is rarely done in the literature, and show how to empirically operationalize institutional concepts. More than 30 established institutional indicators can be clustered into three homogeneous groups of formal institutions: legal, political and economic, which capture to a large extent the complete formal institutional environment of a country. We compute the latent quality of legal, political and economic institutions for every country in the world and for every year. On this basis, we propose a legal, political and economic World Institutional Quality Ranking, through which we can follow whether a country is improving or worsening its relative institutional environment. The calculated latent institutional quality measures can be especially useful in further panel data applications and add to the usual practice of using simply one or another index of institutional quality to capture the institutional environment. We make the Institutional Quality Dataset, covering up to 197 countries and territories from 1990 to 2010, freely available online.

Correspondence Email: aljaz.kuncic@fdv.uni-lj.si

 

 

 

 

 

N6 Long-term expensive environmental damages

 

A)Raukas (2005):

 

„3 . 5 . SILLAMÄE INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX AND WASTE DEPOT

The processing of uranium ore in Sillamäe began in 1948. At first, local

Dictyonema argillite was used as raw material. As the uranium content

of the ore is low (0.03 % in average), it was later replaced by a more rich

ore imported from Eastern Europe. The plant’s administration maintains

that more than 4 million tonnes of uranium ore have been processed at

Sillamäe. In parallel, the plant started processing loparite, a radioactive

mineral mined in the Kola Peninsula, in order to separate from it rare earth

metals, niobium, tantalum etc. In first years of production, the processing

waste was deposited on the low coastal terrace of Päitenina. Construction

of a waste storage separated from the sea with a dam was started

there in 1959; later, the storage has been enlarged to correspond to the

growing need. According to assessments, the volume of the storage is

about 8 million m3 at present; one-half of this amount is made up by the

processing waste of uranium ore. There was a danger that water trickling

through waste layers could create a sliding plane on the Cambrian clay,

the layer which lies under the storage and is tilted towards the sea; as a

result, the radioactive waste could slide into the Gulf of Finland. Heavy

storms increasingly destabilised the dam by eroding the coastal terrace.

As the environmental security of the Sillamäe waste storage concerns

all the Baltic Sea states, a working group of experts, SIERG, was established

in 1997 on the initiative of Sweden; the group included specialists

from Sweden, Finland, Norway and Estonia. On 13 October, 1999, the

Minister of Environment of Estonia, representatives of the governments

of the Nordic countries and NEFCO signed an agreement on sanitation of

the storage. According to the agreement, this most hazardous pollution

source of the Baltic Sea region will be made safe by 2006. The project

is funded by the European Commission (EUR 5m), the Governments of

Norway (USD 2m), Sweden (EUR 1m), Denmark (USD 1m), Finland (USD

1m) and Estonia (EUR 3m), as well as by NEFCO (EUR 2m). A long-term

environmental loan of EUR 5m from the Nordic Investment Bank to

Estonia is to be added to this sum. The total cost of the project is about

EEK 320m.

3 . 6 . THREE IMPORTANT CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of the above, and especially on the example of Sillamäe,

we can draw three important conclusions: 1) the environmental damage

caused by the Soviet Union and Russia is huge; 2) neutralisation of this

damage is a long-term process (sic! in the case of contamination with nuclear waste very long term – üe); 3) the damage can be neutralised only with the assistance of international cooperation. The present review includes only a limited selection of the cases of environmental damage

done by the occupation army. The real situation is even worse. It is

possible that we are unaware of the real situation, because the Russian

Army, which left Estonia in 1994, did not leave any documents about their

pollution; on the contrary, it tried to conceal its deeds. We know virtually

nothing of pollutants dumped into the sea, and the bowels of the earth

may still conceal many unpleasant things in Estonia.“

 

NB!                                                                 

Ten years ago there has been still much uncertainty about long-term environmental damages caused by 1940-91 terrorist occupation – especially by Soviet troops and with nuclear waste etc – consequently this chapter by Raukas needs presently certainly fundamental updating – to be the basis for real contemporary political decisions.

 

 

 

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Blattman, Christopher; Julian Jamison, Tricia Koroknay-Palicz, Katherine Rodrigues, Margaret Sheridan (2016) „Measuring the measurement error: A method to qualitatively validate survey data“ – Journal of Development Economics 120 (2016) 99–112.

