Brexit (draft 10.VII do not quote)
Kvaliteetlehe The Economist 9.VII 16 eeskätt Kirjad Toimetale* sisaldab mitmeid asjatundlikke märkuseid Brexet’i referendumi kohta ning FT.com Kirjad** asjatundlikult väidab et referendumiga ei ole veel midagi paika pandud) – õigemini selle mõttetuse ning tulemuse nii sisulise kui formaalsete kehtetuse ja kahjulikkuse kohta Euroopas – millest tuleneb ka Maarjamaale kibekiiresti rida ülesandeid:
- Riigikogu peab juba esmaspäeval UK Parlamendile saatma avalduse UK Parlamendile (kes referendumi korraldamise heaks kiitis) referendumi tulemuste tühistamise asjus (sest vastasel korral võivad Brüsseli toetused meile oluliselt kahaneda lisaks meie rahvusvahelistele kaubanduslikele kaotustele – mis meile multi-dimensionaalses (sh küberdimensioonides) sõjas Venemaa piiririigina võib väga destabiliseerivalt mõjuda
- Valitsus peab juba esmaspäeval saatma UK Peaministrile päringu Eestist pärit immigrantide edasise staatuse ametliku kujunemise kohta – arvestades et praegu juba seltskonnameedias levivad kuuldused ebameeldivustest ei eskaleeruks jne
- Riigikogul moodustada sõltumatu rahvusvaheline tippteaduskeskus regionaalse institutsionaalse ning sotsio-küberneetiliste mehhanismide disaini alal – vt ka P.S.:
P.S.: a) võib hinnata et UK lahkumise korral aastased toetused meile Brüsselist vähenevad umbes 0,1 miljardi euro võrra (selline mõõtkava on valitud näitamaks hinnangu suurt ligikaudsust sest standardkirjutises 0,1 tähendab 0,1(+/-0,05) + vähemalt samas ulatuses kaotust rahvusvahelisest kaubandusest + määramatuse suurenemisega ELi raames üldse b) vaatamata Brüsseli praegustele toetustele on Eesti rahvuslik majandus praegu juba negatiivsel konvergentsi trendil EL28 kontekstis (vt nt Komisjoni Kevadprognoosi 2016) – ja – arvestades et meie oleme Venemaa piiririik suure venekeelse immigrantide vähemusega – siis Hübriid-Sõja tingimustes igasugune heaolu vähenemine ja määramatuse suurenemine võib aktiviseerida meie venekeelse diasporaa kremlimeelse tiiva diversioonilist tegevust ning olla seega vägagi destabiliseeriv.
- Piketty’ Blog 30 juin 16:
Reconstructing Europe after Brexit
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Let’s be honest: until dawn on 24 June 2016 nobody really believed that the British were going to vote for Brexit. Now that the disaster has struck, it is tempting to feel discouraged and to abandon any dream of a democratic and progressive re-foundation of Europe. However, we must persevere and live in hope, for we have no other choice: the rise of national self-seeking and xenophobia in Europe leads straight to disaster. Let’s look at the sequence of events and see what should be changed and clarified to reconstruct Europe after Brexit.
Time and again it has been said that in many cases the Brexit vote is more of a vote against immigration and globalisation than an anti-European Union vote as such. Even if British insularity does also have its specificities, there is something profoundly nihilist and irrational in this attitude of reverting to xenophobia, a reaction which is well known in France with the Front National vote, and now in the United States with the Trump vote. Stigmatising immigrants and foreign countries and cultures even further is not a solution to the problems – quite the contrary. And it is obviously not by locating itself outside the only existing European framework for collective deliberation that the United Kingdom is going to find its path.
