Ülo Ennuste Economics

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Arvustus

Zombid* on jälle jätnud lapse pesuvette panemata: „Ettevõtte jaotamata kasumi mittemaksustamise mõju investeeringutele ja majandusarengule” (TÜ, Praxis, 2010, ilmselt vist rahandusministeeriumi näpunäidete ja poliitvõimendusega produtseeritud – maksumaksja kulul)

 

 Moodsa heterodokse makro-ökonoomika tuumaks on rahvusliku heaolu jätkusuutlikkuse tõenäosuse tõstmine, seega kriisijärgselt esmaolulised on sellised ingrediendi nagu: hõive languse talitsemine (langeb Eestis ilmselt veel pool aastat) ja aktiivsete pagemise pidurdamine, kodumaised tärkav-investeeringud, sotsiaalkapital, kogu välisvõlg, rahvusliku majanduse tõus ja usaldusväärsus, majanduslik ebavõrdsus ning kodutus, etnilised lõhenemised, varade väljavool rahvuslikust majandusest, majandusmehhanismide ja poliitikate kvaliteetmajandusliidulised institutsionaalsed difusioonid (eriti maksusüsteemide osas), teadusarendus, eksogeensed riskid, teadmusruumi kvaliteet, endogeensed riskid jne. Kuid loetletud faktoreid nimetet uuringust naljalt ei leia.

 Fokusseeritud on see uurimus eeskätt meso-ökonoomikale, täpsemalt korporatsioonide ökonoomika ühele kitsale segmendile: isoleeritult kasumimaksu määra reguleerimise probleemidele ja seda eeskätt seoses ettevõtte investeeringutega ja “säästmisega” ning valitsuse eelarvetulude laekumisega kapitalimaksude kirjes. Seejuures täiesti segaseks jääb et mis määral on tegemist ettevõtete välisinvesteeringutega nii otse-välisinvesteeringute,  portfelli-välisnvesteeringute ning välismaale “laenude” andmisega. Eriti vajakaks jääb hinnang et kuivõrd rahvuslik majandus ning jätkusuutlikkus ning heaolu saab kahjustatud ilmselt oluliselt suurte kasumiosade  riigist väljakantimise tõttu + seda kaotustega et see toimub maksustamata kujul, kui suurte riskidega on need väljakantimised ning tagasipöördumatud (vt ka****C), kõige suurem ebaakõla on muidugi see et autoritele on jäänud märkamata et puukfirmasid ei sobi kohe mitte kudagi tavalise tootmisfunktsiooniga mudelleerida, nagu ka doonorfirmade sihifunktsiooniks sobi panna dividendide maksimeerimist.

Seejuures on ettevõtte käsitluse metoodika/mudel mulluse sajandi tasemel: ei riske, ei üldse kasumimaksu reguleerimise mõjust teistele maksudele, ei inflatsioonifaktorit ja seda eriti kui kaudset maksu hoiustele ja millega valitsus saab korvata otseste maksude alandamist, ei majandusliidulisi reputatsiooni probleeme nagu nt 0-kasumimaksu kui partnerriikide suhtes konkurentsikõlvatu maksu mõju rahvusliku majanduse ettevõtete koostöövõimekuse reputatsioonile ja rentaablusele ning meil sellest tulenevale võimalikule sügavamale kolgastumisele rahaliidu-alal (selle kohta on uurimusi olemas).

Kahetsusväärne asjatundmatus on ka ettevõtte mudelina kasutatada tootmisfunktsiooni mis on ellkõige rahvamajandusliku stabiilsusega mudel, ning kõiki ettevõtteid kirjeldada sarnastena – mudelis ei vahet välismaiste omanikega ega kodumaiste vahel, ei pankadel ega farmidel jne.

Selge, et selliste mudeliga ei saagi hõlmata ega selgitada tasakaalutu 0-kasumimaksuga ning seda oluliselt korvava inflatsioonimaksuga süsteemi poolt tekitatud majanduskaotusi,  seda eeskätt maksustamata kujul riigist väljakanditavate kasumite tõttu (nt EP statistika järgi http://www.eestipank.info/pub/et/dokumendid/publikatsioonid/seeriad/MBkvart/_2010_3.pdf?

2009 tehti Eestist välja otse- ja portfelli-investeeringuid ligemale 40 miljardi kr jagu – kui nendest pooledki olid maksustamata siis sellele lisandus veel ligemale 5% jagu eelarvelaekumiskaotusi ainult ühel aastal) lisaks veel ka moraalsed heaolukaotused seoses nii kodumaise majandusliku ebavõrdsuse suurendamisega ning ka sügavama kolgastumisega euro-ala kontekstis seoses varade väljavooluga (nii lokaalselt kui omandiliselt). Täiesti jäävad selle mudeli puhul välja sotsiaalkapitali, koruptsiooni jne probleemid, mis ometi on maksutamisega oluliselt seotud. Selle asemel on kümnete lehekülgede kaupa ära toodud prügi-valemeid ning -tabeleid.