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a b s t r a c t

this conceptual, interdisciplinary paper will start with an introduction to the new-networked knowledge-based global economy and the importance of intellectual and, specifically, human, capital. Next, an advanced definition of human and other forms of capital using information, energy and entropy will be introduced. This will be followed by a discussion of the premises framing the study of economics and will focus on the role of law in the economy. Afterwards, the paper will suggest the addition of a new model of humans that should serve as the base for the concept of law, the homo sustainabiliticus. Ensuing this discussion and consistent with the newly proposed definition of capital, a proposal for a new currency (“new gold”) will be offered. This proposal suggests viewing usable, renewable energy, knowledge and data as the most important assets for the 21st century

and is seen as the building block for the new sustainabilistic economy.

© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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E-mail address: russm@uwgb.edu.

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A B S T R A C T

This study examines income convergence in regional GDP per capita for a sample of 269 regions within the European Union (EU) between 2003 and 2010. We use an endogenous broad capital model based on foreign direct investment (FDI) induced agglomeration economies and human capital. By applying a Markov chain approach to a new dataset that exploits micro-aggregated sub-national FDI statistics, the analysis provides insights into regional income growth dynamics within the EU. Our results indicate a weak process of overall income convergence across EU regions. This does not apply to the dynamics within Central and East European countries (CEECs), where we find indications of a poverty trap. In contrast to FDI, regional human capital seems to be associated with higher income levels. However, we identify a positive interaction of FDI and human capital in their relation with income growth dynamics. Introduction Regional disparities in per capita output and income have been a concern of the European Community since its inception. The objective of reducing income inequalities has been challenged by trade liberalization following the single market program and more enhanced by the continuous integration process of new member states. While economic growth and cohesion within the European Union (EU) tend to decrease income disparities at a national level, regional inequalities have rather deepened (Kramar, 2006). In this context, the convergence/divergence issue of per capita incomes across any set of regions in the EU has attracted considerable research interest in the last decade, but the results have been mixed. Some studies suggest the existence of convergence across all European regions (Fingleton, 1997, 1999; López-Bazo et al., 1999; Votteler, 2004), while others show evidence of convergence clubs or multiple equilibriums within the income distribution (López-Bazo et al., 1999; Ertur and Le Gallo, 2003; Canova, 2004). Within an endogenous growth framework (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988), the accumulation of foreign direct investment (FDI) can be regarded as an important growth driver that triggers technological progress, resulting in productivity spillovers. FDI has been perceived as a key ingredient for growth and catching-up strategies by Central and East European Countries.

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a b s t r a c t

this conceptual, interdisciplinary paper will start with an introduction to the new-networked knowledge-based global economy and the importance of intellectual and, specifically, human, capital. Next, an advanced definition of human and other forms of capital using information, energy and entropy will be introduced. This will be followed by a discussion of the premises framing the study of economics and will focus on the role of law in the economy. Afterwards, the paper will suggest the addition of a new model of humans that should serve as the base for the concept of law, the homo sustainabiliticus. Ensuing this discussion and consistent with the newly proposed definition of capital, a proposal for a new currency (“new gold”) will be offered. This proposal suggests viewing usable, renewable energy, knowledge and data as the most important assets for the 21st century

and is seen as the building block for the new sustainabilistic economy.

© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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A B S T R A C T

This study examines income convergence in regional GDP per capita for a sample of 269 regions within the European Union (EU) between 2003 and 2010. We use an endogenous broad capital model based on foreign direct investment (FDI) induced agglomeration economies and human capital. By applying a Markov chain approach to a new dataset that exploits micro-aggregated sub-national FDI statistics, the analysis provides insights into regional income growth dynamics within the EU. Our results indicate a weak process of overall income convergence across EU regions. This does not apply to the dynamics within Central and East European countries (CEECs), where we find indications of a poverty trap. In contrast to FDI, regional human capital seems to be associated with higher income levels. However, we identify a positive interaction of FDI and human capital in their relation with income growth dynamics. Introduction Regional disparities in per capita output and income have been a concern of the European Community since its inception. The objective of reducing income inequalities has been challenged by trade liberalization following the single market program and more enhanced by the continuous integration process of new member states. While economic growth and cohesion within the European Union (EU) tend to decrease income disparities at a national level, regional inequalities have rather deepened (Kramar, 2006). In this context, the convergence/divergence issue of per capita incomes across any set of regions in the EU has attracted considerable research interest in the last decade, but the results have been mixed. Some studies suggest the existence of convergence across all European regions (Fingleton, 1997, 1999; López-Bazo et al., 1999; Votteler, 2004), while others show evidence of convergence clubs or multiple equilibriums within the income distribution (López-Bazo et al., 1999; Ertur and Le Gallo, 2003; Canova, 2004). Within an endogenous growth framework (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988), the accumulation of foreign direct investment (FDI) can be regarded as an important growth driver that triggers technological progress, resulting in productivity spillovers. FDI has been perceived as a key ingredient for growth and catching-up strategies by Central and East European Countries.

