Ülo Ennuste Economics

papers and articles in wordpress

Mõned 2013 eelretsenseeritud tekstid

Mõned 2013 eelretsenseeritud makro/sotsiaal ning evolutsioon/küberneetilisest ning institutsionaalsest mehhanismide rakursist huvitavamad metatekstid nii transitsiooni kui harmoneerimise evolutsiooni disainimiseks (mis peaks priilt olema ligipääsetavad)

A)     BUCHANAN, J., CHAI, D.H. and DEAKIN, S. 2013. “Empirical analysis of legal institutions and institutional change: multiple-methods approaches and their application to corporate governance research” – Journal of Institutional Economics, November 2013, pp 1-20: http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=9091910&jid=JOI&volumeId=-1&issueId=-1&aid=9091907 

Abstract:

The claim that institutions matter for economic growth and development has so far received a more extensive theoretical treatment than an empirical or methodological one. Basing our approach on a coevolutionary conception of relations between law and the economy, we link theory to method and explore three techniques for analysing legal institutions empirically: ‘leximetric’ measurement of legal rules, time-series econometrics and interview-based fieldwork. We argue that while robust measurement of institutions is possible, quantitative techniques have their limits, and should be combined with fieldwork in a multiple-methods approach.

B)      Tõsiselt rääkides on maksusüsteem ei saa kakofoonias olla euroliidu orkestris ning et Komisjoni poolt on äsja valminud järjekordne „Raport 2013“ liikmesriikide maksusüsteemide harmoneeritud reformimiseks – kooskõlastatult RM Ligi’ga:

http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2013/pdf/ee5_en.pdf

ja tulumaksupettuste tõkestamiseks hargmaiste korporatsioonide poolt

http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/vat/key_documents/legislation_proposed/com(2013)814_en.pdf

http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/tax_fraud_evasion/further_reading/index_en.htm

 

Tõsiselt  – ilma nende teavikuga tutvumiseta tuleks nii politikaanidel kui vabakondadel ning Jääkeldritel kasutada võimalust avalikkuses suu kinni hoida maksutamismehhanismide optimeerimise küsimustes – kuna need põhinevad suurel andmebaasil ning  kontseptuaalselt rahvusvaheliste tippteadlaste tulemustel

C)       http://cdn.pekkahimanen.org/media/kestavan_kasvun_malli-globaali_nakokulma.pdf

(tekst ei näi olevat kopeeritav)

D)     NB! – EBRD: Transition Report 2013 – “Stuck in transition?” + Lisa

http://tr.ebrd.com/tr13/images/downloads/357_TR2013.pdf

“This year’s

Transition Report

explains why

some countries

may be ‘stuck’ in

traps with little

or no reform, but

also indicates

ways to break out

of them.”

Foreword by Erik Berglof (pp 8-9)

For more than five years, the transition region has been buffeted

by the fall-out from the global recession of 2008-09, and the

eurozone crisis of 2011-12. Beyond their short-term impacts –

collapse in output, followed by stagnation or sluggish recovery

– these shocks have triggered doubts about the ability of

the transition region to return to “convergence”: the process

of catching up with the living standards in advanced market

economies. The main reason for such doubts has been the

decline of international capital flows to the region, which have

been an important element of the “growth model” of countries

in transition.

This Transition Report shows that convergence is indeed at

risk in most countries in the transition region – but for different

reasons. Although they will not return to their pre-crisis highs

(nor should they, since in many cases these reflected an

unsustainable bubble) capital flows will eventually recover. In

addition, several countries are rebalancing toward home-grown

sources of finance, which is generally a positive development

as these economies mature. A more compelling concern is the

stagnation in reforms and in improvements to market-supporting

institutions in most countries in the region since the mid-2000s,

including many that are still far from the transition frontier.

Furthermore, following the 2008-09 crisis there have been

reform reversals in several of the more advanced economies.

How can reforms regain their momentum? The Transition

Report 2013 seeks to answer this question based on an area of

analysis that was first studied in the Transition Report 1999: the

political economy of reform and institutional development.

The 1999 report showed that successful reforms during the

first decade of transition were more likely to have occurred in

countries with stronger political competition and less polarised

electorates. Contrary to conventional wisdom, political turnover

benefited reforms, while strong executives tended to deter them.

