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Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 109 (2015) 145–162. “Corruption, fertility, and human capital” by Dimitrios Varvarigosa, Panagiotis Arsenisba (University of Leicester, United Kingdom and University of Surrey, United Kingdom)

Keywords: Corruption, Fertility, Human capital Economic growth

a b s t r a c t

We build an overlapping generations model (not empirical theoretical deterministic mechanism, üe) in which reproductive households face a child quantity–quality trade-off and bureaucrats are delegated with the task of delivering public services that support the accumulation of human capital. By integrating the theoretical analyses of endogenous growth, corruption and fertility choices, we show that the negative relation between fertility and economic development may also be affected by differences in the magnitude of bureaucratic corruption.

© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  1. Introduction

The relation between corruption and economic activity has always been at the forefront of the research agenda on the economics of development. Despite the fact that some earlier studies asserted that corruption may benefit economic growth through the role of bribery as ‘speed money’ that reduces the costs associated with red tape (Leff, 1964), the most recent evidence establishes a negative association between the incidence of corruption and economic growth. Indeed, a plethora of analyses, such as those by Mauro (1995), Keefer and Knack (1997), Gyimah-Brempong (2002), Aidt (2009), and Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010), have revealed different mechanisms through which the various manifestations of corruption are serious impediments to the long-term prospects of developing economies. 1It is for this reason that the World Bank has identified corruption as “the single greatest obstacle to economic and social development.” 2 – We are grateful to two anonymous referees whose comments and suggestions improved both the substance of our analysis and the clarity of its exposition. …

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References

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Lisamärkus

Tõepoolest olulised teoreetilised probleemid – kui vaadata sedagi mahukat värskete publikatsioonide osundust – kuigi väga hõredat empiirilist käsitlust mis ilmselt saakski olla usaldusväärne ainult stohhastilises kontekstis. Üheks paralleelseks empiiriliseks näiteks kus regressandiks korruptsiooni määr ning regressoriks e-valitsemise maht:

The International Journal of Digital Accounting Research Vol. 12, 2012, pp. 145 – 176 ISSN: 1577-8517

„An Empirical Analysis of the Relationship between e-government and Corruption“

Jamshed J. Mistry. Suffolk University. USA.

Abu Jalal. Suffolk University. USA. jmistry@suffolk.edu

 

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between e-governmentand corruption in developed and developing countries. Specifically, we investigate two issues –(1) the impact of the use of e-government  on corruption in countries around the world and (2) whether the impact of e-governmenton corruption will be higher in developed or developing countries. In order to examine these relationships we develop and test empirical modelsthat investigate these relationships. The results suggest that as the use of ICT relatede-government increases corruption decreases.  … :  http://www.uhu.es/ijdar/10.4192/1577-8517-v12_6.pdf

February 9, 2015 - Posted by | Uncategorized

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