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*****************

 

ex with additional references

Memo 3.I 17 – Microsoft Translator of Origional* (Do not quote!)

President of Estonia Kersti Kaljulaid in the interview for newspaper POSTIMEES (PM) on 22.XII 16 said:

“it must be able to see these trends, how the problem of some kind, seeks to tilt public opinion to someone else. It is emerging as a separate branch of social science disciplines, strategic communications, their understanding of the techniques and their going to be dealing with. In Latvia, by the way, is Excellence Center (sic! – üe) created for analyses.”

To clear (a) that such centers must be coordinated to create in all of the Baltic countries (Poland, Inc.), and (b) the occupation of the Baltic States by the terrorist-caused by the NLi’s long-term socio-economic damages based on Science/informal** clarification of the coordinated field must fall within the competence of those centres (see also PM 30.XII p. 3 “Reinsalu wants to submit the Bill to Russia”.  While it has been argued that the assessment of the losses of Latvia as of 2016. the year was EUR 0.19 trillion in volume – which shows that the investment in human capital (especially the elite), and the social capital of the cultural endowment, and the casualties of national institutional have not been competently assess – perhaps these losses have not rated the level of nationalist) – (c) with the view of strategic communications is the scientific meaning of the thing “invoice submission” of strategic populist point far away – it is in particular in the Kremlin’s side in a new occupation/colonization of the event at the research-based strategy to be applied internationally, communication deterrent in the Baltic Countries, in order of sustainability-– this not the humiliation of compromise-factoid idée right on the way – but the Kremlin’s magnum national and the long-term consequences of the crimes against humanity of the approximate financial evaluation on the way: this particular ethnicities of the sustainability of sustainability erosion.

P.S.: (a) the informal/non-standard  evaluation also includes the assessment of damages in an undocumented what modern socio-cybernetics in macro-and micro/detail-free methods (Bayesian change such as Tongeren, Jan w. van and Ruud Picavet (2016) “Bayesian estimation approach in the will; integration of the compilation and analysis “In the EURO, Eurostat — the Review is a National Accounts and are accompanied by Indicators: a 7-49) allow (see**) – including (b) estimates of the loss of human capital, human resources, national and official institutions, the destruction of the damages (including the destruction of families, such as fertile), a distortion in the national related losses, such as in connection with the real (informal/non-standard) distortions of genuin GDP volumes to market based positive activities, etc.), the distortion of the national demographic structures, Russification etc. etc. (for example, ** according to the assumptions of science-based methods to the show dozens of times in the larger national of the traditional and formal (based on official statistics) ratings: thus, not 100-200 billion euros in the Baltic-about the country – but – most likely 1-2 trillion euros – with the most so far higher than the estimate of damages Estonian PhD Kalev Kukk’s by is 0.15 trillion (the WHITE PAPER 2005) – which is so low in the sense that our national human assets and the destruction of social capital and other national institutions, the size of the losses was the long-term were not taken into account, formally financially – such as at the time was still internationally colonial-policies by analyzing the micro-economically the practice – or rather, into the mainstream of the macro-audiovisual sector, but was the great reluctance of the informal “amorfic” stochastic (one example of a stochastic approach – Ennuste, Ü., 1989. Some Models of Stochastic Planning Mechanisms. – The Finnish Economic Papers, 2, 2, 116-124. http://econpapers.repec.org/article/fepjournl/v_3a2_3ay_3a1989_3ai_3a2_3ap_3a116-124.htm , and http://www.taloustieteellinenyhdist ), and the handling of the hierarchical factors – but that it is now almost fully been exceeded also practically so according to Eurostat (see the “GDP and Beyond”) as well as by the OECD (see OECD (1998) Human Capital Investment: An International Comparison (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Centre for Educational Research and Innovation) – more in theory, see, e.g., here in 2006, Chou cited; Kissinger 2014, Fukuyama in 2014 and 2014 Piketty, etc – these monographs are a few seconds attainable with the help of Amazon.com downloaded – though often more expensive price than the paper) (c) of the national long-term economic losses evaluation should be borne in mind that, in the present case, is also largely irreversible loss of the population exodus because immigrants are significantly less positive activity (Eurostat data) – (d) but a number of international agencies and the financial estimates made by both human and sotsiaal capital are not used here, because, based on the standard-economy-GDP, narrowly to gain access to the base.