All this is true, but two points have to be clarified. In the first instance, this vote is also a reaction to the European institutions which are wholly focussed on the principle of ever purer and more perfect competition between countries and territories with no common fiscal and social basis and, objectively, these institutions have only reinforced the highly unequal trends to globalisation at work over the last decades. Confronted with the lack of any democratic and progressive answer, it is not surprising that the working and middle classes ultimately resort to xenophobic forces. This is a pathological response to a very real sense of abandonment. Originating in a project for a common market in keeping with the reconstruction and growth of the 1950s-1970s, European construction has never known how to convert itself into an effective force for regulation of the globalised and financial capitalism which has been growing rapidly since the 1980s-1990s.
Then, truth obliges me to state that UKIP (UK Independence Party) or the FN (Front National) are unfortunately not the only political forces to have succumbed to the rise of national egoisms and collective irrationality in recent years. In particular, it is short-sighted egoism and the rise of every man for himself which explain the disastrous management of the financial crisis by the Euro zone countries since 2008.
Seen from this angle, the centre-right and centre-left governments (CDU, UMP, PS) who have succeeded each other in power on both sides of the Rhine, bear a heavy historic responsibility which will have to be recognised one day. Scarcely a comma has changed in the position maintained in Germany for nearly ten years now, namely, if other countries in the Euro zone did the same thing as we Germans, implemented the same reforms, behaved with the same reliability and the same virtue, etc. then all would be for the best, in the best of all possible worlds.
The problem with this approach, which is moralising, sanctimonious and nationalist is that it is totally irrational. It is not that there may be some good lessons to be learned from the German industrial and social model, obviously. The problem is that if every country in the Euro zone had adopted the same policy of widespread deflation in wages and found itself today with the same huge commercial surplus of 8% of GDP, unheard of in history since the Industrial Revolution, then, by definition, there would be nobody in the world to absorb such a surplus.
Those in power in Germany always refuse to explain to their public opinion a factual reality which is obvious to the rest of the world and to history, namely, that their high level of economic activity and employment has to a large extent been obtained to the detriment of their neighbours. With several currencies, a significant devaluation of the currencies in the South of Europe would have sufficed; but from the time when the choice was made to keep the single currency it would have been necessary – and it still is necessary – to re-launch salaries and public investment in Germany on a massive scale and set up a fiscal and budgetary union.
In the case of France, which likes to use Germany as a bad excuse to do nothing, the truth is that the reason why it chose to abandon Southern Europe is because it has benefited from the same extremely low interest rates as its German neighbour. This has resulted in policy makers in the Euro zone imposing hyper-austerity policies which plunged the Euro zone into an absurd recession in 2011-2013, counter to world trends and from which it has not yet entirely recovered.
Thus the Euro zone has become a liability for Europe; the advocates of Brexit had no hesitation in exploiting this in the campaign which has just ended. What is the point in remaining with countries which drag us down and who appear to be incapable of correctly managing their monetary union? The Euro was to have been the hallmark of the transformation of the common market into a political union capable of protecting us from market speculation, the first stage towards a public authority enabling the regulation of capitalism in the 21st century. In reality, the Euro has become something almost diabolical which threatens to derail the whole process.
What should we do now? First, it has to be made clear that the European Union cannot be reduced to a vast zone of free movement of goods, services and capital with no fiscal, social and regulatory counterpart. To be sustainable, economic growth requires public services, infrastructures, systems for education, research and health, university exchanges, regional equalization, equality of opportunity and all this has a cost.
The United Kingdom is now going to attempt to obtain a status similar to that of Norway, Iceland and Switzerland. It is high time to remind the British – and it would have changed the course of things if this had been done sooner in a fully transparent fashion by the German and French governments – that this will not be free of charge. Norway and Iceland are part of the European Economic Area (EEA) which guarantees them full access to the common market. But in return these two countries must apply almost all the legislation of the European Union and pay a contribution to its budget (close to the present British contribution, if expressed in terms of GDP), all this with no participation in collective decision-making. Furthermore, we should take advantage of the occasion to apply the same rules to Switzerland which at the moment benefits from a preferential status (its budgetary contribution is half the amount).
