APPENDIX B (Draft 3.IX 14 to https://uloennuste.wordpress.com/2014/08/31/remark-31-viii-14/):
Macro-economic conjecturable hypotheses of the Estonian national losses and damages connected with Russian aggressions in 2014-5(??) and with the EU sanctions
„Sanctions are still an important tool, … Only sanctions that bring the costs of Putin’s war home can have an impact now.”
Garry Kasparov (1)
H.1.: The Russian military territorial aggression in East-Ukraine will be liquidated mainly by the Ukraine military activities – and by the complementary US and EU collective Sanctions + material aid (Anne Appelbaum 2). There will not follow Russian military territorial aggression or occupation into Baltic States significantly due quoted S+ as the necessary factor.
P.S.: Economical estimates of the Estonian national losses via Russian Occupation 1940-91 have reached ca kr 1(+/-1/2) trillion (Kalev Kukk 3) – about 30 times current Estonian Net National Income (NNI): meaning that if the S+ may diminish probability of occupation risks a couple of percentage points – the expected national gain economically may reach € 40-60 B. (estimated by means of analogy with the 1940-91 occupation
H.2.: In the case of the prevention of the Russian military intervention against Baltic States the Estonian national sub-regional losses risks connected with Russia-Ukraine War 2014-5(??) may be estimated by following main big-risk components:
- a) Russian direct retaliatory counter sanctions against Estonia as to the EU member state – inflicting losses to the volume of the ΔNNI (e.g.: via bilateral trade – my present preliminary conjecturable estimate of this potential risk may be in the volume of € 0,4 B. p.a. (here 0,4 notes an approximate standard numeral 0,4+/-0,5) – including losses of complete cut-off Russian gas supply – presently the single gas supply for Baltic states); plus damages to Estonian Domestic Assets – ΔDA (e.g.: complete gas cuts may have potential risk to nullify completely the value of entire Estonian national gas-system infrastructure: the damage to the domestic capital may be several billions + investments to ground replacement infrastructure etc)
- b) The Estonian possible l osses inflicted by the EU’s collectively vs. Russia implemented trade and financial/banking and travel sanctions (these possibly almost certainly € 0,2- 0,4 B., and probably belong at least partially to compensations by Commission)
- c) Possible damages to the international credibility of the Estonian business and investment climate and sustainability – and – political security risks of intensification of ethnic conflicts (Ott and Ennuste 4) and stirring up irredentist fifth columns (“green men”) in the Estonian ample Russian speaking enclaves as in March 2009 in Tallinn etc. And last but not least: This sanction war is almost certainly stirring up propaganda war between the Baltic States and the Kremlin – and additional poisoning of national knowledge spaces especially in the Baltic Russian speaking diasporas – alas Baltic nationals knowledge structures mechanisms are not yet on the level of the Kremlin think tanks dialectical fuzziness – and additional development/sustainability losses at least for Estonia are almost certainly on the horizon (5).
P.S.: Probably it seems too early to summarize quantitatively and finally economically provisional estimates of Estonian expected possible national losses and damages risks – connected with the EU collective Sanctions against RF: but without any doubt these are magnitudes smaller as maybe rationally expected without these notorious Sanctions.
3) “The White Book. Losses Inflicted on the Estonian Nation by Occupation Regimes 1940-1991“. State Committee on the Investigation into Repression Policy of Occupation, Estonian Encyclopaedia Publishers, Tallinn 2005 pp 141-174:
4) Ott, A.F. and Ennuste, U. 1996. Anxiety as a Consequence of Liberalization: an Analysis of Opinion Surveys in Estonia. – Social Science Journal, 33, 2, 149-164:
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