Ülo Ennuste Economics

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Towards Synthetic Design of Implementing Socio-Economic Communication (3.X 09)

 Towards Synthetic Design of Implementing Socio-Economic Communication  Mechanisms for Building Optimal Public Socio-Economic Knowledge Spaces

 

                                                                        Ülo Ennuste

 This narrative note is discussing compiled implementing mechanism design conceptions for                      optimizing public socio-economic information structures. Proposed for discussion optimal meta-synthesis concept emphasizes compiling methods with the imitation of variety of theoretical  partial implementation models and principles of real world evolutionary empirical mechanisms.

The main idea of the proposed design is to sequentially and adaptively coordinate reasonable learning and private information disclosure of the actors with the help of stimulating their reporting credibility (non-distorting with sufficient disclosure, transparency, speed and costs) and respectfulness for incoming reports (reasonable learning from credible actors).  Incentives and constraint may be heterogeneous: relevant material and moral side-payments and consultations and informational constraints etc.

The main suggestion is to complement extant respective public reporting mechanisms with more complex coordination instruments, especially moral ones and with voluntary non-governmental monitoring webs.  For the synthesis of different potential coordination activities and partial mechanisms optimisation models are suggested, the constraints may be e.g. the quality characteristics of the knowledge space and objective function as cost minimization or vice versa.

 Keywords: Public socio-economic knowledge structure, Complex implementation, Side-payments, Moral and material incentives, Voluntary webs, Optimal coordination structure, Coordination magnitude, Over-coordination, Under-coordination, Substitute- and complementary coordination instruments.

1.      Introductory Notes

The basic argument presented is to form a concept that effective/operational theoretical mechanism for the creation of high-quality/optimal public socio-economic knowledge structure may be most conveniently designed by synthesising extant theoretical partial mechanism models.    

At least five supporting interrelated sub-arguments are presented to form the concept:

The first is that high-quality socio-economic information structures with a certain sets of characteristics are the necessary recourses for creating sustainable and utilitarian based socio-economic development paths, that the quality of public socio-economic knowledge structure, the design of communication mechanisms and efficient utilitarian based socio-economic sustainability are interrelated phenomena.

The second sub-argument is that in order to reach this utilitarian based social efficiency, public knowledge structures need large and complicated set of efficient communication mechanisms and institutions, formal as well as informal  (institutions making in the long run all communicating actors better off are labelled efficient).

The third argument is that it is unlikely that such mechanisms will be efficiently designed/evolved/adapted endogenously by communicating actors. “Moreover, if such institutions have been created, we should expect market agents to try to destroy them. Based on insights from various approaches.” (Rothstein 2009).

The fourth argument is that public socio-economic knowledge structure can only reach high quality and social efficiency if the institutions that reproduce the necessary efficient type of mechanisms, act according to a logic institutional and communication truth-telling principles of modern political-economics, that may be different from the logic that actors use, e.g. manipulative strategic business efficiency principles, populist- political capital accumulation tricks etc.

The fifth argument, and most importantly suggestion, is that complement extant respective public reporting mechanisms with more complex coordination instruments and principles, especially moral ones, and with voluntary non-governmental monitoring webs. The main idea of the proposed effective designs is to sequentially and adaptively coordinate reasonable learning and rational private information disclosure of the actors with the help of stimulating their reporting credibility (non-distorting with sufficient disclosure and transparency and speed) and respectfulness for incoming reports (reasonable learning from credible actors).  Incentives and constraint may be heterogeneous: relevant material and moral side-payments and consultations and informational constraints etc. This narrative note is discussing and suggesting synthesising implementing mechanism for optimizing public socio-economic information structures on the basis of modern mechanism design theories. Proposed meta-synthesis concept  emphasizes theoretical compiling methods with the imitation on the basis of optimal planning  models and of principals of real world evolutionary empirical mechanisms.

These arguments are especially topical in finding institutional means to recovery from present             global socio- economic crises. There is plenty of evidence, that one of the significant factors                      to trigger this crises has been defective knowledge structure and that in the crises the quality                      of this structure has suffered and been contaminated continuously (e.g. Inotai 2007, Ennuste                   2008, Krugman 2008). 

 As Friedman (1962,12) has postulated: “basic problem of social organization is how to                            co-ordinate the economic activities of large numbers of people.”