Above all, beyond the question of the permanent budgetary contribution of non-member EU countries wishing to take advantage of the common market, it is time to discuss the question of sanctions applicable to countries that engage in regulatory dumping, and in particular, the countries which do not apply strict rules in matters of financial transparency and combating tax optimisation. It is not normal that we should have to wait for American sanctions for the Swiss banking secrecy to begin (timidly) to be challenged. Gabriel Zucman’s calculations (La richesse des nations, Seuil 2014, translated into many languages: The Hidden Wealth of Nations) show that the profits accruing to Switzerland from the banking secrecy are equivalent to what the country would pay in a 30% customs duties if these were applied by its three main neighbours (Germany, France and Italy).
The same question will be posed for the London financial market and the tax havens of the British Crown. A thorough evaluation of the losses imposed on others and sanctions imposed in keeping with these amounts will have to be made. As long as we are not prepared to impose sanctions of this type, it is not surprising that countries choose to prosper outside the European Union. If it is possible to take advantage of the common market, while quietly siphoning off the fiscal bases of the neighbours, why deprive ourselves of the opportunity? The legal and political system in which Europe has become ensnared which is ultimately based on the canonisation of free movement and the free market, with no serious counterpart in terms of collective regulation, will lead us straight to a whole series of Brexits.
Further if we want to save the Euro zone, a fundamental transformation in direction will be required. After the victory of Syriza at the polls in Greece in January 2015 (itself a consequence of the obstinate refusal of the Europeans to restructure the debt despite having promised the previous government they would do so), the leaders of the Euro zone made the absurd choice of wishing to humiliate the country to discourage other electors from being tempted by the same course of action.
This choice did in part pay since Podemos could do no better than equal the PSOE in the two rounds of elections in Spain in December 2015 and June 2016. The only drawback is that Spain is ungovernable today and the French and German leaders now find themselves faced just about everywhere with the rise of right-wing populism and nationalism, in the United Kingdom, Poland and Hungary. This threat is significantly more dangerous for Europe than the challenge posed by the radical left which essentially is merely formulating a sensible request: the restructuring of the European public debt is inevitable and must be organized as quickly as possible. It would have been preferable to try to rely on Syriza, Podemos, the PSOE and the left wing parties as whole, whether they be radical or not, which have the merit of being fundamentally pro-European in comparison to the populists on the right.
It is disheartening to note that even today the European leaders are still continuing to demand that Greece produce a primary budget surplus of 3.5% of GDP in the coming decades. Given the fact that this is a country where the level of economic activity is a quarter lower than in 2008 and where unemployment is soaring, this is strictly meaningless. It is normal to request a small surplus, in the range of 0.5% or 1% of GDP but not more. The decision to restructure has once again been postponed till the end of the year and it is likely that this will not be the last time.
More generally, it is urgent to establish a moratorium on European debts, until the zone has regained strong growth and to launch a programme of investment in infrastructures, training and research. Today the private sector is afraid to invest, as the negative rates of interest in force at the moment demonstrate, and without public stimulus there is a real risk that the Euro zone may drag on in a period of sluggish growth and almost-zero or even negative, inflation. History has shown that it is impossible to reduce a high public debt in such circumstances and it is much better to have the courage to clearly restructure debts when they become impossible for the new generations to reimburse (Germany considerably benefited from this when its debt was cancelled in the 1950s). The creation of money and the development of new asset price bubbles will not solve the problem in the place of action by governments, quite the contrary.
Finally, if we really want to make progress on all these questions, then the institutional debate cannot be avoided. It is always possible to cobble together compromises in a hurry on the basis of the present institutions. But in the long run if we want to be able to adopt a recovery plan within the Euro zone calmly and democratically, to restructure the debts and adopt a common tax on company profits, etc., then the institutions have to be re-established on a democratic basis. There is a theory that the European institutions reached a state of ultimate perfection with the European constitutional treaty in 2005 (finally adopted in 2008 in the Treaty of Lisbon) and that all would be well if national political leaders and public opinion finally had a proper understanding of these marvellous institutions and ceased to be foolish Europhobes.
