Ülo Ennuste Economics

papers and articles in wordpress


Osundis värske majandusteooria nobelisti* Alvin Roth’i tulemustele arstide turumehhanismide retseptide alal: eriti aktuaalsed Meie praeguse piiriülese äpardturu redisainiks

Roth’i seemnetöödena eeskätt arstide turudisaini vallas nimetakse eeskätt 1984(a)** milledes pani aluse kompleksmehhanismide metasünteesile nii kooperatiivsete kui ka strateegiliste matemaatiliste mänguteoreetiliste mudelite alusel*:

„ … In a study published in 1984, Roth found that the U.S. market

for new doctors had historically suffered from a series of market failures, but

a centralized clearinghouse had improved the situation by implementing a

procedure essentially equivalent to Gale and Shapley’s deferred-acceptance

process. Roth’s 1984 article clarified the tasks that markets perform, and

showed how the concept of stability provides an organizing principle which

helps us understand why markets sometimes work well, and why they some-

times fail to operate properly.

Subsequently, Roth and his colleagues used this framework, in combina-

tion with empirical studies, controlled laboratory experiments and computer

simulations, to examine the functioning of other markets. Their research has

not only illuminated how these markets operate, but has also proved useful

in designing institutions that help markets function better, often by imple-

menting a version or extension of the Gale-Shapley procedure. This has led

to the emergence of a new and vigorous branch of economics known as mar-

ket design. Note that in this context the term „market“does not presuppose

the existence of a price system. Indeed, monetary transfers are ruled out in

many important applications. …“

Järgnesid tosinad teoreetilis-empiirilised uurimused mis päädisid tänavuse Nobel’i majandusteooria preemia jagamisega koos Loyd Shapley’ga.

Roth’i tulemuste alusel on kerge näha et praegusel kujul nt Eesti-Soome piiriülese meditsiinitöötajate turudisaini puuduseks (mis mõlemaid pooli praegusel mitte-koopratiivsel kujul kahjustab) on kooperatiivsete mehhanismielementide puudumine – nt sh riikidevaheline vastav KoostööLeping  jne.

Kuid et taolised disainid on väga keerukad – seda näeme nii lisatud kirjandusviidetest** kui ka asjakohasest lõigust Nobeli Preemiaorganisatsiooni tekstist*** – siis on ütlematagi selge et Meie ja Soome Partnerite vahelise arstide turudisaini koopereerimise optimeerimiseks peaks nt Helsinki Ülikool prof Roth’i konsultatsioonideks viivitamatult kohale kutsuma nt koos EALiga või midagi taolist.





[55] Roth, A.E. 1984a. The evolution of the labor market for medical in-

terns and residents: A case study in game theory. Journal of Political

Economy 92: 991.1016.

[56] Roth, A.E. 1984b. Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage

problem. Journal of Economic Theory 34: 383.387.

[57] Roth, A.E. 1984c. Stability and polarization of interests in job match-

ing. Econometrica 52: 47-57.

[58] Roth, A.E. 1985a. The college admissions problem is not equivalent to

the marriage problem. Journal of Economic Theory 36: 277.288

[59] Roth, A.E. 1985b. Con.ict and coincidence of interest in job match-

ing: Some new results and open questions. Mathematics of Operations

Research 10: 379-389

[60] Roth, A.E. 1989. Two-sided matching with incomplete information

about others.preferences. Games and Economic Behavior 1: 191.209.

[61] Roth, A.E. 1990. New physicians: A natural experiment in market

organization. Science 250: 1524.28.

[62] Roth, A.E. 1991a. A natural experiment in the organization of entry

level labor markets: Regional markets for new physicians and surgeons

in the U.K. American Economic Review 81: 415.40.

[63] Roth, A.E. 1991b. Game theory as a part of empirical economics. Eco-

nomic Journal 101: 107-114

[64] Roth, A.E. 2002. The economist as engineer: Game theory, experimen-

tal economics and computation as tools of design economics. Econo-

metrica 70: 1341.78.

[65] Roth, A.E. 2007. Repugnance as a constraint on markets. Journal of

Economic Perspectives 21: 37-58.

[66] Roth, A.E. 2008a. Deferred acceptance algorithms: History, theory,

practice, and open questions. International Journal of Game Theory

36: 537.569.

[67] Roth, A.E. 2008b. What have we learned from market design? Eco-

nomic Journal 118: 285.310.

[68] Roth, A.E. and I. Erev. 1995. Learning in extensive-form games: Ex-

perimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term.

Games and Economic Behavior 8: 164-212.

[69] Roth, A.E. and M. Malouf. 1979. Game-theoretic models and the role

of information in bargaining. Psychological Review 86: 574-594

[70] Roth, A.E. and J.K. Murnighan. 1982. The role of information in bar-

gaining: An experimental study. Econometrica 50: 1123-1142.

[71] Roth, A.E. and E. Peranson. 1999. The redesign of the matching market

for American physicians: Some engineering aspects of economic design.

