Ülo Ennuste Economics

papers and articles in wordpress

New results in the strategic social network studies

NB! – New adequate results in the strategic social networks studies:  

 

Matthew J. Lindquist  and  Yves Zenou. 2014. Key Players in Co-Offending Networks.

IZA DP No. 8012, February 2014 Discussion Paper No. 8012  http://ftp.iza.org/dp8012.pdf

ABSTRACT

We study peer effects in crime by analyzing co-offending networks. We first provide a

credible estimate of peer effects in these networks equal to 0.17. This estimate implies a

social multiplier of 1.2 for those individuals linked to only one co-offender and a social

multiplier of 2 for those linked to three co-offenders. We then provide one of the first empirical

tests of the key player policy in a real world setting. This policy defines a micro-founded

strategy for removing the criminal from each network that reduces total crime by the largest

amount. Using longitudinal data, we are able to compare the theoretical predictions of the key

player policy with real world outcomes. By focusing on networks for which the key player has

disappeared over time, we show that the theoretical predicted crime reduction is close to

what is observed in the real world. We also show that the key player policy outperforms other

reasonable police policies such as targeting the most active criminals or targeting criminals

who have the highest betweenness or eigenvector centrality in the network. This indicates

that behavioral-based policies can be more efficient in reducing crime than those based on

algorithms that have no micro-foundation.

NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY

We provide one of the first empirical tests of the key player policy in a real world setting. This

policy defines a micro-founded strategy for removing the criminal from each network that

reduces total crime by the largest amount. Using Swedish data, we show that, on average, a

key-player policy reduces crime by 37 percent and outperforms other reasonable police

policies such as targeting the most active criminals or targeting criminals who have the

highest betweenness or eigenvector centrality in the network.

AND

Joan de Martí and Yves Zenou. 2013. Network Games with Incomplete Information:

http://people.su.se/~yvze0888/de%20Marti%20and%20Zenou_02_May_2013.pdf  opt

Abstract

We consider a network game with strategic complementarities where the individual reward

or the strength of interactions is only partially known by the agents. We demonstrate that, in

both cases, there exists a unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. We characterize each equilibrium

by disentangling the information effects from the network effects and show that the equilibrium

efforts of each agent is a convex combinations of different Katz-Bonacich centralities where the

decay factors are the eigenvalues of the information matrix while the weights are its eigenvectors.

We then study the impact of incomplete information on a network policy which aim is to target

the most relevant agents in the network (key players). Compared to the complete information

case, we show that the optimal targeting may be very different.

Keywords: social networks, strategic complementarities, Bayesian games, key player policy.

JEL Classification: C72, D82, D85.

P.S.:

Nendes analüüsides adekvaatselt eeldatakse sotsiaalsetes võrkudes strateegiliste mängijate nii vaegteadmust väga mitmest aspektist (nt võrgu mõju hindamisel nt tekstide säutsformaadid moonutavad sõnumeid) kui ka võimalike kiskjalike mängurite olemasolu. Ilmselt on autorite tulemused rakendatavad ka administratiivsete hierarhiliste võrkude (e-valitsuste võrkude võimalik ummistumine välis-rünnakute või ka sisulist hägustumist valimiseelsete demagoogiakaskaadide käigus eriti uute reformieelnõude massilisel produtseerimisel – samuti nt e-residentide võhamisel kelledest paljud kriminaalsete kavatsustega jne) näidetel.

P.S.P.S.:

Pressiprof Hõbemägi raadios: “Ossinovski maksab seadustatud makse nagu minagi” – taevane arm – Ossinovski jaoks tulumaks ei ole seadustatud: Statisika Tabeli EM060 järgi venemaa kontrolli all olevad siinsed korporatsioonid maksavad kiskjalikult tulumaksu alla 1% ja seda legaliseeritult (kiskjalikult selle pärast et nt saksamaa kontrolli all olevad maksavad vastavalt üle 15%) – täpselt samuti nagu üdini korrumpeerunud Luksemburgis kisjalik Amazon peakontor

Häda on pressi ja sotsiaalvõrkudega et nad ei oska inforiske arvestada – ja – nt et võrkudes mõned mõned mängijad võivad kisjalikud olla. Nt päev hiljem pressiguru Tanlker rääkis raadios et ei ole õige et me ilmselt Ossinovski’te kaudsel soovitusel ei hakka putinoididele piirikrunte müüma sest tema teada me oleme selleks pulliks küllalt tugevad küll ja küll.

 

December 14, 2014 - Posted by | Uncategorized

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