Kokkuvõttes on uuringu arvtulemused ilmselt vastuolus ülaltsiteeritud EP stastistikaga kasumite “nihutamise” osas välismaale maksustamata kujul – seega makrotasandil ei selgita see mikrotasandi empiiriline uuring just kõige olulisemaid küsimusi mis 0-kasumimaksuga seotud ning arvestades majandusliitu ning rahaliitu kuulumisega. Ilmselt need apsud tulenevad puukfirmade olemasolu mittemärkamisest nagu ka nende olemasolu lubavate seadusaukude suhtes silmade kinnipigistamisest.

 

Järeldussõna

Uurimust tuleb alustada uuesti:

– seda uue sihistusega – mitte enam kui ühe ammuse majanduspoliitilise otsuse analüüsina ühe erakonna valimiskampaania tarbeks – vaid kui rahvuslikule majandusele optimaalse maksumehhanismi komplekse disainimisena, seejuures kogu ärisedustikku revideerides – tellijaks Vabariigi President isiklikult

– seda eeskätt moodsa stohhastilise majandusmehhanismide teooria alusel komplekselt maksumehhanismi ning avaliku eelarve optimeerimist käsitledes koos inflatsiooni reguleerimisega, varamaksudega, keskonnamaksudega  jne (eeskjuks vt nt**)

– meil vastavaid tippasjatundjaid pole teada – kuid ka teadusriikides leidub zombisid***, aga ise soovitaksin rühma juhiks Jouko (http://www.blogger.com/profile/16345277036333167287) kes kindlasti värbaks meilt vähemalt Alari

– esimesteks teoreetiliseks trepiastmeks võiks nt olla****A) – D).

***************************************************************

*”zombi” kui majandusoskussõna kohta vaata nt Zombie Economics: How Dead Ideas Still Walk among Us  – by John Quiggin, 2010.

**Journal of Public Economics, Volume 94 Issues 7-8  – ja varasemaid ning Journal of Macroeconomics kus on muide ka balti riikide maksusüsteemide vaegusi analüüsitud rahvusliku heaolu vaatevinklist.

***P. Krugman: http://www.todayonline.com/Commentary/EDC101223-0000151/When-zombies-win,-the-economy-gets-chomped

****

A) Journal of Public Economics
Volume 94, Issues 7-8, August 2010, Pages 453-466

 Optimal democratic mechanisms for taxation and public good provision

Felix Bierbrauera, , and Marco Sahmb,

Abstract

We study the interdependence of optimal tax and expenditure policies. An optimal policy requires that information on preferences is made available. We first study this problem from a general mechanism design perspective and show that efficiency is possible only if the individuals who decide on public good provision face an own incentive scheme that differs from the tax system. We then study democratic mechanisms with the property that tax payers vote over public goods. Under such a mechanism, efficiency cannot be reached and welfare from public good provision declines as the inequality between rich and poor individuals increases.

Keywords: Public goods; Optimal taxation; Two-dimensional heterogeneity; Asymmetric information

JEL classification codes: H41; D71; D72; D82

B) Optimal tax rules and public sector efficiency with an externality in an overlapping generations model

Masanari Nakabayashi

Journal of Public Economics

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jpube.

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history:

Received 20 June 2008

Received in revised form 22 April 2010

Accepted 1 July 2010

Available online 23 August 2010

JEL classification:

D61

D62

D91

H21

H23

Keywords:

Environmental externality

Optimal taxation rule

Environmental tax

Second-best world

Dynamics

Double dividend

This paper examines optimal tax rules and public sector efficiency, integrating them in a second-bestworld with

pollution by using an overlapping generationsmodel. The second-best world is characterized by the comparative

statics of green preferences. The main results obtained are as follows. First, the marginal cost of public funds may

be reduced by the externalities, regardless of the choice of taxes. Second, optimal environmental and nonenvironmental

tax rules are additively and directly affected by the dynamic efficiency of capital accumulation per

unit labour (DECAL), and indirectly by it, through the efficiency of the public sector. Environmental taxes going

beyond Pigovian ones may be welfare-improving if the DECAL is improved by the environmental tax. Even

optimal non-environmental tax rules should additively and directly counter the dynamics of pollution to consider

the income effects of the optimal tax system for the future. Third, the “additivity property,” or the “principle of

targeting,” does not hold even in the absence of incentive compatibility constraints. The essential reasons for this

are clarified as follows: distortions that should be countered by taxes; that is, the incomeeffects of the optimal tax

system and the DECAL in this model, break the equality between optimal environmental taxes and the

externalitiesmeasured by governments. Finally, growing environmental concernsmay, in fact, increase pollution.

