Ülo Ennuste Economics

papers and articles in wordpress

Two important Articles in Press

Two important Articles in Press – important especially for the further extension of a Note on sanction modelling previously also in Press

The Articles are:

Journal of Economic Theory ••• (••••) •••–•••

„Information quality and crises in regime-change games“ by Felipe S. Iachan, Plamen T. Nenov,

aFGV/EPGE–EscolaBrasileiradeEconomiaeFinanças,PraiadeBotafogo,190/1115,RiodeJaneiro,RJ,Brazil

bNorwegianBusinessSchool(BI),Nydalsveien37,0484Oslo,Norway. Received6February2013;finalversionreceived18March2014;accepted23March2014

And

Journal of Economic Theory ••• (••••) •••–•••

„Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs“ by Jing Chen,, Silvio Micali

aDepartmentofComputerScience,StonyBrookUniversity,UnitedStates

bComputerScienceandArtificialIntelligenceLaboratory,MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology,UnitedStates. Received3August2011;finalversionreceived1March2012;accepted27June2013

And  the important Note in Press is:

Baltic Journal of European Studies. October?/November? 2014

Towards Special Methodical Problems of Macro-Optimal Sociocybernetic International Economic Sanctioning Coordination Modelling: Introductory Remarks on Preliminary Postulates and Conjectures” by Ülo Ennuste

Institute for European Studies, Tallinn; accepted August 2014 – extended draft of the Note: https://uloennuste.wordpress.com/2014/08/31/remark-31-viii-14/

Motto:

the reason sanctions are popular is not that they are known to be effective, but “that there is nothing else between words and military action if you want to bring pressure upon a government”

Jeremy Greenstock

P.S.: We believe that for further extension of the Note the new results in the fields of information quality and mechanism design – produced in these two Articles – are of great value indeed e.g.:

does a deterioration in the quality of the information available to market participants contribute towards instability?“

in the short run, and

mechanism design in non-Bayesian settings of incomplete information, when the Designer has no information about the players, and the players have arbitrary, heterogeneous, first-order, and possibilistic beliefs about their opponents’ payoff  types.“

in the long run – are of first-order importance.

September 22, 2014 - Posted by | Uncategorized

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