Annex:

To be published in topical Article also in the area: the strategic communications which claims that should not be forgotten that the hostile camp is trying to in every way, and in many ways our national sustainability stability likelihood to undermine it and in particular in the social capital of the national poisoning  so also the institution of the Holy family of Russification than demolition and the heads of the Kremlin, and the distortion of the national knowledge structure with the appropriate faktoids, etc. – and – as the motto of the article says:

“War gives a sense that we can rise above our smallness and

divisiveness, “by Chris Hedges (2002):

also, it must not be forgotten!

Article

Jennings, Colin; Santiago Sanchez-Pages (2016-17), “Social capital, the conflict and welfare” – the Journal of Development Economics 124 (2017) 157-167:0304-3878

AB S T R A C T

This paper analyzes the role of external conflict as a force that can create social capital. Host inter-group interactions can help to resolve intra-group social dilemmas but these potential gains must be weighed against the insecurity of the host relations with an out-of the group. Our central result is that the presence of an outside threat can induce higher levels of social capital, either because (a) the protective aspect of social capital comes into play and/or as a reallocation of investments from the private to the social capital. Given that social capital is potentially subject to free-riding, the threat, by promoting a greater level of social capital, can be welfare improving. When the threat is severe, the social capital and welfare are more likely to fall. This effect of an external threat is social capital is stronger in poor economies. These results can shed light on the sometimes contradicting empirical evidence on the relationship between conflict and social capital.

© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Available online on 01 October 2016.

……………………….

Some of the references to this article

Chou, Y.K., 2006. Three simple models of social capital and economic growth. J. Socio-Econ. 35, 889-905.

Coleman, j., 1988. Social capital in the creation of human capital. Am. J. Sociol. 94,

S95-S120.

Collier, P, 1999. On the economic consequences of the civil war. Oxford Econ. A Pap smear. 51 (1), 168-183.

De Luca, g., Verpoorten, M., by 2015. Civil war, social capital, and resilience in Uganda. Oxford Econ. A Pap smear. 67 (3), 661-686.

Deng, maybe lb, 2010. Social capital and civil war: the dinka communities in Sudan’s civil war. Afr. Affairs 109 (435), 231-250.

DiPasquale, d., Glaesar, e., 1999. Incentives and social capital: are homeowners better citizens? (J). Urban-Econ. 45 (2), 353-384.

Durlauf, s., Fafchamps, m., 2006. Social capital. In: Aghion, P., Durlauf, S. (Eds.),

Handbook of Economic Growth. North-Netherlands, Amsterdam.

Estrella-Lopez, o., 2003. Social Capital and Government in the Production of Public Goods. Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Department of Economics, Mimeo.

One of the earliest important to the article

Chou, Yuan (K). (2006) “Three simple models of social capital and

economic growth “– The Journal of Socio-Economics 35 (2006) 889-912: DOI: 10.1016/j. socec. 2005.11.053

Abstract

This paper proposes three models of social capital and growth that incorporate different perspectives on the concept of social capital and the empirical evidence gathered to date. In these models, the social capital impacts growth by assisting in the accumulation of human capital, by affecting financial development through its effects is the collective trust and social norms, and by facilitating networking between firms that result in the creation and diffusion of business and technological innovations. We solve for the optimal allocation of resources channelled into the building of social capital, to examine the models ‘ comparative statics and dynamics, and demonstrate how a tax and subsidy scheme may correct the resource under-allocation that results from the public good aspect of social capital creation. Observed, in the social capital across countries are explained by, in government policies and the possibility of multiple equilibria and social capital, the poverty of noughts and crosses.

© 2006 Published by Elsevier Inc.