These findings were explained by the influence of political and

economic elites who – in the absence of appropriate checks and

balances – profited from state subsidies, insider privatisation

and weak enforcement of the rule of law.

With the benefit of considerable hindsight, this report confirms

some of these findings. Its analysis particularly supports the

presence of a strong causal impact of democracy on the success

of reform. At the same time, the report expands the analysis of

economic reform in four directions.

Chapter 2 investigates the causes of democratisation. Why

do some countries succeed in building sustainable democracies

and others not? Does market reform help or hinder the medium

and long-term prospects for democratic consolidation? This is

particularly important in the wake of the changes that the Arab

world has been undergoing for the past two-and-a-half years, as

the international community looks for the most effective ways to

support these countries in their political transitions.

Based on international evidence and data from the transition

region, the chapter finds that (i) economic development makes

democratisation more likely, (ii) natural resource endowment

holds back democratisation, and (iii) market reforms appear

to influence future democratisation – at least in the sense of

preventing reversals to less democratic systems. This could be

because economic liberalisation weakens the power of interest

groups who benefit from less democracy. Hence, the causal links

between democracy and reforms appear to run in both directions.

Chapter 3 takes a broader view of reform, focusing on

the quality of economic institutions. Beyond liberalisation,

stabilisation, and privatisation, this encompasses regulation,

effective government, strong rule of law, low corruption, and other

aspects of the business environment. It finds that determinants

of institutional quality include history, geography, initial reform

experiences, and other factors that are beyond the control of

policy-makers. But economic integration, human capital, and the

design of democratic institutions matter as well. Furthermore,

countries with difficult histories of reform sometimes benefit from

a second chance. The chapter compares such “critical junctures”

in four countries in order to understand why some experienced

permanent improvements in institutions while others did not.

Chapter 4 investigates the state of education and human

capital in the transition region. Most formerly communist

countries have good primary and secondary education systems.

In some of these countries, they are on a par with the equivalent

systems in more advanced economies in the Organisation

for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Tertiary

education, however, is much weaker. In addition, the returns

to university education are comparatively low, particularly in

countries with weak economic institutions. Just as in the case of

democracy and good economic institutions, economic institutions

and human capital appear to complement each other.

Chapter 5 investigates a dimension of economic institutions

that is rather overlooked by traditional measures of institutional

quality, but is key to the long-term success of market systems

– their ability to provide economic opportunities to individuals

regardless of gender, region of birth or social background. The

chapter measures economic inclusion in the transition region for

the first time: from a bottom-up perspective, by examining how

household assets and educational attainment are influenced by

circumstances at birth, and top-down, by rating the inclusiveness

of economic institutions. The results indicate severe inequality Transition Report 2013

of opportunity in several countries, particularly in regard to

employment practices, job opportunities and quality of education.

This hurts young adults from less educated social backgrounds

and from rural areas, but in some countries it also affects women.

Collectively, these findings not only explain why some

countries may be “stuck” in traps with little or no reform, but can

also indicate ways to break out of them.

External shocks, elections, or periods of popular discontent

can offer windows of opportunity. During these windows, political

and economic institutional reform can become politically feasible

and have permanent impact – particularly if used to build

supportive constituencies and to strengthen the incentives for

further reform. The chances of such reforms succeeding are

higher in societies that are less polarised and in which vested

interests are less powerful, but they also depend on leadership

and external support.

In addition, there are policies that can promote successful,

if gradual, economic reform in normal times – even in less

democratic environments. These include openness to foreign

investment and other forms of international integration. The

presence of foreign companies can generate demand for better

government services and set standards for better corporate

governance. International institutions can provide inspiration,

expertise and commitment, while external benchmarks can

encourage improvements in certain aspects of the business

environment, such as cutting red tape.

There is often scope for political reform that supports

economic reform. Even where incumbent elites or vested

interests prevent the reform of political institutions at the

national level, it may be possible to reduce corruption and foster

transparency at local and regional levels. Research shows that

business environment reforms are more likely to be effective in

the presence of transparent local institutions. In turn, this can

foster the entry and growth of small businesses which in turn

generate pressure for reform at the national level.

