Ülo Ennuste Economics

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Memento “4.I 18”

Matsushima, Hitoshi (esmasavaldus võrgus 4.I 2018*) „Efficient Combinatorial Allocations: Individual Rationality versus Stability“ – DE GRUYTER The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. 2017; 20170072 (trükis ilmub ilmselt 2018 esimeses kv):

*) https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejte.ahead-of-print/bejte-2017-0072/bejte-2017-0072.xml


We investigate combinatorial allocations with opt-out types and clarify the possibility of achieving efficiency under incomplete information. We introduce two distinct collective decision procedures. The first procedure assumes that the central planner designs a mechanism and players have the option to exit. The mechanism requires interim individual rationality. The second procedure assumes that players design a mechanism by

committing themselves to participate. The mechanism requires marginal stability against blocking behavior by the largest proper coalitions. We show that the central planner can earn non-negative revenue in the first procedure, if and only if he cannot do so in the second.

Keywords: efficient combinatorial allocations, bayesian incentive compatibility, opt-out types, interim individual rationality, marginal stability

JEL classification: D44, D61, D82

DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2017-0072

P.S.: afinne rakendusnäide

Ennuste,Ü. (2014) “Towards Special Methodological Problems of Macro-Optimal Sociocybernetic International Economic Sanctioning Coordination Modelling: Introductory Remarks oPreliminary Postulates and Conjectures” – Baltic Journal of European Studies Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2228-0588), Vol. 4, No. 2 (17), 150-158:



January 28, 2018 - Posted by | 150-158: http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bjes.2014.4.issue-2/bjes-2014-0021/bjes-2014-0021.xml?format=INT, Uncategorized

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