JEL classification: The G20; I20; O31; O33; O41

Keywords: Economic growth; Social capital; Human capital; Financial development; Technological change

  1. Introduction

The concept of social capital, which refers to features of social organizations, such as networks, norms and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit, has found rising albeit grudging set within the economics profession in recent years. Like other sociological concepts, its amorphous nature initially elicited deep skepticism from mainstream economists, who questioned the validity of classifying social interactions as a form of capital. …

Formalization example:

Y.K. Chou / The Journal of Socio-Economics 35 (2006) 889–912 895
… Mathematically, the model may be summarized as follows:
˙K= Y − C − δKK, (1)
˙H= E(uHH)1−ψSψ − δHH, (2)
˙S= P(uSH)1−σSσ − δSS, (3)
Y = AKα(uYH)1−α, (4)
where K is the aggregate physical capital stock, Y the aggregate output, the aggregate consumption, H the stock of human capital, S the stock of social capital, δK the physical capital depreciation rate, δH the human capital depreciation rate, and δS is the social capital depreciation rate. uH, uS and uY denote the share of the human capital stock that is allocated to accumulating new human
capital, building social capital, and producing goods, respectively. A, E and P are productivity parameters, while α, σ and ψ are elasticity parameters constrained to lie on the (0,1) interval.
While ψ measures the extent of social capital spillovers on human capital formation, σ measures the externalities in social capital building, that is the extent to which community-wide stocks of
social capital influences an individual’s social capital formation. The above equations describe in turn the evolution of the physical, human, and social capital stocks. For example, Eq. (1) states
that the change in the physical capital stock per unit time, ˙K , is equal to new investment (which is equal to savings, Y − C) minus depreciated old capital. Eq. (4) is the production function for the
consumption good. The model collapses to the Lucas (1988) model of human capital and growth if ψ = 0 since S and the ˙S equation then become irrelevant. …

Additional Quotations

Memo to 27.16 XI: XI, of the European Parliament of 23 October 16 Report A8-2016-0317

This paragraph 6 requires the EU/28-s here, particularly from third countries targeted for terrorist propaganda and the improvement of preventive action against it, especially on the Web:

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2016-0440&language=ET&ring=A8-2016-0317

 

Toomse, Rene (2015) in Defending Estonia in peace and war. Retaining a small state near the aggressive neighbor by utilizing unconventional strategies; (supervisor: Jyrki Käkönen); School of Governance, Law and Society, Tallinn University, Tallinn, Estonia: 245lk:

http://www.etera.ee/zoom/8725/view?page=1&p=separate&view=0,0,2067,2834

http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21710862-militia-moms-are-practicing-their-marksmanship-just-case-estonia-counts-nato-worries

Schmid-Schmidsfelden, Hubertus: Kristina Potapova (2016) The Bear in Sheep’s Clothing: Russia’s Government-Funded Organisations. In the EU. Wilfried Martens, Centre for European Studies:

https://www.google.ee/search?q=martensctre%20eu%20publications%20bear%20sheeps%20clothing%20russias%20government%20funded%20organisations

NB! Popular overview of the concept of social capital in the relatively popular fresh:    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_capital:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_capital

P.S.: 18.IV 17

OECD (2016) How’s Life in Estonia? :

https://www.google.ee/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=OECD+(May+2016)+How%E2%80%99s+Life+in+Estonia%3F+Additional+information%2C+including+the+data+used+in+this+country+note%2C+can+be+found+at%3A+www.oecd.org%2Fstatistics%2FBetter-Life-Initiative-2016-country-notes-data.xlsx

Ott, A.F., U. Ennuste (1996) “Anxiety as a Consequence of Liberalization: an Analysis of Opinion Surveys in Estonia” – Social Science Journal, 33, 2, 149-164:

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0362

Rajasalu, Teet (2003) “Indicators of economic freedom and economic structure as determinants of growth and convergence in enlarging EU and priorities for Estonia”:  In: Essays in Estonian transformation economics, 2003, Tallinn: 9-32.

Schmid-Schmidsfelden, Hubertus: Kristina Potapova (2016) The Bear in Sheep’s Clothing: Russia’s Government-Funded Organisations in the EU. Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies:

https://www.google.ee/search?q=martensctre%20eu%20publications%20bear%20sheeps%20clothing%20russias%20government%20funded%20organisations

STIGLITZ, Joseph E., Amartya SEN, Jean-Paul FITOUSSI et al. (2010) Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress:

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/gdp-and-beyond/publications

Raporti kaalukust näitab Eurostati autorite koosseis:

Juhtivad

Professor Joseph E. STIGLITZ, Chair, Columbia University

Professor Amartya SEN, Chair Adviser, Harvard University

Professor Jean-Paul FITOUSSI, Coordinator of the Commission, IEP

http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr

Thorsten Janus, Daniel Riera-Crichton (2015) “Economic shocks, civil war and ethnicity” – Journal of Development Economics 115: 32–44:

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleListURL&_method=list&_ArticleListID=-1175221378&_sort=r&_st=13&view=c&md5=d185b1e7697a1a536327b241f9e4dd3b&searchtype=a

Tirole, Jean (1992) The Theory of Industrial Organizations. The MIT Press: 479.