It follows logically from this statement that the dynamic solution of this basic socio-economic problem cannot be solved without permanently up-dated high quality public knowledge (belief) structure. Meaning, that in this structure the imaginary information store (space) is necessarily and sufficiently large, up-to-date, with high scientific truth-value, transparent, and has specific mechanism (governance system) for implementing non-distorting communication and rational learning, and this with rational enforcements/incentives and expenses.

Understandably, in the turbulent environment, in the situations of emerging phases of rapid change from a centralized market economy to the capitalist type etc, in this situation of exuberant transitional uncertainties (e.g.Ramazzotti 2005), the social governance rules for providing high quality speedy and adequate public socio-economic reporting/correspondence, should be relatively robust and adaptive to corresponding changes, and to respective administrative regulations, and properly monitored.

The most subtle problem here is that heterogeneous reporting actors may have different rationalities and different egoistic objectives, and therefore may be interested in strategically distorting their announcements about hidden private information, erroneous or not, to achieve more conveniently their objectives.     

The theoretical informatics basis for this statement comes from the

phenomenon that for the solving of different national social problems

different public knowledge structures have different value and so may

give social actors incentives to try implementing strategic manipulative and

erroneous message policies to improve the expected egoistic results of

decision makers following activities which may have negative social

externalities (e.g. Azrieli and Lehrer 2008, Hellwig 2002, and Ramazzotti

2005).

 Our point is, after Sir David Walker (2007), that more complex

correspondence relationships and additional incentive mechanisms with

complementary non-governmental arrangements may be more effective especially in

crucial turbulent socio-economic stages  and would help to overcome the communication crises.

This is so because governmental legal administrative contracts cannot or

may be not sufficiently wide-ranging, because the nature of the behaviour

and relationships expected in this public socio-economic-political

correspondence field are often defined dominantly by the dynamic implicit

context, rather than by rigorously fixed formal contracts.

It follows that the effective mechanism of enforcement of such

complementary non-governmental arrangements, where the requirements of

the parties to go on doing data transfers voluntarily, together may be

complementary positive (e.g. Myatt and Wallace 2008.); especially

considering that there are intersections of the groups of different

rationalities, e. g. political and economic rationalities that may make

administrative disclosure regulations ineffective, if not paralysed.

The question, of course, will be first of all about informational privacy of

many institutions/individuals and about the rewards, carrots and sticks, of

senior managers in these institutions, and about reasonable secrecy and

reasonable limits of political populist distortions of reports and announcements.

In the incentive mechanism design of measuring “sticks and carrots” for the

Partners of the Code by the Monitor, we will methodically rely on the

several branches of Applied Institutional Economics Theories and

differentiate political announcers in the political world and announcers of

the socio-economic economic world (see e.g. Aoyagi 1998).

2.      Main Modelling Conceptions

The compact mathematical deduction of rational models of implementing

mechanisms for the public social knowledge structure in the

stochastic dynamic environment is extremely complicated. First of all, all extant definitions of the structure have their drawbacks (Ramazzotti 2005), and more importantly, private information of the actors in this area is an intangible invisible asset of complex values,

moral and material.

 And there are the problems rational private information collection and learning. So also are the preferences of the actors heterogeneous.

We have stressed in our discussions the importance to tackle this kind of

study of public social knowledge structures as active dynamic institutions:

as the sate of quality of this structure has not only indirect relationships with

general social developments, but also directly with future developments of

the implementing mechanisms under this very study.

Consequently, the compact deductions comprising in more or less the whole system may

give only very general results.

Due to these complications the extant rigorous operational mechanism design theories tackle mainly decomposed by aspects (Ennuste 1978) partial models, e.g.: correlated information, non-detail coordination (aggregated coordination), moral incentives, faulty agents, Bayesian environment etc.  The novelty of our approach is to tray design a general theoretical/operational model on the basis of partial models by a kind of wholeness analysis based on the meta-synthetic design (Gu and Tang 2005). And might be highly justified, to use for the synthesis some types of optimisation models where among the activities are e.g. different coordination activities and partial mechanisms, the constraints may be e.g. the quality characteristics of the knowledge space and objective function as cost minimization or vice versa  (Ennuste 2003).