The truth is that the present European institutions are seriously dysfunctional. They are based on a façade of bicameralism: on one hand the European Council with the heads of State (and their instruments at ministerial level: the Council of Finance Ministers, the Council of Ministers for Agriculture, etc.); and on the other, the European Parliament (elected directly by the citizens). In principle, the European legislative texts must be approved by these two legislative chambers. In practice, the main centre of power is held by the European Council and the Ministerial Councils, which in most instances must take unanimous decisions (in particular on tax arrangements, which prevents any real progress), and which, in the rare cases where the rule of the majority applies, still continue to debate behind closed doors.
The truth is that the European Council is a machine for setting national interests against one another, a machine for preventing any possibility of generating democratic discussions and majority decisions at European level. As soon as one person (a Head of State or a Minister for Finance) is expected to represent, alone, 82 million Germans or 65 million French or 11 million Greeks, it is impossible to have a calm democratic discussion culminating in one or other of these persons being overruled.
It is this institutional system, along with the numerous rules aimed at by-passing democracy (unanimity on taxation, automatic rules on budgetary criteria) which produce the inertia and incapacity to act in Europe. Everyone is fighting for what they believe to be their own national interests and in truth nobody knows what is going on since everything takes place behind closed doors. These Councils regularly inform us in the middle of the night that they have saved Europe before we realise the following day that they themselves do not know what they have decided. This institutional structure is hardly calculated to endear Europe to peoples’ hearts.
Faced with this impasse, there are several possible developments. Some Europhiles suggest substantially reducing the role of the European Council and entrusting its main powers to the European Parliament (see for example Laurent Joffrin in Libération a few days ago). This solution has the merit of simplicity. But it has the disadvantage of saying nothing at all about national political institutions, which is likely to generate their hostility and a chain reaction of Brexits.
In my opinion, the most promising way forward is to imagine an original form of a European bicameral system based on one hand on the European Parliament (elected directly by the citizens) and on the other on a Parliamentary Chamber comprising representatives from the national parliaments in proportion to the population of each country and the political groups present in each Parliament.
This Parliamentary Chamber would include, for example, some forty members from the Bundestag, thirty from the Assemblée Nationale, etc., and would meet for one week every month, to deal in particular with budgetary and financial decisions which directly concern national taxpayers: these include, the choice of level of budgetary deficit within the Euro zone, the supervision of the European Stability Mechanism, the budget of the Euro zone, restructuring of debts, etc.
This would involve envisaging various rules for a qualified majority which in all cases would be more satisfactory than the present situation in which each national parliament has a de facto right of veto, which poses horrendous problems of democratic legitimacy (the Bundestag versus the Greek parliament, etc.) and in most instances leads to a deadlock. By giving national elected members the possibility of sitting beside one another and taking majority decisions after public and democratic debate, it is at least permissible to hope that progress will be made in the right direction.
This original form of bicameralism differs from the classical structures of bicameralism (the Assemblée Nationale and Sénat in France, the Bundestag and Bundesrat in Germany, the Senate and the House of Representatives in the United States) and in my opinion corresponds to the unique character of European construction which is based on old Nation States which have succeeded over the years in constructing extremely complex forms of social states, based on parliamentary democracy in a national framework.
It does not seem to me to be either realistic or desirable to build European parliamentary sovereignty by bypassing national Parliaments which, despite all their drawbacks, remain fundamental democratic structures; for decades these have enabled social levies and budgets representing dozens of percentage points of GDP to be voted with a rise in social welfare and an improvement in standard of living unprecedented in the history of the world. It would seem wiser to gradually transform national legislators into European co-legislators, forcing them to give consideration to the interest of Europe as a whole and preventing them from just complaining about Europe.
The debate is open and it deserves detailed discussion. We must also avoid the misunderstandings which could bring it to an abrupt end. Too often, when the question of the role of national parliaments is raised, one hears irritated reactions from Europhiles and in particular those close to the European Parliament, who see these suggestions as an intolerable step backwards.
