Ülo Ennuste Economics

papers and articles in wordpress

Viide

Viide: äsja ilmus teadusartikkel* institutsionaalevolutsiooni alane teoreetilis-empiiriline uurimus – millest muide ka näidete hulgast leiame vihjeliselt Eesti Panga sõltumatuse graafiku 1992-… .

Artikkel oleks õpetlik professionaalsel tasemel meil vastutustundeliselt nt ESMi üle arutlemiseks – loobumiseks vastutustundetust diletantlikust politikaan-manipulatiivsest hägusloogilisest hämamisest bulvaripressi tasemel kus nt termin „institutsioon“ asendatakse hägusa „kehand“ ehk millegi klimbi taolisega ja seega võimaldab justkui tõestada mida tahes ja üles kiita rahvusliku arengu seisukohalt kuitahes käpardlikke nt maksuseaduseid jne

Muide viidatud Neyapti’i  2013 artikkel unisoonis minu 2003 ühe rahvusvaheliselt tunnustatud artikliga formaliseeritud institutsionaal-analüüsi alalt:

Ennuste, Ü. 2003. A Linear Planning Analysis of Institutional Structure in the Economy. In: Ülo Ennuste and Lisa Wilder (eds.) Essays in Estonian Transformation Economics. Tallinn:

https://iweb.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/gdn/RRCII_34_paper_01.pdf lk 41-52.

*)

http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0939362512000799/1-s2.0-S0939362512000799-main.pdf?_tid=0153520c-aca8-11e2-9c2b-00000aab0f26&acdnat=1366785015_cd65ba0227c0f27590d2b9bafae4b085

Modeling institutional evolution

Bilin Neyapti

A B S T R A C T

This paper proposes a formal framework to analyze the process of

institutional evolution in relation with economic progress. Institutions

have both formal (F) and informal (N) aspects that may exhibit

varying processes of change. N is hypothesized to evolve with the

level of capital stock, as in learning by doing, whereas F is chosen

optimally by a government that maximizes output subject to social

and political costs. F and N together define the production

technology and affect the income level. Consistent with evidence,

simulations of the model’s solution reveal that optimum F exhibits a

punctuated pattern.

_ 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Lisa: Krugman’i viimatise  kolumni  NYT 25. IV 13 lõike automaattõlkes


Majandusliku arutelud on harva lõpus nokdauniga (T.K.O.) Kuid viimastel aastatel diskursus keinslaste kes pooldavad kasvu säilitamist ja tõepoolest valitsuse täiendavaid kulutusi depressiooni tõrjumiseks – ja rangete konsolideerijate/kärpijate vahel kes nõuavad kohest kulutuste kärpeid kriisi saabudes – suur poliitiline mõttevahetus ligilähedaselt nokdauniga lõppes — vähemalt ideede maailmas. Sel hetkel, kärpijate positsioon varises; nad on oma prognoosidega reaalses maailmas ebaõnnestunud täielikult, ning ka akadeemilise uurimistöö alal nendele toetus on kadunud sest on osutunud et nende väited on täis vigu ja lünki ja kahtlast statistikat.
Veel kaks suured küsimused jäävad. Esiteks, kuidas ranguse doktriini muutuvad nii mõjukaks et saavad esimese koha? Teiseks kas poliitika muutub üldse nüüd, et olulised kärpijate nõuded muutunud söödaks hilisõhtul Koomiksitele?
Esimese küsimuse: austerianide mõjukates ringkondades domineerimine ei häiri kedagi, kellele meeldib uskuda, et poliitika põhineb, või isegi tugevalt mõjutatud tegelikel tõendtitel. Lõppude lõpuks, kaks peamist uurimust, mis väidetava intellektuaalse põhjendusrangusega – Alberto Alesina ja Silvia Ardagna “ekspansiivset rangus” ja Carmen Reinhart ja Kenneth Rogoff ohtliku võla nõuanne “lävega” 90 protsenti G.D.P. suhtes.
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
Veel ranguse säilitada ning isegi tugevdada oma haaret eliidi arvamust. Miks?
Osa vastus peitub kindlasti laialdast soovi näha ökonoomikat kui moraaliga mängimist, teha seda lugu liialdades koos selle tagajärgedega. Elasime ülevalpool oma vahendid, lugu läheb edasi, ja nüüd me oleme maksma paratamatut hind. Majandusteadlased iiveldamiseni püüavad seletada, et see on vale, et meil massilise tööpuuduse põhjus ei ole, et me tarbisime liiga palju minevikus, kuid telelik põhjus on et me kulutame liiga vähe nüüd, ja et seda probleemi saab ja tuleks lahendada aga see jutt ei ole oluline paljudele inimestele kellel tunne, et oleme pattu teinud ja nüüd peab püüdma kärpekannatuste läbi pattu kahetsema – ja majanduslikku argumenti ega tähelepanekut, et inimesed kes nüüd kannatavad pole üldse samad inimesed, kes pattu teinud ….
Kuid see ei ole vaid probleem – emotsioonid versus loogika. Te ei saa aru ranguse doktriini mõjust ilma rääkimata klassidest ja ebavõrdsusest.
Missugust majanduspoliitikat inimesed tahavad? Vastust, selgub, et see sõltub sellest, missuguseid inimesi te küsitlete – on dokumenteeritud poliitilise teadlased Benjamin töödes ning artiklis Larry Bartels ja Jason Seawright poolt. Need võrdleva väga rikaste poliitilisi eelistusi ning tavalise ameeriklast omadega, ja tulemused on silmade avamise.
Seega Keskmine ameeriklane on mõnevõrra mures eelarve puudujäägist, mis ei ole üllatav, esitatud eelarvepuudujäägi hirmutada lood pidev tulv meedia, aga rikkad, suure häälteenamusega arvesse puudujääk on kõige olulisem probleem, mis on meie ees. Ning kuidas eelarve puudujääk tuleb? Lõikamine föderaalne tervishoiu ja sotsiaalkindlustuse kulutused rikkad kasuks — mis on “õiguste” — Kuigi laiema avalikkuse tegelikult soovib, et need programmid põhjustada kulutusi.
Sa saad idee: ranguse tegevuskava näib omavat palju kõrgema klassi eelistusi, mässitud fassaadi akadeemilise jäikuse lihtsa väljendusega. Mida ülemine 1 protsenti tahab muutub, selleks mida majandusteadus peab ütlema et mida me peame tegema.
Kas jätkuvas depressioonis tegelikult teenivad rikkad? See on küsitav, kuna õitsev majandus on üldiselt hea peaaegu kõigile. Mis on õige, aga on, et aastad, kus oleme pöördunud ranguse poole on olnud töötajatele masendavad, kuid ei ole üldse halb olnud rikastele, kes on saanud kasumit ..
……………………………………………………………………………..