Our  mainly narrative/heuristic discussion is heavily based on the framework

of recent theoretic partial concepts of Descartes-Bayes-Nash transferred utility

implementation as the most precise and rigorous tools in the field of New

Institutional Economics (e.g. d’Aspremont, Crémer and Gerard-Varet 2004).

So far these tools are still quite stylised for a complex analysis of the

empirical mechanisms’ clusters and constructivist design. The main missing

link in a standard implementation theory now is in our context that at

construction of the implementing mechanisms some moral social

dimensions such as credibility/respectability of agents (Matsushima 1993,

2003 and Baliga 1999), bounded rationality (Eliaz 2002 and) and learning

by doing and information trade-offs (Koessler 2004 and Kaminski 2004),

and intuitional capacities of agents are not sufficiently exploited; and the

costs connected with transferring utilities are not taken into consideration;

also the implementation variants of economic institutional structures are not

explicitly formalized (Ennuste 2003).

 Our heuristic model findings, based on the assumption of separability of the

social choice function by agents, containing institutional variables with

complementarities and combined institutional influences, are that the

synthesized models of emergent types of mechanisms have probably robust

sub-optimal implementation permissiveness for a very general class of

socio-economic systems choice functions.

Suppose communicating actors have combined material (socio-economic,

environmental, monetary, material wellbeing) and moral, political, ethical,

cultural and religious objectives, motivations (Macchiavello 2008),

preferences, targets, and values in their private knowledge disseminating

and learning policies in the communication. That means the effective

implementing (optimizing) mechanisms should have complex side-payment

systems combining material and moral side-payments as incentives for

truth-telling, avoiding erroneous statements and respective learning in the

communication processes. In other words, we have a vector like effective

side-payment mechanism to design. In this procedure we have compared

complexly the pairs of informativeness values of different statements:

statements made on the basis of endogenous socio-economic objectives

(consequential/non-consequential) and on the basis of exogenous moral

ends.

The emergent empirical institutional systems generally may be functioning

(e.g. North 1990) sequentially, gradually, repetitively, and adaptively, and

may be active in updating information in this process of communication,

and private and public use; the coordination fields of these systems are not

only limited to primal socio-economic activities but also deal with

constitutional activities (institutional design, organisational engineering and

construction, reforms). In these processes, the social planners with their

private information have had parallel roles as implementers of the game and

also as players in the game in the role of coordinators and utility transferors.

In these mechanisms, agents’ reports may be indirect aggregated indicators;

agents are worried about their consequential credibility status, depending on

their behaviour in the process. They are in parallel consulted and multiply

coordinated horizontally by other agents in market rules and vertically by

the coordinator in their activity variant choices; they may be ostracised, they

may use informal communication, they learn and create new knowledge in

the coordination process, they are private and public actors, etc.

Compared to the standard mathematical implementation theoretic designs,

the empirical mechanisms are taking more into consideration the

complexities and information content of the problems, bounded rationality

and credibility of agents, heavier central coordination by quotas, more side

payments, and not aiming necessarily at the minimalist mechanism design

with exploitation of subsidiary elements but on sufficient implement ability.

And more importantly, the imitations of empirical designs show that socioeconomic

mechanisms should be dealt with in complementary or co-varying

clusters (Pryor 2005).

Our heuristic model findings, based on the imitations of empirical

institutional systems and assumption of separability of the social choice

function of explicit institutional arrangements (”institutional engineering“,

Olsen 2002) by agents, containing institutional variables with

complementarities and combined institutional influences (e.g. Searle 2005

and Solari 2005), are that the emergent types of mechanisms have probably

robust sub-optimal implementation permissiveness for a very general class

of socio-economic choice functions.

As long we all do not understand sufficiently the importance of

informational transparency in national political and socio-economic

activities, especially in learning processes, and unless there are no sufficient

legal and alternative mechanisms bases and other complex contractual

relationships and mechanisms with complementary non-governmental

arrangements, there may be large unperceived socio-economic and political

losses. This is so because governmental legal contracts alone cannot be

sufficiently wide-ranging, and because the nature of the behaviour and

relationships expected in socio-economic-political field are often defined

dominantly by the implicit context, rather than by the formal contract. It

follows that the effective mechanism of enforcement of such complementary

arrangements and contracts is not legal regulations only, but may be the

requirements of the parties to go on doing data transfers voluntarily together

– and more activity will escape from informational shadow, entropy growth

will be reduced, and the efficiency of the functioning of the entire national

socio-economic and political process will be enhanced.