Non-governmental organisations have an important role

to play in demanding transparency and holding government

institutions to account. Social media and the internet have

additionally created an instrument to enforce rules and

regulations and disclose abuses. Social media can also

galvanise broader bottom-up reform movements, as in some

Arab countries. Furthermore, the traditional media continue to

play an important role in restraining politicians and bureaucrats

alike. Ensuring media independence and protection from legal

harassment is critical for this check on the system to be effective.

The findings of this report pose important challenges for the

EBRD and other international financial institutions (IFIs). There are

clearly limits to what can be achieved at the project level without

improvements to national economic and political institutions.

At the same time, some projects can spur sector reform and

ultimately wider improvements, particularly when they involve

equity investment by large companies. Corporate governance

improvements, the separation of political influence from

management and transparency of corporate accounting can be

critical in the fight against vested interests. The participation of

IFIs in infrastructure projects can also encourage transparency in

procurement and draw end-users and consumers into the design

and delivery of public services. Such grassroots involvement

should also increase the prospect of genuine political democracy

in the long term.

The recent history of transition has shown that weak political

institutions and entrenched interest groups can cause countries

to become “stuck” in transition. However, evidence suggests

not only that time is on the side of reform but that countries

can promote and accelerate reform, particularly if international

integration, domestic leadership and broader social movements

work hand in hand.

E)      Lisa (prii ligipääs tekstile tingimuslik – ajakiri võib nõuda kuni 40 eurot)

Ida Kubiszewski, Robert Costanza, Carol Franco, Philip Lawn, John Talberth, Tim Jackson, Camille Aylmer. 2013. “Beyond GDP: Measuring and achieving global genuine progress” – Ecological Economics 93 (2013) 57-68

Abstract 

While global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has increased more than three-fold since 1950, economic welfare, as estimated by the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI), has actually decreased since 1978. We synthesized  estimates of GPI over the 1950–2003 time period for 17 countries for which GPI has been estimated. These 17 countries contain 53% of the global population and 59% of the global GDP. We compared GPI with Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Human Development Index (HDI), Ecological Footprint, Biocapacity, Gini coefficient, and Life Satisfaction scores. Results show a significant variation among these countries, but some major trends. We also estimated a global GPI/capita over the 1950–2003 period. Global GPI/capita peaked in 1978, about the same time that global Ecological Footprint exceeded global Biocapacity. Life Satisfaction in almost all countries has also not improved significantly since 1975. Globally, GPI/capita does not increase beyond a GDP/capita of around $7000/capita. If we distributed income more equitably around the planet, the current world GDP ($67 trillion/yr) could support 9.6 billion people at $7000/capita.While GPI is not the perfect economic welfare indicator, it is a far better approximation than GDP. Development policies need to shift to better account for real welfare and not merely GDP growth.

© 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 

PS:

Makroökonoomiliselt kõigi siin  osundatud tekstide järgi Eesti probleem parajasti ei ole kaugeltki mitte GDP tõstmine vaid majandusmehhanismi optimeerimine heaolu jätkusuutlikkuse taastamiseks.

Mis mõtet on GDP tõstmisel kui kui see olulises osas kohe piiritaha slikerdatakse/transfeeritakse ja selle tõttu veel tööjõud sinna takka järgi rändab et siin mitte kiratsema jääda ebaõiglases majanduslikus ebavõrdsuses. Liiatigi teadustühiste sotiaalmajanduse mehhanismide ning poliitikate puhul võib GDP mahtu paisutavad tooted ning teenused sisaldada isegi rahvuslikke kannatusi põhjustavaid komponente (nt eksternaalselt ja taristulikult ohtlikud transiidid, nt juristide mõttetud sõjakäigud Brüsselisse suhkrutrahvide asjus jne).

Teadusspektrist saab olla moraal ainult järgmine – viivitamatult kokku kutsuda Nobelistide tasemel sotsiaal-majanduse mehhanismide ning poliitikate teaduspõhise (mitte mingi populist koalitsioon-partokraatlik-vabakondlik) reformise komisjon (täpselt EL Komisjoni eeskujul Eestile vastava evolutsioon -institutsionaalse teaduspõhise komplektse reformiprogrammi kontseptsiooni disainimiseks – arvestades kõiki Eesti idiosünkraatiaid.

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December 29, 2013 - Posted by | Uncategorized

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