In fact, before the first election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage in 1979, the European Parliament was only a Parliamentary Assembly comprising representatives from national parliaments with a purely consultative role. But the proposal defended here is entirely different. The intent is to give this Parliamentary Chamber whose members come from national parliaments genuine legislative powers in the place of the European Council (which will never be a real legislative chamber). Ultimately this would enable the parliamentary approach defended by the European Parliament to be strengthened and would undoubtedly constitute the only way to bypass the present deadlocks. But old fears are long lived and there is a concern that they will not disappear overnight.
A few days ago, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, a long-standing defender of a Europe of nations, suggested in Le Monde that the power of the European Council (which however is anything but a place for democratic discussion) should be strengthened, while at the same time the members of the European Parliament should be drawn from national parliaments (which will not fail to annoy the MEPs). However, he did neither specified the form this should take or the powers they should have. Some members of the European Parliament like for example Yannick Jadot or Henri Weber have suggested a mixed solution with a Euro Zone Parliament comprising partly MEPs and partly national elected members. This does not appear to me to be the most legible solution, but the debate is legitimate.
Whatever the case may be, this discussion about the European institutions is fundamental and it should not be reserved to the legal and constitutional experts. It concerns all citizens, as do the discussions about taxation or debts. For too long, these questions have been left to others with the results that we know. It is time for the citizens of Europe to take back their future.
B) Making the Eurozone more resilient: What is needed now and what can wait?
Resiliency Authors 25 June 2016:
Resiliency Authors (25.VI 2016)“Making the Eurozone more resilient: What is needed now and what can wait?“:
Britain voted to leave the EU. This is terrible news for the UK, but it is also bad news for the Eurozone. Brexit opens the door to all sorts of shocks, and dangerous political snowball effects. Now is the time to shore up the Eurozone’s resiliency. The situation is not yet dire, but prompt action is needed. This VoxEU column – which is signed by a wide range of leading economists – identifies what needs to be done soon, and what should also be done but can probably wait if markets are patient.
Giancarlo Corsetti, Lars P Feld, Ralph S.J. Koijen, Lucrezia Reichlin, Ricardo Reis, Hélène Rey, Beatrice Weder di Mauro
Richard Baldwin, Francesco Giavazzi
Rebooting Consensus Authors
Richard Baldwin, Francesco Giavazzi
The UK’s choice to leave the EU was, we believe, a historic mistake. But the choice was made; we must now turn to damage control – especially when it comes to the euro.
The Eurozone is growing, albeit slowly. If all goes as forecast, economic health will eventually be restored, unemployment will decrease, and the periphery countries will regain competitiveness.
But things rarely go as forecast – as we were so forcefully reminded last week. Brexit was the latest – but certainly not the last – shock that will challenge the monetary union.
The question is: Is the Eurozone resilient enough to withstand the bad shocks that it is likely to face in the months and years to come?
For many observers, the answer is “no”. To survive the next bad shock, they argue, Europe’s monetary union needs major reform and deeper political integration. As such deeper integration is extremely difficult in today’s political climate, pessimism is the order of the day.
We do not share this pessimism. The Eurozone’s construction has surely followed a convoluted process, but the fundamental architecture is now in place. Yes, some measures are needed to strengthen this architecture. And yes, more ambitious steps would improve resilience further, but these will have to wait for a political breakthrough.
The purpose of this essay is to identify what needs to be done soon, and what would be good to do but can probably wait. To avoid the mind-numbing details that often cloud discussions of Eurozone reform, we paint our arguments with a broad brush. (We will follow up with further documents with much greater detail on specific reform proposals.)
On banks and the financial system
Think of a good financial architecture for the Eurozone as achieving two main objectives in coping with another bad shock: 1) reducing the risk of bank defaults; and 2) containing the broader economic effects when defaults do occur.
This architecture is largely built. Both supervision and regulation are now largely centralised. Supervision is improving and stress tests are becoming more credible with each iteration. The Single Resolution Mechanism is in place and private-sector bail-in rules have been defined. The Single Resolution Fund can provide some recapitalisation funds if and when needed. If they turn out not to be enough, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) can, within the context of a macroeconomic adjustment programme, add more. In the longer term, a euro-wide deposit insurance scheme could improve resiliency, but this will take time.