Tongeren,  Jan W. van and Ruud Picavet (2016) „Bayesian estimation approach in frameworks; integration of compilation and analysis“ In  EURONA — Eurostat Review on National Accounts and Macroeconomic Indicators: 7-49.

 

Toomse, Rene (2015) Defending Estonia in peace and war. Retaining a small state near the aggressive neighbor by utilizing unconventional strategies; (supervisor: Jyrki Käkönen); School of Governance, Law and Society, Tallinn University, Tallinn, Estonia: 245lk:

http://www.etera.ee/zoom/8725/view?page=1&p=separate&view=0,0,2067,2834

 StratCom COE (15.III 2017) StratCom laughs. In search of an analytical framework – ISBN: 978-9934-564-12-3: http://www.stratcomcoe.org/publications

 

 

November 18, 2016 Posted by | Uncategorized | Leave a comment

Socio-Cybernetic Reference Memo 16.XI 16

Socio-Cybernetic Knowledge Based Reference Memo 16.XI 16

Toomse, Rene (2015) Defending Estonia in peace and war. Retaining a small state near aggressive neighbor by utilizing unconventional strategies; (supervisor: Jyrki Käkönen); School of Governance, Law and Society, Tallinn University, Tallinn: 245lk:

http://www.etera.ee/zoom/8725/view?page=1&p=separate&view=0,0,2067,2834

http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2007/advanced.html  (NB: War risks)

 Thorsten Janus, Daniel Riera-Crichton (2015) Economic shocks, civil war and ethnicity. – Journal of Development Economics 115 32–44 (NB: Absolutely actual for Baltic-Countries).

White Book (2005): The White Book: Losses Inflicted on the Estonian Nation by Occupation Regimes 1940–1991”(2005) State Committee on the Investigation into Repression Policy of Occupation, Tallinn: Estonian Encyclopaedia Publishers: 171:

http://www.digar.ee/arhiiv/nlib-digar:8192

and/or

http://www.riigikogu.ee/public/Riigikogu/TheWhiteBook

(NB:  In the beginning of 1944 the civilian population has been almost entirely Estonians – and after the Stalinist occupation in Summer 1944 – had generally no official allowance to return to North-Eastern Narva region – by now completely Russificated to destroy Estonian National Sustainability in this region).

Wikipedia (2016): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_language_in_post-Soviet_states https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_language_in_post-Soviet_states

 Le, Quan Vu; Paul J. Zak (2016) „Political risk and capital flight“ – Journal of International Money and Finance 25 (2006) 308-329 (NB: Political risks cause capital flights – especially human and financial – and especially by Kremlin predatory foreign policy towards Near Abroad Countries).

Diamond, Peter, Emmanuel Saez (AUGUST 2011) The Case for a Progressive Tax: From Basic Research to Policy Recommendations. CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 3548 CATEGORY 1: PUBLIC FINANCE: http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/diamond-saezJEP11opttax.pdf (NB: Obscurant and predatory regressive Tax Policies cause national macroeconomic decay)

Djankov, Simeon; Elena Nikolova, Jan Zilinsky (2016) „The happiness gap in Eastern Europe“  – Journal of Comparative Economics, … (In Print). (NB: Obscurant Inequality Policies cause happiness gaps in Eastern Europe)

 DOSI, GIOVANNI and LUIGI MARENGO (2015) „The dynamics of organizational structures and performances under diverging distributions of knowledge and different power structures“ – Journal of Institutional Economics, 11, pp 535-559:  http://journals.cambridge.org/JOI, IP address: 90.190.39.14 on 10 Jun 2016.

http://www.eestipank.ee/publikatsioon/maksebilansi-aastaraamat/2015/maksebilansi-aastaraamat-2015 (NB: national net lending to foreign countries anomaly high –

above eur1 bn in 2015).

 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu/forecasts/2016_autumn_forecast_en.htm

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/sdi/indicators (NB: more than many dozens of aggregated macro indicators per member county considered as significant existentially – especially genuine converging indicators.