Economic debates rarely end with a T.K.O. But the great policy debate of recent years between Keynesians, who advocate sustaining and, indeed, increasing government spending in a depression, and austerians, who demand immediate spending cuts, comes close — at least in the world of ideas. At this point, the austerian position has imploded; not only have its predictions about the real world failed completely, but the academic research invoked to support that position has turned out to be riddled with errors, omissions and dubious statistics.

Fred R. Conrad/The New York Times

Paul Krugman

Yet two big questions remain. First, how did austerity doctrine become so influential in the first place? Second, will policy change at all now that crucial austerian claims have become fodder for late-night comics?

On the first question: the dominance of austerians in influential circles should disturb anyone who likes to believe that policy is based on, or even strongly influenced by, actual evidence. After all, the two main studies providing the alleged intellectual justification for austerity — Alberto Alesina and Silvia Ardagna on “expansionary austerity” and Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff on the dangerous debt “threshold” at 90 percent of G.D.P. — faced withering criticism almost as soon as they came out.

And the studies did not hold up under scrutiny. By late 2010, the International Monetary Fund had reworked Alesina-Ardagna with better data and reversed their findings, while many economists raised fundamental questions about Reinhart-Rogoff long before we knew about the famous Excel error. Meanwhile, real-world events — stagnation in Ireland, the original poster child for austerity, falling interest rates in the United States, which was supposed to be facing an imminent fiscal crisis — quickly made nonsense of austerian predictions.

Yet austerity maintained and even strengthened its grip on elite opinion. Why?

Part of the answer surely lies in the widespread desire to see economics as a morality play, to make it a tale of excess and its consequences. We lived beyond our means, the story goes, and now we’re paying the inevitable price. Economists can explain ad nauseam that this is wrong, that the reason we have mass unemployment isn’t that we spent too much in the past but that we’re spending too little now, and that this problem can and should be solved. No matter; many people have a visceral sense that we sinned and must seek redemption through suffering — and neither economic argument nor the observation that the people now suffering aren’t at all the same people who sinned during the bubble years makes much of a dent.

But it’s not just a matter of emotion versus logic. You can’t understand the influence of austerity doctrine without talking about class and inequality.

What, after all, do people want from economic policy? The answer, it turns out, is that it depends on which people you ask — a point documented in a recent research paper by the political scientists Benjamin Page, Larry Bartels and Jason Seawright. The paper compares the policy preferences of ordinary Americans with those of the very wealthy, and the results are eye-opening.

Thus, the average American is somewhat worried about budget deficits, which is no surprise given the constant barrage of deficit scare stories in the news media, but the wealthy, by a large majority, regard deficits as the most important problem we face. And how should the budget deficit be brought down? The wealthy favor cutting federal spending on health care and Social Security — that is, “entitlements” — while the public at large actually wants to see spending on those programs rise.

You get the idea: The austerity agenda looks a lot like a simple expression of upper-class preferences, wrapped in a facade of academic rigor. What the top 1 percent wants becomes what economic science says we must do.

Does a continuing depression actually serve the interests of the wealthy? That’s doubtful, since a booming economy is generally good for almost everyone. What is true, however, is that the years since we turned to austerity have been dismal for workers but not at all bad for the wealthy, who have benefited from surging profits and stock prices even as long-term unemployment festers. The 1 percent may not actually want a weak economy, but they’re doing well enough to indulge their prejudices.

And this makes one wonder how much difference the intellectual collapse of the austerian position will actually make. To the extent that we have policy of the 1 percent, by the 1 percent, for the 1 percent, won’t we just see new justifications for the same old policies?

I hope not; I’d like to believe that ideas and evidence matter, at least a bit. Otherwise, what am I doing with my life? But I guess we’ll see just how much cynicism is justified.

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April 24, 2013 - Posted by | Uncategorized

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