So what more needs to be done soon? Mostly to make sure that the rules in place can be enforced. Italy provides two cases in point. First, non-performing loans have steadily increased and are carried on the books at prices substantially above market prices. Second, the Italian government has proven very reluctant to apply the bail-in rules. The credibility of the rules is at stake. Either they have to be applied, or credibly modified.
What are the measures that would be good to take, but can probably wait?
Diversifying the portfolios of banks so that there are more resilient to domestic shocks would clearly be desirable. The focus has been on decreasing the proportion of domestic sovereign bonds in banks’ portfolios. This would be good, but domestic sovereign bonds represent a relatively small proportion of banks’ portfolios. Decreasing banks’ overexposure to domestic loans would also be an important step towards boosting resiliency. A different approach would be to transfer the responsibility for banks’ rescue from national governments to the ESM. But this is the kind of political step that seems unlikely to be feasible in the near term.
On public finances
Public debt is high, even if, for the time being, low interest rates imply a manageable debt service. Just as for the financial system, a resilient public finance architecture needs to: 1) reduce the risk of default; and 2) contain the adverse effects of default, if it were to occur nevertheless.
On both counts, much remains to be done.
Reducing the risk of default is best achieved through a combination of good rules and market discipline. Neither is really in place. The accumulation of rules has made them unwieldy, unenforceable, and open to too many exceptions. They can and should be simplified. In most countries, the level of expenditure – rather than the deficit – is the main problem. High expenditure makes it difficult to raise taxes and balance the budget, leading to dangerous debt dynamics. Thus, a focus on expenditure rules, linking expenditure reduction to debt levels, appears to be one of the most promising routes. Market discipline, on the other hand, will not work if the holders of the debt do not know what will happen if and when default takes place. This takes us to the second objective.
… The Eurozone has put in place the right institution to deal with default, namely the ESM. Like the IMF, the ESM can, under a programme, help a country adjust. In its current form however, the ESM falls short of what is needed. First, the ESM’s ‘firepower’ is too small compared to the sort of shock-absorbing operations it may be called on to undertake in the case of a large Eurozone nation getting into debt trouble. Second, given its current decision-making procedures, markets cannot be sure that action will be taken promptly. Higher funding or higher leverage, and changes in governance such as replacing the requirement of unanimity by a more flexible one, are needed to make the ESM able to respond quickly and fully to a country in trouble. Third, the current structure is silent on who should negotiate a public debt restructuring in the extreme case where one was needed. Putting an explicit process in place should be a priority; the ESM is the natural place for it. … “
What other measures which would be good to have, but can probably wait?
Initiatives to address the legacy of high public debt would bolster Eurozone resiliency and thus would be very useful. However, as low interest rates are likely for some time to come, debt service is manageable, and debt forecasts show that debt-to-GDP ratios will slowly decline (absent a bad shock). Since proposals for dealing with legacy national debts would require the sort of political willpower that seems in short supply for now, such plans cannot be realistically put on the ‘do now’ menu, even if they are may be necessary in the future.
Another set of measures would implement stronger risk sharing, and transfer schemes to further reduce the impact of domestic shocks on their own economy. Proposals run from euro bonds to fiscal transfer schemes for countries subject to bad shocks. These measures would make the Eurozone more resilient and thus may be desirable. But, equally clearly, they would require more fiscal and political integration than is realistic to assume at this point. We believe that the Eurozone can probably function without tighter fiscal integration at least for some time.
- Blogi VII 16 – üe
Brexit’i ja Venemaa vahel
Krugman nimetab oma NYT.com igapäevastes Blogides just Brexit’it rängaks õnnetuseks (nagu nendest ka ilma selleta ELil puudu oleks) – ja just selle praeguse käpardliku/teadustühise korralduse puhul – eeskätt määramatuse tohutu suurendamisega nii ELis tervikuna ning veelgi enam üksinda UKs endas – selle populistliku supi kokkukeetjas.