 

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/news/news-releases (15.XI 16; NB: Estonian Convergence Stability Probability fragmentally from the GDP p.c  development prospective has probably in 2016 declined 5 percentage points or so on the bases of Eurostat fresh data):

Q3 2016 EU/28 €[ΔGDP p.c 0,5 (26,5×0,018)- EE 0,2 (13,3×0,01,6) = 0,3 :: 26,5-13,3=13,2 (2015) – 27,0-13,4=16,6 (2016)]th :: Prob. of Prospective Sustainabilty Stability EE/EU in 2016<2015 (diverging and towards dawn risks increasing substantially caused by Kremlin aggressiveness inactivating since 2014).

November 16, 2016 Posted by | Uncategorized | Leave a comment

Progressive papers

Kubiszewski, Ida; Robert Costanza, Carol Franco, Philip Lawn,, John Talberth,

Tim Jackson, Camille Aylmer (2013) „GDP: Measuring and achieving global genuine progress“ – Ecological Economics 93: 57–68.

Keywords:

Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI)

Well-being

Happiness

Biocapacity

Ecological Footprint

Gini coefficients

Human Development Index (HDI)

Life Satisfaction

Beyond GDP

Global progress

Abstract

While global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has increased more than three-fold since 1950, economic welfare, as estimated by the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI), has actually decreased since 1978. We synthesized estimates of GPI over the 1950–2003 time period for 17 countries for which GPI has been estimated. These 17 countries contain 53% of the global population and 59% of the global GDP. We compared GPI with Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Human Development Index (HDI), Ecological Footprint, Biocapacity, Gini coefficient,

and Life Satisfaction scores. Results show a significant variation among these countries, but some major trends. We also estimated a global GPI/capita over the 1950–2003 period. Global GPI/capita peaked in 1978, about the same time that global Ecological Footprint exceeded global Biocapacity. Life Satisfaction in almost all countries has also not improved significantly since 1975. Globally, GPI/capita does not increase beyond a GDP/capita of

around $7000/capita. If we distributed income more equitably around the planet, the current world GDP ($67 trillion/yr) could support 9.6 billion people at $7000/capita. While GPI is not the perfect economic welfare indicator, it is a far better approximation than GDP. Development policies need to shift to better account for real welfare and not merely GDP growth.

© 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

NB: This GPI concept is still fragmental and not adequate as National Sustainability Factor indicator – National Macro-Assets (Capital Stocks: Human Capital, National Costly Institutional Capital etc) are missing: so some kind of dual complex indicator should be designed.

 

Russ, Meir (2016) „The probable foundations of sustainabilism: Information, energy and entropy based definition of capital, Homo Sustainabiliticus and the need for a “new gold” – Ecological Economics 130: 328–338.

 

a b s t r a c t

this conceptual, interdisciplinary paper will start with an introduction to the new-networked knowledge-based global economy and the importance of intellectual and, specifically, human, capital. Next, an advanced definition of human and other forms of capital using information, energy and entropy will be introduced. This will be followed by a discussion of the premises framing the study of economics and will focus on the role of law in the economy. Afterwards, the paper will suggest the addition of a new model of humans that should serve as the base for the concept of law, the homo sustainabiliticus. Ensuing this discussion and consistent with the newly proposed definition of capital, a proposal for a new currency (“new gold”) will be offered. This proposal suggests viewing usable, renewable energy, knowledge and data as the most important assets for the 21st century

and is seen as the building block for the new sustainabilistic  economy.

© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Ecological Economics: This paper builds on and significantly enhances a chapter by Russ, M. (2014b).

E-mail address: russm@uwgb.edu.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.07.013

 

NB: Fragmental  in the sense of hybrid war and aggressive international political and moral risk and anxieties situations (Coetzee  and Katz 2015 and Ott and Ennuste 1996).

 

Brada, Josef C., Ali M. Kutan and Goran Vukšić (2009) The Costs of Moving Money across Borders and the Volume of Capital Flight: The Case of Russia and Other CIS Countries.  EMG Working Paper Series, WP-EMG-28-2009.

