Ülo Ennuste Economics

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Pamflett

Keynes mida ütleks lause kohta „see lõimumine on toonud palju head, aga ka kohustusi, mida keegi ei osanud ette näha.“

(PM.ee 20.VIII 12 E. Ergma lõimumisest EL/ESMiga)

„Selle teadmatuse fenomeni kohta makroökonoomika kontekstis riski ja määramatuse ning investorite loomaliku loomuse terminites tegin dr disseri monograafiana 400 lk mis ilmus 1921.

Selle monograafia alusel ülalnimetet lause osa „… keegi ei osanud ette näha“ ütleja näib olevat geneetiline astronoom kes mingi eksituse tõttu on sattunud poliitikasse – sest et kuna ilmselt vaatab väga suurtesse kaugustesse siis seal toimuva kohta küll tõesti mitte Keegi ei oska mitte midagi ette näha – õieti kui me sinnamaani jõuame oleme kõik Surnud – selle viimase lausega olen muide Maailmas kõige rohkem kuulsust kogunud.

Võiks ka öelda et astronoomid kalduvad mitte märkama Elevanti oma kabinetis ehk seda et ettenägemise/teadmuse probleemid on majandusotsuste puhul domineerivad ja väga keerukad ning isegi mina tegin nende käsitlemisel vigu nt ei märganud Tinglikku Tõenäosust piisavalt arvestada sest siis veel puudus selleks vajalik matemaatiline aparatuur – õieti oli küll pastor Bayes’e valem aastast tuhatseitsesada millegagi olemas kuid seda ei suudetud kuni 1921 veel õigesti interpreteerida: tulevaste teadaolevate sündmuste tõenäosust saab täpsustada lõpmatuseni vastavalt tingimuste muutumisele – muidugi peale selle on mitteteadaolevad ootamatud sündmused Mustad Luiged mis teevad probleemid veelgi keerukamaks.

Krugman igatahes väga geniaalselt praegu väidab* et kui riigis majandusteadmuslik määramatus suureneb siis investorid oma loomuliku loomaliku loomuse (Keynes’i termin vt ka**) põhjal seda tajuvad ning asuvad kapitali riigist välja transfeerima sinna kus määramatust vähem – just see mis Maarjamaal anomaalset toimub ja mis seda enam võimendub mida enam nt rahvuslikud astronoomid ekslikult omandavad majanduspoliitilist aplombi.“

*) FT.com „The plague of economic uncertainty“  August 19, 2012 4:52 pm by Gavyn Davies:

„ …. However, modern Keynesians like Paul Krugman ask another question, which is this: once expectations have shifted as uncertainty rises, why does the economy not correct itself? Krugman believes this is because a shortfall in aggregate demand cannot by remedied by lower nominal interest rates, because these rates cannot drop below zero [1]. This also has impeccable antecedents in the General Theory….“.

Kommentaare:

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  • Eric Schoenberg | August 20 6:26pm | Permalink

    I agree with Gobanian that the core issue is the content of competing policy prescriptions — Republican complaints about policy uncertainty are a red herring to avoid the real debate. I also agree with HopeSprings that we need to distinguish between “real” uncertainty which is always with us and the ebb and flow of human recognition of this fact. Anyone interested in a behavioral economics view of the debate can take a look at a piece I have written for the Huffington Post entitled “Policy Pseudocertainty”:

    http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-schoenberg/policy-mitt-romney-economy-prediction_b_1778982.html?utm_hp_ref=fb&src=sp&comm_ref=false

  • Report famulla | August 20 4:31pm | Permalink

    A carrot and stick issue again if you ask me. A Greek exit from the eurozone would be “manageable” even if it would be expensive and result in higher unemployment, a top member of theEuropean Central Bank was quoted as saying on Monday. In an interview with the Frankfurter Rundschau, Joerg Asmussen, a German member of the ECB’s Executive Board, was asked about the possibility of debt-wrackedGreece being forced out of the eurozone. “First: My preference is clear. Greece should stay in the eurozone. Second: It is in Greece’s hands to achieve that. Third: A Greek exit would be manageable. Fourth: An exit would not be as orderly as some imagine,” he said. Such an exit would spark a slump in growth, job losses and would be “very expensive. In Greece, in Europe and in Germany,” said Asmussen. Asmussen’s comments came at the start of a crunch week for Greece as it bids to persuade its European partners to release a further slice of aid to keep its economy on life support and enable it to stay in the 17-nation bloc. Prime Minister Antonis Samaras holds talks with German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Berlin on Friday and with French President Francois Hollande the day after. Greek Foreign Minister Dimitris Avramopoulos was in Berlin Monday for a meeting with his German counterpart Guido Westerwelle to prepare the talks. All eyes are on a key report from Greece’s international creditors, known as the Troika, expected in September. The report will assess Greece’s reform progress demanded to unlock some 31.5 billion euros ($38.9 billion) desperately needed to keep the country afloat. On his foreign tour, Samaras is expected to discuss the possibility of having two more years to achieve the required cuts. Berlin has until now insisted that Athens must stick to the timeline and reforms agreed in return for its aid package. But mass circulation Bild reported on Monday that some concessions could be made to Greece within the agreed timeframe. I thank you Firozali A.Mulla DBA We do make errors, but this wasn’t it. While the term has been recorded in various forms in Latin using various negative particles (ne plus ultra, nec plus ultra, non plus ultra), in English the “ne plus ultra” form is most prevalent. For what it’s worth, ne was the original Latin particle of negation.

**) Animal Spirits in the Euro Area Sovereign CDS Market

URL: http://www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?dpno=9092.asp

Author(s): Hans J. Blommestein, Sylvester C W Eijffinger, Zongxin Qian

Date of Publication: August 2012Programme Area(s): IMKeyword(s): Animal spirit, Euro, sovereign CDS

Abstract: We study the determinants for the sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads of five Euro-area countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain) in the post-Lehman-Brothers period. We find that there are regime switches in the process of sovereign CDS spread changes. We consider three alternative empirical hypotheses associated with regime switches. Under the first hypothesis, there are rational sunspot equilibria. Under the second hypothesis, there is a unique fundamental equilibrium and the regime switching is caused by changes in policy makers’ preferences. The third hypothesis relaxes the rational expectations assumption. Under this hypothesis, indicators of the market fundamentals are not always precise. They are better indicators if cognitive biases are small and the rational expectations economy is a good approximation for reality. However, if market uncertainties enlarge the cognitive biases, the market-based indicators of fundamentals are no longer precise. In this case, they are not useful for CDS pricing. We find that the first two hypotheses are difficult to fit the data and the third hypothesis provides a good explanation for the sovereign CDS spread dynamics in our sample.

PDF: This paper is available for download in electronic (PDF) format.

CEPR Discussion Paper Abstracts

http://www.cepr.org

DP9092 Hans J. Blommestein Sylvester C W Eijffinger Zongxin Qian August 2012 Animal spirit Euro sovereign CDS …
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August 21, 2012 - Posted by | Uncategorized

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