The inverse relationship between environmental and labour income taxes may not hold.

© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

This paper examines optimal tax rules and public sector efficiency,

and integrates them in a second-best world with environmental

externalities by using an overlapping generations model (OGM). The

economy of the second-bestworld is characterizedwith the comparative

statics of greater environmental concern, or greater green preferences.

Environmental taxes are known as incentive-based environmental

policy instruments. The double dividend hypothesis of environmental

taxes suggests that environmental taxes can be useful instruments for

not only environmental policies but also tax policies in financing

public expenditure; that is, environmental taxes may not only

improve the environment but also alleviate the inefficiency of

distortionary taxes if revenues from the former taxes are used to

reduce the latter taxes (see Tullock 1967; Pearce 1991).1 Therefore, it

is necessary to examine optimal tax rules in a second-best world with

the externalities from various perspectives to obtain an approximate

criterion for testing the optimality of environmental tax policies.

The representative results concerning optimal environmental tax

rules in a second-best world are provided by Sandmo (1975),

Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), and Bovenberg and van der Ploeg

(1994). These works conclude that optimal tax rules additively consist

of distortions covered by taxes, and that a distortion should be directly

countered by a tax that acts on the distortion. This is called the

“additivity property” by Sandmo (1975) and the “principle of

targeting” by Dixit (1985). Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) find that

environmental taxes falling below Pigovian ones are welfareimproving.

2 Further, Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994) show that

Journal of Public Economics 94 (2010) 1028–1040

E-mail address: msnk@nagoya-u.jp.

1 Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994, 1997) and Assouline and Fodha (2006) use a static

model, an endogenous growth model, and a Diamond OGM, respectively, to show that

environmental taxes have double dividends under certain conditions. Although

Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998) examine the transitional effects of environmental

taxes on economies by using a Yaari-Blanchard OGM to tackle the intergenerational

issues of environmental policies, lump-sum transfers on all generations are available.

2 Schöb (1997) and Fullerton (1997) support this result of Bovenberg and de Mooij

(1994). It has been shown that environmental taxes going beyond Pigovian ones are

welfare-improving when non-environmental taxes are not labour income taxes but

taxes on clean goods (Schöb 1997; Fullerton 1997) and production output (Bovenberg

and de Mooij 1997).

0047-2727/$ – see front matter © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

C) Journal of Public Economics
Volume 95, Issues 1-2, February 2011, Pages 164-176

 

doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.10.002 | How to Cite or Link Using DOI
Copyright © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
  Permissions & Reprints
Are we taxing ourselves?: How deliberation and experience shape voting on taxes

Rupert Sausgrubera, E-mail The Corresponding Author and Jean-Robert Tyranb, c, low asterisk, E-mail The Corresponding Author

a University of Innsbruck, Department of Public Economics, Universitätsstr. 15, A-6020 Innsbruck, Austria

Abstract

We let consumers vote on tax regimes in experimental markets. We test if taxes on sellers are more popular than taxes on consumers, i.e. on voters themselves, even if taxes on sellers are inefficiently high. Taxes on sellers are more popular if voters underestimate the extent of tax-shifting in the market. We show that inexperienced voters are prone to such a tax-shifting bias, that experience is an effective de-biasing mechanism, but that pre-vote deliberation about tax regimes makes initially held opinions more extreme rather than correct. Our results suggest that voting on taxes is prone to bias and that easy-to-interpret facts are needed to de-bias voters.

D) Journal of Public Economics
Volume 95, Issues 1-2, February 2011, Pages 122-133


doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.10.008 | How to Cite or Link Using DOI
Copyright © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
  Permissions & Reprints
Heterogeneous firms, ‘profit shifting’ FDI and international tax competition

Sebastian Krautheima and Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohrb, low asterisk, E-mail The Corresponding Author

Larger firms are more likely to use tax haven operations to exploit international tax differences. We study tax competition between a large country and a tax haven. In the large country, heterogeneous firms operate under monopolistic competition and can choose to shift profits abroad. We show that a higher degree of firm heterogeneity (a mean-preserving spread of the cost distribution) increases the degree of tax competition, i.e. it decreases the equilibrium tax rate of the large country, leads to higher outflows of its tax base and thus decreases its equilibrium tax revenues. Similar effects hold for a higher substitutability across varieties.

Keywords: Heterogeneous firms; Tax competition; Profit shifting; Tax havens

JEL classification codes: F23; H25; H73.

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January 15, 2011 - Posted by | Uncategorized

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