American Economic Review 89: 748.79.

[72] Roth, A.E. and A. Postlewaite. 1977. Weak versus strong domination

in a market with indivisible goods. Journal of Mathematical Economics

4: 131-137.

[73] Roth, A.E. and U. Rothblum. 1999. Truncation strategies in matching

markets: In search of advice for participants. Econometrica 67: 21-43.

[74] Roth, A.E. and M. Sotomayor. 1990. Two-sided Matching: A Study

in Game-theoretic Modeling and Analysis. Econometric Society Mono-

graph Series, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[75] Roth, A.E. and J.H. Vande Vate. 1990. Random paths to stability in

two-sided matching. Econometrica 58: 1475-1480.

[76] Roth, A.E. and X. Xing. 1994. Jumping the gun: Imperfections and

institutions related to the timing of market transactions. American

Economic Review 84: 992-1044.

[77] Roth, A.E. and X. Xing. 1997. Turnaround time and bottlenecks in

market clearing: Decentralized matching in the market for clinical psy-

chologists. Journal of Political Economy 105: 284.329.

[78] Roth, A.E., M. Malouf and J.K. Murnighan. 1981. Sociological ver-

sus strategic factors in bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior and

Organization 2: 153-177.

[79] Roth, A.E., T. Sönmez and M.U. Ünver. 2004. Kidney exchange. Quar-

terly Journal of Economics 119: 457.88.

[80] Roth, A.E., T. Sönmez and M.U. Ünver. 2005a. A kidney exchange

clearinghouse in New England. American Economic Review 95: 376.

[81] Roth, A.E., T. Sönmez and M.U. Ünver. 2005b. Pairwise kidney ex-

change. Journal of Economic Theory 125: 151.88.

[82] Roth, A.E., T. Sönmez and M.U. Ünver. 2007. E¢ cient kidney ex-

change: Coincidence of wants in markets with compatibility-based pref-

erences. American Economic Review 97: 828.51.

[83] Roth, A.E., V. Prasnikar, M. Okuno-Fujiwara and S. Zamir. 1991.

Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh,

and Tokyo: an experimental study. American Economic Review 81:


[84] Roth, A.E., T. Sönmez, M.U. Ünver, F.L. Delmonico and S.L. Said-

man. 2006. Utilizing list exchange and undirected Good Samaritan do-

nation through .chain.paired kidney donations. American Journal of

Transplantation 6: 2694.705.

[85] Saidman, S.L., A.E. Roth, T. Sönmez, M.U. Ünver, and F.L.


„4 Evidence: Markets for Doctors

The work on stable allocations and stable algorithms was recognized as an

important theoretical contribution in the 1960s and 1970s, but it was not

until the early 1980s that its practical relevance was discovered. The key

contribution is Roth (1984a), which documents the evolution of the market

for new doctors in the U.S. and argues convincingly that a stable algorithm

improved the functioning of the market. This work opened the door to Roth’s

participation in actual design, which began in the 1990s. Roth also conducted

empirical studies of other medical markets, documenting and analyzing how

several regions in the U.K. had adopted deferent algorithms (Roth, 1991a).

These further strengthened the case for stable algorithms. The overall evi-

dence provided by Roth was pivotal.

Centralized matching mechanisms, such as the one in the U.S. market

for new doctors, have well-defined rules of the game.known to both the

participants themselves and the economists who study the market. Knowl-


edge of these rules makes it possible to test game-theoretic predictions, in

the field as well as in laboratory experiments. Moreover, the rules can be

redesigned to improve the market functioning (see Section 5). Accordingly,

these types of matching mechanisms have been studied in depth and are by

now well understood. Other markets with clearly de.ned rules have also been

the subject of intensive studies; the leading example is auction markets. In

fact, matching and auction theory are closely linked, as mentioned above.

We begin this section by describing the U.S. market for new doctors,

and then turn to the U.K. regional medical markets. We also consider how

important evidence regarding the performance of matching algorithms have

been generated using laboratory experiments.

4.1 The U.S. market for new doctors

Roth (1984a) studied the evolution of the U.S. market for new doctors. Stu-

dents who graduate from medical schools in the U.S. are typically employed

As residents (interns) at hospitals, where they comprise a significant part

of the labor force. In the early twentieth century, the market for new doc-

tors was largely decentralized. During the 1940s, competition for medical

students forced hospitals to o¤er residencies (internships) increasingly early,

sometimes several years before a student would graduate. This so-called

unraveling had many negative consequences. Matches were made before stu-

dents could produce evidence of how qualified they might become, and even

before they knew what kind of medicine they would like to practice. The

market also suffered from congestion: …

4.2 Regional medical markets in the U.K.

Roth (1990, 1991a) observed that British regional medical markets suffered

from the same kinds of problems in the 1960s that had …

4.3 Experimental evidence … “


PS: täiendavat lugemist kompleks-disaini alal – http://www.ies.ee/iesp/No4/Ennuste.pdf


October 16, 2012 - Posted by | Uncategorized

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