*Complex and parallel coordination networks (e.g. governmental and nongovernmental;

*Complex coordinating instruments (e.g. material and moral etc);

*Complex social characteristics of actors (e.g. reputation/ respectability, credibility,    respectfulness, rationality etc);

*Complex coordination methods (e.g. non-detail, hierarchical etc);

*Complex coordinating principles (e.g. incentives, constraints, consultations);

*Complex incentive and restriction mechanisms (e.g. based on complex

numeral models).

The results of the survey (Ennuste 2008) revealed the importance in considering current

idiosyncrasies of the societies under the study, e.g.:

*Political system (e.g. divided into political parties and coalitions democracy may be interested at disseminating dominantly populist messages to the public and at non-rational

closure of national statistics; Ennuste 2007b);

*Linguistic heterogeneity of the population (e.g. part of the population may

communicatively belong more or less to some other society);

*Weight of academic community in the society.

     3. Discussion and conclusions

 The main idea of the proposed synthesized design is to

sequentially and adaptively coordinate the game of information and learning

of the subsidiary constitutional actors with the help of stimulating their

credibility and respectability behaviour by the constitutional coordinator

with relevant side payments, quotas, and consultations.

In this game, the social meta (constitutional) planner will first of all take the

role of implementer and will design the rules of the meta game, and then

will take the role and power of coordinator of the collective decision game,

mainly trying to correct the incompleteness of the design to achieve socially

desirable institutional developments.

The proposed illustrative mechanism functions as follows. The

constitutional coordinator will focus the next sequential coordination

campaign of institutional arrangements on one certain selected institutional

agent (or group of them). The coordinator will ask her or him to share the

indirect private information she or he has about efficient steps for her or his

activity profile with fixed short-term plans and state contingent preliminary

long-term activity plans. For that, the coordinator will give to the chosen

agent some coordinating and consulting information, including side

payments and constraint quotas and about new environmental parameters.

These are based on the private information the centre has, containing also

the agent’s credibility probabilities. The better the rate of the agent is, the

more generous the coordination and vice versa. Then the coordinator will

ask other agents to send to all agents messages containing their views about

the plan preferred by the selected agent on the basis of their own private

information. By deviating from the probable weighted average messages,

they will harm their credibility rates.

Then the selected agent will tackle the efficiency of her or his institutional

project. For that she or he will take into consideration the credibility rates of

the communicators and her or his own consideration rate of others, etc. This

all is taken by others to correct her or his common credibility rate in their

eyes. If her or his new version comes to be overwhelmingly effective over

the status quo, she or he will implement it. If the proposed project happens

to be overwhelmingly negative, she or he will stay with the status quo

variant. In the middle of both, the centre may announce repetition of the step

to try again to figure out the efficiency of the proposed corrected project on

the basis of refreshed information and revised credibility rates, etc.

In the end, the next campaign with the other selected agent will be initiated.

 

The meta-synthetic deduction of rational conceptions for implementing mechanism building of the public social knowledge structure in the environment of the dynamic post-transformation society is extremely complicated.

First of all, all extant definitions of the structure have their drawbacks

(Ramazzotti 2005), and more importantly, private information of the actors

in this area is an intangible invisible asset of complex values: moral and

material. So also are the preferences of the actors.

We have stressed in our discussions the importance to tackle these public

social knowledge structures as active dynamic institutions: as the quality of

these structure is not having only relationships with general social

developments, but also directly, with future developments of the

implementing mechanisms under this very study.

Consequently, the studies comprising more or less the whole system may

give only very general results. Still, as this study has proved, this kind of

wholeness analysis based on the meta-synthetic design (deductive

implementation theoretic and inductive empirical-intuitional, based e.g. on optimal planning model ), might be highly justified, especially in the case of post-transformation situations. In

these cases of rapid structural changes in many social areas, the rational

regulation/coordination of current beliefs, opinions, expectations, and

learning structures is extremely important.

The above abstract discussion argued that the adequate socio-economic

information structure implementing mechanisms design should have

extremely complicated configuration.

 Acknowledgements

 

The author has benefited from comments many participants of the EAEPE

2005 Conference in Bremen on the of the parallel paper, also from

dozens of corrections by András Inotai to the earlier version of the paper.

The remaining errors are my own.

 

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