Muide veel üks NY teaduskeskus:
Resiliency Authors (25.VI 2016)“Making the Eurozone more resilient: What is needed now and what can wait?“:
„ … The Eurozone has put in place the right institution to deal with default, namely the ESM. … “ – seega teaduspõhiselt kiidab Euroopa Stabiilsusmehhanismi olemasolu asjakohasust antud turbulentses olukorras – mis kahjuks Brexit’i puhul enam UKni ei ulatu ja seega vajab seal eriti kiireid erakordseid institutsionaalseid stabiliseerivaid samme Valitsuselt.
FT.com 5.VII andmetel ongi UK rahandusministril plaan valmis kuidas leevendada eeskätt väliskapitali institutsioonide hirmu Inglismaad tabanud suure määramatuse tõusu eest: nimelt muuta Inglismaa peaaegu Eesti või Iirimaa taoliseks kasumi-maksu poolparadiisiks – kärpides korporatsioonide maksu praeguselt klassikaliselt tsiviliseeritud 20% tasemelt nt Iirimaa tasemele 12,5% või veelgi barbaarsemalt madalamale nagu Eestis (nt ESA andmetel siinsed Venemaa kontrolli all olevad firmad praktiliselt maksavad ainult paari protsendi jagu nagu ka siinsed hargmaised pangad, samas Salsamaa kontrolli all olevad ettevõtted 15% jne). Kaasneva UK eelarvelaekumise lünga aga kompenseerib see et UK ei pea ju enam maksma ELi osamaksu.
Selle vastu olevat aga juba mitmed Inglise ülikoolid asunud protestima sest nemad on siiani saanud 15% oma rahastusest ELi teadusfondidest – mis seoses Brexit’iga teatavasti täielikult kaob ja kuna Valitsus EL’i liikmemaksudest vabanevad summad suunab eeskätt välismaa ettevõtete ning finantsinstitutsioonide subsideerimisele madalamate kasumimaksude varjus.
Kuid siiski üks asi seoses Brexit’iga on kindel: ELi toetused Eestile automaatselt vähenevad sest oli ju Inglismaa üks suurimaid Brüsseli rahakoti täitjaid ja mitte kõik ei läinud sellest neile tagasi nagu naad eesotsas Nigel Farage’ga nõudsid.
Kas nüüd meie ülikoolide toetused Komisjoni poolt just niipalju langevad kui inglaste omad pole veel välja arvutatud – kõige naljakam on see et meie ülikoolid pole vist sellest üldse veel aru saanudki. Ja, mitte ainult ülikoolid vaid ilmselt isegi mitte Riigikogu: a) nt Esimees avaldas hiljuti arvamust et ELi tuleb institutsionaalselt nüüd kiiresti nii reformida et meie sotsiaaldemokraatidest valijad saaksid aru mis moodi ELi valitsemine hierarhiliselt toimub (taevane arm – FT järgi tavavalijale nt ESM mehhanismi toimimise selgitamine olevat sama keeruline kui oma kassile termodünaamika õpetamine) – või siis nt Euroopa asjade komisjonis ilmselt arusaamad Brexet’ist on samuti algkooli tasemel (nagu nt eile Ms Loone PMi esseest võis välja lugeda) – mis on eriti kurb seose meie osalemisega ELi multi-dimensionaalses (sh küberdimensioonides) sõjas Venemaa agressiooni vastu – milles meile iga eurotoetuste miljard on fataalse tähendusega (arvestades eriti et Venemaa poolesajandiline terroristlik okupatsioon on jätnud meile mitmeid pikaajalisi rahvuslikke kahjustusi (vt „Valge raamat“ 2005) mis hübriid-sõja piiriolukorras uuesti valusalt tunda annavad (eriti putinoidtrollide ägedal mahitusel rikkalikult IKT kasutades ja russifseeritud seltskonda manipuleerides).
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