Splendid complex analysis of Jean Tirole’s main publications on New Industrial Organization Theory

Splendid complex analysis of Jean Tirole’s main publications on New Industrial Organization Theory  (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2014/advanced-economicsciences2014.pdf ):

Scientific Background on the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2014

JEAN TIROLE: MARKET POWER AND REGULATION

 

compiled by the Economic Sciences Prize Committee of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences:

„ … 7 Conclusion

Jean Tirole’s research is characterized by respect for the particulars of different markets

and the skillful use of new analytical methods in the economic sciences. He has developed

deep analytical results about the essential nature of imperfect competition and contracting

under asymmetric information. Tirole has also distilled his own and others’ results

into a unified framework for teaching, policy advice, and continued research. His contributions

provide a splendid example of how economic theory can be of great practical (sic! üe)

significance.“ (p 42)

 

Selected References 1982-2014 compiled by Prize Committee

[38] Dewatripont, M. and J. Tirole (1994a). The Prudential Regulation of Banks. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

[39] Dewatripont, M. and J. Tirole (1994b). A theory of debt and equity: Diversity

of securities and manager-shareholder congruence. Quarterly Journal of Economics

109, 1027-1054.

[40] Dewatripont, M. and J. Tirole (1999). Advocates. Journal of Political Economy

107, 1-39.

[50] Freixas, X., R. Guesnerie and J. Tirole (1985). Planning under incomplete information and the ratchet effect, Review of Economic Studies 52, 173-191.
[51] Fudenberg, D., R. Gilbert, J.E. Stiglitz and J. Tirole (1983). Preemption, leapfrogging and competition in patent races. European Economic Review 22, 3-31.
[52] Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1983). Sequential bargaining with incomplete information. Review of Economic Studies 50, 221-247.
[53] Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1985). Preemption and rent equalization in the adoption of new technology. Review of Economic Studies 52, 383-401.
[54] Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1990). Moral hazard and renegotiation in agency
contracts. Econometrica 58, 1279-1319.
[55] Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1991a). Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Sequential
Equilibrium. Journal of Economic Theory 53, 236-260.
[56] Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1991b). Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[57] Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1995). A theory of income and dividend smoothing
based on incumbency rents. Journal of Political Economy 103, 75-93.

[80] Laffont, J-J. and J. Tirole (1986). Using cost observation to regulate firms. Journal of Political Economy 94, 614-641.

[81] Laffont, J-J. and J. Tirole (1987). Auctioning incentive contracts. Journal of Political Economy 95, 921-937.

[82] Laffont, J-J. and J. Tirole (1988a). The dynamics of incentive contracts. Econometrica

56, 1153-1175.

[83] Laffont, J-J. and J. Tirole (1988b). Repeated auctions of incentive contracts, investment,

and bidding parity with an application to takeovers. RAND Journal of

Economics 19, 516-537.

[84] Laffont, J-J. and J. Tirole (1990a): The regulation of multiproduct firms. Journal

of Public Economics 43, 1-66.

[85] Laffont, J-J. and J. Tirole (1990b). Adverse selection and renegotiation in procurement.

Review of Economic Studies 75, 597-626.

[86] Laffont, J-J. and J. Tirole (1990c). Optimal bypass and cream skimming. American

Economic Review 80, 1042-1061.

[87] Laffont, J-J. and J. Tirole (1991). The politics of government decision making: A

theory of regulatory capture. Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 1089-1127.

[88] Laffont, J-J. and J. Tirole (1993). A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and

Regulation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

[89] Laffont, J-J. and J. Tirole (1994). Access pricing and competition. European Economic

Review 38, 1673-1710.

[90] Laffont, J-J. and J. Tirole (1996). Creating competition through interconnection:

Theory and practice. Journal of Regulatory Economics 10, 227-256.

[91] Laffont, J-J. and J. Tirole (2000). Competition in Telecommunications. Cambridge,

MA: MIT Press.

[92] Laffont, J-J., P. Rey, and J. Tirole (1998a). Network competition: I. Overview and

nondiscriminatory pricing. RAND Journal of Economics 29, 1-37.

[93] Laffont, J-J., P. Rey, and J. Tirole (1998b). Network competition: II. Price discrimination. RAND Journal of Economics 29, 38-56.

[95] Lerner, J. and J. Tirole (2002). Some simple economics of open source. Journal of Industrial Economics 50, 197-234.

[96] Lerner, J. and J. Tirole (2004). Efficient patent pools. American Economic Review 94, 691-711.

[97] Lerner, J. and J. Tirole (2014). Standard-essential patents. IDEI Working Paper,

4. 803, November 5, 2013, revised March 13, 2014.

[147] Tirole, J. (1982). On the possibility of speculation under rational expectations.

Econometrica 50, 1163-1182.

[101] Maskin, E. and J. Tirole (1987). A theory of dynamic oligopoly, III: Cournot competition. European Economic Review 31, 947-968.

[102] Maskin, E. and J. Tirole (1988a). A theory of dynamic oligopoly, I: Overview and

quantity competition with large fixed costs. Econometrica 56, 549-569.

[103] Maskin, E. and J. Tirole (1988b). A theory of dynamic oligopoly, II: Price competition, kinked demand curves, and Edgeworth cycles. Econometrica 56, 571-599.

[104] Maskin, E. and J. Tirole (1990). The principal-agent relationship with an informed

principal: The case of private values. Econometrica 58, 379-409.

[105] Maskin, E. and J. Tirole (1992). The principal-agent relationship with an informed

principal, II: Common values. Econometrica 60, 1-42.

[106] Maskin, E., and J. Tirole (2001). Markov perfect equilibrium: I. Observable actions. Journal of Economic Theory 100, 191-219.

[107] Maskin, E. and J. Tirole (2004). The politician and the judge: Accountability in

government. American Economic Review 94, 1034-1054.

[123] Rey, P. and J. Tirole (1986). The logic of vertical restraints. American Economic

Review 76, 921-939.

[124] Rey, P. and J. Tirole (2007). A primer on foreclosure. Chapter 33 in Handbook

of Industrial Organization Vol. 3, M. Armstrong and R. Porter, eds., New York:

Elsevier.

[126] Rochet, J-C. and J. Tirole (1996a). Interbank lending and systemic risk. Journal

of Money, Credit and Banking 28, 733-762.

[127] Rochet, J-C. and J. Tirole (1996b). Controlling risk in payment systems. Journal

of Money, Credit and Banking 28, 832-862.

[128] Rochet, J-C. and J. Tirole (2003). Platform competition in two-sided markets.

Journal of the European Economic Association 1, 990-1029.

[129] Rochet, J-C. and J. Tirole (2006). Two-sided markets: A progress report. RAND

Journal of Economics 35, 645-667.

[148] Tirole, J. (1985). Asset bubbles and overlapping generations. Econometrica 53,

1499-1528.

[149] Tirole, J. (1986a). Hierarchies and bureaucracies. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 2, 181-214.

[150] Tirole, J. (1986b). Procurement and renegotiation. Journal of Political Economy

94, 235-259.

[151] Tirole, J. (1988). The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge: MIT Press.

[152] Tirole, J. (2006). The Theory of Corporate Finance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

[153] Tirole, J. (2012). Overcoming adverse selection: How public intervention can restore market functioning. American Economic Review 102, 29-59.

 

P.S.: see additionally   –

http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2014/10/economics

 

 

 

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