„The residual method estimates capital flight indirectly, using balance of payment and international asset data. It weighs the country’s sources of funds, as given by the net increase in external debt and the net inflow of foreign investment against the uses of these funds as given by the current account deficit and the change in foreign reserves. If the recorded sources are greater than the recorded uses then there is capital flight from the country. Thus

 

Capital Flight = ΔED + NFI – CA – ΔR (Eq. 1)

 

where ΔED is the change in the stock of gross external debt, NFI is the net foreign investment inflow, CA is the current account deficit and ΔR is the change in the stock of official foreign reserves.“*

„The residual method estimates capital flight indirectly, using balance of payment and international asset data. It weighs the country’s sources of funds, as given by the net increase in external debt and the net inflow of foreign investment against the uses of these funds as given by the current account deficit and the change in foreign reserves. If the recorded sources are greater than the recorded uses then there is capital flight from the country. Thus

 

Capital Flight = ΔED + NFI – CA – ΔR (Eq. 1)

 

where ΔED is the change in the stock of gross external debt, NFI is the net foreign investment inflow, CA is the current account deficit and ΔR is the change in the stock of official foreign reserves.“

 

NB: The residual method estimates capital flight indirectly – including not recorded transfers. In 2009 the political risks have been in CIS Countries much lower as nowadays in the hybrid war conditions. Randomisation should be introduced.

 

 

Le, Quan Vu; Paul J. Zak (2016) „Political risk and capital flight“ – Journal of International Money and Finance 25 (2006) 308e329.

 

Abstract

Capital flight often amounts to a substantial proportion of GDP in developing countries. This paper

presents a portfolio choice model that relates capital flight to return differentials, risk aversion, and three

types of risk: economic risk, political instability, and policy variability. Estimating the equilibrium capital

flight equation for a panel of 45 developing countries over 16 years, all three types of risk have a statistically

significant impact on capital flight. Quantitatively, political instability is the most important factor

associated with capital flight. We also identify several political factors that reduce capital flight, ostensibly

by signalling that market-oriented reforms are imminent.

_ 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

 

JEL classification: F3; P16

Keywords: Capital flight; Economic risk; Political instability; Policy uncertainty; Portfolio choice

 

„Why is it that when an American puts money abroad it is called ‘‘foreign investment’’ and

when an Argentinean does the same it is called ‘‘capital flight’’? Why is it that when an

American company puts 30 percent of its equity abroad it is called ‘‘strategic diversification’’

and when a Bolivian businessman puts only 4 percent abroad it is called ‘‘lack of

confidence’’?

Stephen Charles Kanitz in The Wall Street Journal, September 21, 1984, p. 45.

 

NB: Only economic/financial capital flight is taken into consideration: for modelling sustainability stability probability more important may be human capital flight – and – national institutional and knowledge structure distortions.

 

Ennuste, Ülo (2007):

https://uloennuste.wordpress.com/2008/11/09/ulo-ennustes-speech-at-the-inauguration-of-honorary-doctors-of-international-university-audentes-september-26-2007/

„But in the case of complex politico-economic double systems, these issues are much more complicated, e.g., the complexity should stay in the comparison results (quotients) explicitly: in these mechanisms the political and economic policies should be analysed in one complex but still separately, as side payments for political effects (probably nonmonetary) should be decided by political coordinators and economic transfers by economic regulators.

Still, there may be a probability that the curse of complexity may be eliminated and problems rigorously (not heuristically) solved by the help complex numbers as there seems to be a certain affinity between complex numbers and vector plains where Cauchy-Schwartz inequality exists, plus the phenomenon that complex numbers are divided but vectors not. Analogously, as Arrow’s Prisoner-Dilemma is vanishing in the Harshaniy’s Bayesian Game. But, additionally, the imaginary unit i=sqrt(-1) may play a complicated role as the indicator of the “other world” for the real economic world.

In brief: The rationality connecting imaginary units with a dual world policy regulation mechanisms may be schematically grounded on the reasoning: 1) it is convenient to model complex policies on the bases of vector-like constructions, 2) for efficient comparison of complex policies mechanisms should carry out division procedures of policies with vector-like quotients, 3) one such convenient division procedure is well-defined for complex numbers.

Where the Im axis may be interpreted as the “imaginary political” coordinate, Re as the economic coordinate, real numbers x and y may be e.g. the Blackwellian iformativeness measures of the announcement powers (e.g. dependent on the economic weight of the announcement and importance/credibility of the actor) E.g.: hypothetically it would be appropriate to model the side payments sign calculation for the agents on the basis quotient:

(cos j+isin j) r/r*

where r* is fixed real (=x*>0, y*=0) denoting the module of mainstream real economic truth, i the imaginary unit, the module of the actors in formativeness power, and j is the angel of rotation of the agents announcement from economic truthfulness.”

 

P.S.:  Adequate Sustainability Stability Probability=F(Regressors(Activities/Flows; Assets/Stocks); Conditions(Uncertainties/Risks; etc)).

November 8, 2016 Posted by | Uncategorized | Leave a comment